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AKADEMIA OBRONY NARODOWEJ

Dr. Christopher DANDEKER B.Sc., Ph.D.

New Times for the Military: Some sociological remarks
on the changing role and structure of the Armed Forces
of the advanced societies.

Women in the Armed Forces:
Britain in Comparative Perspective.

Force Regeneration & the Regular Reserve Balance.

Armed Forces After the Cold War:
The Personnel Implications.

Sexual Orientation and Military Service: The British Case.

(Wykłady wygłoszone w Akademii w dniu 10.02.1995 r.)

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New Times for the Military: Some sociological remarks on the changing role and structure of the Armed Forces of the advanced societies

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the impact of the post-Cold War era on the social structure of the armed forces of the advanced societies. The end of the Cold War is viewed as one aspect of a broader social transformation. These 'New Times' are defined in terms of the growth of risk complexity, globalization, the relocation of political authority to transnational and subnational agencies, challenges to national sovereignty, and the impact of globalized communications on the relationship between politics and public opinion.

The paper shows how armed forces are seeking to redefine their role and redesign their structures in order to address the international and domestic challenges posed by these 'New Times'. The range of missions is being broadened and significant changes in the co-ordination of military and political decision-making are taking place. In response to strategic and financial pressures, armed forces are not only becoming smaller, they are also seeking to achieve greater flexibility in their organization structures. At the same time, armed forces have to respond to pressures from wider society to conform to civilian values such as social equality, as is reviewed in current debates on the position of women and homosexual personnel in the services.

INTRODUCTION

One of the central tenets of classical social theory was the idea that, under conditions of modernity, warfare and military institutions would be supplanted by the peaceful ways of industrialism – either in the form of democratic market capitalism or of international socialism (Dandeker 1989; Giddens 1985: 17–31). By the time of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, rather few analysts were arguing that international socialism provided the most favourable conditions for peace and stability. Instead, it was the liberal theory of

industrial society stemming from Durkheim and Spencer that inspired authors to interpret the aftermath of 1989 as the 'End of History' or as heralding the birth of a 'warless society' and a 'New World Order' (Fukuyama 1989; Moskos 1992; Freedman 1991). A common theme in these writings was less the utopian prospect of a peaceful planet than the argument that, on the basis of a world hegemony of democratic capitalism, 'soft power' or economic competition was replacing the 'hard power' of armed force as the key element of the security agenda of the advanced industrial societies (Luttwak 1990; Kennedy 1993: 122-34).

In contrast with the 'end of history' perspective, others have taken a more politically 'realist' view of the perennial importance of 'hard power', and have offered a 'Back to the Future' analysis. For example it has been suggested that, with the end of a bi-polar standoff between the nuclear superpowers, a multi-polar world would experience a rebirth of instability and the risk of war even amongst the advanced industrial powers on the European continent (Mearsheimer 1990). Indeed, it was this strand of realist thinking that inspired a revival of the sociology of the state during the 1980s. Here the focus was on the inadequacies of Marxist and liberal accounts of politics and in particular a failure to understand the state as a bearer of military power and thus equipped with the propensity to behave as a warlike actor in international affairs (Giddens 1985; Mann 1987, 1988; Dandeker 1990; Shaw 1991).

Yet others have argued, as I shall do here, that there is truth in both these lines of argument: that the post-Cold War will be a syncretism of old and new with the three blocs (probably four by the twenty-first century, with China) of advanced industrialism – centred on North America, Europe and Japan – involved in largely economic rather than military competition. Meanwhile, regional, ethnic and related conflicts will continue to trouble the developing world and will also be likely to draw in the advanced societies as peacemakers and peace-keepers. War amongst the advanced industrial societies becomes a remote possibility, yet the world will still remain a violent planet where traditional inter-state war is supplanted by civil wars, ethnic, tribal and regional conflicts that cut across state boundaries (Dandeker 1993). Indeed, Van Creveld has argued that such conflicts will even displace the modern nation-state and the whole basis of modern, armed forces constructed on Clausewitzian assumptions (Van Creveld 1992).

In the light of these debates on the nature of the post-Cold War landscape, it is difficult to deny that the armed forces of the advanced societies face an uncertain future in comparison with the relative certainties of the preceding four decades. In this paper I analyse key changes in the role and structure of the armed forces of the advanced societies, drawing largely on material from Western Europe and North America.

I focus on two contexts of change: the international and the national or domestic social structure. This reflects the fact that armed forces are 'Janus-faced' organizations: on the one hand, they have to respond to the changing strategic context by building militarily effective organizations and, on the other, they have to establish an organization that is responsive to wider social values and thus to the society that pays for the armed services and without whose support they can do little. Of course, these two contexts are analytically distinct but interpenetrate empirically, particularly as modern means of transport and communication facilitate the rapid spread of cultural and other products from one society to another: for example, the impact of television images of the West on the revolt against communism in the 1980s in Eastern Europe and on migratory movements today in the east and south of the European Community (Mesny 1993: 223–30).

The end of the Cold War is only one aspect of a far broader social transformation. Armed forces face the challenge of 'new times': a period of fundamental change in the international context in which they operate and in the social structure of the societies in which they are embedded. I focus first on the external dimension of change.

NEW TIMES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The strategic dimension: a post-Cold War world of risk complexity

The first and most obvious feature of these New Times is the end of the Cold War and a shift from the certainties of the bi-polar standoff between the two superpowers to a more uncertain, fragmented world of competing centres of economic, political and military power (Freedman 1991). There has been a shift from the overwhelming threat posed by the Soviet Union to western security to a new era of risk uncertainty. Of course, it is reasonable to argue that, for the time being, militarily speaking, we are living in a uni-polar world with the United States being the only state with the capability – if not the intent – to use its global military reach to subdue any other power. Nevertheless, it is now difficult for any of the advanced societies to establish the circumstances in which a bewildering array of risks (defined as capabilities not matched to intent) might become identifiable threats. For example, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction increases the risk of their use, but specific identifiable threats cannot be charted without an analysis of the intentions of the users of those weapons. Consequently, in this uncertain and turbulent world it is more difficult than ever before to identify where one's international interests lie and thus what appropriate mix of military and non-military (economic, diplomatic) instruments of security should be developed; what missions should be

allocated to armed forces and what force structure is most appropriate. These are all now much more difficult planning decisions, a situation magnified by economic pressures on defence budgets in all advanced societies, a point to which I shall return.

Globalization and regionalization

New Times are defined not only by the end of the Cold War but by other social changes. We now live in a global integrated economy created by the electronic revolution in the means of communication, to which companies, states and other organizations have to adjust (Held 1988: 12–17; Dicken 1986; Kennedy 1993: 47–64; Giddens 1992: 55–78). Globalization has not only integrated the world economy to a greater degree than before; it has also made different regions of societies susceptible to the consequences of the global shifts of capital and other resources from one part of the world to another, as for instance in the global sourcing of modern manufacturing products such as automobiles and computers (Dicken 1986: 293–312).

The relation of political authority and the modern nation-state

Processes of globalization and regionalization have led to two quite different political developments. On the one hand, there has been what Kennedy and other writers have referred to as the relocation of political authority to supranational political agencies such as the European Community on the regional level and the UN, other international organizations and the transnational corporation at the global level (Kennedy 1993: 122–34; Alter 1989: 119–24). On the other hand, there has been a contrary development: the relocation of authority to regionalist and/or separatist and subnational movements and agencies within the nation-state, even amongst what observers have regarded as the more mature examples in Western Europe (Kennedy 1993: 122–34; Weller 1991: 18–19).

I view both of these developments as responses to globalization and regionalization and thus as deep-rooted challenges to the traditional nation-state from both above and below. Subnational conflicts are, therefore, not simply to be regarded as effects of the 'unfreezing' of ethnic and national rivalries made possible by the end of the Cold War, but as responses to the impact of the global economy on relations between core and peripheral regions of societies and attempts by regions to obtain better terms from their nation-state and/or the supranational agencies that have emerged in recent decades.

From a military point of view, subnational tensions are likely to pose serious difficulties for the advanced societies. Many of these conflicts cut across existing political boundaries and even in the case of more straightforward civil wars, the industrial democracies are likely to be

drawn, willingly or not, into various forms of peacekeeping and peacemaking (Moskos 1992). (As I shall argue presently, this is because public opinion is reluctant to allow any state to deal with its internal problems without some accountability to the international community.) Because these subnational pressures are quite generic to the globalized social world which we inhabit, as events in the former Yugoslavia indicate, peacekeeping and peacemaking challenges to the West will not be confined to distant 'Third World' countries but can be found on its very doorstep. Thus, while war is now most unlikely between advanced industrial democracies, the chances of these countries becoming involved collectively in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations at the interface between the developed and developing world remain high.

This scenario poses a challenge to armed forces in terms of training, doctrine, equipment and other human resource issues. It also poses a challenge to political leaders, who now have to find the money to pay for these operations, having glimpsed the opportunity of a peace dividend after 1989. This is why burden-sharing will be an important item on the new security agenda, as was proved during the Gulf War, and this issue has been raised in current debates over who would fund an international peacemaking force in the Balkan conflict. Yet it is also important to note that burden-sharing of military responsibilities is driven by not only economic but cultural forces: burden-sharing meets a current need to ensure that military interventions by advanced industrial societies are legitimized through recourse to international law, and the UN. This point is connected with a fourth dimension of what I have called New Times: challenges to traditional conceptions of state sovereignty.

Challenges to sovereignty

A critical debate at the present time centres on the important question of how far the UN should not just legitimize traditional peacekeeping operations but move towards what some have referred to as a 'neo-imperialist' model of peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions in order to maintain peace and security and/or the human rights of minority populations. In so far as such a shift takes place then the three principles of established peacekeeping, forged in a context of traditional state sovereignty, will be displaced: (1) that a durable ceasefire can be identified; (2) that the presence of peacekeepers has met with the consent of the conflicting parties; and (3) that peacekeeping can operate only in the context of a stable and promising political framework in which there is a realistic chance that a settlement will emerge. The military consequence of moving away from these principles is that peacekeeping and peacemaking may require high-intensity military capacity to make them work effectively (Rifkind 1993: 1-7).¹

One of the pressures leading to a move away from these principles is the humanitarian impulse of public opinion, as is indicated in current debates on the role of the UK in the Balkan conflict and the wider question of the legitimacy of wars conducted less for strategic interest and more for reasons of moral conscience. This issue is connected with developments in modern communications, to which I now turn.

Globalization, public opinion and the relationship between military and political decision-making

A further dimension of these New Times of ours concerns the impact of the electronic revolution in the means of communication on public opinion, not only within nation-states but in world society itself. We are witnessing an increased capacity of public opinion to exercise its political influence in ways that transcend the boundaries of nation-states (Shaw 1991: 184–90). As was evident in the latter stages of the Gulf War in connection with the question of the Kurds, this has led to the 'something must be done' trend, which has provided an additional pressure on governments to become involved in humanitarian and peacemaking efforts that it is difficult for them to ignore.

However, it must be said that the 'something must be done' factor might fade when, in the course of time, casualties occur and the political objective of an operation might become more and more obscure in public perceptions. Governments face a difficult task of reconciling competing demands: of responding to the humanitarian impulse of their publics; defining realistic political objectives; establishing the part played by military and non-military instruments in achieving them; and formulating responses to subnational and related conflicts in a context of collective security arrangements both with allies and within a framework established by the UN.²

This general trend will be filtered through the national traditions of different societies, the second of the contexts in which the armed forces in these new times will have to operate.

NEW TIMES AND NATIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

In the national or domestic context three issues are of particular importance: (1) the impact of the electronic media on public opinion and politics; (2) the effects of economic constraints on organization structure in the context of the complexity of security risks; (3) changing social values, citizenship and armed forces. I shall focus on the links between each of these and the international context and then indicate the ways in which armed forces are developing (or will need to develop) strategies for readjusting their role and structure. As armed forces confront these New Times they will have to balance the need to

respond to the strategic context by building militarily effective organizations with the need to establish an organization that is responsive to wider social values.

The humanitarian impulse and domestic public opinion: sociological implications for armed forces

As I pointed out above, what has been called the 'something must be done' factor poses an important challenge to states and armed forces. There will be pressure to intervene in conflicts on humanitarian grounds, but public demands for minimal casualties will also be strong. As was illustrated during the Gulf War, government concern over the casualty issue led to the extraordinary sensitivity with which any reports of projected casualty figures were treated and indeed to the enormous effort that was put into ensuring that coalition casualties were minimized. For example, about a quarter of all UK forces in theatre were medical, or medical related (Miller 1991: 48–9). In addition, both the timing of the end of the air war and the beginning of the ground attack were very much influenced by political calculations concerning the casualty issue: how many allied casualties were politically affordable; how many Iraqi perceived casualties would play on public opinion's humanitarian impulses and their view of the legitimacy of the allied war effort (Freedman and Karsh 1991: 17–18).

This media-filtered public perception of the question of casualties and the costs of war further complicates the strategic and military calculations of the armed forces and their governments. Such calculations will be informed by national political and cultural traditions. For example, both Britain and France find it easier to contemplate playing a military role in the post-Cold War international scene in large part because of their respective imperial histories, while, in the British case, there is a nice political judgement to be made as to whether the financial costs of such military activity are worth the benefits of retaining the political advantages accruing to Britain's current role in the UN and other international organizations (Bellamy 1992: 443–56). Meanwhile, in Germany, any humanitarian impulse with military implications has to be filtered through the cultural and constitutional limitations placed on using the armed forces outside the traditional NATO area, and more broadly, on any extension of Germany's political and military role in world politics (Van Orden 1991: 352–70).

In connection with globalization and subnational conflicts, the military operations that are most likely in these New Times will be those in which it will be difficult to identify a threat to vital national interests. As is being proved in the current Balkan conflict, the legitimacy problem is complex and acute from the standpoint of the

national interests of potential intervening powers, no matter how pressing the arguments in terms of humanitarianism. However, should – through a combination of strategic calculation and humanitarian concern – more robust peacemaking or enforcing missions evolve, the domestic legitimacy of such operations might prove fragile, particularly when the casualties, both military and civilian, mount and the graphic details are relayed through the media. These developments pose significant challenges to the armed forces of the advanced societies. However supportive public opinion is in the short term, it will be important for the military – at senior and relatively junior levels on the dispersed modern battlefield – to be aware of the sensitive political consequences of their military acts. This will be made more complex, administratively speaking, by the multinational nature of military operations.

As was revealed during the Gulf War, traditional ideas of a sharp division between political and military decisions and competencies will have to give way to a more fluid situation. In the complex interplay of political, diplomatic and military authorities on the ground (for example the relations between military and Foreign Office advisers attached to commands: Statement on Defence Estimates (HMSO 1992: 40 para. 4; 70 para. 5), the variety of human relations skills that the military will have to perform will require adequate training. In addition, the critical question, 'Why are we here?' will require the armed forces to use their human relations skills with their own personnel in order to provide adequate answers.

Some of these issues were rehearsed three decades ago when Janowitz developed the 'constabulary concept' of armed forces (Janowitz 1975: 417–40). He focused on the close interplay of political and military elites that was required to manage the conflict between the superpowers in an age when nuclear weapons meant that maintenance of viable international relations rather than war-winning had become the key priority. The strategic weapons revolution had played a critical part in breaking the sharp line between political and military decisions and areas of responsibilities (a division rooted in nineteenth-century, theories of public administration as found in Weber's discussion of modern bureaucracy: Perlmutter 1977: 4–6).

Contemporary developments – less weapons technology and a growing impact of public opinion on government – will entail a further 'blurring' of the boundaries between the military and other professions engaged in maintaining the security interests of the state as closer links are forged between the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of policy. Furthermore, there will need to be an additional 'broadening' of the education base of the military establishment in order to equip military professionals with expertise in areas beyond core war-fighting skills and to develop a capacity for flexibility in these turbulent New Times. Again as Janowitz pointed

out in his critique of Huntington's model of civil-military relations, the modern military professional requires a liberal rather than a narrow technical and vocational education to prepare for the political and social complexities facing the armed forces today (Huntington 1957).

*Economic constraints and the complexity of security risks:
organizational challenges for armed forces*

Leaving aside the strategic consequences of the end of the Cold War for the size of armed forces (and their readiness requirements), pressures for 'downsizing' also stem from society itself. Influential sectors of the public, and certainly governments of whatever political hue, are likely to want more to be spent on non-military goods such as transport, health, the environment and other dimensions of infrastructure. Consequently, even in the UK, which has traditionally spent a relatively high percentage of GNP on defence, a distinct downward trend can be identified in recent years (Sabin 1993: 273-7). Indeed, in most advanced industrial societies a critical non-military security issue for decades ahead is how the diminishing proportion of those in employment will be able to fund the health care and related social costs of the retired and ageing population, particularly the very old, that is the over-eighties (Kennedy 1993: 21-46).

As governments seek to control levels of public expenditure – both military and non-military – there will be a continued emphasis on value for money and efficiency in the public sector. Armed forces have acquired a Cold War record of 'budget inflation' with spiralling costs, especially of equipment but also in the personnel sector. This has led all states to exercise greater political and managerial control over the services, a trend that will continue as the Cold War legitimacy of traditional levels of defence spending crumbles (Edmonds 1985: 1-16). In the British case one can observe the introduction of the internal market through devolved budgeting, and the civilianization and subsequent contractorization of administrative and logistic support functions (Dandeker and Watts 1993: 94-101). Such cost control initiatives will lead to far more fundamental reviews of the nature of the military hierarchy and the division of labour. For example, contemporary discussions are focusing on whether the number of ranks and levels of authority in the armed forces can be justified when many civilian companies are seeking to 'de-layer' their structures in order to maximize cost-effectiveness; whether there are too many officers, making the organization 'top heavy', and whether some roles could be performed by more subordinate officers (including non-commissioned officers, e.g. in the command of platoons) (Beevor 1993, 1991). Similar issues have been identified by those engaged in the restructuring of the National Health Service and the reform of the

police and prison services in the UK, although it should be stressed that these debates can also be found in other European countries.

With the development of flatter and leaner organization structures, critical issues to be addressed include the following. Will smaller armed forces be able to offer rewarding career structures for their personnel – sufficient to retain the most able – given a likely decrease in the number of interesting commands available? In addition, will armed forces be able to design effective resettlement strategies in order to recruit and retain (for periods required for optimal organization performance) the 'best and brightest' personnel? (Bagnall-Oakley 1991).

The services will need to be able to show that they are providing a value for money service to the community and this will lead the military to reassert the view that they provide a first-rate training in skills that are of direct benefit to society once military personnel resettle in civilian careers. Here, as in the UK, a major effort is being made both to raise public awareness of this issue and to ensure that the transferability of skills between military and civilian worlds is eased through reforms of the formal qualifications and accreditation of training provided by the services (Ramsbotham 1992: 9–10). However, whether the skills and training provided by the military are what the newly emerging leaner and more flexible civilian business organizations require remains to be seen.

Two further organizational developments deserve attention. The first has already been mentioned: multinational force structures. Their development is being driven not only by the need for the advanced societies to ensure that the use of military force is rooted in international law and the legitimacy of the United Nations, but also by cost considerations, as is indicated by the current debate on who and how to fund long-term peacekeeping missions around the world, not least in the Balkans.

In this context, some observers have spoken of military commitments in terms of decades. More will need to be done on establishing ways in which different national contingents can work together; on how liaison with higher political authorities both of national governments and the UN are to be managed; as well as on how to liaise with the society that is the site of such operations (Mackinlay 1991).

The second development concerns the organizational format of armed forces now that the Cold War threat and short warning times of a major attack on the West have dissolved. Much depends on the definition of the military task and on the national tradition of civil-military relations inherited by different societies.

Concerning the task: given my earlier remarks on the turbulent strategic context of risk uncertainty, it will be important for armed forces to maintain a wide range of military capacities and to avoid specializing in peacekeeping, or even developing earmarked peacekeeping

forces. In any case, peacekeeping in the current context will need critical elements of a high-intensity war machine if it is to be effective.

The cost implications of this argument are serious: can a country like the UK afford a wide range of capabilities? The answer would appear to be a definitive no, in which case for the UK and other countries, there will be a need to maintain this wide range of capabilities on a collective basis, although at the cost of a greater dependence on allies (Sabin 1993: 283). That said, national armed forces, for military and cost reasons, will have to be more flexible in order to respond effectively to a context of uncertainty and complexity of risk. Armed forces will be smaller, busier and more flexible and a critical force multiplier will be effective intelligence about security risks as well as the superiority in command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) to be gained by advanced technology.

In regard to organization structure and national traditions of civil-military relations: for those forces which have retained conscription, albeit in diluted forms, the question of moving to an all-volunteer force (AVF) will be raised, particularly when UN-type peacekeeping missions pose more demands on forces than were ever contemplated a year or so ago. For example, the limits on French military capability revealed in the Gulf stimulated debate in France on the merits of the current system.³ Events in the former Yugoslavia will surely add to that debate.

For those forces already organized on an AVF basis, a critical question that needs to be addressed concerns the regular/reserve balance. How should this be adjusted in order to respond to the different warning times of the post-Cold War context, the need to cut defence budgets, and the need to provide systems of force regeneration as well as forces able to react swiftly and effectively to international crises? Interestingly, some have talked about the armed forces becoming more like a flexible firm with a core of full-time specialists, a highly trained immediately available reserve, particularly in the areas of logistics and other supporting technical arms, and a more general reserve available for fuller mobilizations appropriate for a serious threat should one emerge in the future (Smailes 1992). An interesting question that arises with the smaller, busier and more flexible armed forces that are being developed is whether the services will need to recruit more flexible, intelligent soldiers able to cope with the varied and sensitive missions of these New Times.

In any event, it is clear that it will be impossible, because of financial reasons, as well as the far longer warning times of serious threats, for armed forces to have all the specializations required for modern war located in the regular order of battle. Indeed, ever since the mid-1970s, even though the US had shifted from a mass armed force to a large force in being in the preceding decade, for financial as well as

political reasons, substantial elements of military capacity – half the total strength of the army – were placed in the reserve formations. This entailed something of a reversion to the traditional mobilization system of the mass armed force developed during the late nineteenth century, albeit on a volunteer basis (Segal 1989: 167–77). While in the future forces will be much smaller, the diminution of the threat and budgetary constraints will require a continued and even greater reliance on reserve forces.

However, as the Gulf War demonstrated, the problem is to mesh cost, warning time and military effectiveness. It would appear that reservists perform best in combat support and service support where the convergence of the skills required of reservists' military and civilian roles is highest. Conversely, US infantry 'roundout brigades' (infantry reservists attached to regular formations in peacetime for training and supposedly ready for early use should the need arise) were not a success. If it is determined that even a modest deployment requires early use of reservists it will be critical to provide the training and equipment necessary to ensure that regulars and reservists work well together and trust each other's competence. It is also not unreasonable to assume that, despite the importance of logistic and technical support provided by reservists, many of them are likely to play a critical part less in rapid reaction, especially in the combat arms, than in maintaining the systems of force regeneration required as an insurance policy should a new major threat emerge once again (*Future of Britain's Reserve Forces* (MoD 1992)).

The key issue will be to configure the regular/reserve mix in a way that provides swift effective responses to crises that are likely but hardly threatening to national security (peacekeeping/making) and timely regeneration should the need arise to develop an appropriate response to as major threat.

Social equality, citizenship: challenges to the institutional culture of armed forces

The pressure from society for the implementation of social equality and the maintenance of individual rights will pose serious challenges for the institutional culture of armed forces, until recently a largely all-male and highly hierarchical repository of traditional values in modern society (Moskos and Wood 1988). This has been illustrated in recent debates on the extent to which gender integration in armed forces should develop, whether integration should apply to homosexuals and whether military discipline can continue to impose greater demands on armed forces personnel than those characteristic of civilian organizations.

To take the example of gender integration, in recent years policy changes in several nations have led to greater reliance being placed on

female personnel in armed forces (Stanley and Segal 1988). The United Kingdom is an especially interesting case because, until recently, it has been rightly recognized as occupying the institutional or traditional end of the institution/occupation spectrum (Downes 1988). Yet since 1988 it has made significant moves towards gender integration in all three services. The position of even the most traditional 'male preserves' of the combat or 'teeth' arms in the army – armour and infantry – is currently under review. Overall, the proportion of women employed in the services is likely to rise to 10–15 per cent over the next decade, although in some corps, such as the new Adjutant General corps (largely concerned with personnel functions), this proportion will be much higher than in those combat arms where a much higher number of positions are, at least for the time being, closed to women (BMSG 1992: 9–12).

These changes were spurred in part by the declining availability of eighteen-year-old males during the 1980s (when there was no anticipation that military establishments would soon be cut drastically with the end of the Cold War) and by increasing demands for gender equality. In addition, there was a new generation of politicians and senior officers more attuned to changing social values concerning gender and the division of labour (Dandeker and Segal forthcoming). As gender equality is now the significant driving force in this area, moves towards equality of opportunity for women and men are likely to outlast any diminution in the size of armed forces in the post-Cold War context.

Gender integration in the military raises a broader issue: to what extent can the armed forces be considered as just another organization? Should the operational demands of armed forces as fighting units prevent their increasing convergence with other civilian organizations in regard to prevailing social standards of equality of opportunity whether they be based on gender, ethnic or sexual preference?

Turning to the issue of homosexuality in the armed forces of the UK, until 1991, as a result of the exemption from the 1967 Sexual Offences Act, service personnel could be prosecuted for homosexual acts in circumstances where an offence would not be being committed in civilian life. As with gender integration, recent reforms of this policy have occurred in the context of heated discussions (particularly in the USA) on the supposed link between homosexual integration and operational effectiveness (Moskos 1993). Although the Ministry of Defence has consulted the experience of other countries, it

has never produced testimony . . . to say that [it has] experienced any of the hypothetical difficulties which the MoD insist would follow if lesbians and gay men were allowed to serve. (Stonewall 1993: 3)

Official arguments that homosexual integration would undermine operational effectiveness are normally defended by either anecdotal

evidence or personal conviction rather than by the results of social scientific analysis.⁴

In June 1991 the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill recommended significant changes in service law: that 'homosexual activity of a kind that is legal in civilian law should not constitute an offence under Service law' (Stonewall 1993: 1). Although this recommendation was accepted and implemented immediately in administrative practice pending the necessary amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 1967, it remains the case that it 'is MoD policy neither to recruit nor to retain any person who admits to being homosexual' (Stonewall 1993: 2).

The MoD holds to the view that homosexual activities are incompatible with service in the armed forces, and homosexual personnel will be administratively discharged. However, the issue cannot be regarded as closed, particularly in view of the Prime Minister's announcement in 1991 that, because of changes in social attitudes, homosexuality would no longer provide a bar to security clearance for members of the civil service. Groups such as Stonewall are now pressing for this policy to be extended to members of the armed forces.⁵

CONCLUSION

The 1990s are proving to be a period of radical changes for the advanced societies, including their military institutions. In the UK the armed forces are going through one of the most dramatic periods of change in their history, with adjustments to a radically different post-Cold War strategic context being undertaken at the same time as a – at least to some – bewildering series of personnel and organizational changes in order to conform to the social values and expectations of the 1990s. The main problem is that the changes stemming from the external strategic environment and the domestic social structure are not occurring sequentially but simultaneously. The key problem is to develop appropriate strategies of readjustment that do not damage operational effectiveness – or make the services feel that they are permanently under attack from outsiders who do not fully appreciate the strategic imperatives impinging on them – but at the same time do not undermine the supportive links between armed forces and society.

The armed forces will need to argue a good case for the importance of their organizations in these New Times of risk complexity, particularly when there are so many other pressing claims on the public purse at a time when the level of government borrowing is causing concern in many countries. The price of maintaining a relatively prestigious and privileged position in society will be a

broadening of their role to include functions in addition to the traditional one of war-fighting, such as peacekeeping, disaster and humanitarian relief. Even the traditional role is likely to be rather different, encompassing low-intensity conflicts cutting across state boundaries rather than classic inter-state war – the Gulf War notwithstanding. Combining these different roles in a single organization together with managing the emergent tensions between them in terms of doctrine, training and professional identity will not be an easy task.

In addition, the services will need to communicate effectively with society and deal with a further set of tensions arising from a clash between the military requirements of operational effectiveness and the need to conform to wider social values. In this paper I have argued that, in the absence of a clear threat after the end of the Cold War, it is likely that pressure from society on the armed forces will increase. This idea – that a perceived decline in the external threat facing a state is likely to increase the internal social pressures on armed forces – is not a new one. This point can be illustrated by returning to the case of civil–military relations in Germany mentioned earlier.

The defeat of Nazism in 1945 led to the reconstruction of the armed forces according to the principles of the citizen in uniform and *innere Führung* (roughly, inner leadership), in sharp contrast with the authoritarian traditions of Prussian militarism. The sheer magnitude of the perceived threat posed by the Cold War made it possible for the West German armed forces to rearm and play a pivotal military role in NATO's strategy in Central and Eastern Europe despite the strength of anti-military currents in civil society. Indeed, it was these that accounted for the tight constraints on the use of German armed forces 'out-of-area'. Now, with the end of the Cold War and German reunification, the legitimacy of German armed forces, has come into question as is indicated by current debates over use of German forces outside NATO and as part of UN missions. The deeper issue here is whether Germany's internal social structure will allow it to pursue the 'objective interests' flowing from its geostrategic location in Central Europe (Schlor 1993: 6–22). This example indicates that the impact of changes in the strategic context on societies depends upon the nature of domestic civil–military relations, as I indicated earlier when contrasting the relative ease with which France and the UK can think of playing military roles in ways that are very much more difficult for Germany.

The threat posed by the Cold War – an ideological and nuclear superpower confrontation – was overwhelming in intensity and resulted in priority being given to external defence and military questions. In retrospect, the four decades up to 1989 may well come to be seen as something of an historical aberration. Now, in this turbulent and uncertain world of risk complexity, with no clearly focused threat and a greater discretion available to states in the formulation of their

security policy, it will be more difficult to legitimize defence and military institutions than it was during the Cold War period. This means that tensions between traditional military culture and contemporary social values, particularly the passion for equality, will increase in all advanced societies including France and the UK where, historically, traditional military values have had strong roots. Consequently, as I argued in relation to gender integration and the issue of homosexuality in armed forces, the military will, in even the most traditional of the advanced societies, need to be able to persuade civilian publics that any divergence from wider social values rests not simply on prejudice or the persistence of tradition but on sober judgement of what is required for a militarily effective organization. Like all institutions in a less deferential age, the *raison d'être* of military organizations can no longer be taken for granted.

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NOTES

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1. On neo-imperialism see the interesting remarks of the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd in the *Independent* (21 September 1992: 10).

2. How unenviable a political task this is has been illustrated trenchantly by Max Hastings (1993).

3. I owe this observation to Bernard Boene.

4. For example see the evidence of Captain Lyons to the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill (Parliamentary Reports 1991: 631).

5. This issue is being explored in a collaborative work with Professor Gwyn Harries-Jenkins.

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Women in the Armed Forces: Britain in Comparative Perspective

Context

There is great variation among nations, even among the sixteen nations of NATO, in the extent to which women serve in the armed forces, ranging from those where women are excluded, or have limited involvement, to those where all or a majority of military positions are open to them.

In recent years, policy changes in several nations have led to greater reliance being placed on female personnel in armed forces. These changes were spurred in part by the declining availability of eighteen year old males - the ubiquitous 'demographic trough' - and by increasing demands for gender equality. As gender equality is now the significant driving force in this area, moves towards equality of opportunity for women and men are likely to outlast any diminution in the size of armed forces in the post-Cold War context.

In the UK, all three services are seeking to widen employment opportunities for women and developments in this direction have been rapid since the policy reviews of 1988-9, as has been illustrated in the deployment of WRNS at sea. These policy reviews project increases in the proportion of women to be employed in all three services by the year 2000, and plan major changes in the organisation and administration of female personnel as a consequence of gender integration.

In the context of the new international situation, the 'Options for Change' exercise and the development of smaller armed forces, it is important to consider in some detail the factors other than demography and recruitment shortages that influence gender integration in the armed forces:

- The armed forces have been responding to pressures for better career opportunities from those women already in service. It is recognised that given the generally high quality of these personnel, women have been a relatively under utilised resource.
- In addition, there have been pressures from wider society stemming from changes in the participation of females in the civilian labour

market. The services are keen to avoid a gulf emerging between the career opportunities and conditions of service they offer and those provided by civilian employers in the competition for quality skilled labour in the 1990s.

- Finally, the attitudes of government and senior officers have been crucial in the development of changes in policy concerning the widening of employment opportunities for women.

The pace of change in policy concerning the employment of women has been rapid and raises a number of important issues which now have to be debated in the broader post-Cold War context and, in the case of the UK, the 'Options for Change' process. At the same time, it is important that discussion of these issues places the case of the UK in a cross-national context by drawing on the experiences and expertise of a variety of other countries.

The Israeli Female Soldier: Myth or Reality?

Given the way in which the apparent 'lessons' of the Israeli experience have been used to defend both arguments for and against policies of gender integration, it is important to disentangle historical fact from myth in the history of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).

The stereotype of the highly active part played by women in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) is largely due to the history of the Zionist Socialist Movement. In the War of Independence in 1947-48, there were many cases of women involved in combat, as this was substantially a case of guerrilla-style warfare. A total of 114 women were killed while in combat (equalling 2.8% of the total loss), and this was enough to generate the myth of Israeli female soldiers fighting along side their male counterparts.

However today this has no place in IDF official policy, which states that women must be prevented from going to combat with their units in any circumstance. The CHEN (the female division of the IDF) was originally modelled after the British as an independent corps, and is entirely responsible for the administration of the female soldiers. These women are assigned to various branches of the IDF, and thus in regard to daily matters are treated as equivalent to their male counterparts. However in the case of a court martial, for example, the female soldier may only be judged by another female.

The draft system applies equally to all Israeli citizens above the age of eighteen. Service in the reserves is also required of all, but the women are exempted upon becoming mothers or when they reach 24 (or until 34 if occupationally trained). It must be noted that the largest category of female exemptions so far have been made on religious grounds. About 10% of the whole army comprises those women who have chosen to become career soldiers.

The overall motivation among women for serving in the military is very high, with 90% of 17 year olds expressing a high positive attitude to their future term in the service. Over 50% of those sampled even stated that they would volunteer if not conscripted. However, because the exemptions offered are wider for women

than for men, only 60% (approximately) of all Israeli females serve in the military, compared to an approximate 90% of their male counterparts. The average quality of these women is actually higher than for the males, with 20% of all recruited women in the 'highest quality bracket' compared with 10% of males.

There is not a single unit within the IDF without female soldiers, thus their presence is very apparent. Women are assigned to combat units, but not in combatant roles. Because of this level of integration, 516 out of 775 existing military occupations are open to women. Females are allowed to be drill sergeants for all-male units, yet 50-60% of all female conscripts still serve in 'traditional' female jobs.

Two factors have led to an expansion in the number of occupations in the IDF open to women. The prevailing problem of manpower shortages has led to the IDF policy of "freeing all able men for combat". The second factor is pressure from women to have more significant positions within the military open to them. However, women's preferences seem to reflect a compromise between what they want to do and what actually is available. For example, survey results show that their leading occupation choice, that of 'radar operator', entails close proximity to the front lines while still definable as 'non-combatant'. Females in the IDF often tend to perform 'culturally-designated' roles, such as nurturing the group, acting as a reminder of home, and as a symbol of femininity in a male-dominated world.

Of the permanent force, KEVA, women form 10%, which reflects the choice made by those to remain beyond the conscription period. According to survey data these choices have been made by the individual for similar reasons one would find in the civilian world (for example, the challenge provided by the job).

Those women who serve in actual combat units are assigned to them initially for one out of two years, and may then volunteer to fulfil a second term at these front-line stations. As soon as these units are deployed for action, the women must either be evacuated or must remain at the

rear of the unit. This principle must be followed at all times, partly because of the fear of Israeli women being taken prisoner of war but also because the issue of women's equality is not as important a value as it is in other Western societies. As the head of the women's IDF has commented "We fight to remain women, not to become men." Hence combatant positions are still primarily perceived as the province of the male. Survey data reveal that only 20% of the Israeli women in the military actually desire combatant roles (while the figure for those women not in the military is at 60%).

On the basis of the available evidence therefore, it is necessary to conclude that the stereotype of the Israeli female soldier fighting alongside her male counterpart should be rejected.

The discussion of the Israeli case centred around three crucial issues. One widespread concern was the effect that the introduction of women would have on the cohesion of all-male units, and indeed how cohesion would suffer upon removal of these women with the immediate prospect of combat - that is to say, the IDF seemed to have achieved the worst of both worlds: undermining the male bonding essentially for combat effectiveness and incurring the administrative and financial inconvenience of removing women from units when the imminence of combat required this. However, in response it was argued that as women were assigned to their units at the same time as men, cohesion was seen to develop along normal lines. The effect of withdrawing these women when the unit went into combat was negligible, as the women are actually appointed to peripheral roles.

A second major concern related to cultural issues in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute. What would be the reaction of the Arab men if they were to confront Israeli women in the battlefield, or if they were to be taken prisoner of war? The third issue concerned the uniqueness of the Israeli case compared with other Western nations, as Israel is so frequently exposed to the reality of war. This may entail more hesitancy on the part of the IDF to allow women into combat roles. Here we can see a

direct contrast with nations such as Belgium and Norway which rarely face war, and have opened up combatant roles to women.

Gender Integration: Trends Causes and Objectives

The issue of gender integration has arisen in other occupations that have traditionally been male dominated such as the police force and various academic specialisms, most notably engineering. It is useful to analyse these cases comparatively not only to identify overall trends of integration but also to establish those causes that are specific to each and those which operate more generally. Discussion focused initially on the case of the WRAC before turning to the experience of the Metropolitan Police and trends in the field of engineering.

As the Woman's Royal Army Corps is currently moving towards full integration with the Regular Army, valuable lessons can be learnt from the Metropolitan Police Force, which underwent full gender integration in the early 1970s. What obstacles were encountered, and what attitudes were prevalent? It is clear however, that when all legal barriers have been removed, there will still likely be a vast difference in the proportionate numbers of each sex represented. For example, in the case of engineering, where there are no barriers to the opportunities available for women, they are still vastly under-represented at all levels. Why is this the case and how might women's participation be increased?

The WRAC:

The Women's Royal Army Corps (WRAC) was formed in 1949 as an acknowledgement of women's contribution in both World Wars. Mainly administrative jobs were open to women - they were totally excluded from combatant roles to the extent that their training did not include weapons or field training. Women represented a very small proportion of the total Army at approximately 2.5% up until 1979. At this time women were restricted by the deployment rules and their role; their lack of field experience; the exemption clause in the Equal Opportunities Act; and their own attitudes in addition to those of males. However, women were both underestimating themselves and creating an isolationist culture despite the fact that traditional male attitudes were changing.

They were therefore unable to exploit their full potential.

After 1979, the WRAC began to change significantly due to various factors such as the demographic trough, societal changes (for example the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 from which the Armed Services were initially exempt) and demands by women already serving in the WRAC. In 1980, the WRAC changed from serving as a replacement pool for men, to being an integral part of the armed services. There were changes in disciplinary power enabling males to deal with female misdemeanours. In 1982 it was decided that new recruits were to undergo weapons training, and at the same time the WRAC became the fifth college of Sandhurst. Nineteen-eighty-four saw the beginning of some joint training, while joint management began, and all became eligible for equal prospects. By 1991, 100 out of 134 trades in the Army were open to women. Due to European legislation regarding equal employment opportunities, those army posts closed to women must be justified on the grounds of operational effectiveness and national security. Nineteen-ninety-one also saw the tri-service introduction of maternity leave. Field training now became part of their overall training, and women were allowed up to 8 kilometres from the front lines or further forward if the role requires it, again with operational effectiveness being the determining criterion.

Today, women are playing a more active and visible role in the British Army. In the recent war in the Persian Gulf, 1110 British women were deployed in various capacities (for example as part of medical teams and as part of the WRAC) equalling 2.8% of British forces in the Gulf. In contrast, more than 33,000 U.S. women or 6.2% of the U.S. forces took part including some 13 COs. However, the British contribution should be placed in its proper context: it was Britain's first deployment of women to an area in the build up to hostilities and during war since World War Two.

The future is bright for the role of women in the British Army. On April 5 1992 the WRAC officially disbands, and all new members will be recruited by a joint commissioning board. Operation 2000 envisages a "growing percentage target" for women at 10%. However, in contrast with quotas and targets which patronise and diminish the qualities that women possess, a strong case was made for allocation of jobs to males and females on merit alone; women reaching the top on merit alone; to recognise that there are real physical differences between men and women; and that it was important to maintain our cultural traditions of human mixed gender relationships.

However, it will not be easy for the Army to increase the percentage of women to 10% from the current 5.25% when armed forces must, as a whole, reduce by 30%. While recruiting will continue, post Options for Change, it will be restricted for the next two to three years. If the female component of the new model army is to reach the agreed target of about 10% for non-nursing females, then it will still have to more than double in strength (from 5300 to 11000).

In order to eliminate differences between the female and male components of the Army by 1995 a number of policies are being pursued, including the provision of transitional training to fill the gaps in training for those serving today and bearing the burden of outdated policies. The implications of gender integration for operational effectiveness have to be considered and it will be important to reduce the current gap between the technical prowess and field experience of the women and other members of the services. It will be important to manage the process of change, deal sensitively with sources of resistance and recognise that the problems of women in the land army will always be more difficult to resolve than those in either of the other two services.

The Metropolitan Police:

Female integration in the police force has occurred at a much faster rate than in the armed services. Women have been used by the police

force since the First World War, and they were at first employed as volunteers to patrol the garrison towns and protect the women from servicemen. In 1922 women were first attested as constables but were employed on specialist duties, a situation that remained largely unchanged until 1964.

The most significant changes in employment took place in the early 1970s beginning with the integration of women into the main police force, followed swiftly by the Equal Pay Act of 1973 and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. In terms of promotion, women in the early days of integration tended to hit a "brick wall" because they could not acquire the required experience. Now women are represented in all positions and are performing well, undergoing the same training as the men.

However, the process of gender integration was not a wholly smooth one; there was a great deal of resistance to change and even hostility to women. No support mechanisms existed in 1973 for those women who often found themselves working alone in a male dominated group. They often encountered patronising behaviour from their male counterparts, or an exaggeration of technical language in an attempt to exclude women who were initially at a disadvantage.

The height of the problem, now seen more clearly in retrospect, was that the cultural web of assumptions held by the Metropolitan Police was not addressed directly in 1973. Beliefs and assumptions held in common by the organisation were being undermined by the introduction of gender integration, and planning to deal with resistance to change was not sufficiently thorough.

Widely held beliefs included: that women do not want responsibility despite the fact that nothing can be more responsible than rearing the next generation. It was more likely that as many men as women either desired or sought to avoid positions of responsibility. Another myth concerns women's inability to command - a view resting on the false assumption that command requires physical strength. In regard to the supposed unreliability of women, research

has shown that women officers do have a higher sickness rate than men. However, this finding has to be placed in the context of the societal expectation that it is the woman who should look after the children both generally and when they are sick. This issue should be tackled by appropriate personnel strategies concerning leave of absence and career breaks. Finally, there is the pervasive problem of institutional discrimination manifested in patronising 'protective' behaviour and the presence of token women in senior positions, rather than the implementation of the reality - not the rhetoric only - of equal opportunity policies.

Given these cultural and organizational obstacles standing in the way of effective gender integration it should be noted that women were not equipped to compete, and there was no managerial training of either the men or the women to deal with the specifics of managing this process.

The current situation finds women in the Metropolitan Police limited in their employment opportunities only by their personal skills and those required to match a job description. The police force's experiences of gender integration provide valuable lessons for the British Armed Services. For successful integration to occur, training must be equal for both the sexes. In addition, the fact that the 'cultural web' of the services will be threatened by the full integration of women must be dealt with effectively. Managerial training must extend to cope with the difficulties arising from this new integration. All this requires careful planning and the implementation of the following principles:

1. Involve interested parties in the planning stage; this was already in process in the British Army.
2. Clearly define the goals and objectives of the policy; misunderstandings must be reduced by writing down these goals and objectives.
3. Address 'people needs': that is to say people are the organization; friendships need to be maintained in the process of managing a

significant organisational change and both individuals and groups must feel comfortable with it.

4. Senior officers must be supportive: language and behaviour must reflect the change being sought and should reinforce it at all times.
5. Free expression of feelings: this is not always easy but if change is to be accepted all staff must be allowed to express their views and feelings.
6. Be honest and open with personnel.
7. Focus on the positive aspects of the organisational change being implemented.
8. Use reason when sources of resistance are encountered.

Finally, in adopting these principles it is crucial that the minority group is properly equipped ie trained to compete in the new organisational structure; that managers are also given the appropriate training to ensure, for example, that supervisors do not discriminate against their female subordinates and that female supervisors are able to manage male subordinates. Furthermore, it is important to establish appropriate monitoring procedures in order to ensure that the impact of gender integration policies can be measured and relevant remedial actions adopted.

Gender Integration and Engineering:

In the field of Engineering women are very under-represented but this is not because of barriers to entry or lack of opportunity. Rather, the phenomenon stems from wider societal attitudes regarding the nature of engineering - that it is unsuitable for or uninteresting to women. Women represent 0.6% of the total in the Institute of Electrical Engineers and only represent 0.36% of technicians. This small proportion of women is considered detrimental as it will further discourage more women from becoming engineers, making the choice by a woman to study engineering a difficult one.

The way forward seems to be in changing parental and school attitudes to engineering as a viable choice for all young girls. This can be accomplished by increasing young people's awareness of engineering well before school-leaving age, by offering taster courses for young persons, and by offering flexibility within the engineering world itself in terms of career breaks (allowing for maternity leave) and the provision of creche facilities.

The lessons for the integration of the armed forces are clear. As well as ensuring that all opportunities are equal for both sexes, deeper societal attitudes must be changed regarding the nature and suitability of the armed services as a practical career option for women. All three services must market themselves as a 'gender-free' option to be considered by all who have the appropriate skills or interests.

In the ensuing discussion three main issues were debated. First, there was concern about a 'target figure' mentioned for the desired female composition of the forces. Surely this would constitute some form of quota, and thus present a ceiling beyond which further changes would have to be debated? As positive discrimination is illegal in all forms, a hypothetical target ought not discriminate against men who wish to join the services and who have the desired skills. Rather, target figures should be treated as a temporary aim stated for planning purposes only. It was suggested that women would never be represented in the armed forces in a proportion similar to their proportion in society, since a career in the army would never be so desirable to women. The central need still remains for people with the right skills and attitudes, irrespective of gender.

A second issue was whether there was a limit to the proportion of women employed in the armed services beyond which those forces would no longer be effective fighting organisations. There were two aspects to this: those organisations might no longer appear attractive enough for males to join. Secondly, that service may no longer be seen to be combat effective by other armed forces. Although further research would have to be carried out to substantiate these

hypotheses, it is unlikely that if the force still constituted a highly skilled body of professionals, that it would then appear unattractive for men to join, or seem less combat effective.

Lastly, concern was expressed regarding the effect that integration could be expected to have on the equipment used by the armed services. Any effects would clearly differ between the services, and must be dealt with as such. There would clearly be continuing problems with submarine warfare because of the inherent space limitations and the difficulty in providing separate facilities. It was expected that problems with managing the existing equipment would not be gender-related with the introduction of 'gender-free' physical testing - all those who passed the test would be at a certain physical level capable of managing the equipment. In retrospect, and given the policy of gender integration, it was clear how important it was to properly integrate human factors into equipment design.

Gender Integration: Organisational Problems- The Lessons for Britain from Abroad

Gender Integration and the U.S. Military:

Having examined the cases of engineering and the police force in the UK the discussion turned once more to the international scene and in particular to the lessons that might be learned from the processes of gender integration experienced by a number of other countries. From a survey of a variety of countries three key points emerged:

First, when an army is faced with a shortage of qualified men, it tends to increase women's participation. During the Second World War women were conscripted in Norway, Germany, France, Russia and the UK. They were encouraged to participate in all areas of the military except direct combat. With the end of the Second World War, these opportunities were removed, and limitations on women's participation re-instituted.

Second, a nation tends to undergo a process of "cultural forgetting" of its women's contribution during a war as soon as it is over. One rationale for barriers to women in certain areas of the military is the danger posed to the women themselves. It is therefore ironic that in wartime, when danger to the military is greatest, women's participation peaks. In peacetime, when career opportunities are greatest, women's participation is limited. An example of "cultural forgetting" is the experience of the 450,000 women who worked for the Wehrmacht during World War Two. Although many of them performed combat roles, they were given no military label and were not officially recognised.

Third, factors other than wartime necessity which account for changes in the position of women in the armed forces are:

- demographic troughs in the number of young male adults, forcing armies to rely more heavily on women.
- technological progress which accounts for the declining emphasis on physical prowess and aggressiveness.

- cultural patterns of change within civilian society - for example laws against gender discrimination, declining gender barriers etc.

Current policies and patterns of women's participation in armed forces:

At present women comprise 11% of the US military - the largest percentage of any country in NATO. The US is in the process of opening fighter pilot positions to women, following the example of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK in which some areas of combat have already been opened to women.

In the US there have been problems during the integration process. This is not unique to gender integration - it is also true of race and ethnicity. As had been illustrated already in the discussion of gender integration in the Metropolitan police force, negative attitudes towards the new group often result in discrimination in the form of harassment and social isolation. Positive attitudes towards integration tend to be adopted when interaction is sufficiently close and sustained for men to get to know the women well as individuals. It is important that the wide variety of needs between individual women is recognised. Positive attitudes towards integration are fostered most effectively when:

- women are at least of equal status with men
- women constitute more than 10% of the group
- the situation fosters cooperation rather than competition
- there are commonly shared goals
- those in authority support integration totally and express their support at all levels

Again, instructive parallels could be drawn with the lessons learned from the Metropolitan police force's experiences of gender integration.

Studies carried out in the US in the 1970s showed no difference in combat effectiveness

resulting from an increased proportion of women up to 38%. This was the largest percentage tested. But it has been argued that an actual combat situation was not simulated effectively enough to make the tests reliable.

Unit performance evaluators have been used to expose many of the problems encountered during the integration process. Leadership failures were identified - for example many NCOs failed to assign work to female soldiers. Problems of sexual harassment were shown to be persistent. Women remain reluctant to use official channels of protest especially when others who do so are met with hostility. Sexual harassment can only be eradicated when leaders demonstrate that such behaviour will not be tolerated. It is clear from the studies that the attitudes of leaders towards integration greatly affect the behaviour of male soldiers, both positively and negatively.

The Implications for British Armed Forces: Gender Integration in the Royal Air Force:

To what extent do the experiences of other countries provide instructive lessons for the British armed forces? As of 1991 about eight percent of Royal Air Force personnel are women (Army 4.8%; Royal Navy 7.4%). This is the greatest number and highest percentage of the three services. Women have played a role in the RAF throughout the twentieth century - 32,000 women served in the WRAF in World War One and in World War Two, 250,000 served.

The representation of women is greater in the RAF than the other two services partly because of its structure. It is easy for women to be assimilated in non-combatant roles because the total number of personnel in combat, even during wartime, is very small. Many Royal Air Force occupations are hundreds of miles away from the combat zone and are set in "civilian circumstances". The Royal Air Force is the most meritocratic of the services and women are more able to climb existing career structures.

In 1949, the WRAF ceased as a separate organisation. In 1968, women officers adopted

male ranks and in 1980 women began to be trained in the use of firearms for defensive purposes. In 1945, 17% of the Royal Air Force were women. By 1948, this had fallen to 8% and by 1957, 2%. Until 1979, the percentage of women in the RAF never rose above 6%. Why were there so few women in the service in peacetime despite the suitability of many RAF roles for them and their notable contribution during wartime?

One major reason for the under-representation of women in the RAF was the idea that women are not cost-effective to train. In 1986, the average length of stay for a woman was 6.9 years in contrast to 14 years for a man. Since it costs £13 million to train each air crew, women were deemed unsuitable.

In 1988, the RAF reviewed the rationale for having only 5,000 trained airwomen and yet 70,000 trained men. Research showed that 'training wastage' for women amounted to only half that for men. In addition, women were scoring higher, on average, for personal qualities and professional ability and recruiting enquiries from women were increasing. The RAF realised that it needed the best air crew regardless of gender and started recruiting more women. By 1988, the average stay for women had increased to 10 years, and air crew were only required to stay for 8. It is also important to look at individual cases when examining reasons for leaving a service. Thus, perhaps family responsibility is a better category than gender for noting retention rates. Therefore there have been positive benefits for the RAF in recruiting more women. Now a woman can become a parachutist and the only occupations not open to her are that of fireman, infantry soldier and aerial erector.

The organisational lessons which can be drawn from the experience of the RAF include the need for proper research and continual monitoring of achievement, attitude and cost. It must be remembered that the decision makers are of a different generation than the air crew and that they are men. No attempt should be made to impose their standards on the young. Monitoring must be undertaken by disinterested

and unprejudiced researchers. The very different perceptions of the performance of women on board HMS Brilliant in the Gulf by men and by outside observers illustrate this. There are advantages in adopting evolutionary rather than revolutionary policies and allowing the integration process to happen slowly. This allows individuals to get to know each other well and fosters cooperation rather than competition. All discrimination must be removed concerning both men and women. A token female figurehead is something to be warned against if credibility is to be maintained and quotas must be banished. Manning must be on the basis of cost-effectiveness, affirmative action and the maintenance of full operational efficiency.

Discussion centred on the question of women in combat and whether there was indeed any evidence to support the often cited claim that women are biologically less suited to combat situations than men. It became clear that whilst much attention is given to the question of the effect of a female presence on cohesion, the actual ability of women to perform combat roles is often ignored. Very little research has been done in this area. Most of the evidence of women in combat is from abroad and from situations in which nations were desperate and in many cases employing irregular rather than large-scale organised forces.

The contribution of women to the UDR in Northern Ireland provides an interesting example for study. Women and men are both in uniform and take equal risks and there is no evidence that the presence of women debilitates the operational effectiveness of the UDR. There is no way of telling how women will perform in combat until they are actually performing a combatant role. And a woman must be trained in sustaining aggression over a period of time before her performance in combat can be compared to a man's. Consequently, the placing of women in combat must be anticipated and prepared for. As technology advances combat becomes more about the propensity and ability to take risks than sustain killing. Therefore the argument that women are not biologically designed to kill is redundant. Research on the

American police force has shown that women are more likely to pull their weapon to compensate for a lack in physical strength. But if men and women are trained together from the very start they will be able to identify each other's strengths and weaknesses, and overcome them. It is imperative that each person is suited to his or her job, but that preconceived ideas about suitability which are based in gender differentiation must be discounted. There is a difference between the average 18 year old girl and the average 18 year old boy in their ability to exhibit aggression, but people would not volunteer for jobs unless they wanted them. Individuals cannot be treated as the average for their demographic group and it must be accepted that women with a low propensity to kill are highly unlikely to apply for combat posts within the military.

Finally, it was also pointed out that the argument that the existence of women in combat groups will disturb male cohesion was used to prevent women becoming university professors and neurosurgeons. In areas where integration has taken place these fears have never materialised.

The Employment of Women and Operational Effectiveness: The Implications of Gender Integration

In the last session of the conference, the focus shifted to the aspirations and attitudes of those female personnel at the early stages of their careers in military and other organizations each with quite different histories of gender integration. The main objective of the session was to identify how these young professional women viewed gender integration policies; what significant differences there were among the different services and other organisations; what lessons had been learned and what steps were required in the future to ensure that full integration and equal opportunities for men and women were implemented.

Questions were addressed to a panel of young women - one from each of the services, one from Civil Engineering and one from the Metropolitan Police. Discussion concentrated first on whether a female focus or role model was required within the armed forces, how this was to be implemented, and the problems likely to arise from such a measure. The consequences of increased feminisation on operational effectiveness were also discussed in the light of personal experiences; and the practical considerations required to accommodate female personnel - such as maternity leave - were addressed.

The need for a strong female focus was emphasised particularly in the less fully integrated services. It was considered most important to have a female mentor with power and influence during the transition towards integration. In the RAF and Metropolitan Police, where integration is more complete, personal experience showed that role models are chosen for their personality, rather than their gender. A female focus was also deemed important for the overview and monitoring of general personnel problems - from uniform size to women's issues.

It was emphasised that, in the army, the problem of chauvinism is far more acute within the ranks than the officer corps, and therefore the need for a female focus within the ranks is far greater. The problem of chauvinism appeared to be minimal within small operational groups in which individuals know each other well. The tendency is for each member of the group to

protect the others, especially on 'foreign soil' or in near combat situations, irrespective of gender.

There was some disagreement over the importance of having women in powerful positions rather than men who are sympathetic towards women's needs and dedicated to gender integration. It was concluded that vigilance and a well designed organisational strategy to ensure the continuing progress of equal opportunities were the most significant priorities. But opinions on whether such vigilance would necessarily best come from the women themselves differed.

The positive and negative aspects of setting targets were discussed. It was concluded that targets should be set, but more importantly that opportunities for women should be improved so that these targets can be met through merit. The appointment of a woman to a certain position on a quota basis - because she is a woman irrespective of whether she is qualified for the job - was unanimously deplored. Integration can only be successful if women are given the encouragement and opportunity to reach the required level of achievement themselves. It was emphasised that it should be made clear to men in the military that equal opportunities would not damage their career prospects and thus a sharp distinction needed to be drawn between administrative planning targets and quota provisions.

It was argued that, despite the commonly held belief that feminisation of the military would damage operational effectiveness, the opposite would in fact be true. Personal experience showed that men did not want to be beaten by women and hence their performance has, for example, in training, improved. Integration would also result in a bigger pool from which to select military personnel and hence a higher quality of recruits. The idea that women will come up against male protectiveness in dangerous situations and that, because of this, the performance of both sexes will suffer, was dispelled by experiences in the Metropolitan Police. In dangerous situations personnel look to those of higher status for guidance and

initiative. Where the higher rank is held by a woman, subordinate men will look to her.

The discussion moved on to the practical problems of employing more female personnel in the military and the personal obstacles women have come across as, for instance, in combining a career with a family. A recent questionnaire, sent out to female junior naval officers having recently left Dartmouth, revealed three main findings:

- Women who had married within the service came across problems since there are no mechanisms by which husband and wife can get leave at the same time in the same place.
- Women wanted more opportunities at sea sooner in their careers.
- Non-volunteers for sea service felt they no longer had good career prospects and wanted their terms of service more clearly defined.

The issue of maternity leave and career breaks was addressed, largely by examining precedents set by the Metropolitan Police.

A major problem faced by the military is the clash between political control of the budget and the manpower margin this allows, and political decisions resulting in equal opportunities legislation. It would be very expensive to run a one-to-one replacement scheme for women taking maternity leave from the services, but on the other hand, if resignations rise and recruitment dwindles because no effective 'leave' policies exist, spending on advertising and training would have to rise.

It was argued that the issue of maternity leave, and its implications for recruitment and retention costs, should not be looked at in isolation from days lost due to sickness, alcohol, drugs, family responsibility etc. Surveys have found that in the United States enlisted men lose more time for these reasons than their female counterparts. This must be kept in mind with respect to time lost through pregnancy. Pregnancy is clearly visible and therefore an obvious target for concern about time lost from

work, but it is also more predictable and hence easier to plan and account for.

There was general optimism regarding the integration of women into the services, but greater uncertainty and even pessimism over the broader issue of general manpower cutbacks in the services and the implications for the career prospects of all service personnel. It was felt that, in the longer term, even with the fullest gender integration imaginable, women would comprise far less than thirty per cent of armed forces personnel in large part because fewer women than men would select the military as a career. On the other hand, the fact that gender integration would proceed in the much smaller post-cold war armed forces showed that while demographic factors had played a key part in promoting this major change, social issues of citizenship and equal opportunity were now the more significant driving force.

Conclusions

In the concluding session of the conference, discussion returned to the questions that had been raised in the keynote address:

Why has the question of women in the armed forces arisen now?

It is particularly important to address this topic at the present time because of the speed at which gender integration is taking place in both civilian and military spheres. Furthermore, gender integration in the British armed forces is occurring at the same time as a whole series of other changes concerning their shape, size, role, location and structure.

To what extent is military change responsible?

If the British armed forces are to be both smaller and better in the future it is clear that they need to recruit and employ more women. Thus even with a 30 per cent reduction in recruitment targets, with the competition between employers for skilled young people, the armed forces will need to broaden its recruitment pool in order to attract and retain its share of the 'best and brightest'. For wider social, legal and political reasons, it would in any case have to be seen to be a good equal opportunities employer to attract and retain the ambitious and able - both men and women.

To what extent are human and societal factors outside the military responsible?

The demographic trough and women's increasingly high expectations in all careers have both played an instrumental part in prompting action towards gender integration. It seems clear that the deep historical and cultural differences between societies are largely responsible for the variations in attitudes in different countries in relation to the public's views on the role of women in armed forces and the views of women already serving in the armed forces.

Can women be a combat-effective component of the armed services?

Throughout the conference, it became clear that there was a dearth of scientific research material in this area. There is no evidence to suggest that women should not be just as effective as men in combat roles. The Israeli experience during the War of Independence and the Soviet experience during World War Two indicate that from the standpoint of operational effectiveness alone, there was no reason for excluding women from combat.

What practical and philosophical problems arise?

In regard to gender integration policies, a key question is whether there should be a female figurehead for the armed services. Also, there needs to be some consensus on the personnel and cost implications of maternity and paternity, and on the size of the non-effective margin which must be carried to accommodate a more comprehensive 'leave' system. Furthermore, there are significant differences between the three services, as is evident in the different rates of change with regard to gender integration and the obstacles encountered in implementing integration policy.

The conference ended with recommendations for the management of change based on the experiences of the Metropolitan Police Force:

- involve interested people
- try to foresee and allow for people's needs and social dynamics
- senior officers must be supportive
- people must be free to express their feelings and must not feel inhibited
- honesty and openness at all levels is essential
- when resistance is encountered, reason must be used to counter it

Force Regeneration & the Regular Reserve Balance

Context

The BMSG conference theme was Force Regeneration and the Regular/reserve balance. It brought together representatives from government, industry, the regular and reserve forces in addition to academics and other analysts. There was also a significant attendance of delegates from overseas including Germany, France Belgium and the USA. Conference discussions focused on the policy context of force regeneration and the regular reserve balance by reviewing the implications of the Open government document on the future of Britain's reserve forces, the government's stated policy of an open market as the driving mechanism of the UK's defence industrial base, and the government's intention that through market testing it may contract out large parts of the functions of the support area in peacetime. Key issues addressed included:

- The post Cold war strategic context or 'new world order' of risks and uncertainties
- How the strategic context required armed forces and military planners to be more flexible than before in regard to preparing for a wider range of military operations than during the Cold war era
- The general trend towards a reduction in the size of armed forces
- Changes in the regular/reserve balance in the armed forces
- The organisational, social and political factors governing the use of reserves in operations and how regular and reserve personnel can be 'matched and mixed' in order to maximise military effectiveness
- The legal and administrative context of changes in the regular/reserve balance
- The part played by employers in the provision of an effective reserve force
- The future of the UK defence industrial base in the post Cold war context
- The feasibility of a surge capacity for war equipment and how government and industry can best cooperate in this area

Focus:

1. The post Cold war strategic context:

Three dimensions of the post-Cold war strategic context were taken as points of departure for conference discussion of the changing regular reserve/balance in the UK armed forces: (i) with the end of the bi-polar stand off between the superpowers, warning times of major war had shifted from hours to years or even decades although the warning times for military operations of lesser levels of intensity could be very short indeed particularly in the light of (ii) The certainties stemming from the bi-polar Cold war had given way to a world of ill defined and unpredictable security risks. In some ways, the number of points of conflict around the world that needed to be addressed in order to avoid wider conflagrations had increased with the end of the Cold war. Each of these required a complex admixture of diplomatic, economic and military mechanisms in the broader context of the UK's participation in a number of international organizations (iii) For the UK, in contrast with recent decades, the challenges requiring some sort of military response were increasingly likely to be out of area thus posing problems of how to plan to respond to conflicts of different levels of intensity and ranging from humanitarian relief actions through the spectrum of low and high intensity military operations, in addition to the difficulties of dealing with unexpected allies let alone opponents.

2. The Regular/reserve balance - key issues:

Against this backdrop, the conference was provided with five key issues for discussion: (i) The overall size and structure of armed forces. 'Downsizing' of armed forces is occurring in many countries and the creation of smaller forces has also provoked discussion of the merits of retaining conscription in continental Europe; Belgium for example will soon be shifting to an all volunteer force. In the light of the new strategic context and with constraints on the defence budget it is clear that while a wide range of critical military skills are required they are simply too expensive to be fully maintained in the regular forces, as for example with the medical and nursing skills used in Op Granby. The regular/reserve balance will have to be

considered in the context of a shift in the relationship between combat and combat support - for example fewer combat units but more combat support as in the case of logistics and Royal Engineers. In addition, with smaller forces overall, it is likely that the reserve forces will become smaller, but they will be used more frequently albeit on a selective basis. This usage of reserves will have a substantial impact on employers, the economy, and public opinion more generally and these wider issues will have to be addressed.

ii. The balance of regular and reserve forces:

With the establishment of smaller regular armed forces, the importance of reserve forces, both regular and volunteer will increase. The question of balance between these forces needs to be examined and monitored. For example, while as a consequence of a drawdown of regular forces the regular reserves will experience a short to medium term expansion, there will still be a process of skill fade. Thus it will be important to maintain recruitment and retention in the volunteer reserves and these issues, especially retention, do give some cause for concern. Rather than determine the size of reserve forces by applying a percentage ratio to the regular forces, it will be important to include a whole range of factors including the training costs of reserve forces in the establishment of the regular/reserve balance.

iii. The Use of Reserves: In the new strategic

context both regular and reserve forces need to be more flexible: forces would need to be 'mixed and matched' as the need arose. This posed three critical issues: first, should reserve forces be used as fully formed units rather than as individuals used to backfill slots left vacant by regular forces? In this context, should reservists be encouraged to take up short service commissions? Second, should reservists be used in UN peacekeeping operations and other situations well short of threats to national survival (the traditional context in which the use of reserve forces has been contemplated). Third, to what extent will employers and public opinion more generally support the use of reserves in situations where a threat to national survival

is not evident? In Op Granby the use of reserves was largely voluntary but with more contentious conflicts the use of reserves might prove difficult. Thus, in regard to the question of the political will to use reserves, it is important that any changes in military organisation do not erode the critical supportive links between armed forces and society.

- iv. The legal framework governing reserve forces: It is necessary to reform the legal framework regulating reserve forces because existing law was developed in a strategic context which no longer applies. Justifications for the use of reserves rooted in great or national emergency or warlike preparations are no longer helpful or appropriate for the new security challenges of the post Cold war era. What is required is a rational and simpler method for calling out reservists, in small or larger numbers as the situation requires, in all three services. Therefore, new legislation should have rationalisation and flexibility as their dominant themes. At the same time, the issue of employment protection for reservists will need to be addressed and this will require the development of policies of cooperation and mutual support between employers and the government if the more flexible and effective use of reserve forces is to be a success.
- v. Current government thinking: HMG's views on the future organization and use of reserves have been published recently in an open document *The Future of Britain's Reserve Forces*. This had generally been well received by trades unions, NELC, and other government departments. It was stressed that policy on the reserves is still in the process of being formulated and that already a number of points in the document had stimulated debate and further government thinking. For example, the suggested ever-ready or high readiness reserve as a component in a two-tier reserve structure raised the important question of whether employers would be sufficiently supportive in order for them to be militarily effective. The division between those reservists earmarked for ARRC support and those for national defence might be

better worded in terms of those attached to ARRC and those providing a general reserve for any purpose. Such a formulation would be more in keeping with the post-Cold war context and provide an opening for a range of important MACC duties that might be open to reserve forces. These would not only be important duties in their own right but also have the benefit of assisting reserve morale and fostering society's support for and recognition of the value of reserve forces. It was possible that with the more frequent use of reserves, albeit in relatively small numbers, a new type of volunteer reservist was required: but would there be a sufficient number of people willing to serve in the knowledge that it was quite likely that they would be called to serve and to risk their lives in operations well short of national emergency? In addition there were important organizational questions to be resolved: it was likely that while formed reserve units would persist there would be a relative shift to the use of individuals or 'packets' of reserves in a mix and match system of regular and reserve forces appropriate for each situation as it arose. In regard to the issue of employees with reserve commitments, should employers be expected to provide named individuals or simply numbers of people with particular skills. A tri-service action plan was needed to steer the process of legislative change and administrative re-organization. There was a government will to legislate on the matter of reserves, hopefully in the 1994-5 session. It was thought that the involvement of UK forces in a number of UN operations, and the use of reserves, in small numbers, in the Bosnian crisis (Operation Grapple) would focus minds on the need for action on all these issues. In this context it was important to realise that the issue of the regular/reserve balance was linked to the more fundamental question of the role that Britain wished to play in the world of the 21st century.

Security Risks and the New World Order:

The issue of the regular/reserve balance needs to be addressed in the broader context of the security risks facing the UK in the aftermath of the end of the Cold war. The UK faces a world of risks and uncertainties rather than one characterised by a clear and potentially overwhelming threat as in the case of the Warsaw Pact. (The difference between a risk and a threat was that in the former there is a capability which is not yet matched to an intention while in the latter this is the case. In the case of dictatorships, it is particularly difficult to estimate whether a shift from a risk to a threat has occurred). This post-Cold war trend pointed to the need to monitor risks and uncertainties through intelligence sources in order to ensure that, should they become threats, an appropriate and timely response could be developed. One strand of this trend was the dangerous proliferation of arms, both conventional and those of mass destruction, to states that might pose serious out of area threats to the UK and its allies.

The security risks facing the UK were reviewed in terms of the three broad roles for British defence policy that were set out in the latest Statement on the Defence Estimates. In terms of the defence of the home land and dependent territories (whether or not a clear threat is present), the armed forces are required in relation to the activities of the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in addition to the commitments of Hong Kong and the Falkland Islands. In the future there will be additional challenges posed by the international drugs trade and other activities of organized crime.

In regard to contingency planning for a major external threat to the UK or its allies, the only possible one was a resurgent Russia but the warning time for this was at least ten years given that Russia was economically weak and preoccupied with its own internal and new border problems. Of serious concern was the Balkans crisis and the strains caused by population movements and related unrest associated with post-communist societies which could draw in the UK as a component of a broader peacemaking or peacekeeping initiative. In addition, there were new uncertainties in Africa and the Middle east with water resources providing an important source of conflicts amongst states to add to that of oil.

In terms of the third role - responding to threats to international peace and security and thus, indirectly, to UK security, here there was a very wide range of conflicts or tensions: between India and Pakistan as India sought to become a major regional power; the peacekeeping challenge of Cambodia; the uncertain role of North Korea in the Pacific; the question of whether China would be able to reconcile communist politics and capitalist economics and the security consequences of failing to do so; the future military posture of Japan; and the developments in Southern Africa.

In contrast with the first and second defence roles, the third provides the broadest set of challenges for the UK but also provides the greatest area for discretion. That is to say, what part the UK wishes to play in contributing to international peace and security lies very much in the political calculations and choices of its leaders. However, as a trading nation in a global economy, this could be considered a key area for the UK because in terms of role 2, there was little prospect of a high intensity war between the UK and another advanced country. Irrespective of how this contribution to global peace and security would be defined by the UK it was clear that the task of monitoring security risks and how these became transformed into threats required not merely more resources devoted to intelligence but also a change in the attitude of the UN towards intelligence gathering if it was to perform its role of promoting global security in the 21st century. It was also interesting to note that in terms of the intelligence role, volunteer reservists had played an important part in the Gulf conflict in, for example, the debriefing of hostages. This illustrated a broader point that reservists were most valuable when performing military roles that, in terms of skill, converged with their civilian job.

Force Structure and the regular reserve mix: organizational and operational issues:

In discussion, however, the above argument that the deployment difficulties relating to reserves were insuperable was not universally accepted. Furthermore, it was argued that, even if politically and militarily feasible, an increased focus on reserves would not solve regular infantry 'overstretch' difficulties. Finally, the important point was made that, through their role as an aid to the civil community the reserves played an important part in demonstrating their public value and that this role could be expanded in the future e.g., in relation to drug enforcement activities. The discussion of the operational and organisational dimensions of reserve forces four important themes recurred: the military effectiveness - actual and potential - of reserve units; the problem of ensuring that employers would provide sufficient support for employees with reserve commitments; the extent to which public opinion generally would support the more frequent use of reserve forces in political circumstances where there was no clear national emergency or threat to the homeland; and finally the question of the relative importance of strategy and cost cutting as driving forces in the rethinking of the regular/reserve mix and the Options for Change process of which it is a part.

In order that any future regular/reserve mix can work effectively the long-standing tension and misunderstanding between these forces concerning their respective roles and value needs to be addressed. One contentious issue is the military skill and effectiveness of reserve forces compared with their regular counterparts. It is clear that in terms of regular reservists their utility is highest in the first few years after they have left the regular forces although skill fade is less of a problem in the case of those who perform tasks in their civilian jobs that are closely related to their military speciality. In the same way, the value of volunteer reservists is greatest where such a skill convergence can be identified, as is perhaps best illustrated in the medical specialisations. Furthermore it was important to note that the best way to maximise the military potential stemming from such skill convergence was regular training and exercises, preferably with regular forces they are likely to serve with in operations. Yet the provision of proper training and equipment is expensive and not a few observers commented that the resources 'saved' by a smaller regular force with greater use of reservists would actually have to be spent on

these resources if a revised regular/reserve structure was to be militarily credible and effective. Some posed the question: Why not spend more on regular forces, especially infantry? Others were wary of shifting too far from the established relationship between reserve and regular forces. For example, the TA has two key roles in war: to provide some logistic and combat support units to reinforce the regular army; to train a new set of units to take the place of those of the regular army later in the war when casualties have taken their toll and to be the basis of expansion. The reserves in the other two services have a similar role. However, it was argued that it was unwise to create a regular army which is so short of men in peacetime that it cannot do anything without substantial reinforcement from the first day of war. By their very nature, reserve forces (regular and volunteer) consist of men who need more training before being pitched in to the very point of battle. Against this argument was the view that the armed forces have to adapt to the new strategic and budgetary context: the regular/reserve restructuring was a critical policy challenge because the defence budget could not allow all the required military specialities and the required numbers of personnel to be placed in the regular orbit.

Thus the central question is how best to integrate regular and reserve forces under contemporary conditions in order to maximise military effectiveness. It would seem that, leaving aside matters of political will and the support of employers, there was no evidence of a lack of willingness on the part of reservists to serve if called. The main question concerned the organizational and operational basis of their use. Whatever steps were made in commonality in defence procurement it was difficult to foresee standardisation of reserve structures as between the UK and its actual or potential allies. Problems of integrating regular and reserve units within one national society were difficult enough. However, as it was likely that any future use of UK forces would be in the context of a multinational operation and there would be problems posed by different command structures, this pointed to the importance of thinking through how to deploy reserve forces: in formed units or as individuals and how command structures in regular and reserve components were to be integrated. Some lessons from the USA were instructive. These can be considered in terms of two cross cutting dimensions: the horizontal one of skill or

specialisation and the vertical one of rank. While certain reserve units did perform as well or better than their regular counterparts in the Gulf war (as for instance the Air force national guard) this was because they actually trained more than their regular counterparts and had the appropriate equipment. In addition, it was important not to generalise from this case to other societies with rather different numbers of pilot licenses per head of population. More significant was the relative failure of the round out infantry battalions which, not surprisingly were not up to the combat speed of the regular forces they were due to be deployed with. This revealed a clear flaw in the Total Force concept. However, there was much greater success in the areas of combat support and combat service support, in which a high percentage of US forces are reservists of various kinds and this was due in large part to the skill convergence identified earlier. What is also interesting to note is that integration of reserve and regular forces worked insofar as the reserve rank structure was 'decapitated': that is to say, as in the Federal army reserve (largely made up of ex-regulars) squads, platoons and battalion size units could be integrated into the regular forces and under regular command but not higher level formations. It was interesting that, in the case of logistic formations, complete units could be deployed into units with other regular companies although the staffs and senior commanders were regular officers. This decapitation theme provided a useful basis to discuss the detailed organisation of regular/reserve operational and organizational integration. One possible implication for the TA in the UK was that it would not be able to keep all its cap badges; for example, in the longer term it would have to give up its infantry role and concentrate on combat support and combat service support.

To return more directly to the case of the UK, such operational and organizational matters need to be located in their broader social context: i.e. the degree to which society will support the reserves and the uses to which they might be put in future conflicts. Thus it was critical that the recruitment and retention profile of reserve forces improve if they are to play an effective role in the future. It was noted that at present the volunteer TA reserve is only up to 85% of its strength and that a 30% turnover rate per annum exacerbated the difficulties produced by recruitment shortages.

These recruitment and retention difficulties related to domestic pressures facing reservists: i.e. family commitments and also pressures from employers. Critical to the future successful use of reserve forces is the support of employers and it was felt that policy would have to address the issue of financial compensation to both the employer and employee for loss of earning consequent upon a reserve deployment. At present it had to be admitted that many reservists omit to mention their reserve commitment on their CVs because in these difficult economic times employers are reluctant, or are certainly perceived to be reluctant, to let their labour go in time of emergency for no recompense. Such perceived attitudes act as a negative factor on reserve recruitment and retention. However, a number of contributors argued forcefully that employers, generally speaking, were very supportive of reserves, although there were some important items raised by the Open Document that needed to be addressed. It was argued that, currently, there was sufficient flexibility and notice in the arrangements of time off for training to take into account of operational considerations; the likelihood of losing employees for a significant period was very low; there were benefits to companies in terms of training and development of individual employees; and arrangements were underpinned by cooperation between the companies, employees and the reserve units based on a balance of interest. However, it was suggested that in regard to the government's new proposals, any changes which added to companies' costs or reduced their operational efficiency would be progressively counter-productive by making prospective reservists unreliable as employees. For example, while industry would support the principle of the 'Ever-Ready' reservist, who would voluntarily accept a liability to early call-out for operational deployment, in practice it would add to employers' costs through additional paid time off for employees to attend training activities. From the employers' point of view, while it is not unreasonable to expect reservists to attend peacetime training, this should be subject to limitations on the number of people involved from any single organisation and to adequate prior notification of period of absence so that companies can organize their staffing arrangements. These issues required further detailed consultation between industry and government.

In regard to the Safeguard of Employment Act (SOE 1985), although the Open Document had not recommended any changes to its fundamental provisions, industry recognised that there were major implications for companies if the overall proposals were to rely upon employers being more generous in allowing paid time off for employees to attend mandatory training. The SOE Act provisions could very well remain controversial in peacetime and their application during high intensity large scale deployments, as in the Gulf War could also pose difficulties. Although the partnership between the Services and industry proved effective during the Gulf War, this needs further consolidation and reinforcement in regard to pay, fringe benefits, insurance protection etc. This might require a review of the SOE Act in order to clarify the position of employees and it might be wise to draw fully on some of the lessons provided by American experiences.

A further concern for employers was the concept of maximising the use of civilians from private contractors or Defence Support Agencies in peacetime support functions. The reserve liability of these civilians could be invoked when needed to provide support in an operational theatre in an emergency. This concept derived from the very successful and entirely voluntary response made by the employees of significant defence companies who supported the armed forces in theatre during the Gulf war. While, generally speaking, there was a good deal of support for this concept there was some concern over the best way of implementing it. It was argued that the duties of such volunteer Reservists in wartime should be restricted to equipment support and should not include involvement in military operations. This should minimise the need for military training, although in practice, civilians who provided equipment support only should also have protective training, particularly on the modern battlefield.

Leaving aside the question of employers' support for reserve forces, a further difficulty influencing their effectiveness was the morale problem caused by the uncertainty over the future role of reserves in the new strategic context. A recurrent theme in conference discussions was that quite apart from the issue of military effectiveness, would there be a political will to deploy significant numbers of reservists in contexts that fell well short of national

emergency. Public opinion about this whole question deserved further research.

While government policy is still emerging in this area it was made clear that what the reserve forces needed was a clear role, although the need for flexibility was generally recognized. While the case was made that the key difficulty relating to this and other areas of defence was that HMG had not laid down a clear defence policy an opposing point was also made that it was not wise to design forces to meet a specific threat(s) when the strategic context did not allow for any such calculation to be made. The move from the certainties of the bipolar world to the uncertainties and risks of the new world order was not an easy path to tread and it was tempting but fruitless to look for a new and reassuring certainty.

Industry and Force Regeneration:

A central theme in conference discussions was the problem of force regeneration: how best to ensure that armed forces could be provided with the equipment, technology, civilian technicians and other supplies critical to the prosecution of major war should the need arise and in the period indicated by warning time calculations. A useful point of departure was the issue of warning time itself: one of the dangers of cutting both armed forces and the means of producing them too severely is that any future attempt to rebuild defence capability could well be more destabilising than would have been the case if a higher level of defence capability had been retained in the first place. On the other hand, few questioned the fact that, with the end of the Cold war, major cuts in defence and defence procurement were inevitable: the crucial point was to retain and maintain the means of reconstituting and regenerating forces. For MOD force regeneration means two distinct but related processes: 'the timely and full activation of existing force structure and infrastructure through the mobilisation of reserves and reinforcement'. Reconstitution refers to the 'expansion of forces by government decision in the face of a protracted and visible period of hostile military build-up and preparation'.

The discussion focused initially on the factors which determine the size and technological expertise of the UK defence industrial base and then moved on to examine changes in the way its future size and capability should be determined if it was to maintain a core industrial base and expand it in time of national emergency.

The defence industrial base today should be viewed in the context of current government policy based on value for money and open competition. The MOD confirmed recently that it has no plans to issue a wider list of key technologies in which a UK capability must be retained and argued that the UK simply cannot afford to underpin a capability in every area. Thus the UK list of key technologies remains confined to cryptography and nuclear weapon mechanisms. This policy has led to the rapid erosion of some areas of the technology base for which there is little non-military demand. Procurement from overseas may be possible at a price and perhaps with special conditions attached. Nonetheless defence manufacturers argue that as broad a technology base as can be afforded should

be maintained, even if it has to be at a low level of effort so that a reasonably rapid low risk re-start could be achieved. Thus it was likely that relying on market forces alone would lead to a mismatch between the capabilities of UK industry and the strategic needs of the nation.

Defence manufacturers had sought to shift government policy on this issue by arguing for a more concerted cooperative partnership between government and industry, although it faced the difficulty that responsibilities for defence industry overlap three government departments - MOD, DTI and the Treasury. Defence manufacturers have argued the broader point that a strong manufacturing base is critical to the prosperity of the UK and its ability to afford effective defence policies. Thus a critical issue to be addressed is how national competitiveness can be enhanced through effective levels of all forms of investment - in fixed capital, quality, training and R & D. In regard to R & D it was argued that there should be greater national investment but not exclusively on defence technologies. It was suggested that policy should be to change the emphasis from defence programmes to the needs of the national technology base although it would still be necessary to sustain those areas of national technology for which there is little non-military need unless one could be sure that they will be available elsewhere. While it was generally accepted that there is a clear political imperative to reduce the defence budget, the point was made that through effective government/industry collaboration a process of planned restructuring could produce an effective defence sector as part of a wider flourishing manufacturing sector underpinning the economic well being of the country.

In regard to how this process might be advanced key pointers for government and industry included:

- securing best value for money over the longer term
- encouraging customer/supplier relationships derived from best practice
- encouraging international competitiveness and maximising tactical advantage

- keeping industry well informed of government plans and vice versa
- recognising export potential as a determinant of national procurement activity
- developing agreed technology objectives supported by government and industry investment
- devolving defence objectives to industry to maximum extent

Against this broader backcloth discussion moved on to the question of whether the UK could maintain a core defence industry with mechanisms for expanding industrial capacity in an emergency. It was argued that if industry is market driven, the defence market is declining and the MOD is no longer the dominant or reliable customer that it was, and thus its business was less attractive, then it was critical that military planners in government, preferably with some involvement from industry, decide on the capability priorities they foresee in the post-Cold war world. It was suggested that these priorities could be viewed as follows: C3I, precision munitions, stealth, EW, strategic and tactical transport (sea/air), human factors (ease of operation/support), simulation, system integration, surveillance, enhancements to flexibility, mobility and availability. Potential additions to this list included aerodynamics, arming and fusing systems, control technology, detection and identification systems, design technology and product modelling, guidance systems and laser weapons, manufacturing technology, navigation systems, propulsion and protection systems, sensors and weapon delivery systems.

Having determined a list of key capabilities the next logical step would be to establish what production capabilities should be retained. It was pointed out that this problem is acute at the platform level, where long lives with system up-dates would probably be the pattern for the future. Collaboration; with all its disadvantages and dangers; seemed the only way forward coupled with flexibility of design. Customers could then pick and choose capability, as with EFA and the Meko frigate. However this would require continuity in the development of applied technology. Production technology would only remain if there was a market or there was

government subsidy. The latter seemed unlikely in the future; consequently alignment of UK national requirements with those of its allies was vital. This posed the question of who would be the UK's future allies and how would the military competitive edge be maintained. Having established capability priorities, R&D implications become clearer although 'blue sky' research would require separate consideration.

It was emphasised that globalisation affected industry just as much as international politics. Defence industry could not stand aside from this process despite the dangers of national dependence on technologies produced in other countries that would result. The way forward was flexibility of design giving choice of capability/cost and permitting a number of system updates. All requirements would need to be written with the aim of maximising possible production numbers. A longer term pattern for industry could be one of systems integrators and platform design houses served by specialist manufacturing, equipment, components and even assembly contractors.

While surge capability could be aided by advanced manufacturing technologies and a greater future involvement of industry in the support side of defence, it was important to realise it might be difficult to produce surge capacity without the supportive military and civil infrastructure that was available during the Gulf War. For example, with industry more closely involved in logistic support as a result of market testing, in an emergency there will be no spare capacity available unless this has been specifically contracted for. This would be the downside of market tested involvement of industry in logistic support. A further consequence of a wider role for industry in peace time support functions will be on human resources. There would be a greater intermingling and development of confidence between industrial and service personnel. This could lead to the development of mixed career - part in uniform part in industry - together with an acceptance in front line defence companies of 'reserve' commitments for a proportion of the workforce.

Discussion then turned to a more detailed consideration of the problems industry would face in supporting protracted or extended operations in terms of both equipment and human resources.

During the Cold war, because warning times were short and speed of response in mobilisation necessarily rapid, reserve stocks of equipment, ammunition and spares were maintained - the so called War Maintenance Reserve - which were calculated on the basis of the likelihood that hostilities would involve 30 days of continuous fighting at high rates of expenditure or 10 days at intense rates. However the WMR was not sufficient to support likely attrition rates of equipment (and men) and spares inadequacies were revealed during the Gulf war. Nonetheless WMRs, such as they were, were built up rapidly on the introduction of a new weapon system and they were then held in reserve for years. The need to cater for obsolescent stock was recognised although problems of balancing the budget were not infrequently met by underprovisioning of the ammunition and spares really needed.

A critical issue was if the WMR arrangements were abandoned in whole or part, with future mobilisation needs addressed when they arose through a surge production capability, a number of implications needed to be considered. The factors determining the feasibility of a surge capability option are: (i) Was the item still in production. If so it might be a relatively easy matter to expand production by doubling or trebling shifts of workers to 24 hour per day output. However, the skilled workforce might not be available for this purpose (ii) If the item were not in production whether the tooling for production would still be available or the know how of production personnel would be in question (iii) Once firm orders for an item in peacetime are no longer there, generally speaking industry quickly disposed of tooling and the production facility with the factory, no longer required, sold off or put to another use, then how long would it take to set up and restart the line? (iv) The technical complexity of the item was an important factor as was the availability of long-lead items which might have to be manufactured at home by sub-contractors or even acquired from abroad and that introduced a problem of political uncertainty (v) If the government called for surge production would costs be a major consideration and if so how would this issue be addressed? (vi) How much warning time would there be? If years this might not prove too difficult but only if a timely 'go ahead' signal was given by government.

In order to illustrate these general points, the example of the JP233 (the RAF's low level runway attack weapon used effectively in the Gulf War which incorporated technology lying roughly midway in the technical spectrum) was considered.

Production line for this weapon had been discontinued but the tools and know-how still remained. To re-establish the line at a cost of about £10 million would take about 2 years. Some new development work would have to be carried out because the technology of the weapons system now held by the RAF was of the 70s and 80s and would therefore require updating. Thus there would be a redefinition of build standards and modifications of drawings all of which would take time and money. However, if money were no object the time could be cut to 6-9 months to re-establish the line, provided some inherent technical risks touching on functionality and possibly safety were acceptable. However there were other cases where the surge time would be longer and/or the capacity to respond might not be there in future years and this was especially the case in regard to major platforms and weapon systems - warships, combat aircraft, perhaps tanks. It was conceivable that in future years industry would be able to do relatively little in response to a surge call from government unless the following steps were made in the meantime.

The steps echoed the earlier discussion about government/industry collaboration on the planned restructuring of the defence industrial base: (i) joint investigations by MOD and industry into the feasibility of surge capacity across a range of consumable warlike products (In this connection a major concern was the increasingly limited capability of the merchant fleet to provide adequate response to demands in war) (ii) joint forward planning of likely requirements (iii) consider the possibility of the contractorisation of the entire logistic chain in order to see how total life costs could be reduced (iv) stockpiling of long lead items, the retention of some production facilities in long term care and preservation and the way in which these might be funded should be examined (v) where surge production is shown not to be a feasible option then there should be an appropriate WMR, although this would be far from a cheap option. It was pointed out that the only other alternative is to rely on other nations providing our needs as they arise and this was a not an option free

of risk. Thus in both the areas of regenerating equipment and in the regular reserve balance, debate was structured by the twin pressures exercising the minds of military planners: the external political imperatives and opportunities posed by the new strategic context; and the internal political and economic imperatives of cutting the defence budget at a time when not simply defence but public expenditure generally and the capacity of the economy to sustain it are giving serious cause for concern.

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Armed Forces After the Cold War: The Personnel Implications

Context:

The armed forces have traditionally held a prominent position in British society in terms of their role, cost (as a percentage of GNP) and significance as potent symbols of national identity. Britain still possesses a nexus of relationships between armed forces and society that bears the imprint of its past experience as a great power. However, the 1990s will witness a period of radical change as entrenched assumptions about the nature and significance of armed forces in what is now a middling European power come to be questioned in the light of changes in East-West relations and shifts in public perceptions and social evaluations of the importance of military power. The recent Gulf war and the pace of change in the political change of Europe has left all its countries asking a host of questions about their armed forces and the size of their defence budgets.

Thus far, discussion has focused largely on the political and strategic dimensions of the future of the British armed forces in the broader context of developments in European defence and security. However, a key area also requiring analysis concerns the relationships between emerging defence and security structures and the human resources of the armed forces. Here one encounters problems of institutional change at the core of British society: how will the British armed forces and public opinion adjust to an end to a world military role? How will the armed forces adjust to the charge that military power is a less important dimension of national security in the age of the global economy and that their way of life will be pushed to the margins of contemporary society? What will be the impact of organisational rationalisation on the regimental system and the supportive social relationships between these units and local communities? How will a much smaller regular army with a different regular/reserve balance alter the relationships between the armed forces and the civilian community including civilian employers? How will changes in military careers and formal qualifications impact on the transfer of service personnel from the military to civilian sectors of the labour market? How will the armed forces adjust to the wider employment of women and the policy of increased social representation that is being pursued?

The importance of these issues is heightened because armed forces are operating not only in a new external strategic environment but also in a social context where demographic constraints, changing attitudes towards work, leisure and authority together with shifts in public perceptions of the relative value of defence provide additional challenges for the armed forces as they move into the twenty first century.

The conference provided a focus for the analysis of a key area of social structural change as Britain reorganises one of its most traditional core institutions in the light of internal and external pressures.

Conference discussions moved through four sub-themes: the future direction of British defence and security policy; alternative force structures; implications for the personnel dimension; and finally the likely consequences of the end of the Cold war for the nature and role of military power in contemporary liberal democracies.

Key issues in defence and security policy:

Discussion focused on the implications of current developments in defence and security concepts and structures for the traditional roles of the British armed forces. In particular, the following issues were addressed: the future of NATO - the extent to which its significance would wane and its military component be marginalised; the possibility of the UK emerging as a pivotal point in a revised relationship between the USA and a unified European Community in respect of defence and security; the probable shift of the British nuclear deterrent from a strategic element in a bi-polar superpower confrontation to a minimal deterrence against a broader and more complex range of lower level threats; the nature of out-of-area capabilities required of UK forces and the ways in which these might expand via the United Nations or European Community peacekeeping forces; finally, the persistence of national commitments such as the Falkland Islands and Northern Ireland which impact substantially on UK forces, particularly the infantry of the British army.

Throughout the discussion, three constant themes emerged: first, that in the future armed forces would be geared less for war fighting and more for peacekeeping and the control of other forms of violent conflict - a shift in focus from war to violence. Second, that the UK would be looking to multinational and not just to multilateral force structures in meeting its future defence commitments. Third, that in the UK a major restructuring of defence was being driven in part by severe economic constraints, ie the mismatch between resources and commitments. With pressures deriving from rising personnel and equipment costs major decisions needed to be made in relation to new equipment purchases, on the size of all three services, on revising the teeth/tail ratio (and thus facilities for spares and training) as part of the emergence of smaller, leaner and more mobile forces; and on the implications of a more metropolitan based force in contrast with the 'world reach' that for so long had defined the relationship between the UK and its armed forces. Substantial personnel reductions were mooted, including figures of around 80,000 for the British army and similar proportionate cuts for the other two services.

Defence and security for the UK: the emerging policy context.

For the UK and other western countries, the decline of the threat from the Warsaw Pact and the successful ejection of Iraq from Kuwait posed an acute dilemma: on the one hand the UK needed to maintain effective armed forces in order to face future threats because such forces could not be created overnight. On the other hand, it was difficult to determine exactly who or what constituted the threat(s) of the future and

thus the requisite forces that needed to be developed in order to provide an effective counter to them.

The Gulf War had been fought by forces and equipment developed in the context of the forty year long Cold War and the prospect of a major war in Europe. This latter scenario had now largely dissolved with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. The Gulf War was not likely to diminish the severe financial pressures on the budgets of the armed forces and the attempts to create, through the options for change exercise, smaller and less costly forces which were more appropriate to the new security environment.

However, it would be unwise to make a hasty and overly optimistic judgement about the future of security in Europe. Continuing instability was likely as the countries of eastern Europe tried to make the difficult transition from a socialist command economy to capitalism, and, hopefully, liberal democracy. Success in either of these ventures was by no means guaranteed; thus even in those countries with more favourable conditions for progress, such as Hungary, there was evidence of serious difficulties.

Competition amongst the European powers for influence in eastern and south eastern Europe, along the lines of developments at the end of the nineteenth century was not a proper parallel to draw, although authors such as Mearsheimer had tried to do so (J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold war, International Security 1990, Vol 15 5-56). However, it was not difficult to imagine that, in the context of an emergent European defence and security system, German concerns in eastern Europe in relation to population movements and ethnic unrest could trigger a European military response in which UK forces would have a role to play. This was a conceivable commitment even if it was not in the UK's own national interests, more narrowly defined. Indeed similar population and ethnic pressures could be identified around the whole (but especially eastern and southern) perimeter of the European Community and these could provide major security challenges in the future which might require a military response.

The main problem was that in the light of the range and complexity of security scenarios in relation to which military forces would be required, it was difficult to establish clear priorities. For example, forces equipped for anti-terrorism were regarded as important, as was the development of light forces for security requirements in an unstable eastern and south eastern Europe. On the other hand, far heavier forces had been required to counter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and despite the effectiveness of air power, it was difficult to argue that in future similar crises air power alone would be sufficient to meet the challenge. Indeed, however great the economic gap between rich and poor nations, potential military threats from third world nations were not as easy to neutralise as they had once been. Many powers outside Europe and the USA had substantial military capabilities and, consequently, to meet such threats advanced technology weapons would be needed. Furthermore, there was likely to be a continuing necessity for the maintenance of weapons of mass destruction despite a decline in the tensions between East and West and the dissolution of the scenario of a

major nuclear war linked with a superpower confrontation in Europe.

In meeting future threats, the Gulf War had also shed doubt on what had been called in the USA, the total force concept and this added to the complexity of establishing priorities and developing appropriate force structures for the UK. This concept entailed reducing the reliance on a large full time army yet maintaining readiness, by ensuring that reserve units trained with the regular army units with which they would fight in a war. It had been hoped that with greater reliance on reserve forces less costly defence might be acquired with no serious diminution in military effectiveness. Two related questions were posed by the total force concept: First of all, how effective in combat would non technical specialist reservists be in post-Cold War conflicts? Even if this question was discounted, a second difficulty was the problem of the political willingness of governments to call out reservists early enough to make the total force concept a credible one. This problem was compounded by the fact that future conflicts were likely to be ones which did not directly threaten national interests; thus both difficulties relating to the use of reserves would be likely to emerge.

In establishing priorities and appropriate force structures, it might be thought that role specialisation as between nations would resolve the major difficulties in meeting a complex and wide range of future threats. However, as the Gulf war had revealed, states define their interests in relation to specific conflicts and it was thus difficult to determine in advance who would be partners in any conflict and thus how to apportion responsibility for particular roles in any division of military labour. Of course, one way out of this problem of complexity was to be prepared to deal with every eventuality, but this was prohibitively expensive. With the limited resources available, such a defence policy would lead to even greater deficiencies in each particular branch of the complete range of services it was seeking to provide. In short, to attempt to cover everything was tantamount to being a policy of covering nothing in particular. It was generally accepted that for economic and political reasons, the time had come not simply for cuts in given force structures and distribution of resources but for a reassessment of priorities in relation to the threats faced by the UK and in the light of that reassessment, a restructuring of the armed forces accordingly. In any case, the next ten years looked set to be a period of radical change.

The future of UK force structures:

The legacy of the fifty year war (encompassing the second world war and subsequent cold war) was NATO, an alliance which bound sixteen nations by a single command structure, multinational order of battle and concept of operations. From the current standpoint, the limitations of this organisation related to the fact that its operations were confined to the NATO area.

In regard to the future of British forces, discussion focused on three key elements. The first would be to continue the defence of Europe from external aggression that until now has

been provided by NATO. The second role would be to deal with the threat of military action from within the European Community by maintaining a multinational force on the continent. Third, so that Europeans could defend their interests outside Europe, the European Community should develop a defence as well as foreign policy. Drawing on these considerations the discussion focused on a number of specific reforms.

It could be argued that there will no longer be a need to hold an unbroken line down the centre of the continent, nor will there be a need to be ready to meet waves of heavily armoured forces. Indeed the accent will be upon strategic mobility and speed of response. In addition to the threat of standard military attack, forces are likely to be increasingly threatened by terrorist attacks of increasing ingenuity. To meet such attacks, very sophisticated training techniques demanding high quality manpower and equipment will be needed. The physical number of soldiers would be very considerably reduced, but the financial commitment would remain high to meet the standards needed. In the air, in addition to strategic airlift requirements, there would be a continuing need for a coordinated air defence system although the justification for strike aircraft would be greatly reduced. The likely proliferation of nuclear weapons in the next century would make it essential that those European powers with a nuclear capability retain it in all foreseeable circumstances. One area in which the least change is likely is at sea. Unless a very comprehensive Soviet naval disarmament programme is undertaken, it would seem that the balance of sea power will mean the retention of the majority of existing NATO naval forces, particularly if the prospect of any realistic roles outside the European theatre were envisaged.

In relation to British forces great reductions in the commitment to the land forces on the Continent appear inevitable. The requirement for heavily armoured forces with little strategic mobility would reduce almost to nothing. The sudden demand for such forces in the Middle East after some thirty years without the need for them outside Europe should ensure that at least some armoured formation survives. However, the force as whole would undertake a totally different role from that which we have known in the past; yet nothing would be more damaging to the integrity and security of the new Europe than the withdrawal of national military forces, back into their own territories, allowing the welding of formations which has been achieved under NATO to wither away and be lost. The reduced contribution to Europe, coupled with the review of military forces that are needed in Britain for Home defence, the rapidly declining needs of British interests overseas and the importance of special forces will bring about the greatest reorganisation of the British Army that has happened for many generations.

In this context, discussion turned to further details of a new model army for the next century, bearing in mind the increased focus of the UK's forces on defence of the home base, the need for flexibility and mobility of forces and the lack of knowledge about the armed forces amongst members of the public. One option that was considered was a new national service scheme in the form of adventure training.

The changing security environment and personnel implications for the British armed forces:

The personnel problems of the UK armed forces in the 1990s can be located in two contexts. The first of these concerns changes in the external security environment which have been discussed above. The second context of manpower problems in the armed forces is provided by the changing socio-economic structure of the UK in the 1990s. Here the armed forces have to confront the impact of the demographic trough, the changing aspirations and attitudes of young people towards work and employment, family and leisure as well as the value they attach to the armed forces as a possible career. At the same time, the post Cold War environment and the clamour for a 'peace dividend' means that the long standing supportive link between public opinion and defence spending will no longer be as secure as before. If so, that will pose a major public relations and marketing challenge to the services.

Within these two contexts of change in external security and shifts in the social structure of the UK, four key manpower problems will require the attention of policy makers and a solid base of research on which to base informed decisions. In summary they are :

Recruitment in the changing international context : how will young people be motivated to join the services; how many will be needed; what skills and qualities will the Services require of young people; will the waning of the threat in Europe mean that a different type of recruit will be required for the post-Cold War climate ? Should the Services pursue the goal of more significant participation from women and ethnic minorities, not just for demographic reasons but to ensure that the Services are representative of the modern citizenship state? Has National service, but with alternatives to military service, anything to recommend it in the context of emerging closer links between British and other European Armed Services ?

Retention : In the light of the end of the Cold War and a growing clamour for a peace dividend which might then be spent on non-military public goods, what convincing reasons will military personnel have for wishing to stay in the Services ? How will unwanted manpower losses as reflected in PVR (premature voluntary retirement) rates be countered ? How will the motivation to fight be sustained ? Will the Services continue to experience a drift towards 'occupationalism'; that is, in terms of lifestyle, working routines and motivations, will the military service increasingly become 'just another job'? (cf C.Moskos and F. R. Wood *The Military More than Just a Job*; Brassey's 1989) How will 'turbulence' and pressures rooted in the military family, particularly those connected with dual careers and the reluctance of many women to remain content with the traditional division of sex roles, be handled ? Would retention problems be eased by continuing the trend towards the wider employment of women in the Services ?

Resettlement and the Transferability of Skills: What will be the

scale of redundancy in the light of any peace dividend deriving from cuts in the Armed Forces, or will leaner and meaner services in terms of manpower levels be achieved through natural wastage ? How might the transition to civilian life be eased for Service personnel and what part will retraining and resettlement strategies play in this ? To what extent will an emphasis on the transferability of military skills to the civilian sector assist in addressing both recruitment and retention problems ? How might the Services and the business community collaborate on problems of manpower recruitment, retention, training and transferability between civilian and military sectors ?

Public Perceptions and Resourcing of the Armed Forces: The Armed Forces will face substantial resourcing problems for the foreseeable future. Quite apart from the rising costs of defence equipment and persisting difficulties in finding sufficient funds within the defence budget to meet the array of personnel needs, the changing strategic context means that there will be an unfavourable external environment for sustaining relatively high (ie relative to other European countries) levels of defence expenditure.

For many years the UK has borne a substantially greater defence burden than most other western European countries, although the percentage of GNP devoted to defence expenditure has been declining and, judging from recent Government statements, is set to continue to do so. As recently as 1985-6, the figure was about 5%, with figures for 1988 being 4.3% and 1989 4.0%. In 1989 the figures for FRG, Netherlands, France, Belgium and Italy were 2.9%, 2.9%, 3.7%, 2.7% and 2.4%. Defence spending in the UK is set to fall below one tenth of all government spending for the first time since 1939. In 1991, the Gulf crisis permitting, will see a fall of more than one billion pounds. (P. Johnston Daily Telegraph 9 November 1990). As Christopher Huhne has argued in relation to the Chancellor's Autumn statement of November 1990....'the biggest loser is the MOD. Defence spending is already down by 11 % in real terms since 1985-6 and the current plans forecast a further real fall of 6% by 1993-4 despite the hostilities in the Gulf (the extra cost of which will be funded by the contingency reserve). Who says there is no peace dividend'. (Christopher Huhne Sunday Independent November 1990). In the light of the perceived waning of the Soviet threat to UK security and the persisting difficulties of the domestic economy, it is not surprising that the Treasury is pressing for cuts in defence expenditure to a level already reached by some other European countries. Indeed, the latter are likely to make further cuts to GDP levels substantially lower than the figures quoted above. Of course, Treasury motives also include the desire to obtain better value for money from the defence budget and to release more funds to pay for technology projects at a time when the cost of defence equipment continues to rise disturbingly. Not the least important motive is electoral calculation: it is certainly common ground amongst the political parties that during the 1990s any suggestion of a relative shift of public resources from defence to social expenditure on say health and education would be popular.

Bearing in mind these two contexts of change and the

implications for UK force structures, discussion of personnel issues focused initially on the numbers of recruits required by all three services during the 1990s. It is envisaged that in the mid nineties, the total uniformed requirement for the three services will be about 245,000, a reduction of 18% on current figures. In terms of each of the services this figures breaks down to about 60,000 for the Royal Navy including Royal Marines comprising 10,000 officers and 50,000 other ranks; for the Army 112,000 comprising 16,000 officers and 96,000 other ranks; and the Royal Air Force totalling 75,000 with 13,000 officers and 62,000 other ranks.

One of the determinants of these figures is the issue of warning time and the implications of this for the use of reserve forces which will be discussed below. The regular/reserve balance is also significant in terms of recruiting and personnel costs.

As is well known, in the context of the demographic trough, longstanding shortages of skilled labour in the British labour market and the increasing demands for this resource by civilian employers, the services will face difficulties in recruiting the number and quality of school and college leavers. After the Cold war the smaller regular forces are presented with a recruitment challenge: how to relate to society as a whole. In the labour market the services will have to persuade young people and their parents that they are not entering a hierarchical backwater divorced from reality.

In addition, the regular serviceman will still require a substantial investment in order to give him the training to acquire the necessary warfare skills and to provide conditions of service that will persuade him and his family that he should remain in the services for a full career which might well be longer than is currently the case. In tackling these difficulties of recruitment and training investment, the services are currently expanding the employment of women in all three services and widening access to the services from ethnic minorities. In addition, attention is being given to the human factor in equipment design with the objective of reducing the number of operators and maintainers required wherever possible. The services are also seeking to standardise equipment in order to reduce the training budget, although the technical demands imposed by the varied roles performed by the services together with the readiness demanded of the armed forces in the future mean that they will still demand significant numbers of highly qualified officers and NCOs. Overall, both officer and other rank recruits will be drawn from the top quarter of their civilian peers in terms of physical and mental abilities. In addition, they will need to be able to respond to the challenges posed by service life: taking quick decisions in high pressure situations, leadership, teamwork, and physical and moral courage. In regard to officer recruitment it will be important to widen the recruitment pool although the majority of officers selected will be graduates. Once selected it will be important to develop and utilise the leadership potential of officers in the best possible way, particularly when they are in their 20s and 30s, that is when frigate captains, battalion and fighter squadron commanders are matured. This will require the services to delegate

sufficient responsibility in all areas as well as to provide excellent training and education including civilian qualifications which will have a positive impact on morale and retention which will be of added importance in the light of planned extensions in the lengths of service careers. Thus, in persuading people to stay the service must convince them that they are not drifting away from life in general but pursuing a worthwhile job which will lead on to other worthwhile opportunities in civilian life.

Retention of other ranks will also be important. In many operational and technical areas, the contribution of the trained and dedicated NCO is crucial and this is likely to grow with a greater emphasis on delegation within the services. Thus the services of the nineties will need to sustain over 200,000 other ranks in a wide range of skills. While there are serious problems of separation and domestic mobility it is also important to bear in mind that the service also offer job security and satisfaction as well as training opportunities and the chance of advancement which are difficult to find in the civilian job market. Given the fact that the services will continue to be young peoples' organisations, in large part because of the physical demands involved, it will be particularly important to ensure that adequate provision is made for the resettlement of the vast majority of personnel who leave at 40 in order to take up a second career. It is worth noting that this feature of service life impacts on recruitment and the public support of the services though the role played by ex-service personnel in civilian organisations.

While the reserves have been a crucial part of the service for many years, the post cold war climate will impact on this area as it has on all other aspects of the services. Thus the ability effectively to mobilise and reinforce the British Army on the Rhine over the last 40 years, which has been effectively demonstrated in several major exercises has been crucial to the defense of the central front, and thus has contributed a key component in flexible response and forward deployment. Reservists also played an important role in the recent Gulf war particularly in the medical and other specialist technical areas.

In the post cold war context, reservists will continue to be important. This is a complex issue involving the effects of changes in warning time on the forces, the political will to call out the reserves in time of crisis, and the technical capacities of the reserves to meet the requirements of likely conflicts in the future. Reserves comprise volunteers on the one hand and ex regulars with a call-out commitment on the other. Clearly, although there is a transition period, the ex-regular pool dwindles as the size of the regular forces decreases. Thus any expansion of the reserves will have to rely largely on the volunteer sector. If the services are to attract young people to the volunteer reserves, more will need to be done to provide better quality conditions of service and training facilities. One possibility would be to introduce compulsory service with or without the option of civilian community service although this raises complex political issues which have not yet been given a wide airing at least not in the UK. In any case whatever policy is adopted in relation to the future use of the reserves, there

will need to be revised legislation facilitating their early call out otherwise it will not be possible to put them to their best possible use.

Assuming the forces will be able to recruit sufficient numbers of volunteer reservists to supplement a smaller regular force, the question arises, what will they be used for in the post cold war world? Traditionally reservists have been used in the highly skilled areas where expertise is built up over years such as in the mine counter measures force in the Royal Navy, or in simpler but nevertheless fully operational areas such as the infantry. With short warning times, limited peacetime training and ever more sophisticated equipment, it has proved impossible to use volunteer reserves to a significant degree in manning major equipments in all three services. This point even applies to the ex-regular who fairly quickly gets out of date and loses touch with the relevant skills. In the light of the new security climate and shifts in defence policy it is possible that this situation could change. If the CFE agreement is fully implemented, certain equipments could be stored. One related possibility is that these could be reactivated in a longer warning time whilst, in parallel the relevant reserves could be called up to man them. On this issue it is likely that different equipment would call for different answers in terms of warning times and reserve call outs. Even assuming that reservists called out in this way would be sufficiently technically able to perform the roles required of them, these arrangements would require appropriate investment in storage, maintenance and training capacity. Both maintenance and training would need to 'tick over' in peacetime and have a credible surge capability in a time of tension. Thus reservists should not simply be viewed as a cheap supplement to a smaller regular force if the principles of credibility and military effectiveness are to be sustained.

The discussion then turned to how the forces can find the people they need in the future and how to retain them once they had been attracted to the services. The main focus was on the Army. In the area of recruitment, two issues needed to be distinguished: a person's opinion of the Army and the willingness or otherwise of the individual to join it. Recent research revealed the pertinence of this distinction and showed that the single most important adult objective shared by all young people in the sample and expressed by parents as an aspiration for their children was to be more than simply a survivor of life. That is, the survey population stated that their aim was to be purposeful in life and to progress on to better and more worthwhile things - to have a meaningful life and to earn respect from others. In this context, the Army was seen to have a relevant and rewarding message to communicate: ie that it is a place where success is available for the average person and where the process of becoming a self respecting and respected person is facilitated by the opportunities the Army offers for physical development and further education. Compared to many unrewarding and limiting jobs in civilian life, the Army is seen as providing a route to an attainable and satisfying career and as having the resources to support the individual in the process of becoming a respected individual.

However, even accepting the representativeness of the survey

sample, the real problem is how to convert these generally favourable views of the army into a willingness to adopt it as a career: the individual who admires the army as an institution frequently has a fear of it from the personal point of view. As the authors of the research report cited above have argued:

'the army and what it offers is extremely congruent with many young men's ideal self and the beliefs and values which they espouse, although this is not usually spontaneously apparent to them. Their current perceptions of the army, however vague in detail, are dominated by images of a large monolithic organisation where individuals are changed and moulded to fit the requirements of a 'fighting machine', and are therefore 'swallowed' up in a new and potentially threatening organisational identity, at variance with their real selves and the environment/society in which they have grown up' (cited from the Research Business Report 1989 Creative Advertising Research for the Army; a report on qualitative research among young people and their parents).

This intimidating image often deters young people from exploring further the option of an army career. When they think through the consequences of joining the army the following images come to mind: that it will involve a giant step; putting yourself in the hands of others; leaving home/changing environments; obedience to strangers; loss of individuality and the values associated with the 'new man' of the 1990s; physical challenge; living with strangers; and losing contact with friends and family. In addition the fear of failure and anxiety about going to war also operate as barriers to viewing the army as a 'place for me'.

Together with the other services, the army is looking for recruits who not only enjoy a disciplined and demanding way of life but are also intelligent enough to handle increasingly complicated equipment and motivated sufficiently to act with initiative when on their own - such are the technological demands of modern war. In the light of service demands and those of civilian employers, these people are in short supply. To attract them in sufficient numbers the services will have to ensure some congruence between service conditions and the attitudes and values they are seeking to attract. In regard to officers, the aspirations of young adults are substantially higher than those of their equivalents of two or three decades ago. Thus they tend to regard a university degree as essential. They also look on a professional qualification as eminently desirable. In addition this section of young adults desire four other rewards: an adequate salary; a company car; good holidays; and a house or flat to own. Furthermore, the expectation is that a reasonable career progression would lead to the achievement of these rewards by the age of 30.

In relation to recruitment to other ranks it has to be admitted that here too aspirations and expectations are substantially higher than in the past, and there is much less willingness to endure hardship and rough conditions. Thus in relation to initial training, the services have to strike a balance between harshness and unmilitary softness. Striking this

balance is not made any easier by the transformation in authority relations in the wider society over the last twenty years and the texture of discipline in family life. Compared with fifty years ago it is fair to say that most young people were no more educationally advanced than those of today. However, then there were relatively easier jobs to be done and there was much less complex equipment to handle and maintain.

In order to attract young people the services need to take advantage of their own unrivalled ability to assist in providing what young people want : is the opportunity to become a self respecting and respected adult. This can be done through making the most of the education and training facilities of the services. If pressures relating to the peace dividend lead to the cut back of these resources then there will be a price to pay in terms of recruitment and retention.

Turning to retention, there are four main factors which determine the willingness or otherwise of personnel to stay in the services: 1. the sense of doing a worth-while and respected job in a well run unit; 2. adequate pay and allowances; 3. good quality of life with reasonable holidays and time for development of private interests; and finally 4. proper conditions for a contented family life in the case of married personnel. It was felt that the majority of personnel were satisfied in terms of 1, although there were some reports of low job satisfaction as being at the root of some retention difficulties, and these were connected with shortages in relation to training. Job satisfaction will be a challenge for the services after the cold war when as one of the participants put it the military profession is likely to have its usefulness examined with a critical and, at times, openly hostile eye. There is a danger that there will be a constant pressure to reduce the armed forces to ineffectual levels and in such a climate all ranks may well feel unwanted and unvalued. Current frustrations might grow into a more serious alienation from the wider society unless steps are taken to reassure them of their continuing importance to the security of the nation. The positive public perceptions and evaluations of the services during the Gulf war may not be longlasting and might be drowned by renewed clamours for a peace dividend. The problem of maintaining the morale of the services is related to the fact that they will be almost entirely based in the UK in the future; they will be short of decent equipment and of areas in which to train properly; and third that the potency of the regimental system in sustaining morale will be seriously weakened in the wake of extensive disbandments and amalgamations.

In relation to the second retention factor, pay and allowances are probably adequate, while there are serious problems in relation to the third and fourth factors. The Army does not allow sufficient opportunities for private life compared with what is in offer in civilian life and this deficiency is connected with the vicious circle between poor retention and overstretch. If the best officers and NCOs are to be retained to complete full careers there must be compensations of sufficient attraction to make up for the lack of opportunities for personal satisfaction open to so many of their civilian contemporaries. Steps have already been taken in

relation to these problems through the provision of cash bonuses for completing full engagements. However, perhaps the best compensation would be to solve the house purchase problem for the numerous married and single servicemen who very much want to own their own homes. Discussion focused on the proposed scheme whereby every serviceman who does not own a house should be allowed to operate a house purchase savings fund into which would be paid each year a sum equivalent to maximum tax relief payable on an assumed mortgage of £ 30,000. The scheme could be linked to the purchase of a house on or close to leaving the service. While the recession might make a positive impact on both retention and recruitment, the retention difficulties are of sufficient seriousness to warrant a major effort on the part of the services to address the housing and quality of life dimensions of the services.

Armed forces after the cold war: a warless society ?

In the last session of the conference, discussion returned to issues posed at the outset, in particular the extent to which the post cold war world could be conceptualised in terms of a shift from a war deterrence to a warless society and the implications of such a shift for the role and structure of the armed forces.

Discussion focused on the three-stage typology developed by Charles Moskos in which he charted the main shifts in military organisation that have occurred since the nineteenth century. These changes are encompassed in the concepts war readiness, war deterrence societies and warless societies. In the war readiness society - created by the industrial and democratic revolutions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - military organisation is based on mass armed forces raised by universal conscription; aggregate personnel costs form the major element in the personnel budget; weapons are rooted in low technology; and the identification of members of the armed forces is 'institutional', that is to say centred on the military as a distinct way of life. In the war deterrence society of the post second world war era, the armed forces shift to a professional organisation structure with per capita personnel costs comprising the major element in the personnel budget and high technology weapons taking the major share of weapons procurement funds. Increasingly, as Moskos has argued in his earlier work, the identification of members of armed forces takes on an 'occupational' rather than an institutional hue: the military life increasingly becomes 'just another job'. Compared with the previous phase, in which the dominant type of military professional was the combat leader, here the managerial technician occupies centre stage while, in contrast with the era of a relatively supportive and militaristic public, in the war deterrence society, the military is viewed increasingly with apathy by public opinion. Moskos argued that modern democracies were experiencing a third phase of social development - the transition to a 'warless society'. Here, like Fukuyama in another context, Moskos was pointing to an overarching trend encompassing the end of the cold war, the emergence of a denuclearised Europe and radically reduced conventional forces

(cf F. Fukuyama The End of History ? The National Interest Summer 1989 3-35). The likelihood of war between the super powers has declined markedly and the prospects of a peaceful concert of states in a broader Europe are relatively bright, in large part because history shows that liberal capitalist democracies are not predisposed to go to war with each other to solve their international disputes. Thus an era was identified in which

'war - at least between superpowers and major European powers - is no longer the principal, much less inevitable, mode of conflict resolution' (C. Moskos Armed Forces in a Warless Society, BMSG conference paper p 1).

Moskos was careful to point out however, that he was not referring to the prospect of a world without war. On the contrary, he was fairly sanguine (along with much of the audience) about the persistence of regional conflicts, internal wars within countries, ethnic strife and major power interventions in spheres of influence.

In this developing social and political context, the following profile was predicted for the armed forces: the active duty force would shrink dramatically to a well paid professional cadre which would train less well compensated long term reservists. Thus a militia and territorial defence system would evolve. The management technician would be supplanted by the soldier/scholar as the officer corps became a component of the general advisory service to the state on matters of international security. Thus education and expertise in security studies, broadly conceived, would become more important than a narrower focus on war fighting, strategy and tactics. At the same time, in so far as states persisted with the practice of conscription, civilian service would become a common alternative to service in the armed forces. These developments were likely to be associated with a blurring of the division between the different components of the national security system. Thus internal, regional and ethnic strife had already undermined the military/police divide in many states; this process was likely to continue as armed forces took on not only more policing type functions, but also non-military tasks such as disaster management and related activities.

It was also likely that the public would become more sceptical about the armed forces and that, consequently, their social status would relatively decline. Furthermore, the service would increasingly find difficulty in preserving their share of public expenditure against the competing claims of infrastructure, the environment, education, health and other areas with greater legitimacy in public perceptions.

In discussion, one issue that was taken up was the question of the extent to which the status of the military profession would decline in the new social and security environment and how this would impact on recruitment and retention difficulties which had already given cause for concern. A broader issue that was already addressed concerned the extent to which western societies were facing a diminishing threat which pointed to a diminished role for the armed forces or a changing threat in which case the armed forces would have a different rather than

a lesser role. What emerged in the discussion was that answers to this question depended on whether one adopted a eurocentric or global perspective.

It can be argued that modern states are unable to resort to force as a realistic means of achieving their political objectives at least within advanced societies. Four main grounds have been adduced in support of this contention, particularly in Germany and other parts of continental Europe: i. The interdependency of the technical components of industrial society- transport, water, power, and the ease with which these can be paralysed by the use of force. ii. The self-destructive dangers posed by nuclear, chemical and other potentially hazardous facilities widely present in modern societies, iii. The great dependence of urban populations on a complex division of labour which, if interrupted, would lead to the collapse of their material well being. iv. Any war would accelerate the already serious degradation of the natural environment. On these grounds war is simply not worth it in the context of modern industrial civilisation. Indeed, as the Green constituency has suggested, investing in armed forces could be viewed as actually contributing to the scarcity of material resources and environmental degradation. In other words what is being anticipated here is not simply a warless society with a changed role for the military but an armyless society.

However, in response, it can be argued that this is rather a eurocentric view, and very much one that is a product of the German reunification and the prospect of an integrated Europe with radically diminished military forces. Proponents of this view of the military have little inclination to think in terms of geo-political and international military politics in Europe let alone beyond, accustomed as they have been, as a consequence of the division of Germany after 1945, to having the Soviet and the Americans to do much of this for them. How the break up of the Soviet Union, political turmoil in eastern Europe and the problem of securing German and/or European interests outside Europe will impact on the optimistic views of a post-military or armyless society will be interesting to observe. For an emergent CSCE in the context of an 'armyless society' the challenges posed by the end of Soviet stewardship of eastern Europe in terms of religious and ethnic conflicts, political competition amongst new states, economic dislocation, voluntary and forced migrations would be stern indeed.

Even if one assumes the development of an optimistic scenario in Europe and thus the emergence of a peaceful concert of liberal nation states, the question remains as to what will be the relationships between the liberal democracies and other more authoritarian states in other parts of the world, particularly those which control scarce resources crucial for the survival of industrial societies? Mosk's warless society thesis sought to address this issue. Thus, has the end of the Cold War between East and West led to the opening of a new and far from trouble free era of conflicts between North and South, as the industrial liberal democracies, perhaps even including a restructured Russia - seek to preserve their standards of living and thus their supplies of scarce resources through traditional Clausewitzian means against a range of third world states? Such

a North/South divide would be overlain with a dangerous blend of straightforward economic conflict, ideological and religious tensions as well as geo-political calculations. Such a scenario does indeed point to a very different role for the armed forces of the liberal capitalist democracies in the post Cold War era, but not to a future in which they have no role at all. Radical changes are certainly on the agenda: the development of multinational forces in Europe and perhaps also in the context of the global community and focused on the UN. In the context of Europe, a CSCE with an effective secretariat and other administrative structures together with a reduced and lower profile military might suffice for its internal requirements although for the policing of a variety of territorial disputes, multinational forces are likely to be necessary. However, as seems probable, what if the USA is unable or unwilling to provide for Europe's wider security needs as it has done in the past? Would Europe pay and pay more for the USA to do so? Would it be able to influence US policy sufficiently to enable it to feel that the payment was worthwhile, or would it, in the longer term, feel it necessary to build new types of European forces equipped and able to play a more independent role in securing Europe's interests in out of area operations? Would the various constituent states of Europe respond quite differently to these problems? Comparisons between the response of European countries to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the current Kurdish crisis will be instructive as a pointer to future developments in how the European states manage security in Europe and beyond and the role they will give to their respective armed forces.

Sexual Orientation and Military Service: The British Case

GWYN HARRIES-JENKINS and CHRISTOPHER DANDEKER

The issue of homosexuality in the British military has attracted considerable attention and has produced a small but significant body of literature.¹ Much of what has been written, however, starts from a value-based position in which rational discussion is often subordinated to the presentation of polemics and political arguments. This paper sets out to look critically at the current position of gays and lesbians in the British armed forces by considering the three basic questions of policies, practices, and problems.

Policies, in this context, refer to the declared aims and objectives of the military organization that govern the employment of personnel within national armed forces. Such aims and objectives are not static and they change over time. The term also relates to the rules and regulations that, in the guise of military law, govern the behavior of individual service personnel.

Practices equally refer to the employment of personnel. Specifically, the term acknowledges that the culture of military organizations, in reflecting an amalgam of symbols, rituals, heroes, and values, provides a set of operational criteria. These may imply accord with declared policies; they may enlarge upon them through the provision of examples and rules of good practice. They will in some situations provide an alternative to formal rules and regulations.

Problems are the "garbage can" of decision-making. Notwithstanding legislative provision and an acknowledgment of the impact of culture on management practice, the military, in common with other large, complex organizations, is consistently faced with the existence of major operational problems. Minor issues can be readily solved; major questions require more consideration and deliberation.

The Development of Policy

In the United Kingdom, the traditional policy of the government with regard to the recruitment and retention of homosexuals in the armed forces

was based on the premise that military law should replicate common and statute law. Effectively, this meant that homosexual acts were a criminal offense. In the military, their commission and detection led to the court-martial of the offender; in civil society the full panoply of the law was equally exercised.

This policy was changed in civil society following the recommendations of the Wolfenden Report (1957). Under the subsequent Sexual Offences Act (1967), it was laid down that homosexual acts undertaken in private between two consenting males over the age of 21 would not be a criminal offense. Such acts where one party was under the age of twenty-one continued to be a criminal offense, as did the commission of homosexual acts in a public place. Since lesbian acts had never been a criminal offense, their commission was not affected by the reforms of the 1967 act.

Section 1(5) of the act, however, enacted special provisions for the armed forces of the United Kingdom. For males in the military, traditional policy continued to apply. The rationale for this had been given in the Wolfenden Report:

Offences in Disciplinary Services and Establishments 144. We recognise that within services and establishments whose members are subject to a disciplinary regime it may be necessary, for the sake of good management and the preservation of discipline and for the protection of those of subordinate rank or position, to regard homosexual behaviour, even by consenting adults in private, as an offence. For instance, if our recommendations are accepted, a serving soldier over twenty-one who commits a homosexual act with a consenting adult partner in private will cease to be guilty of a civil offence or of an offence against Section 70(1) of the Army Act, 1955 (which provides that any person subject to military law who commits a civil offence shall be guilty of an offence under that section, and hence liable to be dealt with by court-martial). The service authorities may nevertheless consider it necessary to retain Section 66 of the Act (which provides for the punishment of, *inter alia*, disgraceful conduct of an indecent or unnatural kind) on the grounds that it is essential, in the services, to treat as offences certain types of conduct which may not amount to offences under the civil code. Similar problems may arise in relation to other services and establishments.²

Accordingly, as a result of an exemption from the 1967 act, service personnel could still be charged under military law for the commission of homosexual acts in circumstances where an offense would not be committed in civilian life. The offense would usually be identified as "disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind," "conduct prejudicial to good order or discipline," and possibly, but very rarely, "scandalous conduct by officers" (*Manual of Military Law*). Coincidentally, the military could use the mechanism of an administrative discharge ("services no longer required" or a "return to shore") as an alternative to the legal process of the court-martial. Indeed, thirty-nine

service personnel were dismissed from the armed forces between 1988 and 1992 following conviction for an offense involving homosexual activity (navy, 9; army, 22; air force, 8) while 296 were discharged as a result of administrative action. Of those discharged on administrative grounds from the army during this period, over half were women who under British civil legislation had committed no criminal act.

During the course of considerable discussions in the House of Commons on the 1991 Armed Forces Bill, it was pointed out that society outside the armed forces was now much more tolerant of differences in sexual orientation than it had been. This was contrasted by the British pressure group, Stonewall, with what happened in the military. In an undated press release (probably early 1993), they argued that exemption from the 1967 act had allowed the armed forces to:

punish consenting sex between men, even during off-duty hours and in private. In theory this could also apply to heterosexual sex; in practice only gay sex was punished this harshly. On average, 10 men a year were sent to prison, often for 18 months. Lesbians were often threatened in prison. In addition, lesbians and gay men faced automatic discharge if they were discovered to be gay.

Official policy, however, was vigorously defended by Archie Hamilton, the then responsible minister, during the course of the 1991 debate on the Forces (Discipline) Bill. He argued:

[B]oth homosexual activity and orientation are incompatible with service in the armed forces. The main reason centres on the need to maintain discipline and morale. The services are hierarchical, close knit overwhelmingly single sex and young communities. Units can work to full effectiveness only on the basis of mutual trust and the expectation of equal treatment among each rank. The formation within these units of sexually motivated relationships are potentially very disruptive of discipline and morale, particularly when they cross rank boundaries.³

As a result of the debate, however, the government was forced to concede that the exemption for the military from the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act of 1967—the section 1(5) clause—was no longer tenable. Accordingly, civil and military law were to come into line so that homosexual acts were decriminalized. The Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill of 1991 recommended:

[H]omosexual activity of a kind that is legal in civilian law should not constitute an offence under Service law. We look to the Government to propose an appropriate amendment to the law before the end of the next Session of Parliament.⁴

The government, in the form of Archie Hamilton, responded cautiously to

this recommendation but gave no firm undertaking as to the timing of any legislative changes.⁵ In July 1991, the Earl of Arran announced an internal review to be carried out within the Ministry of Defence in which the experience of other countries would be examined in the development of policy on this issue. In June 1992, in connection with the annual renewal of the Armed Forces Discipline Acts, it was announced that the Select Committee recommendation was to be accepted and implemented immediately in administrative practice and the requisite legislative changes would be introduced as soon as the parliamentary timetable allowed, i.e., the Sexual Offences Act of 1967 would require amendment. This concession did not change the basic policy of the government towards homosexuality in the armed forces. The British position is that overt homosexuality continues to be incompatible with service in the armed forces.

Although criminal charges will not be and cannot be laid against servicemen and -women for the commission of acts that are not offenses under civil law, official policy is unyielding. Homosexuality is incompatible with military service.

Policy Issues and Assumptions

In any discussions of this policy, however, it is necessary to be clear about the terms that are being used. Three terms can be distinguished: *homosexuality*, *homosexual acts*, and *homosexual offenses*. The dictionary and legal definition of the first term states simply that "homosexuality is having a sexual propensity for persons of one's own sex." This definition, as is pointed out in the 1957 *Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution* (the Wolfenden Report), involves the adoption of some criteria for its recognition. As in other psychological fields, the conclusion that such a propensity exists has to be derived from both subjective and objective data. The former will reflect what is felt by the person concerned; the latter, what is done. The use of such data as the determinant of the presence or absence of the sexual propensity has to be treated with caution, for its use is subject to the strict rules of evidence. That is particularly so where subjective data are the basis of evaluation.

For example, individual service personnel may not be aware of either the existence or strength of a feeling or propensity. The Wolfenden Report notes that "rationalizations and self-perception can be carried to great lengths and in some cases lying is also to be expected."

The British military leans heavily toward the use of subjective data in taking disciplinary action in that it is the feelings of the individual concerned that are critical. Hence the reference by Hamilton in the June 1991 debate to "both homosexual activity and orientation":

It is MoD [Ministry of Defence] policy neither to recruit nor to retain any person who admits to being homosexual. Being lesbian or gay is grounds for instant dismissal ("administrative discharge"). You do not have to be caught having sex to be dismissed—the very fact of being gay is enough.⁶

The policy of the military in this context, as the pressure groups such as Stonewall continue to stress, imposes restrictions that would not be tolerated in civilian employment. The policy is often seen to be contrary to the policy of the European Community. In its resolution of March 13, 1984, the European Parliament stated:

[I]n the campaign against discrimination of all kinds, it is impossible to ignore or passively to accept *de facto* or *de jure* discrimination against homosexuals.

In the United Kingdom military, however, an admission by individuals of their homosexuality, makes them liable to dismissal from the armed forces.

Whereas homosexuality, by definition, is a state or condition the existence of which has to be determined from primarily subjective data, homosexual acts are evidenced by objective data. A latent homosexuality may be influenced by behavior that is not overtly sexual. It may thus be inferred from an individual's outlook or expression of opinion or preference for a certain mode of conduct. Homosexual acts, in contrast, are overtly sexual. They are, for example, defined in current U.S. Army Regulations as:

bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires.⁷

It is, however, a question of legislation as to when such acts become homosexual offenses. The concept of homosexual offenses extends by definition the identification of homosexuality as a state or condition, and the identification of homosexual acts as a form of sexual behavior. Homosexual offenses are those overt acts that, because they are contrary to law, render the perpetuating individual or individuals liable to prosecution. On conviction, the offender is punished, the severity of that punishment varying in accordance with the dictates of national practice.

What constitutes a homosexual offense varies by country and has changed over time. There are no absolute homosexual offenses. Notwithstanding the prescriptions of a Judeo-Christian tradition, it is in actuality contemporary legislators who define the legality or otherwise of a specific homosexual act. Legislation in the United Kingdom, however, follows three precepts: (1) There is need for laws to safeguard those in need of protection by reason of their youth or mental incapacity; (2) a major function of law is the preservation of order and decency in public places; and (3) there is a requirement to regulate conduct seen to be contrary to the public good.

To these determinants of civil legislation, military legislation in the United Kingdom adds the need to regulate conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.

Some of the offenses here will be common to all service personnel irrespective of their sexual preference. Offenses such as coercion or harassment irrespective of whether the associated sexual relationship is homosexual or heterosexual are punished as "conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline." The latter term can have a wider interpretation to include conduct such as a sexual relationship between service personnel of different ranks, although such a relationship would not be an offense in a civilian organization. The United Kingdom also stipulates that major breaches of these rules of conduct will constitute offenses punishable by court-martial as an alternative to administrative discharge.

The rationale that underlies U.K. policy on homosexuality in the military can be discussed more fully under the headings of practices and problems to which we now turn.

Practices

In order to understand the position of homosexuals within the British military, one must address not only the formal policy context of legal and administrative regulations but also the organizational culture of the armed forces, because this influences the ways in which regulations are interpreted and enforced. This culture comprises the self-image of the British military. Traditionally, military socialization in the United Kingdom has been linked to the development and maintenance of an occupational culture, the symbols, rituals, and values of which have constituted an idealized self-image.

In British society, the latter has stressed the importance of such qualities as toughness, aggressiveness, endurance, and controlled deviancy. These, irrespective of the logic of the arguments that have been put forward, have been perceived as masculine traits; inadequate or poor performance, on the other hand, has been equated with a femininity that is the antithesis of effective soldiering. To maintain and develop the military self-image, British armed forces have established complex personnel policies and practices. Almost without exception, these have emphasized the notion of conformity, and from the moment of recruitment through induction and advanced training, military personnel have been conditioned to believe that these male traits and this concept of masculinity are desirable qualities. Hockey comments:

This self-image is one which combines traditional masculine values with a competence in the techniques of survival and liquidation. Recruits perceive

themselves very much in the same fashion as the Corporal who saw that soldiers should be young and fit, rough and nasty, not powder puffs.⁸

One long-standing effect of this interpretation of the desired qualities of the traditional military image has been the opposition within the British military to any demonstration of homosexual tendencies. Those service personnel who have shown a sexual propensity for persons of their own gender have been thought to exhibit a pattern of behavior that contradicts the conventional identification of the idealized self-image. They have been seen to be deviants and the military has persistently taken draconian steps to ensure that such individuals do not form part of the military organization. This is not to deny that homosexuals were always found within military organizations. Nevertheless, deviant behavior was always punished on discovery and the British military continues to exercise a policy of exclusion, which contrasts markedly with the attitude toward the recruitment and retention of homosexuals adopted by other European armed forces.

Indeed, it has been claimed that current personnel policies breach legal and human rights. To take one example, it has been reported recently that in the Royal Navy, if officers suspect the sexual conduct of their personnel they can resort to invasive medical procedures in pursuit of their enquiries. It has been claimed that the legal basis of these procedures would be questionable if the United Kingdom possessed a Bill of Human Rights, and they in any case confirm that official policy is based on stereotypes and prejudice rather than well-informed analysis. Thus Stonewall has reported:

Experienced medics are told men suspected of being the passive partner in a gay sex act can be spotted by their feminine gestures, clothes and make up. Senior officers are warned to be "on the alert" for servicemen who spend their time in clubs during shore leave as this is a tell tale sign. And they are warned sailors could get involved in gay sex if they seek out the "haunts of civilian homosexuals" and accept drinks and hospitality from them. The MoD tells the medics a thorough medical examination can be conducted immediately after gay sex has taken place because "homosexual acts are not in themselves life threatening" but they are warned that "homosexuals are often the source of sexually transmitted diseases" and that more than usual care is needed by the examiner.⁹

In addition, it is claimed that a good deal of scarce resources are being spent on investigating the sexual orientation of personnel even when actual or supposed homosexual relations are taking place between consenting adults off duty and off base.

In current circumstances, it is obviously difficult to establish the number of personnel in the U.K. services who experience the effects of the current policy toward homosexuals, but it is interesting to note that gay rights organi-

zations have reported that many homosexual service personnel are, not surprisingly, reluctant to reveal their identity for fear of the consequences on their own careers and those of other personnel.

However, given that current policy is geared to the assumption that homosexuality is incompatible with service life, homosexual personnel are denied the social benefits or rights that are available for heterosexuals, such as pensions and housing benefits. Similarly, bearing in mind the number of personnel administratively discharged from the service on grounds of homosexuality (225 over three years from all three services from 1989 to 1991), it has also been argued that insufficient resources have been devoted to the resettlement of these individuals into civilian society.

Such personnel policies are thus deeply rooted in aspects of the organizational culture of the military. Whatever rules are adopted in regard to the homosexuality issue in the armed forces, any departure from current practice must manage the process of change by addressing problems of organizational and cultural resistance within the services.

Problems

Having discussed the development of policy toward homosexuality in the armed forces and the rationale underlying it, we now turn to the problems and controversies associated with the presence of homosexuals in the British military. These can be analyzed under two headings: social problems and medical problems.

Social Problems

The initial problem is derived from the status of the military as a disciplined organization. It is thought necessary that there should be cohesiveness and a proper sense of purpose among a group of service personnel if their morale is to be maintained in adverse conditions. Intimate personal relationships, whether heterosexual or homosexual, may affect that sense of cohesion and coincidentally affect the morale of the group. At the same time, behavior that affects traditional superior-subordinate relationships is considered to weaken the continuance of a preferred style of leadership, which skillfully blends the exercise of impartial authority with the maintenance of a sense of group camaraderie. The enduring and primary relationship between leader and led, implicit in the term, is thought to be at risk from the presence of homosexuals within a military unit.

The critical issue is the maintenance of small-group (unit) integrity and stability. The creation of a strongly cohesive unit is a major objective of many

military training programs. Cohesive units tend to discourage members from belonging to autonomous groups with possibly deviant norms or from exhibiting a pattern of behavior that is considered to threaten the sense of cohesion. An important factor is the extent to which homosexuality whether overt or covert is deemed by group members to be "deviancy" or "threatening" behavior.

Hockey brings out very clearly the manner in which training practices within the British military bolster this sense of "belonging" to the small group.¹⁰ As has been noted, many of these practices reinforce the perceived link between masculinity and military effectiveness; this link becomes the very basis of cohesiveness. Whether this should or should not be so is irrelevant; what is important is the reaction of individuals within the group, a group that on the streets of Northern Ireland may be as small as the "brick" of two men supporting each other on street patrol in a hostile environment. For these men, the critical variable is the ability to rely without question on the commitment of the other person, a commitment that is believed to be most evident in "a mate who is like I am."

A second no less important social problem is the violence and assaults that homosexuals may suffer. In the United Kingdom, as in most European countries, numerous incidents of anti-lesbian and anti-gay violence—"queer bashing"—are reported. Similar assaults occur in military organizations and, as in the parent society, they may lead to the death of the victim. While military law can deal with the problem of assault irrespective of the sexual orientations of those involved, such violence has a negative effect on the discipline and cohesion of the military unit. In recognition of this, some European armed forces, notably the Scandinavian and Dutch, have instituted major training programs designed to change the attitudes of those who are instrumental in promoting such violence. However, there seems to be little recognition within British armed forces of the problem of homophobic violence. The conclusion seemingly reached is that the way to avoid any potential problem is to remove the perceived cause of the problem. The exclusion of the homosexual reduces the possibility of tensions or acts of violence that adversely affect discipline, order, morale, trust, and confidence among service members or impair the system of rank and command.

A lesser form of homophobic violence is the sexual harassment to which individuals in the British military may be subject. A harassment Code of Practice was adopted in November 1991 in the European Community along with a European Commission Recommendation advocating supporting action by E.C. member states. The code aims to give "practical guidance" to employers, trade unions and employees on the "protection of the dignity of women and men at work." It seeks to "ensure that sexual harassment does not occur and, if it does occur, to ensure that adequate procedures are readily available to deal with the problem and prevent its recurrence." The

code notes that "some specific groups are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment," and that research indicates that lesbians and gay men are among the groups especially at risk of such harassment. The code adds: "It is undeniable that harassment on grounds of sexual orientation undermines the dignity at work of those affected and it is impossible to regard such harassment as appropriate workplace behaviour."

The extent, however, to which this Code of Practice is implemented within the British military is questionable. It would seem that policy continues to be based on the belief that the use of the normal legal process contained in the respective manuals of military law and exemplified by specific orders, regulations, and instructions is sufficient to deal with this problem.

Medical Problems

Social problems that center around issues such as cohesion, discrimination, group solidarity and so on are primarily subjective in nature. A more objective issue that has to be faced by the British military is the operational consequences of recruiting and retraining homosexuals within the military. Armed forces have a responsibility to ensure that their personnel are medically fit to undertake operational duties. For that reason, the military sets health criteria that it regularly monitors while coincidentally establishing programs of health care, the scope and nature of which far exceed the provision of civilian organizations. A rationale for this is derived from the nature of military service, which may involve postings overseas at short notice under adverse conditions, even if actual combat is not involved.

Underlying this concern with operational efficiency is the conclusion that personnel with certain medical conditions pose a major risk. The nature of this concern is summarized by the New Zealand Defence Forces (NZDF) as "having in the body organisms of causing illness."¹¹ This includes personnel who have such diseases or conditions as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and hepatitis B or C, illnesses that can inadvertently be transmitted through unscreened blood transfusions. The risk of this occurring is much greater in the British armed forces than in the general community because of the very nature of operational military service. Under certain conditions, particularly in combat situations, every British service person is a potential blood donor for another. While nonblood products are available for use in emergency situations, these are plasma expanders, which, while they are acceptable in the short term, do not replace blood.

Consequently, there are two problems: (1) the use of unscreened blood clearly presents a risk, and (2) rapid HIV testing is not appropriate for battlefield situations.

One solution is to submit all personnel to routine periodic HIV or hepatitis B/C testing. This is expensive and there is a danger of false positive/negative

results. Even so, it can be argued that personnel should be tested for operational reasons. It is to be noted that the medical fitness of personnel for overseas duty under United Nations auspices is governed by U.N. rules. Under these rules, personnel must be tested before deployment and be HIV negative and hepatitis B/C negative.

The British government, however, has chosen to adopt a policy of recruitment and retention that seeks to minimize risk by excluding from military service certain individuals. First, these will include those, who irrespective of their sexual preference, are unable to meet the stipulated criteria of fitness for military service: military personnel who *inter alia* are infected with such diseases as AIDS, hepatitis B and C, and so on. This policy accords very closely with that adopted by other European states. What is more controversial is the second feature of British policy, whereby homosexuals are excluded from the military because of their homosexuality *per se*. This policy differs markedly, for example, from that adopted in Denmark, where it is argued:

No specific health care initiatives are applied towards homosexuals. No military or civilian employees are requested to get an HIV test.

The Danish argument is that this particular illness, in common with other illnesses such as cancer, will affect the ability of the individual to perform a given task. When individuals are medically unfit for service, the normal processes of care and consideration take place. No special consideration will be given to a particular illness:

Denmark recruits soldiers even if they state that they are HIV positive or have AIDS. The only question asked by the military organisation is, "Are you ill?"¹²

It can be argued that the British attitude in this context is contrary to those resolutions of the international community (e.g., Resolution 756 of the Council of Europe of October 1, 1981), which called on the World Health Organization to delete homosexuality from its international classification of diseases. Policy in the United Kingdom, however, appears to be based on the argument that the potential consequences of the noted medical conditions are not determined by the sexual orientation of the person concerned, for both heterosexuals and homosexuals may contract these particular illnesses. The issue is essentially one of fitness for military service. Risk-aversion theory would, however, suggest that the exclusion of homosexuals from military service would reduce the chance of a potential recruit or member of the military having, or developing, organisms that in causing illness would render the individual unfit.

Conclusions

It is the use of risk-aversion that characterizes the attitude of the British government to the recruitment and retention of homosexuals in the military. There is very little hard data to support the conclusions that are reached. According to Stonewall, although the Ministry of Defence has consulted the experience of other countries on the issue of homosexuality and the effectiveness of armed forces, the Ministry

has never produced testimony from any of these countries to say that they have experienced any of the hypothetical difficulties which the MoD insist would follow if lesbians and gay men were allowed to serve.¹³

It is of particular interest to note that in the course of the Select Committee discussions, despite being repeatedly pressed on just this issue, the rationales and arguments outlined above concerning the negative impact of homosexual personnel on morals and discipline were defended by either anecdotal evidence or personal conviction.¹⁴ It is not that these rationales are necessarily wrong or ill-founded but rather that, in regard to this issue as well as gender integration, policy needs to be guided by social scientific analysis of the links between personnel policy and operational effectiveness.

How much has British traditional policy changed? Clearly homosexuality has been decriminalized in the armed forces in the sense that homosexual activities of a type that are legal in civilian law should not constitute an offense under service law. This change echoes developments in other countries, not least the United States, where developments are watched closely by the MoD in formulating its own policy. However, for the time being, it remains the case that the MoD holds to the view that homosexual activities are incompatible with service in the armed forces. Until the amendment to the Sexual Offences Act of 1967 is implemented, decisions on the prosecution of personnel under existing legislation will be made on a case-by-case basis, presumably with the likelihood of prosecution being high only in the most serious of cases (as defined by the service offenses listed earlier).

To return to the distinction between disciplinary dismissals of homosexuals and administrative discharges, it remains the case that homosexuals will continue to be discharged on an administrative basis if they engage in homosexual activities, even if it is clear that no offense under service law has been committed. However, further policy changes are likely, not least because of current developments in the United States. In any case, in view of the Prime Minister's announcement in 1991 that, because of changes in social attitudes, homosexuality would no longer provide a bar to security clearance for members of the civil service, pressure groups such as Stonewall are now pressing for this policy to be extended to members of the armed forces.

Three policy options on homosexuality in the armed forces come to mind: (1) the reassertion of what might be called "traditional institutionalism," by maintaining the existing gay ban; (2) lifting the ban and instituting full equality regardless of openly declared sexual orientation; and (3) a compromise along the lines of the U.S. "don't ask, don't tell" scheme. This third option could either be a pragmatic solution for the indefinite future or linked with an explicit strategy of linking any shift in policy toward or away from option 2 to the outcome of a systematic research project on the relationship between homosexuality and operational effectiveness of military organizations.

We take the view that it will be difficult for the services to adopt option 1 given the current general shift away from core institutional military values, particularly as reflected in gender integration. Turning to option 2, this would institute the concept of full equality regardless of sexual orientation but may well, at least at this juncture, pose too radical a change for the services given the series of challenges they have to resolve whether in human resources, technology, or other fields. The question to be asked is: Would meeting the demands of one interest group be worth the disruption, or does this argument itself exaggerate the forces of resistance within the services?

Option 3, as sociologist James Burk has pointed out, means that homosexuals by being forced to remain silent about their orientation, although they would not be quizzed on the subject, would be denied benefits that they would be able to receive if they were allowed to openly declare their identities and have them accepted by their employers. Burk suggests that the "don't ask, don't tell" compromise could work from an administrative and disciplinary point of view if three rules were applied to sexual conduct in the service, whether or not it was of a homosexual kind:

First, no unwanted sexual advances will be tolerated; second, the norm of privacy will be observed—this means that homosexual conduct, or more generally, oral and anal sex, will not be punished so long as it is done in private between consenting adults; and finally public conduct which demonstrably degrades unit effectiveness will be subject to administrative review and disciplinary action.¹⁵

Any sexually motivated act (whether of the homosexual kind or not) that demonstrably undermines the good order and effectiveness of a military unit would be subject to administrative or, in serious cases, disciplinary action on a case-by-case basis. The mere presence of personnel who are homosexually inclined would not *ipso facto* be the cause of such an action.

In all of this, what needs to be remembered is that the British armed forces are going through one of the most dramatic periods of change in their history, with adjustments to a radically different post-cold war strategic context at the same time as, at least to some, a bewildering series of person-

nel and organizational changes in order to adjust to the social values and expectations of the 1990s. The main problem is that these changes, stemming from the external strategic environment and the domestic social structure, are not occurring sequentially but simultaneously. As a result, the key is to create in quick time appropriate readjustments that do not damage operational effectiveness—or make the services feel that they are permanently under attack from outsiders who do not fully appreciate imperatives impinging upon them—but at the same time do not undermine the supportive links between the armed forces and society.

Notes

1. A major revue of information is the publication of the Stonewall group, a pressure group established to look after the interests of homosexuals who are members or former members of the British armed forces.
2. *Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution* (also called the Wolfenden Report) (London: HMSO, 1957).
3. *Hansard* (June 17, 1991), 115–116.
4. Annex B to the *Report of the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill* (1992) (London: HMSO, 1992), 14.
5. *Hansard*, 116.
6. *Ibid.*
7. AR 135-175, *Separation of Officers*; AR 135-178, *Separation of Enlisted Personnel*.
8. John Hockey, *Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture* (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1986), 37–38.
9. Stonewall Group, press release, June 14, 1993.
10. Hockey, *Squaddies*.
11. Submission by Chief of New Zealand Defence Force, NZDF 1961 (12), to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee (March 16, 1993), 3.
12. Statement of the Danish Surgeon-General, Knud Jessen, *Ekstrabladet*, 7 February 1993.
13. Stonewall, press release.
14. Select Committee Report; *Hansard*, 629–631.
15. James Burk, "Power, Morals and Military Uniqueness: Reflections on Banning Homosexuals from Military Service," *Society* (November/December 1993):29–36.

