




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POLSKA AKADEMIA UMIEJĘTNOŚCI

PRACE KOMISJI ORIENTALISTYCZNEJ NR 31
MÉMOIRES DE LA COMMISSION ORIENTALISTE No 31

STANISŁAW SCHAYER

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

PRZYCZYNNKI DO ZAGADNIENIA
CZASU W FILOZOFII INDYJSKIEJ

KRAKÓW

NAKŁADEM POLSKIEJ AKADEMII UMIEJĘTNOŚCI
SKŁAD GŁÓWNY W KSIĘGARNIACH GEBETHNERA I WOLFFA
WARSZAWA - KRAKÓW - ŁÓDŹ - POZNAŃ - WILNO - ZAKOPANE

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POLECA AKADEMIA WIEDZ

WYDAWCA
WARSZAWA

STANISŁAW SCHWAB

CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

PROFESSOR DO KATEDRY
FILOZOFII

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Preface

To any historian studying philosophy as a phenomenon of human civilization the views of old Indian thinkers on Time are an exceptionally attractive as well as instructive subject. We learn, not without surprise, that this notion, which seems so abstract, already appears in the oldest pre-systematical records, not however as an empty *Anschaunungsform*, but as a concrete mythological hypostasis. We meet it later on in a number of developed scholastic systems, as an impersonal substance, as a subtle Time-stuff. This very »physicalism« of the Indian Time-notion is its most striking feature. I am devoting to it the first chapter of the present study, without trying however to sketch the history of its development as reflected in the oldest mythological speculations. I shall confine myself to giving the main points and arguments of the philosophy of Time-substance as represented by Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas, the two classical representatives of the *kālavāda*.

The second chapter is devoted to the problem of Time in early Buddhism and in the system of the Vibhāṣā. The first subject to be discussed here is the reconstruction of the pre-canonical Buddhist Time-theories. My observations concerning this problem are evidently only provisional and hypothetical, nevertheless, the fact that the old Buddhism diverged, on this point as well, from the constructions of the Abhidharma is beyond doubt.

The next and the most important problem is the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the three Time-epochs, the *traikālyavāda*. We are now relatively well informed on this doctrine by the Abhidharmakośa, and the work of interpretation carried on by Rosenberg, de La Vallée Poussin and Stcherbatsky helped us to under-

stand its most substantial points. Nevertheless some questions remained unexplained, as for instance the problem of the »activity« (*kāritra*) of an element and its relation to »essence« (*svabhāva*). I have tried to ascertain the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣikas in this matter on the basis of some evidences from Mahāvibhāṣā and Nyāyanusārāśāstra.

The doctrine of the *traikālyā* is an interesting and original attempt at replacing the hypostasis of a substantial Time by another hypostasis, *viz.* that of real future and past elements of being. Each *dharma* exists through the three phases of the future, present and past. The future has no beginning but it has an end, the present has both a beginning and an end; the past has a beginning but no end. In this sense it is said that a *dharma* exists always (= *sarvam asti* = *sadāsti* = *sarvadāsti*) and that it is only its »mode of existence« (*bhāva, avasthā*) which is changing.

This theory has been criticised by the Sautrāntikas, a school which has a long history not yet sufficiently explored. But the arguments against the *traikālyavāda* seem to have been stereotyped in all epochs, from the old Dārṣṭāntikas till the school of Sautrāntika-Yogācāras. I have refrained from giving an exposition of these arguments, but I have given instead a complete translation of the *traikālyaparīkṣā* in the Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntara-kṣita and Kamalaśīla. Both these authors are Sautrāntika-Yogācāras.

The main idea of the Sautrāntika doctrine is the negation of the reality of the future and past elements: the only one to be real is the dynamical moment of efficacious activity (*arthakriyā-kāritra*) and this is essentially »present«. The distinction of the three times is only a construction of the mind, a pure imagination. In the place of the Time-substance and also in the place of real future and past elements, Buddhism in its ripest form puts the theory of moments, the *kṣaṇavāda*, thus closing an important chapter in the history of the Time-problem on Indian soil.

Between the Indian and Western speculations on Time many parallelisms can be pointed out. The notion of Time existing independently as a substance was not unknown to Greek philosophers (Epicurus?, Iamblichus, Proclus), and it survives even in Newton's philosophy. His *tempus absolutum, verum et mathematicum* which flows evenly and exists *in se et natura sua absque*

relatione ad externum quodvis, differs however from the Indian Time-substance which is conceived principally as an immovable stuff containing movable, contingent phenomena. It may consequently be compared rather with the *dharma* of the Jainas, the fine, ubiquitous substance which makes motion possible, like water to a moving fish.

A thorough analysis of the Indian and Western coincidences in Time speculation is however not possible as long as the history of Time notion in Western thought is not sufficiently examined. In this regard—in spite of a recent study by Z. Zawirski, *L' évolution de la notion du temps*, Cracovie 1936—much remains to be done by historians of ancient as well as of modern philosophy.

Another problem which can also only be pointed out is the influence of Indian Time-theories on the philosophy of Islam. Unfortunately, it is a subject as important as it is obscure. The informations of Horten, *Die philosophischen Probleme der spekulativen Theologie im Islam*, Bonn 1910, p. 72, taken from the treatise »The roaring Sea« (al-Baḥr az-zaḥḥār) of 'Aḥmad ibn Jaḥjā ibn al-Murtaḍā show an unquestionable influence of the Buddhist *traikālyavāda*, but the details as to whence and by which routes these influences travelled remain to be examined.

In a word: more is left to be done than what has already been achieved in this line and so this study is really only a modest contribution to a vast and complicated question.

I can only cherish the hope that I shall be able to continue my researches in a further series of similar contributions.

I. The philosophy of Time-Substance

Indian philosophy arose out of mythology not in a round-about way through protest and scepticism, as Deussen imagined, but directly through a rationalization of mythological hypostases. It is often said that mythology is a symbolical philosophy. This formulation is not wrong, provided that the term »symbol« is taken in its proper meaning. »Myth« is a »symbol« in the sense that it describes a real, primeval miracle which happened once upon a time and created a holy precedent, a holy paradigm which is since repeated and reconstructed in rituals, acts of cult and ceremonies¹. When told in words it is a holy story, when considered as a precedent it is a norm for the explanation of life and the world, hence a »doctrine«. The transition from mythology to philosophy is imperceptible: wherever philosophy was created, it sprang from the same faith which formed myths.

The starting point of the evolution of Indian philosophy is the sacred story about the creation of the world by the Cosmical Anthropos, an asexual or rather bisexual supreme god who, through a series of hypostases, emanates the empirical plurality out of himself. The Iranian variant of this divine androgyne is Zurvān, the parent of the inimical twins, Ahuramazda and Angramanyu. In Vedic lore he appears as Puruṣa, as Prajāpati, as Brahman and Ātman; in Buddhism he can be easily discovered in the person of the Great Male, the Mahāpuruṣa Tathāgata; in Hinduism his attributes are inherited by Viṣṇu and Śiva².

¹ For this definition of the myth cf. B. Malinowski, *The Foundations of Faith and Morals*, Riddel Memorial Lectures, London 1936.

² We are indebted for the detailed reconstruction of the old-Indian myth about Anthropos to the remarkable work of Dr Maryla Falk, *Il mito psicologico nell' India antica*, Memorie

Unfortunately, we can build only suppositions about the genesis of this conception. According to a well known and undoubtedly ancient version, the differentiation of the Anthropos consists in its »disintegration«: the divine androgyne was dismembered in sacrifice and out of his parts arose the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, etc. It is easy to suppose some relation between this version and the myths about the dismemberment of Osiris, Attis, Tiamat, etc., but it is very difficult to prove that relation in detail. We can only quote as an hypothesis the supposition of Professor Przyluski, *La Grande Déesse*, Muséon XLIX p. 303, that the god-androgyne is as a rule a substitute for the Great Mother Goddess, and that the Indo-Iranian Anthropos is the result of an amalgamation between the old Asiatic Great Goddess and the Indo-European masculine Father-God of the type of Dyaus-Zeus. At any rate, the non-Indo-European and also non-Aryan origin both of Zurvān and of Puruṣa is beyond all reasonable doubts. The bisexual androgyne is somehow or other connected with the pre-Aryan substratum of Iranian and Indian civilizations. In the Brahmanical literary tradition it appears, in spite of all retouching, as an adaptation of a ready-made doctrine, developed outside Brahminism.

Among the substances emanated by the Anthropos out of himself in the creative process there appears, already in the oldest records, Time, or rather »Year« (*saṃvatsara*) as the texts say, at an epoch when the word *kāla*, originally a pastoral term denoting the driving of the cattle,¹ had not yet acquired its later, abstract meaning. According to RV X 190, 2 the »Year« originated as the first product out of Cosmic Waters. According to Brh. Ār. Up. I 2, 4 the Anthropos at first emanates the female hypostasis Speech (*Vāc*), and subsequently he himself, through his mind (*manasā*), unites with her in the sexual act as Death (*Mṛtyu*) and Hunger. The sperm then poured out, was the Year. For — as the text adds — before there was no Year.

dell' Accademia dei Lincei, Rome 1938. In this study the connection between the anthropological myth and *yoga* has been for the first time fully elucidated and the whole complicated evolution from the Xth Mandala of the Rg-Veda till the beginnings of Buddhism subtly disentangled.

¹ Cf. W. Wüst, ZII Bd. V p. 165 ff.

Time created as a child of Death is itself Death. Therefore that part of the Cosmos which is permeated by it is mortal and impermanent. All mythological personifications of Kāla as a god of destruction and of inexorable fate, the identification of Time with Yama, as well as his connection with the later belief in the power of *daiva* and *viddhi*, the Indian Heimarmene, have their source in this conception. Hellenistic astrology, when introduced into India, might have made use of, but did not give birth to it.

Beyond the created Time lies the infinite, unlimited and indivisible substance of immortality, the *amṛta*. It permeates the upper part of the Cosmos, but apart from that, being homogeneous and without limits, it reaches beyond the cupola of the world into the sphere of the acosmic Absolute. It is identical with the true essence of the Supreme Being, with that condition which existed before the act of *sr̥ṣṭi*. And this very substance of eternity is also identified with Time in some later texts. The paradox is only apparent: the divisible changeable and flowing Time can be only an accident of the eternal Time; change, impermanence and death can be but a disturbance in the womb of Eternity. The same god who as Hunger and Death impregnates Speech is, at the same time, beyond death by his true nature. He is Eternity, Unlimited Life without dying. In one word: he is the Absolute Time. In this sense, according to a stereotyped formula of the Brāhmaṇas, the god Prajāpati is the Year¹. The Buddhist hypostasis of Unlimited Life is Amitāyus, in

¹ If we take into account the fact that Prajapati just as Zurvān is androgyne and that, just as Zurvān, he is the father of *devas* and *asuras*, the Indo-Iranian parallelism should be considered as complete in this matter. Between Zurvānism and the Indian identifications of the Supreme Being with Time there is, undoubtedly, a very ancient connection. In opposition to Scheffelowitz, *Die Zeit als Schicksalsgottheit in der indischen und iranischen Religion*, Stuttgart 1929, who finds here later influences of Hellenistic astrology, I accept, along with Professor J. Przyluski, rather the unity of Indian and Iranian civilizations based, not only on the common pre-Aryan substratum, but also on historical interactions. About the date of Zurvānism cf. now A. Christensen, *L' Iran sous les Sassanides*, Copenhagen 1936, p. 143 ff., 430 ff. and of the same author *Études sur le Zoroastrisme de la Perse antique*, Copenhagen 1928.

Hinduism it is Kāla as identified with Śiva(= Mahākāla) or with Viṣṇu. This type of divinity is quite different from Kāla = Mr̥tyu in the same degree as Absolute Time is different from Created Time. As behoves a being who is the ultimate source of all anti-theses, itself remaining far beyond and high above them, this universal God-Time is absolutely »impartial«. It is He who speaks through the mouth of Kṛṣṇa in Bhagavad-Gītā IX 29: *samo 'haṁ sarvabhūteṣu, na me dveṣyo 'sti na priyaḥ*.

This identification of the Absolute with Time has played no great part as a philosophical motive; it has however shown great vitality, beginning from the well known hymns of Atharva-Veda up to the latest scholastic treatises which do not omit the *kālavāda* when enumerating the possible metaphysical views¹.

As I have already pointed out, the characteristic trait of these oldest conceptions of Time is their »physicalism« or better »somatism«: Time, empirical as well as absolute, is conceived of as a kind of body, a subtle stuff filling space. The principal difference between the created and the eternal Time lies only in the fact that the former is divisible and limited while the latter is one, homogeneous, indivisible and unlimited. The empirical Time fills the lower part of the Cosmos which is built up of coarse-matter and which lies under the Sun; the eternal Time occupies the spiritual spheres on the other side. The three following passages may be quoted as an illustration. 1) Jaiminiya-Br. I 11: »All that is on the other side of the Sun is immortal, but what is on this side is perpetually destroyed by Day and by Night (= by the empirical Time, by Mr̥tyu) just as a storm uprooting [trees etc.]. There are many worlds on the other side of the Sun«. — 2) Brh. Ār. Up. IV 4, 16: »Below which the Year with its day rotates, upon that immortal Light of Lights the gods meditate² as longevity«. — 3) Maitr. Up. VI 15: »There

¹ On *kālavāda* cf. F. O. Schrader, *Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas*, Leipzig 1902. — It may be noted that in later treatises (as e. g. in *Tattvasamgraha*) the term *kālavāda* means not only the doctrine which identifies the Absolute with Time, but also the opinions of all philosophers who hold Time to be a real substance.

² *upāsate*. On the meaning of the term *upās* cf. the article of Dr Maryla Falk in *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XIII 1938.

are two forms of Brahman: Time and Not-Time. What is before the Sun¹ is the indivisible Not-Time (*akālo 'kalo*), and what begins with the Sun is the divisible Time (*kālaḥ sakalaḥ*)². In other words: the limit between the eternal, spiritual and the impermanent, material worlds is the cupola of the heavens on which the Sun wanders³.

The conception of Time as a subtle substance clearly survives in the majority of later scholastical systems. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, *kāla* is one of the nine *padārthas* side by side with four coarse-material elements, the ether, space, the mind and the soul. Time appears also in the list of substances accepted by Mīmāṃsakas. The stand-point of the Jainas is semi-realistic: Time is not an *astikāya*, because it is without spatial localization (*pradeśa*); nevertheless it is a *dravya*, a real substance⁴. According to Rāmānuja it belongs together with the *mūlaprakṛti* to the categories of insentient substances⁵.

The foundation of all these realistic Time-theories is nearly the same in all the schools and can be reduced principally to two arguments.

1) Language possesses a number of expressions denoting Time-relations: simultaneity, subsequence, precedence etc. Moreover, with the help of suffixes, it can express times and time-aspects of action: *kriyate*, *kṛtam*, *karisyati*⁶. We make efficacious use of all these terms in our every day experience, there exists consequently an empirical applicability (= *vyavahāra*) of these terms which would not be possible were it based only on fiction, *i. e.* if to all expressions denoting Time-relations and to all concepts connected with them no separate reality, nor special element would correspond. In other words: real Time must be postulated as

¹ *prāg ādityād* = 'before the Sun' is meant here spatially not temporally *i. e.* before the creation of the Sun.

² The obscure stanza of AV X 8, 12 is probably concerned with this very limit: »Far extends what is unlimited; mutually separating the Unlimited and the Limited, which touch each other, the Guard of the Heavens (= the Sun), the Knower of the future and of the past, wanders«.

³ Cf. Glasenapp, *Der Jainismus*, p. 154.

⁴ Cf. the classification of substances in Veṅkanātha's *Tattva-muktākalāpa*, quoted in *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, p. 112.

⁵ Cf. TSP p. 206.

a necessary objective correlate of Time-terms and Time-notions. This is the meaning of the definition in Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra II 2, 6: »[concepts such as] 'earlier', 'later', 'simultaneous', 'not simultaneous', 'slow' and 'quick' are symptoms (*līṅga*) of Time'. The same argument is formulated concisely and clearly by Baladeva Vidyābhāṣana, the author of the Govindabhāṣya: *kālaś ca bhūta-bhaviṣyad-varttamāna-yugapac-cira-kṣiprādi-vyavahāra-hetuḥ*¹.

2) The second argument refers to the fact of the changeability and impermanence of all that belongs to empirical existence. There are specific causes (*asādhāraṇakāraṇa*) which decide that in the given *hic et nunc* there arises a determined effect *p* and not *q* or *r* or *s*. But, side by side with this specific determination there exists another, general determination owing to which all effects originate, endure and disappear. The passage through these three phases of existence is a universal feature characterising everything that is »contingent«. Specific causes are not sufficient for its explanation. On the other hand, it can be explained by Time as a general cause (*sādhāraṇakāraṇa*), hence the definition of Praśastapāda: Time is »the cause of the origination, duration and disappearance of all effects«².

The Time-substance is, by its very nature, inaccessible to sensuous perception. Its existence can be inferred only indirectly (*sāmarthyād*), just as we infer the existence of *manas*, *ātman*, or *ākāśa*. The school of Prabhākara which holds that Time, contrarily to *ākāśa* and *manas*, is *śad-indriya-grāhya* and must not be inferred from conceptions such as simultaneity etc.³ is the only one to differ from this *siddhānta* generally accepted by all *kālavadīns*.

Independently from this difference of opinion concerning the origin of our knowledge of the reality of Time, the Mīmāṃsakas, as well as Vaiśeṣikas and partly also the Vedāntins unanimously ascribe to the Time-substance the four following characteristic marks: 1) subtlety (*sūkṣmatva*); 2) omnipenetrability or

¹ Quoted in *Beḍānta Darśhaner Itihās* by Swami Prajñānanda Sarasvatī, vol. III p. 844 (Calcutta, Bangabā 1934).

² According to Vaiśeṣikas such »general causes« are, apart from Time, the will of Īśvara, space (*dig*) and *karman*.

³ Mānameyodaya ed. Kunhan Raja and Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras 1933, p. 189 gives a formal demonstration of this theory.

omnipresence (*vibhūta*); 3) eternity (*nityatva*) and 4) unity and indivisibility (*ekatva*, *anavayatva*). The same qualities are characteristic of *ākāśa* as well. Thus, in Indian philosophy, Time and Space stand in the middle of the scale between spiritual and coarsely material substances, having in common with the former subtlety, unity and eternity, and, with the latter, lack of consciousness (*acetanatva*) and insensibility (*jāḍatva*). Consequently, between Time and Space there is, from the Indian stand-point, also some analogy and some parallelism, though in a quite different sense than in Kantian philosophy: they are not two *Anschaungsformen* but two objective, substantial fluids in which are merged all contingent beings. They are moreover two »elements« differing from earth, water, air and light¹ only by a higher degree of subtlety. This is why they can permeate coarse bodies without offering resistance.

As subtle and eternal substance Time is, for the majority of schools, an indivisible, homogeneous, never-ending mass. We can express it in other terms by stating that Time exists in only one, unique example just as the moon, ether and similar »descriptions« which do not form a »class«. In a word: there is no *jāti* of Time to which could be subordinated several, individual »Times«. Nevertheless we speak of moments, hours etc. How are they to be understood? — The difficulty is solved by the theory of *upādhis*: just as the unique Space is divided in appearance by pots etc. into several compartments, so also is Time, one and the same, differentiated only in appearance into greater and smaller »Time-ports«, beginning with moments up to astronomical periods (*parārdha*), by a projection on the background of empirical plurality. Thus all measures of Time have only a metaphorical significance because, in reality, we do not measure Time itself but only coarse

¹ On account of its subtlety light, more than other material elements, is akin to Time, Space and Consciousness. Hence the repeated attempts of a mystical *adaequatio* (= *upāsana*) of the spiritual Absolute not only with Time, Space and Consciousness, but also with Light. We must not forget, however, that Indian optics are based on the stand-point of the »corpuscular theory«: light is composed of atomic »photons« (*kirāṇa*, *marīci*) and is not a unique continuous substance.

bodies existing in Time. — *kālasya'pi vibhutve 'py upādhiśāśād aupādhiko bhedavyavahāro 'sti*¹.

The Mīmāṃsakas refer also to the following analogy: just as the one, uncreated Word manifests itself in empirical sounds with a definite articulation, accent, length etc., so also Time, though one, eternal and omnipresent, manifests itself as divided in coordination with the motion of the Sun: *yathā hi varṇo nityaḥ sarvagato 'pi dīrghādirūpeṇa vibhakto bhāśate dhvanyupādhiśāśāt, tathā kālo 'pi svayam abhinno 'py ādityasya gatikriyopādhiśāśād bhinno bhāśate*². To sum up: the factor which differentiates the omnipresent, subtle Time is coarse matter, its movements and its accidents.

The problem of the divisibility of Time has, however, another, more complicated aspect in connection with the problem of impermanence. Whatever is merged in the fluid of Time is impermanent and changeable. Time as a mythological hypostasis of Life and Death gives birth to beings, makes them »ripen« (*pacayati*) and, just as the Greek Chronos, devours its own offspring. In the philosophical, rationalised version, this myth is reduced to the already mentioned conception of Time as the »general cause« determining the origination, duration and disappearance of all empirical beings. To the distinction of these three phases of existence corresponds the differentiation of Time into three »portions«, acting consecutively, the first by »originating«, the second by »stabilizing« and »making ripen«, the third by »annihilating«. These three »portions« are identical with the »three Times«, the Future, the Present and the Past: *kālas tūtpattisthiti-vināśa-lakṣaṇas trividhaḥ*³. And this division is also only

¹ Mānameyodaya, p. 191. — The real divisibility of Time-substance is taught by Madhva. Cf. Glasenapp, *Madhva's Philosophie des Vishnu-Glaubens*, Bonn 1923, p. 53: »Die Zeit besitzt in sich selbst Unterschiede und erhält diese nicht erst durch die Vorfälle, die sich zufällig in ihr abspielen«.

² Parthasārathi ad Śloka-vārttika, Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa, 301—2 = TS 2299. Cf. TSP p. 633: *yathāiko 'pi nityo gākārādivarṇo yadā kenacid dhvanivīṣeṣeṇa kvacitpradeśe vā vyajate, tadā deśādivibhāgena pravibhakto gamyate, tathā kālo 'pi yady api cāsau sarvopādārtthavyāpī, tathāpi yadā kvacit kriyāvīṣeṣeṇa kvacitpadārthe vyajyate*.

³ Saptapadārthī, § 14. Mitabhāṣinī (ed. Amarendra Mohan

an »imposition« of accidental *upādhis* on the unique, indivisible Time-substance. In other words: Time is itself motionless, but the empirical things which it permeates arise and disappear, and this change is reflected on the screen of Time as its apparent tripartition.

Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1934, p. 21) explains: *kālasya 'pādhikam vibhāgam āha: utpattīti. padārthānām utpatti-sthiti-vināśair lakṣyata ity utpatti-sthiti-vināśa-lakṣaṇaḥ. utpattiyā bhaviṣyan, sthityā varttamānaḥ, vināśena bhūtakālo lakṣyata iti trividhaḥ.*

II. Time in Early Buddhism and in the System of the Vibhāṣā

Passing on to systems which blankly rejected the conception of a real Time-substance, we shall mention at first the Sāṃkhya in its classical form. — »Time which is accepted by Vaiśeṣikas — says Vācaspatimiśra¹ — cannot originate alone the terminological distinction of the future etc. Hence there exist only the *upādhi*, the differentiation of which effects the differentiation of the future etc. Time is therefore considered by the Masters of Sāṃkhya as redundant and that is why we do not admit the reality of Time as a separate entity (*na kālarūpatattvāntarābhyupagama iti*).

In spite of this decided protest against the hypostatizing of a real Time, the Sāṃkhya, as a matter of fact, does not go beyond the problems and constructions of the »Substantialists«, Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas etc. The distinction of eternal and created Time is retained in the form that the former becomes an attribute (*gunaviśeṣa*) of the *prakṛti*, while the latter is reduced to *ākāśa* as the motion of the Sun and of the planets. The Sāṃkhyas also do not dismiss the conception of Time as the general cause. — »*nanv ātmā svabhāvato na baddhaḥ, kiṃ tu kālavāśād baddho bhaviṣyatīty āha: 'na kālayogato vyāpino nityasya sarvasambandhāt'. bhavato ayam, yadi tasya kadāpi kālayogaḥ syāt, na syāt vā. nityasya vyāpinaḥ sarvakālasambandhopādhitvāt*«². Therefore I can hardly agree with Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie*,

¹ Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, ad Sāṃkhyakārikā 33.

² Aniruddha ad Sāṃkhyasūtra I 12; Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, p. 25. It is not denied that Time (just as Space, karma etc.) possesses *param kāranaṃ* *sāmānyarūpeṇa*; what is denied is only that it is a special cause, an *asādhāranaḥ kārana*.

1917, p. 168, that the views on Time in the Sāṃkhya system are »ein höherer philosophischer Standpunkt« and that, in the philosophical analysis of the problem, the Sāṃkhya is »am weitesten vorgedrungen, da es Zeit und Raum für zwei Qualitäten der ewigen als Einheit betrachteten Materie erklärt«. A true estimate would rather be just the opposite, *i. e.* that the classical Sāṃkhya manifested strikingly little interest in the Time-problem and that, apart from the negation of Time as a separate substance, it confined itself to copying the views of the rejected *kālavāda*.

As a matter of course, India is indebted for real progress in the critical analysis of the Time-problem not to Sāṃkhya but to Buddhism. This progress was so essential that, if the history of the Indian Time philosophy is ever written, it will be in a large measure a history of Buddhist thought. Since sources are only partly opened, it is difficult to attempt an exhaustive exposition just now. But some facts can be ascertained.

I shall begin with the statement that there is no general Buddhist theory of Time accepted by all schools and sects. If therefore we characterize Buddhists as antagonists of the *kālavāda*, then even this characterization will be correct only in reference to some schools belonging, it is true, to the most representative ones. Moreover we should take into account the relative chronology and the very complicated stratification of Buddhist scholastics. The origin of Buddhism and its oldest pre-*hīnayānistic* phase lies, at any rate, in the pre-systematical epoch which is directly connected with the Anthropological Myth and its problems. Hence it would have been surprising if we could not find any traces whatsoever of Time speculations in the style of the old Indian »substantialism«. Indeed, in the list of the Hundred Dharmas of the *Yogācāras*¹, among the *viprayuktasaṃskāras*, there appears *kāla* side by side with empirical space (*dig*). The fact that we come across this conception in relatively recent records has evidently no importance. In *Mahāyāna*, much more than in the *Hīnayāna*, old and original elements have been preserved. Besides, I am sure that with a better and more exact acquaintance with the sources,

¹ Cf. Rosenberg, *Problemy*, p. 319; de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, III p. 188.

support for hypostases of Time will also be found in hīnayānistic literature.

Meanwhile we can only form suppositions as to how Time was conceived in the pre-hīnayānistic Buddhism. The starting point must be the fact that in the oldest Buddhism, just as in the Upanishads, impermanence was confined to the sphere of coarse materiality (*rūpa*), while all other, subtle, spiritual elements (*citta*, *viññāna*) lay beyond its reach. It is possible that in Buddhism as well this conception was connected with the distinction of two Times: one transcendental, indivisible and identical with eternity and immortality, the other contingent, divisible and determining the origination of impermanent beings. It may also be that eternal Time did not form a separate »sphere« (*āyatana*) as *ākāśa* or *viññāna* but was only a fluid permeating or containing in itself the subtle as well as the coarse material substances. These suppositions however are not so strongly founded as to constitute a basis for further constructions. Nevertheless, we can state that the idea of Time as the real reservoir of contingent beings is not without support in Buddhist literature. Mvbh. p. 393a quotes the following erroneous view: »the *svabhāva* of Time is *nitya*, but the *svabhāva* of the *saṃskṛtadharma*s is *anītya*. The *saṃskṛtadharma*s wander across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another, or as a man from one house into another. This is also the case with the *saṃskṛtadharma*s: going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the present and enter into the past«. We are allowed to suppose that this theory of three reservoirs is only a later development of the more primitive conception of Time as a unique, universal reservoir in which future, present and past entities are placed in layers, one upon another.

When speaking of the traces of the »somatic« Time-conception preserved in Buddhist literature, we may mention another point. In *Abhidharmakośa*¹ we hear of such a version of the *traikālyavāda*, according to which the »actualization« (*vartamānīkāraṇa*) of a future effect consists in »dislocation« (*deśāntarakarṣaṇa*). The Sautrāntika rightly objects that this theory is unable to explain the origination of spiritual phenomena (*arūpiṇo dharmāḥ* = *citta*-

¹ T p. 106a 18—22 = de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, III p. 63. Cf. also TSP p. 516₁₅.



caittāḥ) since they are principally without spatial localization (*adeśastha*)¹. But this objection holds good only in connection with later scholastics which extends impermanence also to the psychological sphere. In the pre-hinayānist doctrine, connecting Time and impermanence only with coarse materiality, the theory of spatial dislocation totally fulfils its object, thus corroborating its archaic character.

There is still another problem connected with the theory of Time as a reservoir containing future, present and past things. If the process of life consists in a pouring out of the future through the present into the past then, sooner or later, there must come a moment when the entire future will be exhausted to its dregs, and the whole world will be only the past. So far as I can see, such a formulation does not occur *verbatim* in any text. I can however point out an interesting discussion in Mybh. p. 395a which indirectly presupposes the existence of such conceptions: »All future *dharma*s are [connected] with 'going out' and all past *dharma*s are [connected] with 'entering into' (= the *dharma* goes out of the future and enters into the past). Why is it said that in the future there cannot be imagined (*prajñāpyate*) any 'decrease', and why is it said that in the past there cannot be imagined any 'increase'?« — The Bhadanta Vasumitra gives the following answer: the future *dharma*s are not yet countable (= *chu sku*) and the past *dharma* are no more countable. They are both without measure and without limits. Just as the Great Ocean which does not undergo any decrease even if 100.000 pots of water are taken away and which does not undergo any increase even if 100.000 pots are added«. — What is the meaning of this *dr̥ṣṭānta*? To ∞ we can add whatever finite number, and from ∞ we can subtract whatever finite number: the result will always be the same, *i. e.* ∞ . But the Great Ocean is not an infinity strictly speaking: on the contrary, its drops are uncountable only from the empirical stand-point just as the particles of sand of the Ganges which represent a very high (= 10^{52}) but, nevertheless,

¹ Cf. Mybh. p. 395a: »If a *dharma* has the nature of *vedanā*, it is necessarily not *deśastha*; there exist however, *dharma*s which are not *deśastha* and which do not possess the nature of *vedanā*, viz. the *saṃjñās*, the *saṃskāras*, the *viññānas*, the *paramāṇus*, the *avijñapti* and the *asaṃskṛtas*.

a finite number. Thus in reality, Vasumitra does not deny that there is an 'increase' of the past *dharma*s and a 'decrease' of the future *dharma*s. He means only that, in comparison with the immensity of the future and of the past, the saying that *dharma*s either 'increase' or 'decrease' has no practical significance. We can guess the intention of such a point of view: it was probably the wish to retain the old Buddhist conception of the future pouring itself into the past, and to avoid at the same time the necessarily arising consequence that the whole world automatically strives after extinction. This idea was not alien to Mahāyāna and probably also to old Buddhism, but for the Hīnayānist it was not acceptable because it rendered useless, or at any rate diminished the value of individual, ascetic efforts.

Finally let me quote from Saṃghabhadra's, Nyāyanūsāraśāstra p. 636 a¹⁴ the following argumentation of an opponent who denies the reality of the three Times: »Past and future do not really exist because, if they existed, they would resist one another. Indeed, the elements of *rūpa* must occupy a definite place. If the already destroyed elements and the elements not yet born existed really, then they would resist one another. All *rūpa*-elements, if they exist, possess impenetrability (*apratighatva*) and whatever does not possess impenetrability is not a *rūpa*«. This argument also presupposes that past and future are two receptacles of a finite volume. The canonical theory removes this difficulty by stating that impenetrability is attributed to the present *rūpadharma*s alone¹. Hence only these present *rūpadharma*s are *deśastha*, spatially localised, while all past and future elements are lacking in 'localization'. It is an obvious correction of the more primitive theory according to which the difference between the future, present and past elements was due literally to the difference of *avasthā*, of spatial »position« in one of the three Time-spheres.

Now, coming to the system of the Vaibhāṣikas, we may

¹ Cf. Mvbh. p. 395 a: »Question: If a *dharma* has the nature of *rūpa*, is it *deśastha*? — Answer: If a *dharma* is *deśastha*, it has necessarily the nature of *rūpa*; there exist, however, *dharma*s which have the nature of *rūpa* and which are not *deśastha*, viz. the past and the future *rūpas*, the present *paramāṇus* and the *avijñapti*«.

begin with a short review of the most important innovations introduced into Buddhism by the *hīnayānistic* Abhidharma.

1) The most striking feature of the primitive doctrine was the dualism of the impermanent coarse matter (*rūpa*) and the permanent, subtle soul-stuff (*citta*). In the *Hīnayāna* a new thesis of universal impermanence, which extends also to the psychic phenomena, gets the upperhand¹.

2) In the *samsāra* there no more wanders a subsisting soul (a *gandharva*, a *pudgala*), and what is called personality is now changed into a continuum of appearing and disappearing psycho-physical elements.

3) These separate elements are called *dharma*s, by the same term which, in the old Buddhism, designated the permanent, spiritual and suprasensuous reality. This new significance of the term *dharma* (always in the plural) can be explained as a differentiation of one universal Dharma, the true essence of *Tathāgata* and synonymous with *Brahma*, just as all *rūpa*-elements are differentiations of the one cosmic *Rūpa*, the body of the *Makranthropos*². The *Hīnayānists* interpret this new notion by the learned etymology: *sva-lakṣaṇadhāraṇād* (or: *svabhāvadhāraṇād*) *iti dharmah*, thus giving to the term *dharma* the meaning of a bearer of phenomena manifesting themselves in the continuum.

4) In pre-*hīnayānistic* Buddhism salvation was the deliverance of the pure and radiant soul-stuff (*ādisūdhā*, *prabhāsvara citta*) from stains and defilements (*kleśa*, *āsrava*) caused by coarse materiality. This purification was at the same time a going out from the mortal, coarsely material world to the higher, spiritual sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*) which was the element of immortality (= *amṛtadhātu*) on the other side of the sun. A saint who made his way to this upper sphere, reaching the 'top of existence' (= *bhūtakoṭi*), acquired the 'place from which there was no fall' (*acyuta-pada*). He became an *Anāgamin* — 'One who does not return' and this was probably the final goal of a Saint's career. But as a consequence of extending impermanence to the spiritual sphere this old soteriological conception has also been re-interpreted: in order to reach salvation one should go beyond

¹ Cf. my *Precanonical Buddhism*, Archiv Orientální VII 1935 and Keith, IHQ XII 1936.

² Cf. M. Falk, *Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rūpa*, Cracow 1938.

the element of consciousness. True eternity and true immortality became a transmundane (*lokottara*) element of fully extinguished empirical existence. Higher than Anāgamin, who has been changed into an individual not returning to birth in the lower, material worlds, now stays the Arahan, the Saint who is perfectly released from all forms of existence.

5) In relation with these new views the old conception of Time must also have undergone a change. The limit between the eternal and created Times has been shifted so far as to embrace the whole Cosmos within mortality. The sun ceased to be the Gate of Immortality and the many worlds beyond became victims of Māra the Papimān just as the lower, material world.

This is however only a general frame for the treatment of the problem of Time. In connection with the new Abhidharmic philosophy, the first question to be asked was whether Time is a *dharma* or not.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, there exist not only *dharma*s participating in the continuum of life, but also some which always remain beyond contingency and never manifest themselves in the empirical world. Hence they cannot be positively defined. These are the three *asaṃskṛtas*, viz. the two *nirodhas* and *ākāśa*. As a homogeneous, universal fluid of space, the *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa*'s mark is »non-resistance«. Besides this absolute space there exists also empirical, finite and divisible space, the *ākāśa-dhātu*, which is considered by Vaibhāṣikas not as an *upādhi* of the *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa*, but as a derivative of the *rūpadhātu*. By analogy we could have expected the same distinction between the absolute and empirical Times as two different kinds of *dharma*s. But, in reality, there is in the list of 75 *dharma*s of Vaibhāṣikas no Time, either absolute or empirical. Nevertheless, we find both notions also in Vaibhāṣika doctrine, though in disguise. The absolute Time, Eternity is identical with the *amṛtadhātu* which is another name for the *nirvāṇadhātu*. And the empirical Time hides in the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas*, the *jāti*, *sthiti*, *jarā* and *anityatā* which together form the Vaibhāṣika correlative of the *sādhāraṇakāraṇa* of the Vaiśeṣikas etc. Their function is to drive each *saṃskṛtadharmā* through the three Time-phases: the *jāti* forces the *dharma* to go out of the future and enter into the present, the *sthiti* stabilizes the *dharma* for a moment, the *jarā* and *anityatā* make it go out of

the present and enter into the past¹. I am refraining from analysing the theory of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* and shall confine myself to point out that we have here a doctrine corresponding to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinction of the two *abhāvas*: the antecedent non-existence (*prag-abhāva* = *paṭo bhaviṣyati*) and the non-existence after destruction (*pradhvaṃsābhāva* = *paṭo naṣṭaḥ*). Between these two *abhāvas* — which are however *padārthas* — is squeezed in the present *bhāva*, just as is the manifestation of the *dharma* of the Vaibhāṣikas between its future and past phases. It may also be supposed that, originally, *anityatā* alone acted as a substitute for empirical Time (a reduction of *Mṛtyu*), that it has subsequently been developed into the triad of *jāti*, *sthiti* and *nirodha* and that the classical tetrad is but a later synthesis.

By introducing the theory of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* as special factors cooperating with all *saṃskṛtadharma*s, the Vaibhāṣikas dismissed the older theory of Time as a receptacle containing empirical beings. There exists only one universal fluid in which the *dharma*s are merged, viz. the *ākāśa*. But Time is not thus conceived. and the parallelism between Time and Space is given up. It is true, the Vaibhāṣikas further say in a colloquial sense that the *dharma*s wander across the three Times, that *nirvāṇa* lies beyond the three Times, that there exists a Future and a Past etc., but all these expressions are meant only metaphorically and not literally: each *dharma* exists in the three Times as future, present and past and the term »three Times« is consequently only a synonymous denomination (*adhivācana*) for *saṃskṛtadharma*s².

We can try to guess the motive of this new view. It may be that the difficulty of spatial localization of the three Times has played some part here. Accepting that *ākāśa* as a unique and homogeneous fluid filling up the whole Cosmos, one should have to admit that this Space-fluid is itself permeated by another fluid of Time. Such a conception would not have been

¹ Cf. Mvvh. 394a: »If all the three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* have not yet been active, the *dharma* is called future. If one of them has already finished its activity and two are just active, then the *dharma* is called present. If they all have already finished their activity, the *dharma* is called past«.

² Cf. AbhK I, *kārikā* 7: *ta evādhvāḥ*.

unheard of in India¹, but it did not solve the other difficulty, that of assigning place to the three Times of future, present and past, within one Cosmos. The conception of Time-layers would have come into conflict with an analogous spatial dislocation of the worlds and the dodge of the fourth dimension was unfortunately not yet known. Nothing remained but the theory, which was accepted as a matter of fact, *viz.* that all future and past *dharma*s are without spatial localization (*adeśatha*).

This was however only a partial solution and the main question, *viz.* the difference between the future, present and past *dharma*s remained to be answered.

The simplest interpretation which can be deduced from the Vaibhāṣika stand-point is the following. Each *dharma* is the bearer of its specific mark (*svalakṣaṇa*), which is at the same time its special function (*svakriyā*, *vṛtti*, *kāritra*, *svabhāga*). On this relation are based the definitions of the Abhidharma: the essence of a *dharma*, its *svabhāva* as *definiendum* (= *lakṣya*) is defined by its *kāritra* (= *svakriyā* or *svalakṣaṇa*) as *definiens*². Now, although

¹ Cf. Bṛh. Ār. Up. III 8, 7: *yad urdhvaṃ divaḥ, yad avāk pṛthivyāḥ, yad antarā dyāvapṛthivī ime, yad bhūtaṃ ca bhavac ca bhaviṣyac cety ācakṣate, ākāśa eva tad otaṃ ca protaṃ ceti*.

² This double logical and ontological meaning has been pointed out by the present author in *Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā*, p. 2 in a remark on Chapter V of the Maḍhyamakakārikā where the problem of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa* is discussed by Nāgārjuna on the example of *ākāśa*, and its *svalakṣaṇa*, the *anāvaraṇatva*. But Professor Stcherbatsky, RO X p. 35 holds that this discussion is without any connection with the problem of *dharma*s *svabhāva* and *kāritra*, and as a result accuses me, in the plainest terms, of not distinguishing between *lakṣaṇa* = *svalakṣaṇa* and *lakṣaṇa* = *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa* and of having overlooked that *ākāśa* is not a *saṃskṛtadharma*! These are indeed *pārājika* sins which I have, however, not committed; hence I need not atone for them. I wish only to add that the *asaṃskṛtadharma*s, as e. g. *ākāśa*, have also their *svakāritra* from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣikas. Cf. de La Vallée Poussin, *Documents d'Abhidharma* (BEFEO XXX), p. 43: »L'Ākāśa inconditionné, bien qu'il n'ait point d'appui, a cependant un effet (*kārya*): à savoir, il donne place à toute lumière; par le fruit est manifestée la cause qui a donc réels nature et caractère«. Ibid. p. 50, 54: »Les organes, l'organe de l'œil, etc. ne sont pas connus par évidence; néanmoins nous savons qu'ils existent parce qu'ils possèdent une

each *dharma* always possesses its *kāritra*, yet it manifests the *kāritra* only at a given moment, and having thus discharged its function, becomes sterile once for all. Just this moment of discharging is called the present, and we can thus say that the future *dharma*s are those which have not yet manifested their *kāritra* and the past ones are those which have already manifested their activity. In my *Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā* I have given this very interpretation and it was not mistaken in so far as we really come across such a conception in Mvbh. p. 393 c: »Question. On what is based the distinction of Time-epochs? — Answer. On the *kāritra*. The *saṃskṛtadharma*s which do not yet possess the *kāritra* are called 'future', the *saṃskṛtadharma*s which just now possess the *kāritra* are called 'present', the *saṃskṛtadharma*s whose *kāritra* is already destroyed, are called 'past'. Or: the *rūpa*, when it does not offer any resistance (*pratighatva*) is called 'future', when it offers resistance just now, is called 'present', when it has already ceased to offer resistance, is called 'past' etc.«

This apparently simple theory leads in reality to great complications. If we admit as present only such *dharma*s as are just now manifesting their special function, then what should we do with the elements of an eye which sleeps or is obstructed by darkness? These elements are obviously present, nevertheless they do not perform their *kāritra*, they do not give sight. Hence the necessity of another definition of the term *kāritra*.

Indeed, we can take another stand-point according to which the manifestation of the specific function of the *dharma a* is the activity not of this very *dharma*, but of other preceding *dharma*s *p*, *q*, *r* etc. by which the function of the *dharma a* is causally determined. The true activity of a *dharma* is consequently its faculty of determining other *dharma*s, i. e. of compelling future *dharma*s to manifest their special functions. The Hinayanistic scholastics admit, as we know, six different types of such a determination by 1) simultaneous cause (*sahabhūkāraṇa*), 2) an im-

certaine activité (*kāritra*). De même l'Ākāśa possède une certaine activité«. In one word: it is true that »die *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*s begleiten bloss die *saṃskṛtadharma*s«, but the problem of *kāritra* of the *asaṃskṛtadharma*s has nothing in common with it.

mediate cause (*samanantarakāraṇa*), 3) homogeneous cause (*sabhāgakāraṇa*), 4) a moral omnipenetrant cause (*sarvatragakāraṇa*), 5) a moral specific cause (*vipākakāraṇa*) and 6) a general negative cause (*adhipatīkāraṇa*)¹. If, in the stream of life, there appears a *dharma* of sight (*cakṣurindriya*), it is 1) the simultaneous cause for the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, 2) the homogeneous cause for all next *dharma*s of sight which form the illusionary unity of the same eye and, 3) the general negative cause for all other *dharma*s whose origination it does not hinder. In brief: in this conception the *kāritra* of a *dharma* is no more its *svakāritra*, *svabhāga* etc., but its *hetubhāvāvasthāna*, its *phalotpādanasāmarthya*: its causal function and its faculty of producing effects.

In order to fulfil the purpose of establishing the distinction of the three Times, this new definition of *kāritra* needs however some further supplementary restrictions as well. There exist cases where a given *dharma* *a* determines the effect *p* at a longer distance, e. g. the karmic retribution becomes ripe only some time after the act has been committed². In the moment *t*, when the karmic cause has already ceased and the »fruit« has not yet begun to exist, the determination lasts. Should we consequently accept that a past act is present as long as it has not produced its effect?

To avoid these difficulties the Vaibhāṣikas construct the following definite theory: the mechanism of the functioning of the six causes is different according as to whether the effect is realized in the same moment or in an immediately subsequent moment or in some more remote moment in the *saṃtāna*. The simultaneous and the immediate causes belong exclusively to the first category, the homogeneous and the omnipenetrant causes to the second or to the third and the specific moral cause exclusively to the third³. The determination of the effect by a cause can consequently be compared with the throwing of a projectile in which two phases can be distinguished: 1) the phase of »pro-

¹ Cf. Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception*, p. 81 and de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, II p. 244 ff.

² Cf. Yaśomitra, ed. Wogihara p. 178: *atītasyaāpi hi phala-dānakāritram iṣyate*.

³ Cf. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, II p. 293 ff.

jection« (*ākṣepa*) which is otherwise called »the grasping« (*grahana*) of the effect and 2) the phase of »giving« (*dāna*) the effect, its actual realization. Each *dharma*, in the moment in which it becomes present and »discharges« its activity, as it were grasps and throws its future effect. When the course of the projected effect has the form of a parabola, both the phases of »projecting« and »giving« are distinctly separated. But when a *dharma* projects and gives its effect in the same or in two immediately subsequent moments, then »throwing« and »giving« coalesce. Nevertheless the distinction of both these moments is indispensable because only the »throwing« decides of the passing of a *dharma* from the future into the present¹. This is just the definition of the *kāritra* advocated by Saṃghabhadra²: *kāritra* = *phalākṣepasākti*, the potency of projecting effects. Acts already done, even if they have not yet produced their effect, are not present because they have already performed the act of projecting³.

Now we come to the last but the most controversial point: what is the relation between the activity thus conceived and the element itself, between the *phalākṣepasākti* and the *svabhāva* or *svarūpa* of the *dharma*? All theories which accept the reality of the three Times emphasise unanimously that a *dharma*, when passing through the Time-epochs, does not change its essence and that it is only its empirical aspect, the *bhāva* in the terminology of Dharmatrāta, the *avasthā* in the terminology of Vasumitra, which undergoes transformation. But both these terms do not mean much as they are unfortunately not explained in details, but only *modo indico* illustrated by *drṣṭāntas* which should not be taken literally. Vasumitra appeals to the example of an abacus where the same ball according to its »position« (*avasthā*) receives

¹ Ibid. p. 293, note 3: »Le *dharma* existe toujours, qu'il soit futur, présent ou passé. Nous disons qu'il prend ou projette un fruit au moment où, devenant présent, il devient cause ou semence d'un fruit«. Cf. also E. Lamotte, *Le traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, 1936, p. 80 ff.

² N p. 631 b. cf. infra p. 36.

³ On the contrary, the function of »giving« effects is characteristic of past as well as present *dharmas*; it is absent only from future and from all *asaṃskṛtas*.

the significance of 1, 100 or 1000. In this case we are dealing with changes in the spatial positions, with *avasthās* in the literal sense of the word, and this was possibly also the meaning of the Time-*avasthā* in pre-Abhidharmic speculation. But for Vasumitra, as we know, the Time-*avasthās* of a *dharma* are not spatial positions and the term is used only *upacāreṇa*. Similarly, it is quite difficult to say something more definite about the *bhāva* of Dharma-trāta: whether a kind of quality is meant or rather a »mode of existence«, something in the kind of *guṇas* of the Sāṃkhya as Dr Johnston¹ supposes. All these difficulties were probably felt by the Vaiśeṣika themselves and thus as a result the theory of »impredicability« (*anirvacanīyatva*) of the *kāritra* was adopted as the correct view.

In the Mvbh. p. 394c we come across the following discussion: »Are *kāritra* and *svabhāva* the same or are they different? — Answer: It cannot be said categorically whether they are the same or different. Just as the *svabhāva* of each *sāsrava-dharma* possesses many *lakṣaṇas* as *anitya* etc., and it cannot be said categorically whether they are identical with or different from [these *lakṣaṇas*], such is the case here. Therefore [the relation between *kāritra* and *svabhāva*] is not predicable«.

Samghabhadra, N 633a adduces another instance: the relation between *kāritra* and *svabhāva* is, just in the same manner, not accessible to determination as is the case with the relation between the *dharmas* and the *saṃtāna*. In one word: *kāritra* and *svabhāva* are and are not identical.

The statement of the Vaibhāṣikas that, when a *dharma* wanders across the Times, only the *kāritra* not the *svabhāva* changes, and that, nevertheless, it cannot be said that *kāritra* is *svabhāva* nor that *kāritra* exists independently of *svabhāva*, is ridiculed by the Sautrāntikas who call such a theory »a caprice of the Īśvara«:

kāritram sarvadū nāsti, sadā dharmaś ca varṇyate
*dharmān nānyac ca kāritram vyaktaṃ devaviceṣṭitam*²

¹ *Early Sāṃkhya*, 1937, p. 31.

² Cf. AbhK V p. 57. = TS 1802.

But Saṃghabhadra N 633 c vehemently protests: »This irony is improper! Because Buddha Bhagavān himself also teaches: 'Tathāgata is and is not *lokottara*'; 'the *dharmatā* of the *pratitya-samutpāda* is and is not *nitya*'. Should the Buddha Bhagavān also be made ridiculous for that? We accept that *dharma* exists always and, at the same time, we teach that *dharma* is not eternal. Your criticism [of this theory] is unfounded because the terms 'eternal' and 'not eternal' are used here in two different senses. Therefore one should not deride Buddha! Is it not so in this case as well? The *dharma* lasts eternally but the *dharmabhāva* changes. When the *samskṛtadharmas* wander across the Times, they do not lose their *svabhāva* and the *kāritra* which arises depends on *pratyayas*. Immediately after its origination, *kāritra* disappears. Therefore we teach: the *dharma* is eternal, but the *dharmabhāva* is not eternal. Wherefore Your irony in saying that it is a caprice of the *Īśvara*?«

And this is the summary of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine given by Saṃghabhadra, N 633 b: »All *samskṛtadharmas* in the state (*avasthā*) of *phalākṣepa* are called present. This state of *phalākṣepa* is »previously« and »subsequently« inexistent. In accordance [with this previous and subsequent inexistence] the distinction of the three Times is established. Past and Future exist just as the Present. In brief: although the *svabhāva* of all *samskṛtadharmas* remains always the same, yet the »potencies« are different. In this manner although the *svabhāva* of the three Times is always the same, yet, their *kāritra* is not without differentiation«.

From the evidences quoted above it becomes clear that the Vaibhāṣika teach a »duality of aspects« of the *dharma*, which is however not a duality »of two different planes« or of »two sets of elements« as Professor Stcherbatsky accepted it till recently¹. *kāritra* is no »supplement« to the *svabhāva*, it is not the second element neither the second nature of the element; neither is it the element itself, the *svlakṣaṇa*. As we learn from TS², this view was explicitly rejected by Saṃghabhadra. The

¹ Central Conception p. 42, *Nirvāṇa* p. 27; cf. also Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Calcutta 193, p. 250: »duality of nature«.

² Cf. *infra* p. 45.

difference between *kāritra* = *phalākṣepasakti* and *svakāritra* = *svalakṣaṇa* is indeed very fundamental: the *svalakṣaṇas* as *sapratighatva* etc. express the whole essence of the *dharma* and that is why a *dharma* possessing *sapratighatva* can never become *apratigha*. On the contrary, the *phalākṣepasakti* is an accidental, temporary characteristic of a *dharma*, it is only *kādācitka*.

In other terms, the Vaibhāṣika doctrine teaches a kind of *bhedābhedavāda*, a theory according to which the relation between the true essence of reality and its phenomenal manifestation is one of identity in difference.

III. Śāntaraksita's Analysis of the Three Times with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla

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- § 1. The theories of Dharmatrāta, Ghosaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva.

Now, in order to demonstrate that [the absolute reality as conceived by the school of Sautrāntika-Yogācāras is characterised]

by the absence of duration (*asaṃkrānti*)¹, [Śāntarakṣita opens the discussion by quoting the following objection]:

Then, following the analogy of gold, the permanence (*sthīratvam*) [of the being] is assumed. There are even certain Buddhists who accept that the being (*bhāva*) possesses different states (*avasthābheda*). [1786]

[Our teaching:] 'nothing has duration' (*avasthāna*) is assailed [by the opponent who says:] How can it be asserted that nothing persists as long as there are even certain Buddhists, as Dharmatrāta and others, who pretend that the being persists through the three Times. The reason [adduced by those Buddhists] is the differentiation of states (*avasthābheda*). The homogeneous instance (*sādharmya*) [of this syllogism] is gold.

The [meaning of this comparison is explained by the next *kārikā*:

Just as gold, even when its states are changed, does not lose its colour during the Time-epochs, in the same manner elements of being (= *bhāva*) do not lose their substance (*dravya*). [1787]

1. The venerable Dharmatrāta² is the author of a theory, according to which there is a differentiation of the *bhāva*. He states: when a *dharma* is wandering through the Times, only its *bhāva* changes, not its substance (*dravya*). Just as gold itself is not changed, but only this quality (= *guṇa*) of the substance of gold,

¹ Cf. TS 4: *asaṃkrāntim anādyantam* etc. P 13: *saṃkrāntivādināḥ* = *sarvāstivādināḥ*. They teach that *skandhas* etc. exist in three Time-epochs without changing and without abandoning their essence (= *asaṃkīrṇasvabhāvāḥ, ajahatsvabhāvāḥ*). This is denied by Sautrāntikas, the advocates of the doctrine *abhūtvā bhavati*, who may be consequently designed as *Asaṃkrāntivādins*. The term *saṃkrānti*, however, denotes also 'transmigration of the *sūkṣmacitta* from one world to the other' and in this sense the *Sarvāstivādins* (= the *Vaibhāṣikas*) are *Asaṃkrāntivādins*, the *Sautrāntikas* — *Samkrāntivādins*. Cf. J. Masuda, *Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools*, p. 66., note 3 and E. Lamotte, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, MBC IV 1936, p. 24—26.

² The exposition of the four doctrines of the *sarvāstivāda*, as given by Kamalaśīla, is a quite accurate reproduction of *Maḥāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 396; *Abhidharmakośa* V p. 52—56, *Nyāyānusāra*, T 1562, p. 631.

which is the cause (*nimitta*) of terminological distinction (*abhidhāna*) such as »bracelets«, »armlets« »ear-rings« etc. The *dharma* is differentiated in respect to the *bhāvas* of the future, present and past in the same manner *i. e.*: by discarding its future *bhāva* it attains the present *bhāva* and by discarding its present *bhāva* it attains the past *bhāva*. The *dravya* does not change because it is never missing (= *sarvatra vyabhicārāt*). Otherwise we shall arrive at the *prasaṅga* that the *dravya* is one in the future, another one in the present and still another one in the past. Now what is the *bhāva* postulated by this theory? The answer is: the *bhāva* is a special quality¹ (= *guṇaviśeṣa*) to which are related cognitive processes (*jñānapravṛtti*), expressed in distinction of terms (*abhidhāna*): »future«, »present« and »past«.

2. The venerable Ghosaka is the author of a theory according to which there is a differentiation of the *lakṣaṇa*. He states that when a *dharma* is wandering through the Times then, as a past one, it is connected with the *lakṣaṇa* of the past without however being, at the same time, free from the connection with the remaining two *lakṣaṇas* of the present and of the past. Just as a man, although devoted to one wife, is not free from passion for other wives². The future and the present [Times] are to be explained in the same way. The empirical applicableness (*vyava-*

¹ As pointed out by Dr. E. H. Johnston, *Early Sāṃkhya*, 1937, p. 31, there is an old connection between *bhāva* — 'state of being' and the *guṇas* of the Sāṃkhyas. I am however not quite convinced that, in the expression *guṇaviśeṣa* used by Kamalaśīla as definition of the *bhāva* of Dharmatrāta, we are concerned with the Sāṃkhyan *guṇas*. I entirely agree that the *guṇapariṇāma* is a later theory, unknown to the early Sāṃkhya, but Sāṃkhya was known to Kamalaśīla only in its later form, and it is hardly probable that he, when commenting Dharmatrāta, is likely to refer to a meaning which the word *guṇa* possessed in the Epic Age. I should also like to refrain from drawing any far reaching conclusions from the fact that Dharmatrāta and Vaibhāṣikas are accused of affinity with the Sāṃkhya. These accusations are made by the Sautrāntikas for polemical purposes and, as it seems, not necessarily *bona fide*. Cf. note 5.

² The Chinese translations of this comparison distinguish *ch'i shih* = 'a legitimate wife' from *chi yin* = 'a concubine'. — »A man who feels passion for his legitimate wife is not free from passions for concubines«.

hāra) [of the terms denoting the three Times] is based on the fact that the *lakṣaṇas* of the past etc. attain (in succession) their activity (= *ṛtti*). This is the difference between the present theory and the preceding one.

3. The venerable Vasumitra is the author of a theory, according to which there is a differentiation of the *avasthā*. He states: when a *dharma* is wandering through the Times, having reached this or an other *avasthā*, it receives different designations with reference to different *avasthās*, but not with reference to its substance (*dravya*). Because its substance remains unchanged in all the three Times. Just as, in an abacus, the same ball, when thrown in the place of units, means »one«, in the place of hundreds, »hundred«; in the place of thousands, »thousand«. In the same manner a *dharma* (= *bhāva*), when staying in its *kāritra*, is called »present«, when fallen down from it — it is called »past«, when it had not yet reached it, it is called »future«. The applicableness of [different Time-designations] depends on *avasthā*, just as in an abacus. Indeed, [when counting on it], the *svabhāva* [of the ball] remains unchanged, only as a result of [its] being connected with different positions (*sthānaviśeṣa*) there arise different numeral notions.

4. The venerable Buddhadeva is the author of a theory, according to which there is [only] a differentiation of the *anyathā*-[relation]. He says: when a *dharma* is wandering through the Times, it is called in each case 'another one' in a different sense in accordance with its relation to the antecedent and subsequent [moments]. Just as the same woman is called 'mother' and 'daughter'. Thus a *dharma* which [at a given moment] has its antecedent but no subsequent moments is called 'future'; that which has its antecedent as well as its subsequent moments is called 'present'; that which has only its subsequent but no antecedent moments is called 'past'.

Thus we have, in all, these four schools of the *sarvāstivāda*, designed as the theories of the *bhāva-anyathātva*, *lakṣaṇa-anyathātva*, *avasthā-anyathātva* and *anyathā-anyathātva*.

The first of them does not differ from the Sāṃkhya doctrine ¹

¹ We find the same objection in AbhK V p. 54, but Saṃghabhadra N p. 631 b, c—10, protests: »There is no analogy!

which teaches the transformation (*pariṇāma*) [of the permanent substance]. The refutation of this [variant of the *sarvāstivāda*] is consequently identical with the refutation of the [*pariṇāmavāda*]. [The main line of argumentation is as follows:] transformation is possible either by abandoning the previous *svabhāva*, or without abandoning the previous *svabhāva*. If there is no abandoning, then a confusion (*saṃkara*) of Time-epochs will be the consequence; if so, we have a contradiction with [the fundamental thesis of your school] that [entities] exist always (*sadāstitva*).

Neither are the advocates of the second theory free from the consequence of Time-confusion, because [accepting the *lakṣaṇa-anyathātva* they must admit that] each *dharma* is connected [simultaneously] with each [of the three] Time-*lakṣaṇas*. Moreover there is no analogy at all between the *dr̥ṣṭānta* of a 'man in passion' and [the *dharma* wandering through the Times] as the subject to be illustrated by this *dr̥ṣṭānta*. Indeed, a man is called 'in passion' (= *rakta*) with reference to the actual operation (*samudācāra*) of passion towards an external object; and he is called 'not without passion' (*avirakta*) with reference to the fact of possessing (= *samanvāgamamātreṇa*) [passion as a potential disposition]¹. But the acquisition (*prāpti*) of Time-*lakṣaṇas* by a *dharma* is not in this sense [sometimes] an actual operation (*samudācāra*), and [sometimes] a [mere] possession (*samanvāgama*).

The refutation of the third theory, teaching that the distinction of Time-epochs is based on *kāritra*, will be given later in detail.

Finally, according to the fourth theory, in each Time-epoch we should have simultaneously all three Times together, *e. g.*: in the past Time the subsequent and the antecedent moments would represent the past and the future, and the middle moment would be the present. The refutation of this theory is self evident.

This Bhadanta does not teach that the *svabhāva* of the *saṃskṛta-dharmas* is *nitya* and that, during the Time-epochs, the *dharma* becomes sometimes invisible (*tirobhūta*) and sometimes manifest (*āvirbhūta*). On the contrary he teaches: the *dharmas* wander through the Time-epochs. Although their *svabhāva* remains the same, their *bhāva* changes. [This standpoint] is identical with the view of the Bhadanta Vasumitra. How can it be held as identical with the heresy of the Sāṃkhyas?«

¹ Cf. Y p. 470: *kevalaṃ samanvāgamaḥ*.

A more detailed critical analysis of the *traikālyā*-doctrine, will be undertaken later.

The example of gold [in the *kārikā* 1787] is mentioned only in order to give a [generally accepted] *siddhānta*, not in order to give a special illustration of the first theory of Dharmatrāta. Also when it is said [in the *kārikā* 1791]: »the distinction of Time-epochs is established by the *kāritra*«, [the theory of Dharmatrāta is not alluded to by these words]. The thesis that the Time-epochs are established by the *kāritra* is, indeed, the doctrine of Vasumitra and not that of Dharmatrāta.

§ 2. Five arguments of the Vaibhāṣikas demonstrating the reality of the past and of the future.

[Now let us expound the main arguments by which the Vaibhāṣikas try to demonstrate the reality of past and future things].

Otherwise the cognition of the past and of the future would be without any object. Moreover, how could Buddha have then said that consciousness (*viññāna*) is supported by two factors?

And how would it be possible to assume that an unreal past *karma* could give a moral retribution? And how could the Yogins possess a distinctly differentiated knowledge of the past and of the future?

Past and future [*dharmas*] are therefore not deprived of substantial reality because under the heading 'Time-epoch' (*adhvan*), just like the present, [past and future] *rūpas* etc. are comprehended. [1788—1790]

1) If past and future things are not real, then the consciousness (*viññāna*) of such [judgments] referring to the past and to the future, as *e. g.*: 'there was once [a king] Mahāsammata', or: 'there will be once the Cakravartin Śaṃkha' would be objectless (*nirālambana*). And then there would be no consciousness at all, just because of the inexistence of the objective correlate (*ālambana*). Indeed it is said: 'consciousness is essentially awareness of the corresponding object (= *prativastu viññapyātmakam viññānam*) and if there was no cognizable object (*jñeya*), nothing could be known by it'. Hence there would be no consciousness at all.

2) Moreover [it has been said by Buddha]: 'consciousness originates in a correlative dependence from two factors, *viz.* in correlative dependence from eye and visual forms etc. up to mind (*manas*) and mental objects (*dharmāḥ*)'. Hence, if there was no past and no future, consciousness which has them as objective correlates could not originate in a correlative dependence from those two factors. And thus a contradiction with the Āgama would result therefrom¹.

3) The past *karma* would give no moral retribution (*vipāka*), if it were inexistent and devoid of all reality, because then the moment moral retribution would arise, the moral cause (*vipāka-hetu*) would be inexistent; and what is inexistent does not possess the potency of producing effects (*kāryotpādana-śakti*). Indeed, 'inexistence' is defined as a total absence of all potencies (= *sarva-sāmārthya-viraha*).

4) The distinctly differentiated consciousness of Yogins, having as its object past and future [events]: 'there was once [a king] Māndhātara'², 'there was once [a king] Brahmadatta', or: 'there will be once the Cakravartin Śaṃkha', 'there will be once the Tathāgata Maitreya', would be impossible. Indeed, there can be no distinct differentiation (*vibhāga*) of what does not exist. And, therefore, past as well as future [events], as Śrīharṣa etc. cannot be deprived of substantial reality (= *dravyapratishedharūpa*).

5) Past and future things are real, because it has been taught that, just like the present, the [three] Time-epochs are comprehended under the headings of *rūpa* etc. Indeed, it has been said by the Bhagavān³: »If, o monks, there were no past *rūpa*, a learned Śrāvaka could not become disgusted with a past *rūpa*. But as there exist past *rūpas*, therefore a learned Śrāvaka is disgusted with a past *rūpa* etc.« In this manner whatever past and future *rūpas* may exist, they all must be put together in order to get the complete class of the *rūpaskandha*.

The explanation of the expression *adhva-saṃgraha-rūpādi-bhāvāder* is as follows: *adhvanā saṃgraho yeṣāṃ, te 'dhva-saṃgrahā*

¹ The arguments 2—5 are enumerated in AbhK V 51.

² G.: Māndhāna(sic!); Tib. has only *rgyal po*. On the Cakravartin Māndhātara cf. the references by de La Vallée Poussin, AbhK III 28.

³ Saṃyukta III 14. Cf. AbhK V 51; Prasannapadā p. 444.

rūpādayaḥ. ādi [in *rūpādi*] indicates that other *skandhas*, as *vedanā* etc. are understood. *teṣāṃ* = *adhva-saṃgrahānām rūpādīnām bhāvaḥ* = *adhva-saṃgraha-rūpādītvam* = the fact that under 'Time-epochs' *rūpa* etc. is comprehended. *adhva-saṃgraha-rūpādi-bhāvādi*: here again the word *ādi* is added in order to indicate that [under 'Time-epochs' not only the *skandhas*, but also] other [synonyms] as *duḥkha-samudaya*, *anitya*, *anātma* etc. are included¹.

§ 3. Saṃghabhadra's definition of the *kāritra*.

It may be so. But if [the *svabhāva* of the *dharma*] is everlasting (*sadāvasthita*) like *ākāśa*, how is the distinction of past etc. possible?

[The answer of the Vaibhāṣika is given in the following *kārikā*:]

One must not think that the distinction of Times is groundless; because this distinction is established by the *kāritra*. What is just manifesting its *kāritra* is called present, past — when it has abandoned its *kāritra*, and future — when it has not yet reached its *kāritra*.

The *kāritra* of the *dharma*s is projecting a *kārya*, not producing it. The past [*dharma*s] do not possess this potency of projection and therefore they cannot possess a *kāritra*. [1791—1793]

[The Vaibhāṣika] defines as »present« [a *dharma*] which has just fully attained its *kāritra*; as »past« — [a *dharma*] whose *kāritra* has already ceased, as »future« — [a *dharma*] which has not yet attained its *kāritra*. In this way the distinction of Times is based on *kāritra*².

Now the question arises: what is the meaning of the term *kāritra*?

The Vaibhāṣika answers: *kāritra* means *vyāpāra*, activity or operation, as seeing etc.; [in another words:] it is [the special potency] by which the eye is seeing, the ear is hearing, the nose is smelling, the tongue is tasting etc.; it is [further the special

¹ There exists no separate *dharma* of Time. *adhvan* is only a synonymous denomination of *saṃskāra*. Cf. Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, p. 987 b. 4.

² Cf. Mvvh. p. 393 c 13—26.

potency] by which consciousness (*viññāna*) is active as cognizing; [and finally] it is [the special potency] by which visual forms (*rūpa*) etc. are made objects of the corresponding sense-organs (*svendriya gocaratva*)¹.

[This theory is rejected by Sautrāntikas].

[First objection:]² if it were so, then an actually given *tatsabhāga* eye (= an actually given *dharma* of the homogeneous series forming the so called eye) would possess no presence in the state of sleep owing to the lack of its *kāritra*.

[Vaibhāṣika formulates a new definition:] *kāritra* means [not the special potency of a *dharma*, but the capacity of] giving and of grasping a result (*phala-dāna-grahana*). So e. g. the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas* (= *jāti* etc.) which are co-existent (*sahabhū*) with a given element A of the] *cakṣur-indriya* constitute its anthropomorphic result (*puruṣakāra-phala*). [Another] immediately succeeding [element B of the] *cakṣur-indriya* is [with reference to the element A at the same time:] its result of the type *puruṣakāra*, of the type *adhipati* and of the type *niṣyanda*. When the eye (= an element of the *cakṣur-indriya*) produces all these effects, it is 'giving'; when it becomes the cause of these effects (*hetubhāvāvasthānād*), it is 'grasping'. In this sense it is called present.

[Second objection:] if so, the consequence would be that past causes *sabhāga*, *sarvatraga* and *vipāka* are present, because it is admitted that they are also 'giving an effect'.

Vaibhāṣika. [This objection does not hold good]. We accept that *kāritra* = *phala-dāna* + *phala-grahana* (jointly). [The past *sabhāga* although »giving«, is not »grasping«].

Sautrāntika. In this case the consequence will be the semi-presence³ (*arddha-varttamānatva*) of the past causes *sabhāga* etc.

Anxious to avoid these drawbacks the Master Saṃghabhadra declares⁴: »the *kāritra* of the *dharmas* means potency (*śakti*) only

¹ Cf. Y p. 17.

² Cf. supra p. 22.

³ The past causes can be *saphala*, consequently they possess, as it were, one half of *kāritra*.

⁴ This is not a quotation but a résumé of a longer passage from N p. 631 b₁₅–c₁₄ which sounds as follows: »As I have explained, past and future exist. This is not contradicted by the *dharma-svabhāva* and agrees with the Āgamas. Should one deny the past and the future, then there would be a contradiction with the

of projecting results (*phalākṣepa* = *grahana*), not the [actual] generation (*janana* = *dāna*). Past causes *sabhāga* etc. do not possess the potency of projecting results because the projecting takes

dharmaśvabhāva, the Āgamas would be disregarded and many difficulties would arise. Therefore let it be known: the past and the future, as it has been stated by Bhadanta Vasumitra, exist really. In accordance with sound logic and the testimony of the Āgamas it cannot be altered. And this is what Bhadanta Vasumitra teaches: Buddha has said in the Sūtra that the three Times exist. — With regard to what are they differentiated? — Answer: the differentiation of the three Times is established by the *kāritra*. All *saṃskṛtadharmas* whose *kāritra* is not yet manifested are called 'future', all *saṃskṛtadharmas* whose *kāritra* is just now manifesting itself are called 'present'; all *saṃskṛtadharmas* whose *kāritra* is already destroyed are called 'past'. On the contrary in the substance of the *saṃskṛtadharmas* there is no change«.

»Now what is *kāritra*? — Answer: it is the potency [inherent] in the *saṃskṛtadharmas* to produce a result (= *saṃskṛtadharmāṇām phalākṣepaśaktiḥ*). It means that they can become a determining cause of other *śvabhāva* in the moment of their origination. He who, in accordance with this, establishes the differentiation of the three Times and who explains the [unexplained] remainder without trespassing into contradictory theories, should be called by wise men an individual with a clear understanding. But if one erroneously establishes the principle of differentiation of the three Times, or from fear of difficulties, directly rejects the Āgamas, or makes an easily understandable meaning of the Sūtra difficult to understand, or teaches that there is only present and no past and no future, or even that the present is equally fictitious as the past and the future, or if he rejects altogether the three Times and teaches that they are all unreal, then he falls into a contradiction with the Truth of the Āgamas and wise men should denounce him as a person with a confused understanding«.

»Moreover, he who shows disrespect to the Āgamas by teaching that the Times do not exist really, is covered with immeasurable faults, meets with many hindrances and attains salvation with difficulty. On the contrary, he who teaches that the three Times exist really is a true Master of the Śāstras, he meets with little hindrances and attains salvation easily. This is why a wise man does not show disrespect to the Āgamas by teaching that there are no Times. As for myself, I am relying on Bhadanta Vasumitra who teaches that the differentiation of the three Times is established by the *kāritra*. And as far as I am capable of it, I am solving difficulties«.

place only in the state of presence. An [already] projected result is not, on its part, connected with [new potency of] projection, because otherwise a regressus in infinitum would result. Therefore no past *dharma*s can possess a *kāritra* and hence there is no confusion of Time-marks«.

§ 4. A *prasaṅga* argument showing that *kāritra* is neither different from nor identical with the
dharmasvabhāva.

Sautrāntika replies:

These [advocates of the *sarvāstivāda* doctrine] must concede, that the *kāritra* is either different or identical with the *dharma*, the third possibility being altogether unreal.

»The Sautrāntika raises the following objection: If the distinction of the three Times is established by the *kāritra*, then what is the *kāritra* of the *tatsabhāga*cakṣuḥ and of other *tatsabhāga*-indriyas which are present? If you say [that although without *svakarma*] they are grasping an effect and giving an effect (= *phalaṃ gṛhṇanti phalaṃ ca dadanti*), then the *sabhāga*hetus etc., as they are also giving an effect (*phaladānāt*), would possess their *kāritra*. Or they would possess a half-*kāritra*. And a confusion of the Time-marks would result (*adhvalakṣaṇānām saṃkaro bhavet*)«.

»[We answer:] all these difficulties have their origin in the lack of understanding of the *dharmasvabhāva*. The *śaktis* of a *dharma* are of two kinds: one is called *kāritra*, the other is called *sāmarthya*. *kāritra* has been defined as a *phalākṣepasāmarthya*, but *kāritra* is not always identical with *sāmarthya*. There exists also a *sāmarthya* which is different from *kāritra*. If. e. g., in darkness, the eye sees the *rūpas*, its *sāmarthya* is obstructed by an *āvaraṇa*, but not its *kāritra*. The *darśanasāmarthya* is obstructed by the *tamas* and it is why, in darkness, the eye is not able to perceive the *rūpas*. But its *kāritra* [which is identical with] 'projecting an effect' (*phalākṣepa*) is not obstructed by darkness. Therefore the eye is able to project an effect also in darkness«.

»Apart from the present condition (*avasthā*), *kāritra* is absent, because it arises only in dependence with the present. [A *dharma*] the *kāritra* of which is destroyed, is not absolutely inactive (*nīṣkriya* ?): when an other *svabhāva* originates, it may become its determining cause. But this [determination] is not *kāritra*, it is only *sāmarthya*. Because [a *dharma*] can project an effect only

In case of difference, the antecedent and subsequent unreality of present [*dharmas*] would arise on account of [their] being a cause, being contingent, etc., just as is the case with the *kāritra*. In the opposite case permanence would follow on account of the uninterrupted duration of essence. Indeed, besides substantial identity there is no other essential mark of permanence. [1794—1796]

[Saṃghabhadra and his adherents] must concede that the *kāritra* is alternatively either different or not different from the *dharma*, because these two theses are mutually exclusive, so that when denying the one we affirm the other and *vice versa*. A third possibility does not exist.

[Now it will be shown that both alternatives imply consequences which are not acceptable by Sarvāstivādin].

A. [We begin with the *prasāṅga* deduction from the supposition that the *kāritra* is different from the *dharma*]. If *kāritra* is different from the *dharma*, then we would arrive at the conclusion that *dharmas* existing in the present are unreal in their antecedent and subsequent states. [This inference can be formulated in the following syllogism:]

Probandum: *dharmas* existing in the present are unreal in their antecedent and subsequent states.

Reason: because they are causes (= *hetuvād*), or because they are contingent (= *saṃskṛtatvād*).

Example: just as is the case with *kāritra*.

The same probandum can be proved also by other reasons, as e.g. 'reality' (*vastutva*). All these remaining reasons are alluded to by the addition of the word 'etc.' [in the *kārikā* 1795:] »being a cause, being contingent, etc.«.

In the opposite case, if there were no antecedent and no subsequent unreality, then the permanence (*nityatā*) of all which is contingent (*saṃskṛta*) would arise, because the essence (*svabhāva*) [of a *dharma*] would continue to exist in all Times (= *sarvadā*). Indeed, besides everlasting existence (*sadāsattva*), there is no other essential mark of permanence.

when it is present. What is [absolutely] inactive cannot project its special effect (*na svaphalam ākṣipati*), and only the projection of a special effect is called *kāritra*«.

As it is said:

»Wise men call permanent a thing the essence of which is never destroyed«.

[Now our opponent may object that the *kāritra* (= *śakti*) is [also] inherent to permanent substances (= *nityasya śaktiḥ*)¹. Consequently [in our syllogism] there is no exclusion of the reasons: *hetutva* (being a cause) or *saṃskṛtatva* (being contingent), etc. from the class of negative instances (= *hetoḥ sādhyavipakṣeṇa virodhaḥ*), [i.e. in our case from the class of permanent entities].

[In order to reject this objection, the author says:]

The causal determination of something which is permanent has been previously rejected by showing its impossibility in both alternative cases of a successive and of a simultaneous [manifestation of all the effects]. Indeed, it is obvious that in the permanent there is no place for contingency. [1797]

»Previously« means: »in Chapter [VIII of this treatise, devoted to the] Analysis of permanent Substance«. As it is generally admitted that whatever is contingent (*saṃskṛta*) is also impermanent (*anitya*), the statement: »no contingency is possible in the permanent« (*saṃskṛtatvaṃ nitye na sambhavati*) is self-evident.

[In other words: it can be shown by the way of logical argumentation that the assumption of a *kāritra*, as different from the *dharma* itself, is not compatible with the *traikālyā* doctrine].

[The same result can be drawn from the testimony of the Scripture:]

By admitting *kāritra* along with *skandhas*, *āyatana*s etc. there would arise [for the Sarvāstivādin] an unavoidable contradiction with the fundamental theses of [his] own system. [1798]

By admitting the *kāritra* as something different from the *skandhas*, *āyatana*s etc., there would arise a contradiction with the fundamental thesis of [Buddhist] doctrine. Indeed, the Blessed

¹ G. *nityatā śaktiḥ*. T. *gal te rtag pa dan nus pa dan*. — According to Mahāvibhāṣā, cf. supra p. 21², the *asaṃskṛtas* do not possess any *hetutva*, but nevertheless they have a *sui generis* negative *kāritra*.

One said¹: »The people are saying 'all'; o Brahman! by 'all' are meant the five *skandhas*, the twelve *āyatanas*, the eighteen *dhātus*«. [= The reality of a *kāritra* of the *dharma* apart from the *dharma*s themselves is implicitly denied by this saying of Buddha].

B. [We analyze next the second alternative, *viz.* the supposition that the *kāritra* of a *dharma* and the *dharma* itself are identical. The author says:]

Also when assuming its identity, *kāritra*, because of its non-difference from the *dharma*, would be perpetually existing, just as the essence of the *dharma*. And therefore the distinction of Times could not be based on it, as, indeed, there would be no possibility of distinction between the loss, the attaining and the non-attaining of the *kāritra* [by *dharma*]. [1799—1800]

We may admit that *kāritra* is identical with the *dharma*. Then in its quality of being not different from the *dharma* itself, the *kāritra*, just as the *dharmasvabhāva* would also become 'perpetually existing'. And consequently there would be no distinction of Times based on *kāritra* as in the aforesaid definition: »What has lost its *kāritra* is past, what has attained its *kāritra* is present, what has not yet attained its *kāritra* is future«.

[Indeed this distinction of Times is possible only when

¹ *sarvam asti* belongs to those canonical formulae, which are accepted by all schools, but the interpretation of which was by no means settled. In the sense of the Sūtra quoted in the text (Samy. Nik. IV, 15), the Sautrāntikas too are »Sarvāstivādins«. But Vaibhāṣikas take *sarvam asti* to mean *sarvadā asti* = *trikāleṣv asti*. Neither one explanation nor the other seem, however, to convey the original meaning which was probably the totality of the differentiated, mortal, world as opposed to the primeval unity of the undifferentiated absolute. Cf. de La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, p. 139, n. 2: »quand l'Écriture parle de «tout» elle entend tout ce qui est l'objet de la connaissance vulgaire: elle fait abstraction d'une chose plus subtile, plus difficile à connaître, à savoir le Nirvāṇa. Ceci résulte de Majjhima, I, 3, où sont séparés et distingués, d'une part «tout», d'autre part le Nirvāṇa«. In other words: *sarvam* = *sarve* [*saṃskṛta*] *dharmāḥ* = *nāmarūpa* as opposed to the one, absolute and transcendental Dharma = *dharmakāya* = *nirvāṇadhātu*.

attaining and not attaining [of the present] are understood as [two real and] distinctly differentiated [states] of the *kāritra* and precisely those two [states] cannot be distinctly differentiated because there is no such a differentiation for [entities] which perpetually persist in the same unique essence (= *sadāvasthitaikarūpa*).

[Another consequence of the identity of *kāritra* and *dharma* is the following one:]

Or in consequence of its being not different from the *kāritra*, the *dharma* may be just as *kāritra*: cut off before and after and condensing its whole existence in the instantaneous middlepoint (= *madhyamātrakasarva*). [1801]

In consequence of its being not different from the *kāritra*, the *dharma* would be just as *kāritra*, lacking past and future and possessing its whole existence only in the middle [point-instant]. [This view is actually accepted by the Sautrāntikas, it stands however in direct opposition to the theory of *sarvāstivāda*].

§ 5. The third possibility of a *kāritra* which is and is not identical with the *dharmasvabhāva* is rejected.

[The Vaibhāṣika rejoinders: Your two *prasaṅgas* do not exhaust all possibilities of the problem. Indeed, besides difference and identity of *kāritra* and *dharma* a third theory is possible according to which *kāritra* and *dharma* are and are not identical. This is just our stand-point. We teach that the *kāritra* does not exist independently, as something different from the *dharma*, but we deny that the *kāritra* is simply identical with the *dharma* and that it lasts permanently just as does the *dharma*].

[Alluding to this theory the Sautrāntika states:] The assertion that *kāritra* and *dharma* are and are not identical includes a mutual contradiction. It is therefore justly turned into ridicule by the following stanza:

The *kāritra* does not exist permanently, the *dharma* is characterised as existing permanently, but nevertheless the *kāritra* is not different from the *dharma*! Indeed, it is a caprice of the *Īśvara* in its arbitrariness¹. [1802]

¹ Cf. AbhK V, 58; N p. 6; Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 5.

As a consequence of the non-difference from the *kāritra* it follows that the *dharma*s of *rūpa* etc. do not exist permanently. Therefore the Vaibhāṣika admits: »the *kāritra* does not exist permanently«. In the same way [as a consequence of non-difference] it follows that *kāritra* is not different from *dharma* and it is just this which is [also] admitted [by the Vaibhāṣika]. [And nevertheless the Vaibhāṣika assumes that the *dharma* exist permanently!] This attitude has been characterized as a caprice of the Īśvara. Just as the Īśvara and similar almighty persons, without troubling themselves about what is rationally founded or not, act arbitrarily, such is exactly the attitude of these Vaibhāṣikas: arbitrary and disregarding all logical consistency.

§ 6. *kāritra* of *kāritra*, rejected.

[Besides this *prasaṅga*-deduction there is another argument against the thesis of Vaibhāṣikas, viz. that the distinction of Times is based on the *kāritra*:]

If the Time-epochs [of the *kāritra*] are established also with reference to another *kāritra*, we must repeat the same method of arguing *ad infinitum*. [1803]

According to Vaibhāṣikas the *kāritra* is not different from the *dharma*s. Consequently it lasts also during the three Times and has its future, present and past states¹, viz.: the *kāritra* which has not yet attained its existence is a future *kāritra*; the *kāritra* which has just attained its existence is the present *kāritra*; the *kāritra* which has already ceased to be is a past *kāritra*].

[Now we state:] If you claim the possession of three Times, future etc. by the *kāritra* [of a *dharma*], without however admitting the existence of a second *kāritra* of this *kāritra*, then you cannot say that the distinction of Times is [always] based on the *kāritra*, because you admit an exception to this rule. You teach namely that the *kāritra* possesses the three Times, future etc.

¹ This tacit supposition is necessary for deducing the *prasaṅga* formulated by the Sautrāntika. This very starting point is, however, erroneous. The Vaibhāṣika do not teach that *kāritra* possesses the three Times; *kāritra* is momentary and the *dharma-svabhāva* only lasts through the three Times.

only with reference to its own essence (= *svarūpasattā*), [not with reference to its *kāritra*] and you should also treat the *dharma*s (= *bhāvas*) precisely in the same manner. Hence what is the use of inventing a *kāritra*?

Now, if in order to avoid the objection that there are exceptions from the rule accepted, the Vaibhāṣika admits the *kāritra* of the *kāritra* of a *dharma*, then the whole *prasaṅga*-deduction: [difference or not difference] must be repeated. And moreover there would arise the error of a regressus in infinitum.

§ 7. Śāntarakṣita's criticism of the theory according to which the *kāritra* is a quality differentiating the essence of a *dharma*.

If one holds that *kāritra* is a *viśeṣa* like *sapratighatva* etc., which is not different¹ from the *svarūpa*, we reply: this theory is useless against the argument in question.

sapratighatva etc. is not conceived as an occasional [quality] of an unvariably concomitant substance because it expresses the being as such. [1804]

Let us return to the syllogism: assuming the identity [of *kāritra* with the *dharma*], the *kāritra* would be everlasting because, in that case, no differentiation (*viśeṣa*), just as in the case of the *dharma*svarūpa, would be possible. Referring to this argument Saṃghabhadra says: there exist determining qualities (*viśeṣaka dharma*) which are not different from the *svarūpa* (= *svabhāva*) [of the *dharma*], as e. g. the *sapratighatva* of the earth etc. Indeed, the [*dharma*s], although not differentiated by their *padārthatva* [which they possess in common], are differentiated as *sapratigha* and *apratigha*, *sanidarśana* and *anidarśana* by qualities (= *dharma*) which are not different from their *svarūpa*. In the same manner, a *dharma* may be determined by a *kāritra* [which is itself not different from the *svarūpa* of the *dharma*].

¹ G has *svarūpād vyatirikto*, but. Tib. reads *°tha mi dud* = *svarūpavyatirikto*.

[Master Saṃghabhadra rejects this theory, because] it is useless against the argument in question which is as follows: having admitted that *kāritra* is not different from the *svarūpa*, no differentiation (= *viśeṣa*) of the *padārtha*, which has been identified with the *kāritra*, is possible; hence the necessary conclusion that no distinction of Times can be established by *kāritra*.

[Between special qualities and *kāritra* there is of course no analogy]. The *dharmas* of the earth etc. are different because they are differentiated by their mutually exclusive *svalakṣaṇas*. Hence some are *sapratigha*, and some *apratigha*, as e.g. the *vedanā* etc. But these [*dharmas*] which are *apratigha* can never become *sapratigha*, because there is no unique unvariably concomitant substance (= *eko 'nugamī padārthātāmā*) to which the *sapratighatva* of the earth etc. could be attributed as a temporary, occasional quality (*kādācitka dharma*). Special qualities as *sapratighatva* etc. express the whole being as such, i.e. as determined by the exclusion of all remaining homogeneous (*sajātīya*) as well as heterogeneous (*vijātīya*) qualities. Hence, although not differing from the *svarūpa*, they cannot be [in opposition to the *kāritra*], the principle of differentiation of the same [unchangeable substance].

[Objection:] if there is no *sapratighatva* as a principle of differentiation existing independently of the *svarūpa* itself, why is the expression *rūpasya sapratighatvam* used as if we were concerned with a real entity differentiating the *rūpa* into *sapratigha* and *apratigha*?

The author answers:

Without rejecting other differences, the *dharma* (= *bhāva*) is thus characterized by the expression *rūpasya sapratighatva* just as we say also *cetaso vāsanā*. [1806]

*anaksiptānyabhedena = bhedāntarāpratikṣepena*¹ = without rejecting other differences. — »Is thus characterized« = as if it were an [independently existing] principle of differentiation (= *vyatirekī*). »Just as the *vāsanā* of the mind« is the example².

¹ T. *mi hphen yin*. G. has *bhedāntarāpratikṣepena*.

² The *vāsanās* (= *bījas*) are *upatta* by the *citta*: »'appropriés' — embrassés (*parigrah*, 'intégrés') dans son être, partageant son destin bon ou mauvais (*ekayogakṣemeṇa*)«. De La Vallée Poussin, *Siddhi*, p. 124.

§ 8. The impredicability of *kāritra*.

Again Master [Saṃghabhadra] says¹: the *kāritra* is not different from the *dharmā*, because we do not perceive it independently of the *svabhāva* [of the *dharmā*]; neither is it simply the *dharmā*, because, even when the *svabhāva* [of the *dharmā*] exists, *kāritra* may sometimes be absent. It can neither [be said, that] *kāritra* does not exist at all, only because there is no difference [between *kāritra* and *dharmā*], or because *kāritra* is antecedently inexistent. [In one word:] *kāritra* is just as *saṃtāna* which is defined as the immediate succession of *dharma*s. Indeed, it is not different from the *dharma*s, because it is not perceived independently of them. Moreover, it is also not simply the *dharma*s, because, in that case a single *dharma* would still be a *saṃtāna*. Finally, it cannot be said that *saṃtāna* does not exist at all, because its effects are real. It is said therefore:

We postulate the effects of *saṃtāna* [as existing really], but the *saṃtāna* itself can nowhere be found; our thesis that the distinction of Times is based on *kāritra* may be also understood by analogy to this.

[The author now criticizes this theory]. He says:

kāritra is described [by you] as being exactly like *saṃtāna* etc.: impredicable with reference to both alternatives of identity and non-identity [with the *dharma*s]. In this case would it not possess [only] a *saṃvṛti*-reality?

And hence being only a construction of the mind (= *kalpita*), it will not be able [to produce] any effect (*kārya*), exactly like the *saṃtāna*, because only real entities possess the potency of efficacious action (= *arthakriyā*).

Its existence is not real and therefore the distinction of Times which is based upon it is not *tāttvika* either (= is also without foundation in absolute reality). [1807—1809]

In the *kārika* it is said: »*saṃtāna* etc.« — by the word »etc.« other similar entities as collection (*saṃūha*) etc. are included. As regards the *saṃtāna*, neither its identity nor its non-identity with elements constituting it can be predicated. Therefore the *saṃtāna*

¹ Cf. N p. 633 a 25.

[for us Sautrāntikas] is *niḥsvabhāva*. Just as the *pudgala* [which is also impredicable], and, in the same sense the *kāritra* is *niḥsvabhāva* as well. Indeed, if there is any *svabhāva* [in a thing], it is necessarily either identical or not identical. And hence, because it is [only] a construction of the mind (= *kalpitatvāt*), the *kāritra* of the *dharma* is not capable to produce any effect, exactly like the *saṃtāna*. Indeed, the *saṃtāna*, being only a construction of the mind, possesses no capacity of producing effects in consequence of its *niḥsvabhāvatva*, and because the production of effects is intimately bound with the *svabhāva*. Therefore only real elements of the *saṃtāna* are capable of efficacious action, and not the constructed (*kalpita*) *saṃtāna*.

[A further consequence of all these statements is that] *kāritra*, because it exists only as a *prajñapti*, does not exist *paramārthatas* neither before nor after [its manifestation]. And, therefore, the distinction of Times as well which is [according to your doctrine] based upon it, is only a construction of the mind and nothing real (*na bhāvikam* = *na tātṭvikam*).

§ 9. *kāritra* as *prajñapti* is rejected

[Our opponent asks:] It may be granted that *kāritra*, and consequently the distinction of Times which is based upon it as well, are only *prajñaptisat*. What is wrong in this assumption?

[The author answers:]

The *kāritra*, which has been defined [by you] as a potency of projecting effects, has only a nominal existence (= *śabdagocara*). But potency means reality, therefore how can it be only *prajñaptisat*?

Can the *rūpa*-[elements of fire], which are postulated as effecting the action of burning, ripening etc., be accepted as identical in their past and future states?

If so, how can such mutually exclusive aspects as [precedent] non-activity, actual activity and [subsequent] loss of activity coexist in the same undifferentiated (*nirviśiṣṭa*) thing? Now [our opponent] may admit that the thing existing during the [three] Times is postulated, not as being the same and undifferentiated, because it attains its next [Time]-condition after having abandoned the [previous one]. In this

case we must ask: are the conditions (= *avasthā*) different from the being itself? [The answer cannot be but:] No. Because [otherwise] inactivity would be the consequence.

Indeed [only] because those [three Time-conditions] are really existing, the existence of effects is perceived. [1810—1815]

[Sautrāntika:] You have defined the *kāritra* of the *dharma*s as the potency of projecting results (*phalākṣepa*). [The potency of projecting results, however, is just the definition of the *svabhāva*, consequently it can be only *tāttvika*, having its foundation in absolute reality, and not *śabdāgocara*, belonging only to the domain of verbal conventions. Indeed, the *svabhāvalakṣaṇa*, because it does not belong to wordly experience (= *avyavahārikam*), cannot be attained by words. And thus, being not different from the being itself]¹, how can potency possess [only] a *prajñapti*-existence? [The answer is:] it cannot. And therefore the Time-distinction, which depends on it, must be also accepted as »based upon absolute reality« (*tāttvika*).

Moreover: we perceive *rūpa*-elements constituting fire etc., which possess [the potency of] effecting such purposive actions [= which are *arthakriyākāri*] as burning, ripening etc. [Concerning such] potencies [there arises the question:] are they in their past and future conditions the same or different [potencies]? If they are the same, how can the three mutually exclusive qualities, *viz.* the [antecedent] inactivity etc., by which the distinction of succeeding conditions of future, past and present is established, be coexistent in one and the same, undifferentiated thing? Indeed, if, notwithstanding the attribution of contradictory qualities, the identity [of a thing] could be preserved, then all differentiations would disappear and the whole world would become one. And the consequence of identity would be the simultaneous origination [of all effects].

Now, [to avoid all these *prasaṅgas* another theory may be taken into consideration:] the thing [existing] during [the three] Times is not postulated as being without differentiation (*nirviśiṣṭa*), because [in reality] it is differentiated by the difference of aban-

¹ The whole passage is wanting in G. My translation follows the T.

doning [the one] and of grasping [the another] condition. If it is so, we must ask: of what sort are those conditions? — Are they different (*bhinna*) or not different from the being itself (*bhāva* = *svabhāva*)?

Our opponent answers: they are not different (*abheda*). — Why? [For two reasons:] 1° because the inactivity of the being would be the consequence, and 2° because the potency of producing effects would be realized in the case of presence as well in the case of absence (= *anvaya-vyatirekābhīyam*) of those conditions.

§ 10. The 'thing' and its 'conditions'.

Now [Śāntarakṣita] criticizes [also these views. He says:]

How can those [three conditions] be proved not to be different from the thing itself during the Time-epochs? As they exist and disappear after having been previously nonexistent, how can they be 'essentially identical' (= *tādātmika*)?

If in the middle (= present) condition a thing is active by its own essence (*svabhāvena* = *svarūpeṇa*), then the same essence exists also in both remaining conditions [of future and of past] and [consequently] how can you imagine the previous lack and the subsequent loss of activity in this thing's own essence, in those two conditions?

On the other hand, if [the thing] is active through the essence of some other being (*pararūpeṇa* = *parabhāvena*), then its own inactivity would result.

[But] if we admit that [things as] fire etc. are not the same in the conditions of past and future, this thesis would give no support to the objection of intermingling activity [and non-activity]. [The consequence would be the doctrine, that] the capacity of producing effects (= *kāryayogya*) arises in the present moment (= *idāṇīm*), after having been previously nonexistent, and that it does not last, after its having gained existence. In this manner the absence of invariable coexistence of the thing [with its Time-conditions] would be proved. [1816—1820]

[We ask:] how can it be demonstrated that the conditions (*avasthā*) are not different from the thing itself (*vastu*)? [And

we answer:] it is not possible at all. Indeed, the *avasthās* come into existence after having been inexistent and they disappear after having been existent; but the *vastu* is not postulated thus, for it is granted [by all schools] that it exists permanently. Consequently, how can the *avasthās*, which come into existence after having been inexistent and which [afterwards] cease to be existent, be 'essentially identical' (*tādātmika*) [with the *vastu*]? [We reply again:] it is quite impossible! The *yogakṣema*¹ [of these two notions: *avasthā* and *vastu*] is [essentially] different.

[Now we are giving a formal demonstration of our denial of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine by the way of the *prasaṅga* method:]

[First alternative (I):] the *avasthās* and the *vastu* are not different². Then two following *prasaṅga* syllogisms could be formulated:

a) the *avasthās* exist permanently because they are not different from the *vastu*; just as it is the case with the *svabhāva* of the *vastu*;

b) the *vastu* comes into existence after having been inexistent, because it is not different from the *avasthās*, just as the *svabhāvas* of the *avasthās*.

[Second alternative (II):] the *avasthās* and the *vastu* are different. [In this thesis two further alternatives may be distinguished: a) in all *avasthās* the *vastu* is the same, identical *vastu*, b) in each *avasthā* there is a different *vastu*.]

a. Admitting that there is a difference between the *avasthās* and the *vastu*, [which is the same in all *avasthās*], the attribution of contradictory qualities [to the same subject] will again be unavoidable.

[Indeed, let us consider in this connection the following *prasaṅga*:] the *vastu* displays its *kāritra* in the middle (= present) *avasthā* either through its *svabhāva* (= through its own essence), or through the *parabhāva* (= through the essence of another *vastu*). [Both suppositions lead to unacceptable consequences:]

¹ *bhinnayogakṣema* = 'different destiny' = »a different connotation«: as opposed to *ekayogakṣema*; cf. *Triṃśikā* p. 19, Jacobi p. 13: »als etwas durchaus Gleichartiges«; TSP p. 134: *ekayogakṣemalakṣaṇatvād abhedasya* and supra, p. 45 note 2.

² *bhavatu cāvasthābhedaparikalpanā*, Tib.: *gnas skabs tha dad pa yōis su brtags pa yin du chug mod*. G. has *parakalpanā*.

α) First alternative: the *vastu* displays its *kāritra* (= the *vastu* is *kāraka*) in the middle-*avasthā* through its *svabhāva*; then the same *svabhāva* also exists in the remaining two *avasthās* of the past and of the future, and, consequently, in the very *svabhāva* which is just displaying its *kāritra*, the absence of the not yet manifested and of the still vanished *kāritra* would be coexistent. How it is possible?

β) Second alternative: the *vastu* displays its *kāritra* in the middle-*avasthā* through the *svabhāva* of another *vastu* (= through the *parabhāva*): then the *vastu* itself is without its own *kāritra*; it is hence a non-*vastu*.

In this way the alternative (II a) that *vastus*, as fire etc. are the same in all *avasthās*, [is shown] to be impossible.

b. [Now let us analyze the alternative (II b), that there is a different *vastu* [in each *avasthā*]. When accepting this thesis we would be free from the objection of intermingling in the same subject (= *ekatra*) mutually exclusive qualities as *kāritra* and non-*kāritra*, just because the *vastu* would not be the same. But [on the other hand a new difficulty would arise, viz.] that the *vastu* as fire etc. which possesses its *kāritra* as burning, ripening etc. would come into existence after having been inexistent, and that it would cease to exist after having been existent. Thus the contradiction with the accepted definition of the *vastu* as possessing a permanent existence (= *sadāstitva*) would arise as consequence of the absence of coexistence (= *anvaya*) [of the *vastu* with its *avasthās*].

§ 11. Two *prasaṅga* arguments shoving the impossibility of a thing without *kāritra*.

[Vaibhāṣika objects:] the *vastu*, as possessing the *kāritra*, may indeed come into existence after having been inexistent, and it may cease to exist after having been existent. [But this does not exclude that the *vastu* exists in the past and in the future *avasthās* [as the same *vastu*], possessing however no *kāritra*. Consequently, there is no contradiction with the permanent existence accepted [by our school].

[To this we reply:]

Only a *vastu* (= *bhāva*) which possesses *kāritra* (= *kriyā*) is really existent. And precisely this kind of *vastu* does not

exist in both *avasthās* [of the past and of the future]. From the *vastu* which exists [in these *avasthās* without *kāritra*] no effect (*kārya*) can originate. [1821]

[Vaibhāṣika again protests:] the past *sabhāga-hetus* possess the *kāritra* (= *kāryayogyā*). Your argument: 'no *kārya* can originate from the *vastu*, which exists [in these *avasthās* without the *kāritra*]' is not right.

[In reply to this objection Śāntarakṣita adduces further *prasāṅga* deductions showing the impossibility of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine. He says:]

That past *vastu* [without *kāritra*] would be evidently a present one because, in consequence of its occasionalness (*kādācithkatayā*), it is coming into existence after having been [previously] inexistent, exactly like other [present *vastus*].

What is free from causal determination (*ahetutva*) can only be either always existent or always inexistent. A thing the existence of which is necessarily determined by causal factors is called 'present'.

Our opponents teach, that there is a substantial difference (*vailakṣanya*) with the *pratisamkhyānirodha* etc., because the *samskṛtatva* of *rūpa* etc. is due to association with *jāti*, *sthiti* etc.

Concerning this [theory] we must ask: what is the *viśeṣa* produced [by the *jāti*] and with reference to which [the *jāti*] is called 'the parent of the [*rūpa*]'?—Is it different or not different from the not yet born *rūpa*?

To begin with [the first alternative:] if this *viśeṣa* (= *atiśaya*) is not different, then it has no potency of producing, because, just like after the realization [of the *jāti*], it exists also before [its] realization.

This *viśeṣa* (= *atiśaya*) does not exist as a different one, because, owing to this difference, there is no possibility [of any real relation]¹. Moreover, the *asatkārya* would then be the consequence, because it was previously inexistent.

¹ A similar argumentation is to be found in TSP 146, ad TS 402 where the impossibility of cooperation of the *sahakārins* with a *sthirapadārtha* is discussed: *teneti* = *atiśayena*, *tasyāpīti* = *nityasya kaḥ sambandha ityādinottaram āha. kaḥ sambandhaḥ* =

[When analysing] disintegration, stabilization and destruction in both alternatives of difference and identity, precisely the same logical errors concerning [the remaining *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*], *jarā* etc. will arise. [1822—1828]

[First *prasaṅga* (I): the past *vastu* without *kāritra*, which you admit, would be a present one,] because in consequence of its occasionalness [it comes into existence after having been previously inexistent]. Example: other present *vastus* which do not constitute the subjects of our discussion (= which are not the *dharmin* of the present syllogism).

[This argument] is valid, because the invariable concomitance (*anvaya*) [between occasional existence and presence is not missing]: everything which is produced by causal determinants (*hetu-pratyaya*), is called 'present', and everything which exists occasionally (*kādācitka*) is necessarily produced by causal determinants. Indeed, for an entity which is not produced by causal determinants (= *ahetuka*) only two alternatives are possible: to be always existent or to be always inexistent, for only in these two cases complete independence from any other entity is guaranteed. [Hence, the third possibility, that of being sometimes existent and sometimes inexistent is reserved to entities which are causally determined = whose existence is limited by causal determinants]. Therefore [we may fairly conclude:] whatever exists occasionally, is necessarily produced by causal determinants, and whatever is produced by causal determinants is necessarily in the present. [In one word:] 'to exist occasionally (*kādācitkatva*)' implies: 'to be present (*varttamānatva*)' [and our *prasaṅga* deduction is precisely based on this *vyāpti*].

[Second *prasaṅga* (II):] if past and future things exist as real entities (*dravyatas*), then the consequence would be the permanent existence (*śāśvata*) of all *saṃskṛta*-elements (= *saṃskāra*), and hence the special quality (*viśeṣa* = *atiśaya*) which distinguishes

naiva kaścīd ity arthaḥ. dvividha eva hi sambandhas: tādātmyaṃ tadutpattiś ca. tatra na tāvat tādātmyalakṣaṇo bhedasyā 'ṅgikṛta-tvāt. nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ saḥakāribhya eva tasyotpatteḥ. tatas tasyotpattir aṅgikriyate, tadā tanmātrabhāvitvād atiśayānām yugapad evotpattiḥ syāt. tatas ca sarvakāryānām yugapad utpattiprasaṅgaḥ. atiśayavataḥ kārāṇasya sarvadā 'vasthitatvāt.

the *saṃskṛta* elements, such as *rūpa* etc., from the *asaṃskṛta* elements, such as *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* etc., would not be possible.

The Vaibhāṣika protests: the *saṃskṛtatva* of *rūpa* etc. is due to the association of these elements with the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*; *asaṃskṛta* elements, as infinite space etc. are not associated with them. There is therefore an essential difference (= *vailakṣaṇya*) between *rūpa* etc. and *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* etc.

We reply: Your theory is wrong. [In order to demonstrate it, let us consider your distinction of] the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, viz. *jāti*, *jarā*, *sthiti* and *anityatā*, and their special potencies (= *kāritra*, *vyāpara*) causing birth, disintegrating, stabilizing and destroying.

We may start with the analysis of the *jāti*. [According to your doctrine] it gives birth to a supplementation (*viśeṣa*) [*i. e.* to a special quality¹ owing to which future *saṃskṛta*-elements acquire

¹ 1. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, etc. the origination of an effect is due to the cooperation of many special causes (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) which can be divided into the 3 following categories: a) basal instrumental cause (*sādhakatama*, *atiśayaśaktimat-kāraṇa*, *kaṛaṇa*), b) subsidiary or assisting causes (*sahakāri*), c) material cause (*samavāyi*, *upādāna-kāraṇa*). To this may be added the fourth variety of general or universal causes (*sādhāraṇa*), as Space, Time, the will of God etc. The »collocation« of all these factors destroys a given whole (*avayavin*) and produces a new »collocation«, a new whole out of the same material. This transition is what is called the *asatkāryavāda*: it does not obviously teach the creation of a new substance, but only an increment, an outgrowth of immanent potencies (*atiśaya-ādhana*, 'Steigerung der Kräfte') owing to which the clay is supplanted by a pot, a seed by a sprout etc. The basal cause is the *sādhakatamaṃ kāraṇam* because it contributes pre-eminently to the production of the *atiśaya*.

2. The theory of causation elaborated by the Buddhist Abhidharma shares with the Naiyāyikas the view that no effect arises from a single cause. There is also — in spite of the essentially different interpretation of causal interdependence as *pratītyasamutpāda* — some analogy and correspondence between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika classifications; so *e.g.* the *adhipati-pratyaya* can be compared with the *atiśayaśaktimat* = *sādhakatamaṃ kāraṇam*, the *samanantara-pratyaya* with the *upādāna* or *samavāyikāraṇa*. Cf. Th. Stecherbatsky, *Central Conception*, p. 106, *Buddhist Logic* II, p. 311. There is also an obvious analogy between the

their *kāritra* and produce their effects]. In this sense *jāti* is called 'the parent of the *saṃskṛtadharmas*'. [It does not produce the *saṃskṛta*-elements themselves, but it makes them present.]

We ask: of what kind is this *viśeṣa*? — Does it differ or not from the element itself?

1. First alternative: the *viśeṣa* is not different from the element itself. This thesis is impossible, because then this *viśeṣa*, being realized (*niṣpanna*) before the *jāti* had displayed its *kāritra*, would be fully ineffective just like after [its] realization. Indeed, what is [already] realized, is without *kāritra*, otherwise everything would possess its *kāritra* (= *atiprasaṅgāt*)¹.

2. Second alternative: the *viśeṣa* is different from the element. This cannot be admitted either, because then the relation expressed by [the Genetive case:] 'the *viśeṣa* of this *rūpa*' would be without real foundation. [Indeed, what kind of a relation would in this case be possible?] The relation of substantial identity (*tādātmya*) is excluded by the very supposition that there is a difference, or because the aforesaid consequences would arise. Causal relation (*adūtpatti*) is also out of question, because the *jāti*, [not the element itself] is the producing cause of this

sādhāraṇa-kāraṇas of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas etc. and the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* of the Vaiśeṣikas. Thus the effect is produced by the cooperation of two sets of causal determinants: by the totality of special causes and conditions (*hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrya*) and by the four (or three) universal forces of contingency (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*). Cf. AbhK II 234. The essence of the *saṃskṛta-dharma* always exists but only at a given moment, when a definite constellation of *hetu* and *pratyayas* arises, *jāti* and the remaining *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* associate with the *dharma* and compel it to manifest the momentary *kāritra*. The eternal elements as *ākāśa* are never associated with the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* and are therefore beyond the reach of contingency and causality.

3. This doctrine is rejected by Sautrāntikas. The *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* taught by Buddha refer to the whole personal series (*saṃtāna*), not to the separate elements. Moreover, the hypostasis of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, as independent forces cooperating with all *saṃskṛtadharmas*, is quite superfluous: it is the totality of causes and conditions (*sāmagrya*) which makes the *dharma* present, not the *jāti*. Cf. AbhK II 228, 235.

¹ According to T., G. has *anavasthāprasaṅgāt*.

viśeṣa (= *jāter eva tadutpatteḥ*)¹. Other relations, as *ādhara*, *ādheya* etc. cannot be admitted either, because they are only special cases of causal dependence.

Now [let us again consider] the assumption of causal dependence. [Then two following *prasaṅgas* may be taken into account:]

1) [The element] is a *tanmātra-kāraṇa* (= a basal, main cause)². Then the *viśeṣa*, as produced exclusively by it, would always arise and *jāti* would be of no use.

2) The element produces the *viśeṣa* in correlation with the *jāti*. This assumption is possible only when the *jāti* is the *sahakāri-kāraṇa*. But then, by analysing the two alternatives of identity and not-identity in the same manner as the *viśeṣa* analysed before, we shall have a *regressus ad infinitum*.

Therefore [we conclude]: admitting the difference of the element and its *viśeṣa*, we are unable to establish logically any relation between them.

Another [argument against the theory of difference]: the *viśeṣa* of the element is previously inexistent; the consequence therefore is the *asatkārya*, the inexistence of the effect before its creation by the cause.

In the same manner, when the disintegration (= *anyathātva*) is accomplished by *jarā*, the stabilization by *sthiti* and the annihilation by *anityata* two alternatives [must be taken into consideration, *viz.* the alternative] of identity and of non-identity [between the element itself and the *viśeṣa* produced by the special potencies] of these [three remaining *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*], disintegration etc. The criticism which applies to *jarā* etc. is just the same as in the case of the *jāti*.

§ 12. *kāritra* and the momentariness of past and future *dharmas*.

[Now we come to another argument:]

Those [*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*] *jāti* etc. are executing their special effects by an essential determination of their potency (= *sāmarthyā-niyamātmanā*) and their essence exists before

¹ Lit: »because it arises out of *jāti*«.

² *tanmātra-kāraṇa* = *atiśaya-śaktimat, sādihakatamaṃ kāraṇam*, cf. TSP p. 407, 413.

and after; therefore why do they not always¹ display the activity which is [produced] by their [everlasting] essential potency? But if they do, the indefiniteness of Time-epochs [is the consequence]. [1830]

Moreover, the fact that *jāti* etc. each display their special effect is due to the determination of their *sāmarthya-svabhāva*. Now [as you teach] that *sāmarthya-svabhāva* (= essential potency) is always existent, hence [you are obliged to allow that the *samskṛtalakṣaṇas* must] always display their special effects². [And if you object that this consequence would not arise, because the displaying of special effects (*svakārya*) of *jāti* etc. depends on cooperation with auxiliary causes and conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*), then we answer:] the lack of [auxiliary] causes and conditions is no [argument], because these causes and conditions [again according to your own theory] are always present.

We conclude that *jāti* etc. produce their special effects as origination etc. [not only in the present, but also] in their past and future conditions. Hence the indefiniteness (= *aparimitatva* = non-discrimination) of Time-epochs in each single Time-epoch is the inevitable consequence [of your stand-point]

Moreover of what nature are past [and future] things? Are they momentary or not? If we admit the first, the indefiniteness of Time-epochs would arise again. [Indeed] a moment which just originates is present, when it is annihilated after having arisen, then it is past; that which will arise is a future one. [1831—1832]

There are two alternatives: past and future things may be either momentary or not momentary. If we admit the first alternative, *viz.* that they are momentary, then we shall have just the same indefiniteness of Time-epochs, [as before]. By the words 'a moment which just originates etc.' the author explains this [indefiniteness].

¹ G. has *prārabhante na kiṃ tadā svānūrūpaṃ kriyāṃ* and *tadā* is also confirmed by the Tib. version (*de tshe*). The sense, however, requires clearly *sadā*.

² The same argument AbhK II, 56.

Or they are not momentary. Then we shall have a contradiction with the fundamental tenet. Indeed, the doctrine that all *saṃskāras* are momentary has been taught as a fundamental thesis [of Buddhism]. [1833]

The second alternative is: past and future things are not momentary. If we admit this, we will be in contradiction with the fundamental tenet (*siddhānta*, *kṛtānta*) which proclaims that all *saṃskāras* are momentary.

We shall also have a contradiction with sound logic: whatever exists is necessarily momentary¹, just as is the present. We have already demonstrated before the implication-relationship between these two predications (= *atra*). [1834]

Moreover, this thesis, [*viz.* the non-momentariness of past things] would be not only in contradiction with the fundamental, [generally admitted] tenet [of Buddhist philosophy], but also it would be in contradiction with logical arguments, namely with the following syllogism:

Whatever is existing is momentary.

Example: present things.

Reason: past and future things are existing.

Conclusion: they are necessarily momentary.

In a previous Chapter, that on Momentariness² (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅgādhikāre*), we have proved the implication-relationship (= *pratibandha*) of this *hetu* (= *sattva*) [with the *sādhya* 'kṣaṇikatva']. This syllogism is therefore not *anaikāntika*. Indeed the potency of producing effects (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the essence of existence, because non-momentary entities exclude simultaneous as well as successive *arthakriyākāritva*: therefore, when excluding the *arthakriyākāritva*, we also exclude existence (= *sattva*) which is identical with it. The predicate 'existence' (= *sattva*) is excluded from all *dharmins* which are predicated by the negation of the *sādhya* (= from all *sādhya-vipakṣas*) [and thus the validity of our syllogism is ascertained].

¹ G. *santaś cen niyamāt kṣaṇabhaṅginah*; but *santaś ca* (as in Tib.) would be a better reading.

² TS 391—394, TSP p. 143.

§ 13. *kāritra* and *samśkr̥tatva*.

[A further argument proceeds as follows]:

Those past and future [elements] may be either able or unable to produce an *arthakriyā*. If this ability is really existent [in past and future elements], then [past and future elements] are present just as other [present elements].

On the other hand, in the case of being not present, the already destroyed and the not yet born elements would become deprived of all potencies, just like sky flowers etc.

All non-contingent (= *akṛta* = *asamśkr̥ta*) elements, as space (*ākāśa*) etc. fall under the same rule; they are [consequently] not arguments for the assumption of the *anaikāntikatva* [of our syllogism deducing momentariness from existence].

The potency of elements to produce a determined *arthakriyā* is identical with origination from *pratyayas*. If there were no causal determination, all would arise out of all in the same manner.

The origination of the potency of a determined *arthakriyā* is produced by *pratyayas* and there is no other definition of a present element.

And precisely this [characteristic of the present] entirely fits in with your past and future elements. Therefore why is the nature of being present not ascribed to them?

We consider two alternatives: past and future elements are either capable to produce an *arthakriyā* or not.

1. If they are capable to do it then, this capacity being really existent, they become present, just as [other] present elements which are not subjects of this discussion.

Whatever is able to produce an *arthakriyā*, is present.

Example: present elements, which are not the subject of this discussion (*avivādāspadībhūta*).

Reason: past and future elements are able to produce an *arthakriyā*.

[Conclusion: they are present].

This syllogism is based on the relation of substantial identity between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. And it is not *anaikāntika*,

because it denies the predication 'varttamānatva' for elements which are already destroyed or which are not yet born. The privation of all potencies (= *sarva-sāmarthyā-viyogitva*) would be the consequence, just like in the case of sky flowers and other unreal things.

prayoga:

Whatever is not present does not possess any potency.

Example: just like a sky flower etc.

Past and future things are not present.

Consequently they do not possess any potency.

This syllogism is based on the non-apprehension (= negation) of the implicans (= *vyāpakānupalabdhi*). [And it is not true that] it is made uncertain (*anaikāntika*) by the *asaṃskṛta*-elements, as *ākāśa* and the two *nirodhas*, because they can also be present as *dharmin* (= *pakṣikāraṇāt*) in the same syllogism. They are therefore no arguments for the assumption that [our syllogism] is uncertain.

Indeed you must concede that the potency of the *dharma*s (= *bhāvas*) to produce determined *arthakriyās* is identical with their origination from *pratyayas* (= with their *hetutva*). Otherwise if this [potency] were without *hetu* then, owing to the absence of determining *hetus*, there would be no determined potency of *dharma*s (= *bhāvas*) at all. And then it would be possible to assume any cause for any effect. Therefore [the attribution of] the determined potency to the non-contingent (= *akṛta*) entities as *ākāśa* etc. is not possible and thus there is no reason for the assumption that our syllogism is made uncertain by these non-contingent entities.

Neither is it true that our first syllogism is invalidated by the error of the *saṃdigdha-vipakṣa-vṛttikā* (= uncertainty of absence in contrary cases), because the origination of the potency of determined *arthakriyās* is produced by *hetu-pratyayas* and precisely the fact of being produced by *hetu-pratyayas* is the essential mark of the 'present'. Now this very essential mark of presence is found wholly in past and future [*dharma*s]. As there are no other reasons [for designing a *dharma* as present], why will you not admit that [your past and future *dharma*s are in reality] present?

§ 14. The reality of the past and of the future renders the striving for salvation useless. The theory of 'displacement' rejected.

[Another argument:]

The efforts directed towards the acquisition of heaven and salvation would therefore be useless, and no religious result to be realized by striving could be pointed out. [1841]

[In Abhidharmakośavyākhyā¹ it is said:]

»The result (*phala*) of a thing, the past and the future of which exist really (= a thing which exists really in its past and future state), must also be permanent (= *nitya*, existing always)«. Hence all efforts directed towards the acquisition of heaven and final salvation would be useless, because there would be no result at all to be striven for². Indeed what kind of a *sāmarthya* could be attributed in this case to striving, as the making a vow etc.? Indeed it is said in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: If *sāmarthya* is taken in the sense of producing (*utpādana*) then our thesis: 'emergence into existence after having been previously nonexistent' is proved. And if you say that this *sāmarthya* is 'a potency of making a thing present' (*varttamānīkaraṇa*), then we ask: what does this 'making present' mean? If only 'a displacing' (*deśāntarākaraṇa*), then [again] we have as consequence that the result is permanent, because it exists in all [three] Times. Besides,

¹ Cf. AbhK V p. 63.

² This objection is quoted as *pūrvapakṣa* in Saṃghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra, p. 635 b, 20: »If the past were really (*dravyatas*) existent, then there would be no *nirvāṇa*, because an Arhant is not extinguished as long as the *skandhas* exist. And if the past *duḥkha* did exist permanently (*nityam*), then all *sattvas* would be unreleased (*avimukta*)«. It is obviously a *male fide* argument. Saṃghabhadra replies in the same way, l.c. p. 635 b, : »Your doctrine is that the past does not exist really. Hence, on account of the inexistence of the *duḥkhaskandha*, *nirvāṇa* would be permanently [realized] and all *sattvas* would already be released«. The Vaibhāṣika does not teach »that *atītaduḥkhaskandha* exists«; he teaches only: »*nirvāṇa* is the state when the present *duḥkha* is already destroyed and a new *duḥkha* does not succeed it«. »It is therefore not admissible to say: 'as the totality of the past *dharma*s constituting the *duḥkhaskandha* exist, therefore the *nirvāṇa* is not possible'«.

how would it be possible to displace the *arūpiṇo dharmāḥ*, as *vedanā* etc., as they are without localisation in space¹. 'Displacing' can be understood only in the sense of our formula: emerging into existence after having been previously inexistent.

The explanation of the terms: 'heaven', 'salvation' etc.: 'heaven' (*svarga*) are the paradises on the back of Meru etc.; 'salvation' is [final] deliverance [from *saṃsāra*]; *saṃsarga* = *prāpti* is the acquisition of them; 'efforts' means making a vow etc.

And if we now concede that they do not possess any potency of *arthakriyā*, then they are inexistent just like a sky-flower. [1842]

Now let us admit the seconde alternative, *viz.* that those past and future *dharmas* do not possess the *arthakriyākāritva*. Then as the consequence of being deprived of *arthakriyā* their inexistence, just as in the case of a sky-flower, would arise because 'inexistence' is just defined as a total lack of any potency (*sāmarthya*).

§ 15. The refutation of the five arguments of the Vaibhāṣikas.

Having at first given [our own] arguments showing the inexistence of past and future [*dharmas*], we now come to the refutation of arguments by which [the Vaibhāṣikas] try to prove the existence of the past and of the future:

Even as predicates predicating existence (= even as *bhāvadharmas*) these arguments are not [conclusive], because their [*dharmin*] is unreal. Or [their *dharmin*] possesses reality, and then [these arguments] are contradictory because, as a consequence of the reality of the present, they are contradicted by the *dharmin*. [1843]

¹ The thesis, that the *arūpiṇo dharmāḥ* could not be »displaced« is explained by Y. p. 476: *arūpinām ca vedanādinām. katham taddeśāntarākarsanā?* — *amūrtatvenādeśasthatvān na tad yujyata ity abhiprāyaḥ*. G. has instead of 'adeśasthatvād' 'niskriyatvād' and this misreading must be an old one because it occurs also in the T. version: *byed pa med pahi phyir*.

The arguments [of the Vaibhāṣika] which have been enumerated above *viz.* *adhvasaṃgrhātva* (=the fact that all *rūpas* etc. are included under the heading 'Time-epoch') etc., are lacking in a real subject (= *āśrayāsiddha*) because the *dharmin* [of these syllogisms] the past etc. is not ascertained (*asiddha*). Indeed it has been said [by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika* I 192 c]: »'Existence' as predicate [to be proved] (= *bhāvadharma*) is not [possible] because [the *dharmin*] is not ascertained«¹.

Now let us suppose that past and future things are ascertained (*siddha*). Then the arguments [of the Vaibhāṣikas] are contradictory [*viruddha*] because accepting [as homogeneous instance] the reality of the present, we would prove just the contrary of what is the essence (*svarūpa*) of the probandum (*dharma* = *sādhya-dharma*).

[There is a further objection *viz.*] how is it possible to teach that past and future *rūpas* are included under the heading 'Time-epoch'? Indeed, no such [distinctions] as 'past' or 'future' can be established about the horn of a hare, which is absolutely inexistent.

[The author summarizes again the standpoint of the Sautrāntikas:]

A *rūpa* which already disappeared after having come into existence, is called 'past'; that which will appear, when the totality of conditions (*pratyaya-sākalya*) is given, is called 'future'.

But, assuming real existence for them, the presence [of the past and of the future] would be the consequence. This is established because 'existence' is the only definition of the present. [1844—1845]

These *kārikās* are clear in themselves.

What is consequently [the real meaning of] the statement, that *rūpas*, *vedanās* etc. are included [under 'Time-epoch']? — The answer is:

That *rūpa* etc. is included under 'past etc.', has been said [by the Buddha] in the sense of an imputed (*adhyā-*

¹ *nāsiddhe bhāvadharṃ* 'sti. Cf. TSP 412²⁵ and the Sanskrit text of the *Pramāṇavārttika* edited by Rāhula Saṅkrītyāyana in Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Vol. XXIV, Pts. I—II, p. 16.

ropya), not in the sense of a real distinction of the past and of the future conditions. [1846]

Now what is the true meaning of the doctrine that consciousness depends on two factors?

The Seer of Truth has said that consciousness depends on two factors. This teaching refers to the mind (*citta*) connected with an object (*saviṣaya*) and was meant as [a doctrine] of provisory sense (*abhisamdhāya*). [1447]

Consciousness (*viññāna*) is of two kinds: having an objective correlate (*sālaṃbana*) and without one (*anālaṃbana*). The teaching of the Bhagavān about consciousness depending on two factors refers to the first category of consciousness having an objective correlate. It was meant as a doctrine of provisory sense.

[Next question:] how is the existence of consciousness without an objective correlate to be ascertained? The answer is:

Indeed there is no objective correlate for such notions (*buddhi*) as Eternal Being, Almighty God (*īśvara*) etc. because [in this case] the *dharma*s of words, names etc. are not connected with a corresponding [objective] aspect (*ākāra*). [1448]

In »etc.« [after »Almighty God] are comprised other [kinds of absolute entities] as *pradhāna*, *kāla*, etc., which are hypostasized by different philosophers. We must not think that all these notions (*buddhi*) possess words etc. as their objective correlate (*ālaṃbana*)¹ In order to emphasize it the author says: »the *dharma*s.

¹ This is perhaps an allusion to the theory of the eternal Word, as expounded by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*. According to that theory, each true cognition is necessarily supported by words which possess their own, objective validity and which are emanations of a unique, transcendental Logos (*brahma śabda-tattvam*). From the Buddhist view-point, metaphysical verbal hypostases as *īśvara*, *kāla*, etc. are pure »constructions« (*kalpanā*) without any corresponding reality; not only without an external object, but even without the support of pure, unutterable sensation. In acts of empirical sense perception, however, »words« do not likewise play any substantial rôle: cognition arises through the coordination (*sārūpya*) of the moment of pure self-conscious sensation with a mental reflex (*ābhāsa*) and this reflex is »capable of coalescing with a verbal designation«, but the association

of words, names etc. are not connected with a corresponding [objective] aspect«. The [objective] aspect of [the notion] God etc. is eternity, totality of causal determinants etc., and this very aspect, which is ascertained by these notions, is not connected with words, names and other *viprayuktasamskāras*.

By »etc.« in »*dharmas* of words, names etc.« are meant other determinants (*nimitta*) which may be accepted by our opponents as having potencies (*svabhāva* = *sāmarthyā*) producing the mental reflex of an external object etc. (*arthapratibimbakādi*).

Objection: if consciousness even without an object is possible, how can it be called cognition (*jñāna*)? Consciousness (*viññāna*) has been defined as 'what cognizes' (*viññātīti viññānam*) and, if there is no object to be cognized (*viññeya*), how can consciousness [as cognition] exist?

We answer:

Consciousness [as cognition] is admitted only in the sense of a 'conscious accompaniment'. And this 'conscious accompaniment' of the consciousness is assumed (*parikalpita*) to be identical with its immateriality (*ajāḍarūpatva*) on account of its 'luminousness' (*prākāśya*). [1849]

If our opponent thinks that there is no 'conscious accompaniment' (*bodhānugama*) possible without an object to be made conscious (*bodhya*), we answer: This conscious accompaniment of consciousness (*viññāna*) is only another expression for its 'immateriality' (*ajāḍarūpatva*)¹. As there is no external object to be illuminated (*prakāśyavastvantarābhāvāt*) [by the light of consciousness] and as there is no separate illumination either, just as in the case of light in the sky [which is only one and indivisible], therefore, with regard to this luminous essence, consciousness is called 'having cognition as its essence'².

with a word is by no means a *conditio sine qua non* of perception. Cf. Stecherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II p. 19 ff.

¹ Cf. TS 2000:

*viññānaṃ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate
iyam evā 'tmasamvittir yā 'jaḍarūpatā.*

² According to the epistemology of the Viññānavādins the act of cognition presupposes a tripartition of the unique and homogenous mind-stuff into: a) a subject-portion (*grāhaka* = *pramāṇa* = *darśanabhāga*), b) an object-portion (*grāhya* = *prameya* =

Referring to the question how can past *karma* give a moral retribution (*phala*), the author says:

We do not admit that a past moral cause (*vipākahetu*) gives a retribution (*phala*). The retribution is granted only as an effect of a whole series of conscious moments (*viññāna-prabandha*), so far as it became permeated (*vāsita*) by [the moral character of] this¹ [past cause]. [1450]

[The whole *saṃtāna*] having been permeated (*vāsita*) [by the past *karma*] becomes capable of producing retribution².

Opponent: But Bhagavān has said: »A *karma* which is annihilated, reduced to nought and destroyed does not, nevertheless, cease to exist«. How is this to be understood?

Answer:

Alluding to the *vāsanā* [permeating the whole] stream of consciousness (*cetaḥsaṃtāna*) [Bhagavān] has taught in metaphorical sense (*bhaktyā* = *upacāreṇa*) that the [past] *karma* exists. In the same manner we are speaking of the non-destruction of the [already annihilated] basic-element (*mūla*). [1851]

As long as a series of effects (*phalaprabandha*) which form [the illusory unity of one permanent material thing], a piece of

nimittabhāga), and c) the self-conscious portion (*svasaṃvittibhāga*), by which both the preceding portions are »supported«.

According to some Yogācāras, this process of division is real, and the *bhāgas* exist as independent »parts«; but, according to the school of Dignāga, *citta* is one and indivisible and the separation of the *darśana* and *nimittabhāga* from their »support« (*āśraya*) which is self-consciousness, is only illusory. Cf. Trikalaparīkṣā, śl. 31—32, Mdo XCV № 6, 179 a 4—180 b, 1, restored by Dr. E. Frauwallner, *Festschrift Winternitz*, p. 237 ff., *Pramāṇavārttika*, III 354 and *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, quoted by de La Vallée Poussin, *Siddhi*, p. 131.

¹ *tad-vāsītāt*, according to T.; G. has *sad-vāsītāt*.

² Cf. the stanza quoted in Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 473 and Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Poona 1924, p. 49:

*yasminn eva hi saṃtāne āhitā karmavāsanā
phalaṃ tatraiva badhnāti kārpase raktatā yathā.*

For the problem of moral retribution in Buddhist philosophy one may now consult the study of Professor E. Lamotte, *Le Traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu*, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, Mém. Chin. et Bouddh., vol. IV 1936.

gold etc., and which is produced by a basic element¹ (*mūla-dravya*) continues to exist, this basic element, [although it is in reality already destroyed,] is spoken of as 'not yet destroyed'. In the same manner the [past and already annihilated] *karma* is called 'existing'.

The author explains what is the aim of such metaphorical teachings (*upacāreṇa deśanā*):

This doctrine has been revealed by the Teacher in order to destroy the *uccheda-dṛṣṭi*. [There is no other sense of this doctrine.] Otherwise how could the teaching given in the Śūnyatāsūtra be explained? [1852]

Had it been said that the past *karma* does not exist, then people might believe that the potency of producing effects indirectly (*paramparyeṇa phalotpādanasāmarthyā*) which has been created by the past *karma* [and which as a *vāsanā* permeates the whole *saṃtāna*] does not exist either. And individuals to be guided (*vineyajana*) would fall into the heresy of the *uccheda-dṛṣṭi*. Therefore, in order to prevent these false conclusions, Bhagavān has said: »The past *karma* exists«. [And this teaching is to be understood only in this sense]. Otherwise, if the past did really exist, how could the teaching of the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra be explained²: »When the eye originates it comes from nowhere and when it disappears, it goes nowhere. Therefore the eye exists after having been inexistent, and it ceases to exist after having been existent«.

And if the Vaibhāṣika thinks that the meaning of this Sūtra is that the *dharma* exists after having been previously inexistent as present (= in the present Time-epoch = *varttamāne 'dhvany abhūtā*³), then this view is also to be rejected, because Time-epochs and elements (= *bhāva*) are not different things. Indeed [in the Abhidharmakośa I, 7] it is stated [explicitly], that *saṃskṛtadharma*s are [otherwise called] *adhva*n and *kathāvastu*⁴.

¹ *mūladravya* = 'the basic element' = the first element of a homogeneous series (*pravāha*).

² *Samyukta* 13¹². Cf. *AbhK.* V p. 59, note 3.

³ Cf. *AbhK.* V p. 60.

⁴ *ta evādhvā kathāvastu*. G. has: *ta evādhvānas tathā 'vasthi-vacanāt* (sic!).

[There is another subterfuge of the Vaibhāṣika according to which the formula *abhūtā bhavati* is to be interpreted as *svātmany abhūtā*¹:] 'a *dharma* exists after having been previously inexistent in its essence'. This [interpretation] is obviously nothing short of an acknowledgment that [just as we are teaching] the past eye does not exist.

Moreover: if the contingent elements (= *saṃskāra* = *saṃskṛta-dharma*) exist permanently, then there are no causes (*hetu*) and no effects (*phala*); hence the origination of painful existence (= *duḥkhasamudaya*) would be unreal, and, as a consequence of its unreality, the non-existence of the suppression [of painful existence] and of the path [leading to it] (*nīrodhamārga*) would result. In this way, if the four Aryan Truths are unreal, neither the *parijñā*, nor the *prahāṇa*, nor the *sākṣātkriyā*, nor the *bhāvanā* would be possible². These being unreal, neither candidates [for the attainment of *nirvāṇa*] (*pratipannaka pudgala*) nor individuals enjoying the fruition of the Path (*phalastha pudgala*) would exist. Thus [as conclusion] the whole doctrine of the Buddha would be contradicted. Therefore we state: the conception of real thing which is past etc. does not possess any objective correlate (= *nātitādivastujātakalpanā sādhvī*).

Finally we come to the problem, of how Yogins can possess a distinct knowledge of past and future [events]. It is explained by the author in the following *kārikās*:

¹ Cf. AbhK V p. 60: *svātmani cakṣuṣi cakṣur abhūtā bhavati*. Y. p. 474: *atha svātmani cakṣuṣi cakṣur abhūtā bhavati siddham idam anāgatam cakṣur nāstīti*.

² This seems to be an antistrophe of Mvbb p. 393 b, 21: »Moreover, if the past and the future did not exist really, then the present would also be inexistent, because the present is established [only] by the [right] discernment of the past and of the future. If the three Times were inexistent then the *saṃskṛta* would be inexistent. If the *saṃskṛta* were inexistent then the *asaṃskṛta* would also be inexistent, because the *asaṃskṛta* is established [only] by a [right] discernment of the *saṃskṛtadharma*s. If the *saṃskṛta* as well as the *asaṃskṛta* were inexistent, then all *dharma*s would be inexistent. If all *dharma*s were inexistent, then salvation and the reaching of *nirvāṇa* would be inexistent. Great heresies would thus arise. In order to avoid these mistakes it must be known that the past and the future exist really«.

The Yogins cognize this aspect of the present which, indirectly or directly, is an effect [of the past causes] or a cause [of future effects].

And thereupon they associate it with conscious moments which, although belonging to the empirical sphere, are nevertheless purified; in their true essence they are objectless but, nevertheless, they are connected with conceptual hypostases (*vikalpa*).

Therefore, supported by this past and future stream of causes and effects, statements in verbal form (= teachings, *deśanā*) about the past and the future arise.

But the teachings of the Tathāgata, whose stream of consciousness is entirely free from the net of all discursive notions, emanate even without any conscious volitional effort (*anābhogena*). [1853—1856]

kārya-kāraṇatām gatam = *atītārthāpekṣayā kāryatām gatam*, *anāgatāpekṣayā kāraṇatām* = [the present] is recognized as an effect with reference to a past thing and as a cause with reference to a future one.

[The moments of] consciousness 'which are objectless in their real essence' (= *tattvato 'viśayair*) means: 'which are connected with a [purely] verbal designation' (*āviśṭābhitāpa*), because they do not possess as their substratum a *svalakṣaṇa*, a moment of pure sensation (= because they do not objectify a pure sensation = *svalakṣaṇasyā 'viśayīkaraṇāt*). Therefore with Yogins who are not completely purified [instructions], concerning past and future events could arise, supported by the past and the future chain of causes and effects (*hetuphalayoḥ saṃtatiṃ bhūtaṃ bhāvinīṃ cāśritya*). But the Bhagavān Tathāgata does not possess any mundane consciousness (*laukikaṃ jñānam*), even purified (*śuddha*), because he is permanently in a state of a deep trance (*saṃāhita*) as he discarded all ignorance (*avidyā*) while discursive notions (*vikalpa*) are by their essence identical with ignorance. As it is said:

Those discursive notions are themselves essentially identical with ignorance. Because they possess [only] an imputed

reality (= *āropya varttate*), in the form of an external object which is only a reflex of consciousness itself¹.

The teaching of the Tathāgata whose nature is similar to the nature of the miraculous gem Cintāmaṇi, arises even without any conscious volitional effort (*anābhogena*) out of the potency acquired by the accumulation of former vows (*praṇidhāna*), meritorious deeds (*puṇya*) and wisdom (*jñāna*)².

End of the Analysis of the three Times.

¹ The equation *kalpanā* = *avidyā* is a *locus communis* of the Mahāyānist philosophy, cf. e. g. *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 230c:

prthagjanāḥ kalpanayaiva baddhā |
akalpayaṇaṃ muktim upaiti yogī ||
yā kalpanānāṃ vinivṛttir etad |
phalam vicārasya budhā vadanti ||

² A more detailed exposition of this docetic doctrine which is common to all Mahāyāna schools is given in *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 360₁₉: The Buddhas display for the benefit of all living beings an activity which consists in applying the methods of conversion according to the need of individuals. Now the question arises: since on the *buddhabhūmi* there is no *kalpanā* any longer, how is this activity possible? — Answer: Buddhas do not think in *vikalpas*; nevertheless, just as a magical jewel (*cintāmaṇi*) or the »Wish-three« (*kalpataru*), they are devoted to the realization of human happiness without disturbing even for one moment the *dharmadhātu*. While converting beings, they are free from *karma* and they manifest the Dharma [automatically] through the power of vows taken previously. Moreover [this manifestation of the Dharma] takes place also owing to the fact, that the *karma* of listening to such a Dharma by the *vineyajanas* becomes ripe. Therefore one should know that the *tattvadeśanā* and the *sattvārthakriyā* follow even when no conscious effort (*prayatna*) is made for their production.

Appendix

Prajñākaramati's Refutation of the *traikālyavāda* (Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 579—582)

[Vaibhāṣika:] phenomena (*bhāva*) are not absolutely unreal. They are »coming« from the future Time-epoch to the present Time-epoch owing to the force of causal determinants (*hetupratyaya*), and again, they go away from the present Time-epoch into the past Time-epoch owing to the force of impermanence (*anityatā*). [The »three marks of contingency« *samskṛtalakṣaṇa*], viz. origination, duration and destruction have been taught in this sense. In this sense too, »dependent origination« (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is quite acceptable.

Referring to this doctrine of the *traikālyavāda*, the Master Śāntideva says: »Nothing is coming from elsewhere, nor does it stay, nor does it go away« (IX 143 a).

Commentary: »nothing is coming from elsewhere« = from any other place or Time; nor having come does it go away out of the present to any place whatsoever; nor does it stay anywhere in its own essence (*svabhāvena*) as the same, identical being.

Indeed, if it came from the future Time-epoch to the present and went away from the present to the past, then even a contingent element (*samskṛta*) would be permanent (*nitya*). As existing always, it could not be impermanent. And it would be impossible to prove that such a *dharma* is not permanent.

Now [the Vaibhāṣika teaches that] the differentiation of the *dharma* [wandering] through the Time-epochs consists in the fact that its *kāritra* is absent 'previously' and 'subsequently'; i. e., as long as the *dharma* has not yet acquired its *kāritra* and is unable to perform its function (*krtya*), it is called 'future'; as soon it

performs its function, it is 'present'; when it has accomplished its function it is 'past', these are the differences [between the Time-epochs].

We answer: This theory is also of no value. Indeed we must ask: if the *dharma* exists permanently in its own, identical essence, why does not the *kāritra* also [always] exist?

[If you say that the occasional existence and inexistence of the *kāritra* depends on special external conditions, we must reject this explanation because] dependence on external conditions is not possible for a substance which permanently exists by its own essence.

And if you accept that a substance can exist even if it has no *kāritra*, then the reality of such unreal things as horns of horses, etc. would be the consequence of this theory.

Or you admit that *kāritra* [being not different from the *dharma*] is also future, present and past. But how can it be possible? Is it due to the presence of another *kāritra* [of the first *kāritra*] or does [this first] *kāritra* exist [as future, present and past] by its own nature? Accepting the former we shall fall into *regressus ad infinitum*, accepting the latter we are not allowed to deny for a *dharma* the same possibility of existing as past etc. by its own nature [and without the help of a *kāritra*].

Moreover, the Vaibhāṣika teaches that past and future *dharma*s exist *substantialiter* just as present ones. This is however quite impossible. Indeed, how can a *dharma* which exists [always] by its own essence be at the same time essentially connected with origination and destruction? What does it miss in its previous state owing to the lack of which it is called 'not yet born'? And what does it miss in its later state, owing to the lack of which it is called 'already destroyed'? The consequence is that [the *dharma*], in the condition of the antecedent and of the subsequent Time-epochs, is existing by its own nature just in the same manner as in the present state. [There is no difference at all between your 'future' 'present' and 'past' *dharma*]. Therefore, on account of inexistence [of Time-distinctions], the triad of Time-epochs is absolutely impossible. For one who accepts the essential reality (= *tattva* = *svātmanā*, *ekasvabhāvenā* 'stīva) the past etc. cannot be existent. This is summarized in the following stanza [AbhK V p. 57 = TS 1802]:

kāritra does not exist permanently, *dharma* is characterized as existing permanently, but nevertheless the *kāritra* is not different from the *dharma*! Indeed, it is a caprice of the *Īśvara* in its arbitrariness.

Now [the *Vaibhāṣika* quotes a scriptural evidence. He says:] The past etc. must be really existent, because it is said in the *Sūtra*: 'past *karma* exists, future retribution exists'.

We answer: Only in order to refute the heresy denying [moral] causality (*hetuphalāpavāda*), has the *Bhagavān* said: 'past *karma* exists, future retribution exists'. But 'past' means: 'previously inexistent, which originated and has been already destroyed', and 'future' means: 'that which will be when the cause is given'. In this sense it has been said that causes etc. exist. The word 'exist' being a *nipāta* can have the meaning of all three tenses.

And this is [the true doctrine taught] by the *Bhagavān* in the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra*: »When the eye originates it comes from nowhere and when it disappears, it goes nowhere. Therefore the eye exists after having been inexistent, and it ceases to exist after having been existent«. Were the future eye really existent, it would not have been said that 'it exists after having been inexistent'. Therefore there is no 'transgression' (*saṃkrānti*) from one Time-epoch into another. And thus as there is no coming from anywhere nor going away, and as the present *rūpa* which is only an unreal appearance does not possess duration in any sense, therefore the Master Śāntideva asks: »what is the difference between the *māyā* and the phenomena [produced by causes] which are considered by ignorant individuals as existing really? — [Evidently there is no difference at all].

Abbreviations

- AbhK *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, by L. de La Vallée Poussin, 1923—1931 (quoted by volume and page number).
 G. Gaekwad edition of the TS.
 Mvbh. Mahāvibhāṣā, Taishō Nr 1545.
 N Nyāyānusāra, Taishō Nr 1562.
 P Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā to the Tattvasaṃgraha (quoted by page number of the Gaekwad edition).
 T Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripitaka.
 TS Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntaraksita (quoted by kārikā number of the Gaekwad edition).
 Tib., T. Tibetan Version of the TS and of the P. [Narthang].
 Y Yaśomitra's Sphūtartha, ed. Wogihara.

Addenda

- p. 40. »Wise men call permanent etc.« — This is a quotation from Pramānavārttika, II 204.
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