AKADEMIA OBRONY NARODOWEJ

WYDZIAŁ WOJSK LĄDOWYCH

BEZPIECZEŃSTWO EUROPEJSKIE,

POLSKIE I AMERYKAŃSKIE PERSPEKTYWY

MATERIAŁY Z MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO SEMINARIUM
/tekst w języku angielskim/

1-2

Opracował:
ppłk dr Kazimierz SIKORSKI

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Wstęp.

Niniejsze opracowanie zostało opublikowane w celu umożliwienia kadrze dydaktyczno-naukowej i studentom Akademii Obrony Narodowej zapoznania się z problematyką współpracy polsko-amerykańskiej w procesie kształtowania systemu bezpieczeństwa europejskiego.

Opracowanie zawiera materiały, które zostały udostępnione autorowi podczas polsko-amerykańskiego seminarium zorganizowanego przez Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych w Warszawie, w dniach 8-9.06.1992 r..

Do opracowania włączono, oprócz merytorycznych, również inne materiały, które dokumentują organizacyjną stronę przedsięwzięcia.

Materiały zostały przedstawione w oryginale, w języku angielskim, co znacznie przyspieszyło termin ich opublikowania, a ponadto umożliwi doskonalenie języka angielskiego przez kadrę i studentów akademii.

AUTOR

Polish-American Seminar
"European Security: Polish and American Perspectives"
Warsaw, 8-9 June, 1992

SEMINAR SCHEDULE

7 June
(Sunday) -Arrival of the American Participants

8 June
(Monday) 9.00 -OPENING OF THE SEMINAR

Speakers: Professor Jacek Kurczewski, M.P.,
Deputy Speaker of the Sejm RP

H.E.Ambassador Thomas Simons,
Embassy of the United States, Warsaw
(tentative)

Professor Antoni Z.Kamiński, Director
of the PISM

Professor Jerzy Konieczny,Undersecretary
of State, Office of National Security
Chancellory of the President

THE AMERICAN DAY

9.30 SESSION I

Moderator:Dr Henryk Szlajfer
Senior Deputy Director,
PISM

The Role of Europe in the US Security
Concept (U.S. participant's paper to
be announced)

The Future of the US Military
Presence in Europe (U.S participant's
paper to be announced)

10.10-10.30 - Coffee break

10.30-12.30 - Discussion

12.30-15.00 - Break for lunch

15.00-16.00 - SESSION II

Moderator: Mr Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas, Director, Office of the Defense Policy, Ministry of National Defense

The Role and importance of Poland in the US European policy (U.S.participant paper to be announced)

The American assessment of the situation in the post-Soviet states and the US prognosis as to the stability of the region(U.S.participant´s paper to be announced)

The US viewpoint on the potential areas of cooperation with Poland in the process of establishing of the European security system (U.S.participant´s paper to be announced)

16.00-16.15 - Coffee break

16.15-18.00 - Discussion

20.00 - Buffet dinner hosted by Professor Jacek Kurczewski, Deputy Speaker of the Sejm RP

9 June
(Tuesday)

9.00 - Meeting with Mr.Radosław Sikorski, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (tentative)

THE POLISH DAY

10.15-11.00 - SESSION I

Moderator: H.E.Harry J.Gilmore, Deputy Commander, U.S.Army War College

Polish security policy (Professor Jerzy Konieczny)

PISM

NATO in the Polsh security policy(Dr Andrzej Towpik)

11.00-11.15 - Coffee break

11.15-12.30 - Discussion

13.00-15.00 - Break for lunch

15.00-16.00 - SESSION II

Moderator: Col.David M.Glantz,
Director,FMSO

- The role and significance of the U.S.military presence in Europe for the security of Poland and the continent (Lt.-Col.Grzegorz Wiśniewski)

The assesment of the situation in the newly created states on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The prognosis of the military sphere(Col.Waldemar Czarnecki)

The prognosis of political sphere(Mr.Lech Kościuk)

The possible areas of cooperation between Poland and the United States in t process of establishing of the European Security system
(Lt.-Col.Dr.Włodzimierz Idczak)
(Lt.-Col.Dr. Kazimierz Sikorski

Compatability of the Polish Armed Forces with Western Armed Forces
(Col.Professor Stanisław Koziej)

16.00-16.15 - Coffee break

16.15-18.00 - Discussion

18.00 - End of the Seminar (with participation of Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Professor Antoni Kamiński) -tentative

NEW DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: AN AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORIAN'S REFLECTIONS ON REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE

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Foreign Military Studies Office
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This paper was prepared for the
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The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be construed to represent the views of the US Department of Defense or Department of the Army.

NEW DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: AN AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORIAN'S REFLECTIONS ON REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

It is with great modesty that this military historian will seek to examine the new architecture, concepts, institutions, problems, and prospects for European security in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Great thinkers have at times caught the essence of such sea changes and provided insights into the long-term implications of such revolutionary situations. Edmund Burke on the French Revolution, John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Shumpeter on Versailles, George Kennan on the Cold War, and Raymond Aron on our century of total war come immediately to mind. These thinkers were noteworthy because of their ability to rephrase the press issues of each age so as to make clear the nature of the break with past models and paradigms. We are as one on agreeing that the new order which has been emerging since 1989 is radically different from the past, bipolar international system. My objective is modest: to use my skills as an historian and observer to explore the possibilities and dangers associated with the emergence of an alternative security system for a "Revolutionary Europe."

The year 1991 looms as large a watershed in European History as 1789, 1815, 1919, and 1945. The challenges and opportunities are great as Europe seeks to put an end to the divisions of four decades of militarized Cold War and to build a secure peace and general prosperity for the entire continent. The culmination of the "Velvet Revolutions" of 1989 and the peaceful end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991 has rewritten Europe's political and economic order. The emergence of independent, market-oriented democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the creation of new sovereign states in the lands of the former USSR, and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991 mark the beginning of a new era in Central and Eastern Europe. The disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the transformations of the European Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, likewise, have profound, all-European implications for this new era. A bilateral international order of global dimensions has given way to a multi-polar system, in which the very term "superpower" has lost its distinct military overtones. The new definition of "great power" now encompasses all aspects of national life and is infused with a multi-national component in the form of trans-national economic enterprises and multi-national economic cooperation.

While the threat of general war, which loomed over the continent for so long, has gone, new dangers, especially ethno-national, social dislocations, a persistent world-wide recession, potential trade wars, and the economic collapse in Central and Eastern Europe, have emerged. 1991 also marked the first large-

scale civil war of the new era and tested the ability of European institutions' ability to bring about the end of that fighting in Yugoslavia. The gradual unfolding of that ethno-national crisis, the failure of persistent efforts to bring about a brokered solution, and the late intervention of the UN through sanctions against the Yugoslav rump state speak to the emergence of new challenges to old institutions. This new era will be marked by these new roles for old institutions and efforts to create new institutions and arrangements to deal with a more diverse, complex, and dynamic security situation. Even a static graphic of these emerging new arrangements gives insight into their many potential contradictions.[1]

As in the post-World War I era, "Russia" once again is in revolution, a revolution, that is redefining the government, social order, economy, national boundaries, and ethnic composition of the successor state/states of the former Soviet Union. One of the cornerstones of Western policy throughout the Cold War has been the use of containment to check military expansion and await a domestic transformation away from totalitarianism in the USSR and Eastern Europe. That transformation has begun in earnest. As the events of the last seven years--culminating in the "Velvet Revolutions of 1989 and 1991--made clear, the old totalitarian order has been broken. Europe, once divided, has the chance to become whole. Liberty, as a right of each human being, has become a possibility. A militarized Cold War between ideological adversaries has given way to the dynamic changes, holding out two diametrically opposing new orders. One is the notion of a single continent, anchored in the Atlantic and extending its cultural and civic values from "Vancouver to Vladivostok." This concept is, as Germany's former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has pointed out, based upon the creation of "a great Euro-Atlantic area of peace and freedom." It encompasses a profound recognition of the need for a radical, new definition of security in which the military dimension is but one factor. The new values recognize that security begins with the security of the person, his/her family, his/her property, and his/her community. It encompasses political, economic, ecological, cultural, and ethno-national dimensions, as well as military. The building blocks for such a system are to be found in the domestic structures, institutions, and values of a broadly-defined, tolerant civic society, based upon a state under law [Rechtsstaat]. The building of such an order will be a gradual process of extension and consolidation over time--an inclusive order with varying degrees of integration, reflecting the institutionalization of such values within the confines of sovereign nation-states. As one who has lived in Poland and experienced Poland's difficult role as a bridge between East and West during some of the most difficult days of the Cold War, this historian has high hopes for Poland's role as a bridge in a new, free and common Europe.

This concept of a new Europe embraces the basic notion of mutual security and involves a fundamental denial of the possibility and legitimacy of any state's striving for absolute security at the expense of other states. It is a concept of a Europe that in its vitality once again encompasses its periphery as partners and not victors. It represents an opportunity to escape one of the most costly burdens of this century of total war: the need for permanent preparations to deter war in the nuclear era.

The other concept, which sees the existing gulf between East and West, would draw another cordon across Europe and leave the East to its own devices in solving its many problems. In the end, this concept, which has much short-term appeal, would leave those striving for democracy and prosperity to fend for themselves. This concept would reject both Europe's eastern and Atlantic ties as historic impositions. So far, this view has not gained broad currency, although their are disturbing signs on the horizon, fed by the recession and fostered by the frustrations of adaptation and reform. At its basis is a nightmare of millions of poor, displaced refugees fleeing west.

Pessimists argue that the first vision is "utopian" and that the compromises that will have to be made over a protracted period of gradual adjustment will, in the end, hardly fit the initial promise and lead to frustration and cynicism in West and East. Realists, and the author is one, would agree that the challenges are, indeed, great but would also argue that failing to make the effort will undermine the very values which the West upheld throughout the two-score years of Cold War and lead to a Hobbesian world--a continuation of this century of total war by other, i.e., violent, means. We must master our revolution or it quite surely will master us.

THE CHALLENGES

The challenges before Europe's system are monumental and have their roots in historical experience and contemporary socio-economic-political realities. The totalitarian experiments of this century have widened the gap between East and West, just as scientific-technical, economic, and cultural changes have made such divisions quite irrational. Evolutionary changes in Western Europe, led by the European Community, offer the promise of a new era of greater economic and political integration. A united Germany--democratic, prosperous, and sovereign--has become the keystone and wheel-horse of these changes. Nationalism, which throughout the nineteenth century divided the nations of Western Europe, has become inclusive. In Central and Eastern Europe the legacies of totalitarianism are severe economic dislocations as national economies shift from command to market systems, weak political institutions struggling to adapt to democratic norms, and the emergence of a virulent ethno-nationalism threatening social stability in the many multi-ethnic states of the region.

Central and Eastern Europe, including the European lands of the former USSR, are in a period of crisis, the outcome of which is still too early to determine. This crisis has political, economic, social, ethnic, and security dimensions. The depths of this crisis can be measured in terms of declining GDPs, rising unemployment, uncontrolled inflation, political instability, heightened ethno-nationalist tensions, and "masterless armies."

The hallmarks of the region at present are economic crisis associated with the collapse of the national command economies, the existing pattern of inter-regional trade, and the slow and difficult process of marketization and privatization of these economies and their integration into the global system of trade and division of labor. The economies are capital-starved at a time of a grave capital crisis in the industrial West. Their existing patterns of trade under CMEA have been seriously disrupted, and alternative markets for these goods have yet to appear. Labor productivity remains low. Unsound industrial policies have created ecological disasters which place heavy demands for capital to clean up the environment, stop pollution, and adjust the supply of labor and capital to fit industrial shifts within and among sub-regions of each national economy. The pre-requisites for a solution to this economic crisis are a general economic recovery, which would create a climate for foreign investment in the region, reduce the barriers to Western markets, stimulate general economic activity, and increase employment in the region. While the countries can and have done much to reform their economies, they remain dependent upon the revival of the advanced Western economies to create a climate for economic growth and investment.

The political crisis is marked by the search for viable state institutions which will provide for the foundation of a democratic polity and undo the political dislocations of decades of one-party, totalitarian politics. The immaturity of civic societies has made the emergence of democratic politics, stable multi-party systems, and vital representative institutions a protracted process, complete with recurrent setbacks and disrupts.

The social crisis is marked by the dislocations of the existing class structure of the Communist system and the conflict arising out of the emergence of new social classes associated with market institutions. This social crisis is primarily one of competing value systems--particularly economic egalitarianism versus individualism. There is a profound conflict between the possibilities of market economics and the dislocations of obsolete industrial giants and bloated command bureaucracies. There is the pressing requirement to create a social safety net for those classes and groups faced with impoverishment and loss of employment in the transition period. Finally, there is the pressing issue to maintain social services as part of the still-existing social contract between state and citizenry. No state can expect to use its sovereign power to protect private contracts in order to

survive the collapse of the basic social contract upon which the state itself is based.

The ethno-nationalist crisis is marked by conflicts among ethnic groups and nations over national self-identification and minority rights. These conflicts are a legacy of the pre-Communist period, but have been sharped by the tide of national self-determination set in motion by German unification. Such conflicts have explosive potential within states and among states. They are calling into question the existence of some multi-national states, fostered belated efforts to find new confederative institutions, and led to the establishment of new nation-states. This crisis has also raised prospects for major border changes in Europe for the first time in four decades. In several of these crises we are now witnessing explicit efforts to solve ethnic-conflict by one nation forcing the removal of people of another nation from a contested region. This has been the de facto content of the civil war in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The result has been an accelerated flow of refugees for which the bordering states are not prepared.

The security crisis is marked by the existence of a vacuum stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Oder to the Ural Mountains. Neutrality, in the absence of the Cold War and in the face of European economic integration, is in the process of re-definition. The old security system among Communist states has given way to anarchy. Existing European institutions, i. e., NATO, EC, WEU, and CSCE, have sought to bridge the gap by expanding consultations, extending aid, and redefining their role to overcome the isolation of these states. Regional patterns of cooperation and consultation have also emerged. New institutions such as the Commonwealth of Independent States have emerged, but their long-term vitality, based upon shared interests and mutual trust, seems open to question. "Masterless armies," as in the case of the Yugoslav People's Army, can become the instruments for intensified civil war, when they become identified with a particular ethnic group in a multi-national polity in the process of disintegration. There is some evidence that in both Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina Serbian para-military groups have drawn much strength from such a process of deconstruction.[2] Recent fighting in the "Trans-Dniester Republic" raises the prospect that the "Yugoslav disease" is spreading and may, if unchecked, become an epidemic. The actions of the Russian 14th Army in recent fighting and the conflicting statements by President Yeltsin and senior officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the CIS Joint Command over the role of those forces raise serious questions about the de facto control of those forces.[3]

Finally, the crisis in Central and Eastern Europe is complicated by the uneven development of the region. Some states are much further along in addressing the above problems, thanks to historical experience or internal developments under Communism.

Others are only now in the process of turning national identity into state sovereignty.

EXISTING INSTITUTIONS

None of the existing institutions of European security were created to deal with the current European revolution. Most have their origins in the postwar world and were shaped by Cold War competition. All are in the process of adaptation. On the success of their adaptation rests Europe's long-term stability and peace. These institutions are diverse in their functions, memberships, and roles. They have played very distinct parts in the process of creating a new European security system.

NATO as a consensual military alliance has been most obviously affected by the revolutionary events. The immediate military threat that was the raison d'etre of its existence has, to all intents and purposes, disappeared. Yet NATO provides Europe with its most intimate tie to Atlantism. In a revolutionary environment, where dangers can quite rapidly become threats, NATO is the linkage to US power and its commitment to European stability and liberty. NATO has in the course of the "Velvet Revolutions" undertaken a process of adjustment, de-emphasizing and re-defining its military role to fit new contingencies in keeping with the dangers confronting the alliance. This has involved the expansion of NATO multi-national forces and the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force to deal with crisis situations before they become overwhelming threats.[4] NATO is now exploring ways in which its forces could be used for peace-keeping operations in Europe, including some role in support of CSCE-mandated actions. At the same time, NATO countries are reducing their military budgets and cutting their forces. These forces are also be restructured to fit a very different threat environment, where logistical reach may be more important than large-scale, standing heavy forces.

The political dimension of NATO has been enhanced. Since 1990 NATO has engaged the states of Central and Eastern Europe in constructive dialogue, creating institutions to provide a forum for consultation through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. These consultations are only a first step towards a more inclusive partnership. Such meetings are a manifestation of this adjustment. And in the long-run the vitality of NATO will provide continuity in a time of dynamic changes. While the states of Central and Eastern Europe may be impatient with the pace of change in NATO and frustrated by their inability to secure immediate membership, they must understand that such a process will take time. At the same time, they should recognize that the present changes are a manifestation of good will and a promissory note on the future. As NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner has stressed, a Euro-Atlantic security zone should be developed. "We want to bring stability to the Central and East European area. That means we want

to expand cooperation to help these state on their road to democracy and reform."[5]

NATO's role in the new Europe will be critical precisely in this area of security integration and stability, but the long-term success of the Euro-Atlantic security zone will depend upon the economic stability and general prosperity of the region. In this regard, it is the European Economic Community which plays the paramount role by providing a milieu for trade and industry. If a climate of free trade can be preserved, it will allow Europe to assume the role of middleman, banker, and entrepreneur to a "Euro-Atlantic" economic zone.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The European Economic Community has been one of the most profound engines of revolutionary change over the last decade. The sustained development and prosperity of its members and their movement towards greater economic and political integration has served as one of the most powerful levers in demolishing the divisions of Europe. The Treaty signed in Maastricht on a monetary, political, and security union continues that process. Confronted by the promise and risks of 1992, the other states of Europe, including neutrals and members of the former Communist Bloc, have sought to guarantee their own special arrangements with the European Community. Negotiations between the EC and the European Free Trade Association over a European Economic Area agreement are an indication of this process. More recently, the decision of the EC to extend to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Poland, and Hungary the status of associate members was an overt recognition of both the importance of such ties to the future prosperity of Central and Eastern Europe and a gradual process of such economic integration.[6] At the same time, the recent close vote in Denmark against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty underscores the new dynamics that are at play in Europe after the Cold War.[7] What was seen as broadly acceptable in terms of deepening the Community during the Cold War now takes on a very different perspective.

The economic power of the European Community still remains a powerful factor in defining the future of Europe. That power has in the case of Central and Eastern Europe translated into political influence, setting the primary and much-desired axis of integration. Germany, which has carried the lion's share of the financial burden through unification with the lands of the former DDR and of aid to Russia and the other successor states, has sought to get other nations to increase their commitment to the economic assistance program. The economic viability of Central and Eastern Europe is recognized as a vital concern for the Community.

At the same time, EC member states themselves have demonstrated a deep concern over the risks of political instability

in Central and Eastern Europe and an overt willingness to take responsibility in the new Europe. With the onset of the ethno-nationalist disintegration of the Yugoslav Socialist Federal Republic in June 1991, the EC emerged as a central actor in trying to bring about a peaceful settlement in keeping with the demands for national self-determination. The German-sponsored decision by the EC to grant collective recognition to those successor states which demonstrated their commitment to international norms of behavior was an important step in the legitimization of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In conjunction with the dispatch of UN-sponsored peacekeeping forces to Croatia, these actions temporarily stabilized a crisis situation and led to a de-escalation of fighting in Croatia. It remains to be seen whether EC leadership will be as effective in ending the escalation of fighting among Croatian, Slavic Moslem, and Serbian forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina or will assume a similar role in other potential ethnic crises within the rest of Yugoslavia, including Macedonia, Serbian-dominated Kosovo and the Vojevodina.

At the Maastricht summit in December 1991, the EC member states agreed on "the need to develop a genuine European security and defense identity and a greater European responsibility on defense matters." This declaration drew attention to a long-established institution, the Western European Union, founded in 1955, but now enjoying a post-Cold War revival.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The Western European Union, a discrete organization composed initially of seven member states [United Kingdom, France, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Italy], but expanding to nine with the entry of Spain and Portugal in 1988, played a vital role in the integration of Germany into West Europe's defense. However, during the Cold War it found its intermediary position between the sovereign national governments and NATO with its trans-Atlantic ties. As the Cold War has wound down, the WEU has enjoyed renewed vitality. In 1987 the Council of the WEU adopted a platform on European security interests. The WEU's new role in no way challenged the role of US strategic power and nuclear forces in deterring war, but, instead, sought to develop "a more cohesive European defense identity." During the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf, the WEU coordinated the counter-mining efforts of vessels from five member states sent to the region. Once again in 1990-1991, WEU coordinated the actions of 32 naval vessels belonging to its member states taking part in the embargo against Iraq. In the postwar period WEU coordinated the counter-mining efforts of its members' naval units in clearing the Gulf. The WEU was also involved in bringing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds of northern Iraq during the same period. This increased activity in a period of revolutionary change in Europe has led to two divergent visions of the future of the WEU. One sees the WEU as the security component of European integration under the EC. The other view

sees the WEU as "NATO's European pillar." Presenting these positions as a dichotomy does not reflect the real vitality of the renewed role for the WEU. As it has demonstrated over the last several years, it can serve as a coordinator of out-of-area actions by its member states, control peace-keeping forces, and engage in humanitarian aid and disaster relief. As Willem van Eekelen, the Secretary General of the WEU observed in 1990:

> On the one hand, it is the European pillar of NATO, on the other it is the security dimension of European integration. Opinions about its evolution differ, but it could best be regarded as a transitional organization on the road toward European Union, in which ultimately the economic, foreign policy, and security dimensions converge.[8]

This role as a transitional organization on the road to European Union has become very appealing to many states in Central and Eastern Europe.

Recently, Poland, CSFR, and Hungary used the WEU meeting in Berlin to request a security partnership with the WEU to deal with ethno-national threats of civil war. Citing the case of Yugoslavia and fearful of the spread of the Yugoslav disease to the states of the former Soviet Union, these three countries have sought to begin the creation of this security partnership by seeking observer status initially, then associate membership, and finally full membership at some time in the future.[9] In response to this call Secretary General van Eekelen noted that Western security institutions have been "very slow" in responding to the changed strategic situation in Europe. The increasing number of European security groupings has made the creation of a "rational pan-European security architecture" more difficult.[10] This development deserves close examination for both its promise and potential dangers, given the explosive character of ethno-national conflict throughout all of Central and Eastern Europe. Would a WEU security partnership be a bridge to the east to resolve such issues or the first bricks in a new wall across Europe? Would European Union become truly inclusive or be exclusive?

The recent proclamation of the creation of a joint Franco-German Corps raises more issues than it resolves regarding the future of the WEU and NATO. Is such a corps the beginning of a European Army and a logical extension of Maastricht or is it a bilateral arrangement and demarche to the allies of these two states within NATO and WEU? Franco-German spokesmen presented the corps as but an addition to the existing binational brigade and a European effort to shoulder more of the defense burden. But without consulting either NATO or WEU allies, the measure loomed larger as a re-assertion of Paris-Bonn-Berlin cooperation at a time of difficulty for both governments.[11]

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Of all the existing institutions devoted to European Security, none has done more to make security a continent-wide issue than CSCE. Since the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1975 it has been a bridge between East and West. Its initial 35 members--all European states, minus Albania, but including Canada and the United States--have sought to use it as a forum for communications and cooperation under the three baskets of the Final Act. These included security issues, economic, scientific-technological and environmental issues, and human rights issues. Lacking in formal structure, CSCE played a key role in the de-escalation of the Cold War via its Stockholm Conference, and provided an effective means for promoting human rights in Communist Europe. CSCE's program of confidence-building measures provided the context for negotiations between NATO and WTO members over Conventional Forces in Europe, leading to the signing of the CFE Treaty in November 1990. At the same time, CSCE was also restructured to play a more prominent role in post-Cold War European security, including the creation of a permanent Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna and an Office of Free Elections in Warsaw. In addition, the reforms looked to the creation of a future representative institution, an Assembly of Europe.[12]

These developments, which represented the apogee of CSCE, have been followed by a crisis of success. In the wake of the Velvet Revolutions of 1989-1991, CSCE has expanded to 48 and later 52 members. Its Final Act no longer fits the key issues facing Europe. The CFE Treaty remains an important measure, but one whose execution has become increasingly complex, thanks to the break-up of the USSR. Its role in economic, scientific-technical, and environmental matters has become much more complex with the end of the division of the continent along market and command lines. Finally, its concern for human rights faces the challenge of dealing with the issue of ethno-nationalism within multi-national states. How this principle can be squared with the concept of the "inviolability of borders" remains to be seen. Yet, by its very inclusiveness, CSCE can play a key role in the transition of a "Euro-Atlantic Security zone." The Paris Declaration of 1990, while a beginning formulation of a new relationship, has also been overtaken by events. Indeed, this is not in any way surprising. The Helsinki Declaration of 1975 came after three decades of struggle, when the Post-World War II settlement in Europe had achieved a de facto acceptance and when the revolutionary impulses of the postwar period had been purged from the European security system. At present, we are attempting to adapt institutions to radical and profound changes only in the process of unfolding.

US Secretary of State James Baker has put this challenge in terms of viewing "CSCE as a framework--not a unitary body--for the Euro-Atlantic agenda." He recommended a flexible and creative approach using multiple methods and institutions to address common

concerns."[13] The recent Hungarian proposal to provide CSCE with more effective mechanisms for strengthening its role in conflict prevention and crisis management is clear evidence of the importance attached to CSCE by many of the Central and East European states, which are in the front line of the current instability.[14] These efforts are gaining in intensity precisely because the sources of conflict across the regions of Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Near East, and the Caucasus are multiplying and becoming interconnected.

SOURCES OF CONFLICT

Frequently, when Western specialists discuss the revolutionary situation in Central and Eastern Europe, they confine their analysis to its impact upon Europe proper, the chief arena of East-West military confrontation over the last five decades. However, a more long-range view of the role of the successor states in Central and Eastern Europe in the international system would note the key role that the USSR played in several regional security systems, i. e., European, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Northwest Asian. The interconnections and inter-penetrations of these systems and the potential conflicts within each were a basic rationale to horizontal escalation as advocated in the early 1980s. In the 1990s the core crisis in the former USSR is likely to affect each of these regional systems, leading to much greater instability in the international order than has been seen since the immediate post-World War II period. Even within regional security systems sub-regional conflicts may become more dynamic and less subject to effective control by external powers.

As the civil war in Yugoslavia has made clear, the explosive forces at work in Southeast Europe will not be controlled without the threat of force. Failure to control those forces, as the Yugoslav military leadership has itself acknowledged, holds out the prospect of the "Lebanization" of Yugoslavia. Moreover the Yugoslav crisis has its own internal dynamics which posit further potential explosions, including external intervention by regional powers in defense of other co-nationals or co-religionists, i. e., Albania, Turkey, Greece, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Indeed, the disagreement between the US and Germany over the latter's commitment to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as the best means to bring about an end of the fighting highlighted the sort of tensions which such regional conflicts can bring about as new power relations come into focus. And the Yugoslav disease can easily become an epidemic if it spreads into the Soviet Union--there are already signs of such spreading ethnic violence and paramilitary intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichivan, where Armenians and Azeris are engaged in combat, and on the Dniester, where forces of the Moldova Republic have been challenged by regular troops and paramilitary formations fighting for the Slavic minority which has proclaimed the creation of a Trans-Dniester Republic on Moldovan territory. The greatest threat for a Yugoslav-type civil war still resides in the

unresolved status of military units in Ukraine, which could serve as a spark for more deep-seated conflict between Russia and Ukraine and simultaneously provide the men and materiel to make such armed hostilities a very large-scale and potentially nuclear war.

One of the vital issues which links the fate of the states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is the fate of Communist armies in post-Communist societies. In Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav People's Army was the last institution committed to Tito's federal state and the concept of a socialist Yugoslavia. Immediately prior to and during the Civil War, that military was subjected to pressures to de-legitimize it, to challenge its monopoly on violence within the state. Slovene and Croatian nationalists presented the YPA as an instrument of Communist-Serbian oppression against all the other nations and ethnic groups within Yugoslavia. Serbian nationalists tried to coopt it as an instrument of President Milosevic's dreams of a "Greater Serbia." Having found neither means nor will for it to dismantle itself, the YPA was left to fight a civil war in the name of a multi-ethnic state that had lost its constituencies. The Yugoslav Civil War should raise concern over the fate of the former Soviet Armed Forces, now caught in a similar ideological-political crossfire. The demobilization of the armed forces of the former USSR and the reintegration of soldiers and officers into society as productive members is the only way to avoid turning a "masterless" and hungry army into an instrument of civil war. In some regions these armies have already found competing masters and are either on the verge of all-out civil war or have passed beyond that to regional warfare with the attendant risk of foreign intervention.

Given the complexity of these crises and their explosive nature once a certain level of communal violence has been reached, one of the most promising solutions seems to be to create regional and sub-regional security structures. Some of these efforts have been predominantly diplomatic, without an explicit security component. Some have had explicit security agendas but no formal structures. All are concerned with integrating individual states into larger edifices. They include the Pentagonale, Hexagonale, and Central European Initiative, in which Italy has played a key role. They extend to the Baltic Council and the Visegrad Triangle. As the Cracow Declaration of last fall made clear, such efforts by the Triangle have been aimed at achieving integration into Europe and enhanced security:

> The principal task set by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary is a full-range integration into the European political, economic and juridical as well as security system. In pursuit of accomplishment of this aim our states aspire most of all to an association with the European Community, extension of relations with the Atlantic Treaty, including their institutionalization, also by means of an international agreement in accordance


> with the American-German proposal of October the 2, 1991, and the Western European Union (WEU), as well as to strengthening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and its institutions.[15]

The challenge remains to adapt existing institutions to a new and revolutionary situation and to use such regional groups to bring about the effective extension of the European security system. Ukrainian interest in joining the Visegrad Triangle, as we will/have hear/d here, is a manifestation of just such an extension. Recent steps in the development of Ukraine's bilateral security relations with individual members of the Triangle are noteworthy.[16]

While the Visegrad Triangle is acknowledged to have great promise as a stabilizing institution in the region, the fact remains that two members of the Triangle face very serious security problems. The upcoming elections in the CSFR holds out the prospect of the declaration of Slovak independence and the end of the federation. Hungary, which has a large diaspora of its co-nationals located in the states surrounding it, faces immediate crises over the status of Hungarian minorities in three of states/regions, i. e., Romanian Transylvania, Serbian Vojevodina, and Slovakia. The civil war in Yugoslavia has added to the follow of refugees into Hungary. The impact of UN-imposed sanctions upon that Hungarian minority in the Vojevodina may further strain relations between Budapest and Belgrade in the weeks ahead.

CONCLUSION

In the end, Europeans confronting this very unstable situation would do well to remember the experience of the last Russian Revolution and try to seek timely solutions to a worsening crisis before events get out of control. In the end, economic collapse and political chaos are the two most serious threats to successful reform and the creation of a Euro-Atlantic security zone. These breed a climate of pessimism and disaffection. Despair among the mass of the population and impatience with democratic/market reforms feed xenophobic, authoritarian political movements. Such movements become even more dangerous, however, when they are able to link with and exploit a crisis within the military. Events are moving very rapidly in the successor states. Unless Europeans find the means to act now and use existing institutions in concert, the option of a Euro-Atlantic security zone, embracing a Central and Eastern Europe of democratized polities, and market economies may be lost.



Revised 24 March 1992 to show the admission of Georgia, Croatia, and Slovenia to the CSCE.
Revised 16 April 1992 to show the admission of Georgia to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.
Revised 6 May 1992 to show Bosnia's admission to the CSCE (30 April 1992), Bulgaria's admission to the Council of Europe (7 May 1992), the "Visegrad" Triangle, and the formation of the European Economic Area (EEA) [2 May 1992].

Chart prepared by Douglas Clarke of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
This chart will appear in issue 1/2 of the journal European Security.

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Perspectives on Poland

The Polish political crisis is coming to a head. The issues are who governs Poland, the president or a parliamentary government, and national direction, a West or East option.

The present government of Prime Minister Jan Olszewski has failed to create a parliamentary majority to support the government on its terms. These terms included conducting economic reforms, according to IMF criteria with modifications to soften the social impact of these economic changes. It is still possible for the government to create a majority by including the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), a right wing party, which demands substantial moderation of the IMF-directed economic policy. President Walesa in anticipation said that he can not work with Prime Minister Olszewski.

President Walesa constitutionally can not dismiss the government, but has called upon parliament (Sejm) to vote no-confidence. The last straw in the continuing conflict, which began with the dismissal by Dr Jan Parys of his predecessor, Admiral Kolodziejczyk, was a reminder sent by Mr Olszewski to President Walesa during the latter's visit to Moscow, calling for modification of the draft text on Soviet troop withdrawal from Poland. The issue was paragraph seven of this agreement on the establishment of Polish-Russian joint ventures on former Northern Group of Forces (NGF) bases in Poland. Previously President Walesa had agreed to this treaty paragraph, apparently outside of ongoing government-to-government negotiations, during his talks with General Grachev in Warsaw. Prime Minister Olszewski had opposed this extra-governmental act by the president.

Should the Sejm agree with Walesa, he would then be able to propose a another candidate for prime minister. The candidates being mentioned are the former prime minister, Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki, whose Democratic Union (UD) party is one of the two largest parliamentary parties and Mr Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL).

Mr Mazowiecki's nomination would be opposed by all Peasants' Parties. They have accused Mr Mazowiecki of bringing Polish agriculture to ruin during his tenure as prime minister. A possible solution for Mr Mazowiecki would be to enter into another agreement with the post-communist left. This could lead to the resumption of a "contract agreement" government which resulted following the April 1989 Round Table talks with the communists. President Walesa is on record supporting Mr Mazowiecki for the next prime minister. Mr Mazowiecki has announced that his party will table a no-confidence vote (most probably within the coming week). The no-confidence vote had come early on 5 June.

The Sejm is continually intimidated by President Walesa with

threat of being dissolved. Furthermore, the parliament is being pressured to pass the president's draft of a "Little Constitution" which would give Walesa "dictatorial" powers. Among other things this presidential constitution foresees:

* granting the president a right to issue decrees with powers of parliament bills during Sejm tenures;

* writing into the Constitution the National Security Council (a presidential body) as a superior organ in matters of defence and public order;

* extension of the president's rights to introduce a state of martial law (also for reasons of "internal security of the state")

* granting to the president the right of one-man rule over the state in the period of martial law;

The changes in the Constitution would be accompanied by a bill "On organs appropriate in the matters of national security," which has been prepared by the President's National Security Bureau. The bill foresees among other things:

* changes in the composition of the National Security Council, so that majority of it's members will be appointed by the President.

* it would be the duty of the government and Defence minister to execute Council decisions in matters connected with defence and security. So far the Council has executed its tasks "in consistence with the government settlements". The general leadership of the defence was assigned to the government;

* the president would be recognized as a superior of the chief of the general staff, chiefs of the military districts, and the commanders of army, navy and the air force. So far the superior of the above ranks has been the Defence Minister.

* the president would be granted the right to decide on the organizational structure of the armed forces and to establish the division of authority between police, State Protection Office (Polish: UOP), Border Guard, Fire Brigades, Military Gendarmerie, Government Protection Bureau (Polish: BOR), Military Information Services (military intelligence and counter-intelligence) and Civil Defence.

* it would be a duty to coordinate with the president the nominations of: vice-ministers of defence and internal affairs, chief of State Protection Office , the chief commandants of police and fire brigade.

It seems that neither the parliament nor the government can withstand this presidential pressure. It was expected in Warsaw that the government would fall imminently. On 5 June the parliament had voiced no-confidence. However, on 27 May the parliament had voted overwhelmingly to support a resolution that obliges the Interior Minister to make available a list of names of senior public officials, possibly including ministers, who collaborated with the communist security service. This resolution must be acted upon by 6 June. The ministry will be given two months to produce a broader list of former agents, including persons who are currently judges and members of parliament.

This may highly embarrass President Walesa whose closest friend and confidant, now a minister in the president's chancellory, Mr Wachowski, was named recently by Polish newspapers as a KGB agent. Another Walesa protege and present foreign affairs minister, Mr Skubiszewski, who served in Mr Mazowiecki's government and who was imposed on the Mr Olszewski's cabinet, has also been named publicly as a collaborator with the communist secret police. As to the judges, the majority of these were appointed during Mr Mazowiecki's tenure.

The Polish crisis notwithstanding, it is worth posing the following questions to competent Polish authorities. Is there still a Western Option for defense and security cooperation as outlined by former defense minister Jan Parys? How do Poles define democratization and control of the armed forces?

What then in Poland is the contemporary prospect for democratization - meaning the introduction of greater political choice. Democratization encompasses the evolution of a concept that accepts and tolerates conflict, rather than equating the world of politics as one of rule and command.[1]

Challenges of Democratization: In Poland democratization may involve contradiction, internal conflict and inconsistencies in terms of diversity of goals pursued.

The Economic Process and the State. What is the capacity and willingness of the Polish state to intervene to the extent required.

Cultural Orientation and Attachment to Political Pluralism. Tension and contradiction. Does Poland have the capacity to develop beyond a nascent stage of democracy? Political attitudes appear not to change and the population continues to define its attitude to the political leadership in terms of confidence and trust - rather than support for the government in terms of reason, interests and the imperatives of compromise.[2] Three years after Mr Mazowiecki's appointment as prime minister there still persists

an absence of mass enthusiasm about democracy, and anxiety and insecurity about the future.

Lack of Institutional Growth. There is a definite lack of an organized opposition within parliament, and an absence of alternatives to government, or presidential programs. The dominant orientation is "don't know" as indicated in public opinion polls. Such confusion and uncertainty will contribute to furthering political instability.

Problem of Political Participation. Democratization demands political activity, new institutions and channels of participation. It includes the issue of voter passivity.

The direction of political change in Poland, and in the rest of Eastern Europe, is of considerable interest and concern. At stake are political stability and leadership capacity for maneuver, economic growth and increased opportunity for becoming commercially competitive, and national confidence (reduced sensitivities) towards a variety of internal and external pressures.

5 June 1992

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Defining U.S. Forward Presence in Europe: Getting Past the Numbers

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Précis and Findings.

- o Greater attention needs to be focused on establishing the residual capabilities required of the future U.S. Army presence in Europe, vice absolute numbers of individuals forward deployed, as is currently the case in the on-going debates. In short, ways and means must be fully integrated, rather than means driving the process.
- o Irrespective of the eventual size of the residual U.S. presence in Europe, a balanced force structure of all three services will be needed to provide a credible presence in the eyes of European allies, as well as potential foes.
- o Within the U.S. Army commitment to Europe, a similar balance must be maintained between war fighting capabilities and reinforcement and sustainability requirements.
- o Should personnel numbers fall to levels incapable of sustaining such a balance, priority should be given to reinforcement and sustainability, as these capabilities represent a fuller expression of the U.S. commitment to our European allies. The United States:

  oo must maintain sufficient elements of the existing infrastructure in Europe, to include personnel, that

will permit reinforcement options at levels currently envisaged; and,

oo should negotiate for increased host nation support for these capabilities.

o In designing the residual war fighting structure, innumerable options are available. That said, the following represent the minimal capabilities required:

oo a corps headquarters/planning staff to command the U.S.-led multinational corps in AFCENT;

oo sufficient corps troops to support peacetime operations, to provide adequate combat support and combat service support during conflict, and to facilitate rapid reinforcement;

oo two U.S. division headquarters/planning staffs will be required; one for service in the U.S.-led corps, the second to participate in the German-led corps to which the United States has committed;

oo the exact composition of the two divisions and corps troops can vary substantially, depending upon the numbers of personnel available. Again, focus should be on retaining key capabilities, vice pure numbers of personnel;

oo one of the two divisions could also fill the U.S. role in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps; and,

oo sufficient personnel and infrastructure to integrate CONUS-based reinforcements into operational plans and structures upon arrival in theater.

- The percentage of U.S. participation in the numerous NATO and international headquarters should be maintained.
- While U.S. headquarters in Europe will undoubtedly be reduced, and some eliminated, a certain level of peacetime command and control headquarters and organizations will still be required (e.g., USEUCOM). Additionally, theater army support capabilities must be sufficient to support envisaged operations. Moreover, these organizations must be capable of being augmented and making the transition to a war headquarters, if required.
- Additional personnel may be required to initiate and sustain military-to-military contacts with the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Given existing, and potential for expanded, cooperation, substantial numbers of personnel may be required. Also, the level of participation by the individual states, and the decision of what form of permanent cooperative relationship will exist, may require the establishment of some form of joint military advisory group structure.

Defining U.S. Forward Presence in Europe: Getting Past the Numbers

Despite the massive changes brought on by the end of the cold war, U.S. vital interests throughout the world remain largely constant. Nowhere is this more true than in Europe, where the metamorphosis in that region's security environment has been dramatic. To cope with these altered conditions in regional security, while protecting vital interests, NATO and U.S. strategy have changed profoundly.[1] For the Atlantic Alliance, increased attention is now focused on forward presence, crisis management, rapid reaction forces, and multinational formations, and away from "Flexible Response" and "Forward Defense." U.S. national strategy will continue to rely ultimately on nuclear deterrence, but in the conventional arena will parallel NATO's strategy and shift toward reduced forward presence, improved crisis response capabilities, and reconstitution, as well as a smaller, restructured residual force.[2]

Ascertaining what will constitute "forward presence" lies, perhaps, at the crux of the new National Security Strategy, for the level of forward presence largely dictates the scope of the remaining elements of the strategy; i.e., size of contingency forces based in the continental United States (CONUS) needed for crisis response, reinforcement capabilities, mix of the active and reserve components, and reconstitution. Because

Europe remains the region most vital to U.S. national interests, the question of the U.S. military presence there is a matter of no small consequence.

That a U.S. military presence is needed in Europe for the foreseeable future is generally accepted in both Europe and the United States. Many key leaders in Europe remain convinced that a U.S. military presence (of some undefined size) is a sine qua non for continued stability on the "Old Continent" and are actively lobbying for retention of U.S. military forces. The Bush Administration has acknowledged the concerns of U.S. allies, as well as the strategic importance of Europe to the United States, and has argued vigorously for a continued significant U.S. presence in the region. Nor is this key point lost on the loyal opposition. Democratic presidential hopeful Governor Bill Clinton is also on record supporting a sizeable continued U.S. military presence in Europe.[3]

But, the eventual size of the U.S. forward presence in Europe has yet to be established and is the subject of an increasingly intense debate. To contribute positively to the current debate over forward presence, therefore, this paper will attempt, first, to review briefly the current definition of forward presence in Europe; second, to discuss the general capabilities required of U.S. forces in Europe under the new security conditions; third, to redefine more clearly forward presence in Europe; and, fourth, to provide options for future

force structures in Europe to support forward presence. Given space limitations, this paper will limit itself to the U.S. Army in Europe. For, in the final analysis, the physical presence of land power (vice air or maritime) will provide the greatest symbolic credibility to our European allies and potential foes.

U.S. Forward Presence in Europe as Currently Defined.

The National Military Strategy of the United States defines forward presence as "...forces stationed overseas and afloat...periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts."[4] Because of this rather all-encompassing description, forward presence currently has the unavoidable characteristic of being all things to all people.

For example, the Bush Administration has proposed a force of 150,000 to remain in Europe, while Democratic presidential hopeful and former Governor of California, Jerry Brown, has (flippantly, perhaps) suggested that a residual force of 1,000 would be sufficient.[5] Such divergent numbers obviously represent opposing poles of the debate. But determining which pole will exert the stronger attraction is a critical question. Key congressional leaders, for example, have indicated potential support for numbers well below the administration's position (i.e., 50,000 to 75,000).[6]

Because the credibility of U.S. forward presence depends upon perception (of both friend and potential foes), it may not be appropriate to define forward presence categorically as being tied to some arbitrary number of personnel to be stationed in Europe. Whether in its national debate the United States finally decides to finance 1,000 or 75,000 or 150,000 troops stationed in Europe may be the critical issue. Critical because numbers take on a symbolic importance of their own. That said, it is important to refocus on the identification of the capabilities required of residual U.S. forces in Europe and how those forces are structured, stationed, and incorporated into NATO's future multinational forces to support U.S. national security strategy. For, only by ensuring the full integration of ends, ways, and means (instead of standing the strategic process on its head by concentrating first on means and then adapting ways and ends) can the future U.S. military presence in Europe best insure U.S. national interests in the region.

Capabilities Required.

Before delving into the discussion of the capabilities required of a U.S. military presence in Europe after 1994, it must be understood that forward presence does not lend itself to simple, linear analysis. Rather, forward presence is linked to a complex set of factors, each of which consists of a number of dependent variables, all of which must remain in balance.

In analyzing and assessing potential elements of future U.S. forward presence in Europe, it is essential to keep these many linkages in mind and assess the various options in light of possible combinations and potential outcomes.

The ability to determine the capabilities required of a future U.S. forward presence in Europe is complicated further by the perceived absence of a significant threat. In the past, U.S. forward presence was easily defined against a distinct and measurable threat. That clear threat no longer exists, and, while "instability" in a generic sense may pose risks, it does not lend itself to detailed threat based force planning. The basis for the future U.S. forward presence cannot, therefore, be based solely on potential threats. Instead, analysis must look beyond the search for the "right" number of U.S. personnel and focus on the capabilities needed to ensure the ability to execute effective military operations, if required.

In determining required capabilities, the U.S. residual presence in Europe must, first and foremost, retain the ability to contribute to the defense of our allies in accordance with U.S. obligations to NATO.[7] Second, residual forces must manifest Washington's continued political commitment to Europe and assuage our NATO allies that Washington remains militarily committed to their future security.[8]

While the second capability is clearly a political, as opposed to strictly military, requirement, the two issues are

closely intertwined and, therefore, the political necessity must be translated into military structures. On the one hand, the magnitude of the future force in Europe could be defined solely as a function of budget allocations: the current numbers oriented debate. On the other hand, such an approach may not suffice because it could fail to satisfy either our allies' perceptions of, what constitutes a credible presence or pass the test of military sufficiency.

Combat Capabilities. To be credible, either to our allies or our own military commanders, the future U.S. military presence in Europe must have a certain level of combat capabilities. In other words, planning should be based on the assumption that these forces will be capable of performing military operations, as opposed to fulfilling strictly custodial functions. Said military operations have yet to be defined in any detail, but, the new U.S. national and military strategies and NATO's new strategic concept do provide a broad range of missions for U.S. military forces in Europe that can be used to deduce requisite capabilities.

For example, under the new NATO and U.S. national strategies, crisis management and response across the breadth of the Alliance will take on greater importance. U.S. forces remaining in Europe after 1995 must, therefore, be capable of contributing to NATO's Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces, as well as possible operations in support of U.S. national

commitments, either individually or as part of an ad hoc coalition. In the first case, the United States remains committed to its long-standing contribution to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) to NATO's Immediate Reaction Forces and has indicated (but not yet committed) a division sized contribution to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps.[9] The extent of the U.S. contribution in the latter two cases would, of course, be dictated by the circumstances of the individual case, but could require commitment of a large share of the U.S. military presence in Europe.[10] The United States also has acknowledged the requirement to contribute to the main defense forces of the Alliance. At the moment, the U.S. presence is concentrated in the Central Region of Allied Command Europe and is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future.[11] Moreover, the United States has committed itself to participate in main defense multinational corps within the Central Region. Based on current U.S. assurances, the U.S. Army must maintain, at the very least, one corps headquarters with one U.S. division to participate with a German division within a U.S.-led multinational corps. An appropriate level of corps troops to support this formation is also required. The United States must also provide one division to a German-led multinational corps. When considered with the intention of the United States to contribute a division to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, this equates to a total commitment of three divisions. However,

indications are that only two divisions will be stationed in Europe.[12]

Force Structures. The eventual force structure of the future U.S. Army forward military presence in Central Europe needed to fulfill these capabilities will depend on the interaction of a number of issues: the nature of perceived risks, forces required by commitments to support rapid reaction forces, the amount of time available for reinforcement, and strategic lift capabilities. Obviously, if the United States faces a low risk environment, needs few rapid reaction forces, has adequate warning time, and has access to sufficient strategic lift assets, then a smaller forward presence in Europe would be acceptable. Whether these circumstances will occur remains to be seen.[13]

The calculus of these interactive requirements becomes much more complicated outside the Central Region and its highly modern force structures, developed infrastructure, and long-standing host nation agreements, all of which have been extensively exercised. And, because of the low likelihood of being able to establish a significant level of U.S. military ground force presence on the flanks of NATO,[14] units stationed in Central Europe must possess the capability to deploy to either Allied Forces Northwestern Europe (e.g., North Norway) or the Southern Region (AFSOUTH) to reinforce those vital areas in a time of crisis.

Deployability. Units remaining in the Central Region, therefore, must be configured to be capable of rapid transfer to the flanks (which have less developed infrastructure and will require introduction of considerably greater levels of combat support and combat service support capabilities). Additionally, these forces must be prepared to meet a broad range of potential risks and operate on terrain decidedly different from that in Central Europe. Such conditions will require a more robust and, therefore, larger presence than might be required if forces were focused only on the Central European Plain.

The residual U.S. military presence in Europe must also be prepared for operations outside the NATO area, either in support of NATO or as part of an ad hoc coalition. Moreover, in a future of constrained resources and reduced force structures, these forces may be called upon to support U.S. national interests outside of Europe more frequently.[15]

Such operations may place considerable demands on European-based forces. Although analogous to reinforcement of the flanks, out of area operations are not identical. For example, under the envisaged National Security Strategy, the United States will engage in ad hoc coalitions, which by definition, may lack the long-term, peacetime, day-to-day coordination and cooperation that exists within NATO. Under certain circumstances, U.S. forces could rely on substantial

allied logistical support, extensive NATO infrastructure, and alliance experience in large-scale strategic movements that could, in turn, require a lesser U.S. commitment of personnel and resources.

In-Theater Infrastructure. In other cases, where the United States might operate outside of NATO's aegis or in areas where extensive infrastructure support might not be available, U.S. military forces in Europe must possess sufficient combat support and combat service support capabilities to sustain themselves during extended operations. Such possibilities would require U.S. forces in Europe to maintain higher levels of combat support and combat service support personnel, units, and equipment than might be required solely to support operations in the Central Region where the United States could rely on a highly developed infrastructure and considerable host nation support.[16] Should numbers of personnel fall below certain levels, the United States may find itself in the difficult position of deciding which national obligations will be met, i.e., combat, versus reinforcement capabilities.

The U.S. military presence in Europe must also be capable of receiving, integrating, and supporting augmentation forces from North America, i.e., "contingency forces" from CONUS.[17] This requirement will mean that acontinued U.S. military presence in Europe must support the long-standing U.S. reinforcement commitment to the Central Region, as well as

improved capabilities to perform similar operations on the periphery of NATO. Moreover, the U.S. military presence must be prepared to receive and forward reinforcements to theaters of operation outside of the NATO area either in support of NATO or as part of an ad hoc coalition.[18] But, contrary to past planning for reinforcing the Central Region with its extensive infrastructure and host nation support arrangements, reinforcement of the flanks will be decidedly more difficult because of the absence of such in place support.

The ability to receive and integrate reinforcements along the far flung edges of the Atlantic Alliance may require a commitment of personnel and resources in peacetime to coordinate and support the potential introduction of augmentation forces. Although the numbers of personnel in individual headquarters and organizations may be relatively small, total numbers may not be inconsequential. In sum, many of the reinforcement responsibilities of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and 7th Army, and 21st Theater Army Area Command (21st TAACOM), for example, will remain. Thus, while fewer residual forces in Europe and reduced reinforcement requirements will make acceptable a smaller, leaner support structure in Europe, the requirement to maintain such capabilities will remain for the foreseeable future. The eventual size of that support structure will

depend upon the ultimate mix of the U.S. forward presence and reinforcements envisaged from CONUS.

Headquarters Staffs. Related to the retention of forward based U.S. forces in Europe is the sensitive and important issue of the residual U.S. Army command structure and rank of individuals filling command billets in Europe. For many European policymakers, the ranks of these individuals represent a manifestation of the U.S. commitment to Europe. Consequently, a reduced presence of U.S. general officers in key, highly visible billets may be perceived as an indication of reduced U.S. interest in Europe. Granted, in view of the reductions anticipated in U.S. Army forces in Europe, a comparable contraction in general officer positions will occur. But, the Administration and the U.S. Army should carefully examine which posts should be eliminated or downgraded and which should retained as highly visible expressions of U.S commitment. For example, for policy reasons, the United States may wish to retain an Army four-star general officer billet because of the requirement to interact with international officers of that rank.

On the other hand, because of the scale of reductions contemplated, some might argue that the responsibilities of the remaining corps commander could be extended to all U.S. Army forces in Europe. Such an option is not considered desirable. The corps commander will be fully committed to commanding his

peacetime U.S., and wartime multinational, corps. Similarly, the reinforcement responsibilities, and requirements to support the U.S. corps and divisions, as well as units at corps and echelons above corps, will fully occupy the Commander, 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM, or whatever its successor organization may be designated). Moreover, logistics and administrative support (in both time of peace or conflict) at the theater army level will still be required. Anticipated conditions argue, therefore, for retention of Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Certainly, the size and structure of Headquarters, USAREUR will be rationalized to conform to changed conditions.

Although some headquarters in Europe will be eliminated and manning levels reduced in remaining staffs, the requirement will still exist for the U.S. Army to provide personnel for these activities. This will include U.S. national, as well as international staffs. At the same time, new headquarters are being established in NATO, e.g., ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, main defense multinational corps headquarters, that will require U.S. participation. Indeed, one should not depreciate the number of personnel required for these assignments. In view of the force levels anticipated, one can expect tension between the competing requirements to man these staffs and, at the same time, man the requisite U.S. combat, combat support and combat service support forces forward deployed in Europe.

New Missions to the East. In addition to its responsibilities to its NATO allies, the United States may desire to extend military contacts with the newly democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe. The end of the cold war and the emergence of democratic governments in Eastern and Central Europe presents the opportunity for the United States to encourage the creation of democratically-responsive civil-military relations in these former Communist states. Indeed, ongoing, but heretofore limited, military-to-military contacts have indicated a number of areas where Western military experts can contribute to the creation of new military forces responsive to democratic governments.[19] A requirement may emerge, therefore, to establish and sustain more substantial cooperative military-to-military relationships with the newly democratic Central and Eastern European states.

Depending upon the level of U.S. Government commitment to such activities, the numbers of U.S. personnel involved could vary considerably. At the very least, if we are to be successful, increased liaison teams, attaches, offices of defense cooperation, etc., may have to be created, or expanded. A larger commitment, for example the establishment of organizations along the lines of Joint U.S. Military Assistance Groups (JUSMAGs) throughout Eastern and Central Europe and the former-Soviet Union, could entail a considerable number of personnel. Finally, while the numbers in each country may not

be consequential, the total effort, especially when combined with the many other functions in Europe, e.g., U.S. and allied headquarters, TAACOM activities, could reduce the personnel available for combat forces.

Force Structure Options.

Before laying out some of the potential options available to U.S. planners, one must reinforce the point that this discussion will not seek to identify the illusive "number" of U.S. personnel which are to eventually remain in Europe. Instead, the focus should be on developing a force structure that provides the necessary capabilities to fulfill the missions required of that forward presence. Under such an approach, a much broader range of options are then available to policymakers. At the same time, a focus on ensuring requisite capabilities assures our allies of a stronger U.S. commitment to European security.

Commitments. As indicated earlier, the United States is committed to participation in multinational forces. As currently articulated, the U.S. Army must maintain one corps headquarters with one U.S. division and appropriate levels of corps troops to participate with a German division within a U.S.-led multinational corps. The United States must also provide one division to serve in a German-led multinational corps. Either of the two divisions could be called upon to participate in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. These commitments

establish the skeleton of our forward presence--a "corps" sized formation remaining in Europe.

Defining the "Corps". The organization of a corps is currently being redefined, particularly within the Central Region where the "corps" has long been recognized as the "coin of the realm" of an army's force structure. For example, NATO is moving toward creating multinational corps where national contributions will be at the division and brigade level. However, U.S. Army doctrine is currently under revision and it is not clear that the current definition of the corps (i.e., based on divisions) will be retained. Indeed, participants in the doctrinal discussions ("AirLand Operations")[20] argue for a move toward a corps based proportionally more upon brigade structures. Thus, in addition to different definitions of what constitutes a "corps" in Europe, the "Capable Corps" as currently envisaged may not be necessary to provide reassurance to our allies. Over time, therefore, and in an era of both reduced risks and national force structures in Europe, smaller formations may provide a new base line for credibility.

Even within such new parameters, the eventual size and composition of that "corps" could vary considerably. Indeed, the permutations of the composition of the divisions and corps are nearly inexhaustible. For example, in the face of the past threat, particularly in Central Europe, complete units were needed to demonstrate national resolve and credibility. In the

future, a similar level of commitment may be possible without the physical presence of entire units in Europe. Given the warning times anticipated in Central Europe, it may be possible to introduce large-scale reinforcements from CONUS within times anticipated. Such conditions could allow for a smaller physical presence of combat forces in Europe (e.g., one or two maneuver brigades per division flag, as well as appropriate corp "slice"), and minimal troops needed to ensure rapid reinforcement to flesh out the corps during a period of increasing tensions.

Reinforcement. The ability to introduce large-scale reinforcements rapidly into Europe obviously depends upon balancing a variety of factors: the degree of accepted risk; available warning and reaction times; levels of personnel and facilities to receive, forward, and integrate reinforcements, and prepositioned equipment. Here, the importance of U.S. equipment held in Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) cannot be overlooked. Designed to meet the requirements of reinforcing Europe in the face of the cold war threat, substantial amounts of equipment stocks have been built up in Central Europe. This equipment could obviously facilitate rapid reinforcement from CONUS and, therefore, make the U.S. commitment to reinforce Europe more credible to both allies and potential foes. More importantly, perhaps, POMCUS stocks and the personnel required to maintain them provide a

physical manifestation of U.S. commitments to European security. The continued maintenance of adequate POMCUS facilities and stocks in Europe to support anticipated levels of reinforcement should, therefore, remain a goal of U.S. policy.

At the same time, U.S. POMCUS stocks will allow the United States to maintain roughly equivalent force generation capabilities with its major allies. Again, this may not be as difficult as it first appears. For example, the Bundeswehr is to shrink to a peacetime strength of 370,000, with a potential to mobilize to 900,000 during wartime, and the brigade and divisional force structures of the German Army will be split almost equally between active and mobilization-dependent formations.[21] The United States could maintain a smaller physical presence in Europe and still possess force generation capabilities equivalent to our allies.[22]

There are, however, at least two risks inherent in relying too heavily on reinforcing forces at the expense of in-place units. First, while units may be withdrawn from Europe, there is no guarantee that they will be available for future reinforcement of Europe. Given fiscal constraints and recent historical example, it is likely that many units withdrawn from Europe will be eliminated from the U.S. Army's overall force structure.[23] Units withdrawn from Europe and eliminated from the force structure cast a shadow of doubt over the U.S.

reinforcement capabilities, and, hence, over the credibility of the U.S. commitment to European security.

Second, a point may be reached where the level of residual forces in Europe no longer represents a credible level of commitment in the eyes of our European allies or potential foes. Where this number lies cannot be known at this time and, undoubtedly, will be the subject of considerable debate.[24] But, in that debate the United States must not decide alone. At reduced levels of forces in Europe, the United States will no longer be able to make what may be perceived as unilateral decisions. It will be important for the United States to consult its European allies and understand what the members of the Alliance perceive to be a credible U.S. contribution--both politically and militarily.

Rotations. A further means of putting flesh on the skeleton is for units from CONUS to rotate periodically to Europe and operate under the command and control of their parent units in Europe. Units could also deploy to Europe for the purpose of exercising with their forward deployed parent unit, as well as to gain familiarity with terrain and allied militaries.[25] While a potential option, the associated costs of transporting units to and from Europe are not inconsiderable and must be recognized. For example, to maintain a 6 month brigade-sized rotation may require as many as three brigades in the force structure.[26] However, in declining defense budgets,

funds simply may not be available to support such a deployment scheme. Finally, human costs must be taken into account. Frequent or lengthy rotations to Europe can have adverse effects upon morale. Any reductions in deployment schedules or significant cancellations may cast doubt on the credibility of our commitment.

A More Reduced Forward Presence. Another option is simply to have a smaller skeleton. For example, this, the United States would commit itself solely to the leadership of one multinational corps in Europe, with one division and, importantly, all of the corps assets (combat, combat support, and combat service support) to sustain the corps. Such an option would result in substantial economies, but could, however, call into question Washington's political and military commitment. Moreover, the U.S. Army would be providing a substantial and expensive element of its overall force structure, an entire corps' combat, combat support and combat service support, to support one U.S. division. On the other hand, such a commitment could also indicate considerable support for the multinational concept. As a means of further demonstrating U.S. resolve, provisions could be made, given adequate finances, to reinforce the corps with an additional armored/mechanized division from CONUS during a time of increasing tension.

The political costs of such an option could be substantial. First, allies may question the U.S. commitment to regional stability and security. Second, Bonn would surely oppose the lack of reciprocity in U.S. participation in multinational corps, i.e., subordination of a German Army division to a U.S. corps, without provision for a U.S. division serving under a German Army corps.[27] Third, the German-led "multinational" corps would no longer be multinational. As other nations are already fully committed to other multinational corps, the only potential participant nation is France. In view of the controversy surrounding the fall 1991 Franco-German initiative to create a European Corps,[28] and the fact that France still refuses to serve within the integrated military structure of NATO, such an option is probably not in U.S. interests. Finally, U.S. participation in a German-led multinational corps could be essential for continued political support for the Bundeswehr's maintenance of an active force of 370,000.

The Gordian Knot. Finally, the U.S. Army may eventually find itself at force levels where it is unable simultaneously to sustain an effective combat force and adequate reinforcement potential in Europe. Where that particular number falls is unknown and may not be reached for a considerable time, but it will certainly require considerable analysis. Eventually, however, a point may be reached where the senior leadership of

the U.S. Army must approach the Administration to ascertain which mission has priority: in-theater combat capability or reinforcement.[29] Equally important, the United States must seek guidance from its European allies concerning their expectations of types and levels of U.S. forces.

When these decisions are considered, we recommend that the U.S. Army focus on reinforcement capability at the expense of forward deployed combat forces. The rationale behind this alternative is three-fold. First, our European allies will view a strong U.S. reinforcement capability as an expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. Second, and, perhaps, more important from a U.S. Army standpoint, rapid reinforcement capability is what will permit the establishment of a combat capable corps structure in Europe. Third, such reinforcement capability may be required for out-of-NATO-area operations.

Should a decision be made to retain predominantly the reinforcement option, the capability to carry out that mission must be assiduously safeguarded, for the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Europe will be measured against that capability. However, given the reduced force levels in Europe that some anticipate, it may be unreasonable to assume that whatever remains of 21st TAACOM will be capable of providing the level of support needed for such operations, unless augmented from CONUS.[30] On the other hand, should 21st TAACOM be directed to maintain a full capability on the ground in

Europe, a conscious decision may be required on the trade-offs between combat forces and combat support. For, in the constrained fiscal environment (and finite numbers of personnel authorized in Europe) the U.S. Army will likely face in Europe after 1995, there may not be sufficient forces to perform all missions equally well. And, a decision to increase the capabilities of the reinforcing mission may result in a decrease of the number of spaces available for combat force structure.

This conclusion does not imply, however, that the current levels of theater support in Europe cannot be rationalized. At present, there is considerable reinforcement infrastructure in Europe, based on the long-held premise of deploying 10 divisions in 10 days to Europe. Given anticipated risks in that region, it is likely that both the number of divisions will be reduced and reinforcement time extended. These conditions should permit existing capabilities to be rationalized and responsibilities shared between the United States and host nations. Moreover, given this new security environment, now is the time to approach our European allies with a view to expanding host nation support arrangements in order to maintain adequate reinforcement capabilities, but at lower financial costs to the United States.[31]

Conclusions.

The U.S. Government is clearly committed to providing a credible forward presence in support of its security obligations in Europe. Supporting that commitment will fall most heavily on the U.S. Army, for, in the final analysis, it is land power that will provide the greatest symbolic credibility. As currently articulated by the Bush Administration, this commitment will be manifested by the U.S. Army through the presence of a corps headquarters, two divisions, the requisite corps troops to support operations of a combat capable corps, and the ability to execute large-scale reinforcement of Europe. At the same time, the Bush Administration has advocated a forward presence of roughly 92,000 personnel in Europe to man the skeletal force structure in a manner that would ensure a combat capable corps, and, hence, provide a credible commitment to friends and potential foes, alike.

Equally possible, however, is that future fiscal and political events in the United States could make the attainment of such personnel figures highly unlikely in the long term. In short, therefore, sacrifices may have to be made and it is incumbent on the U.S. Army to begin planning now for such a possible eventuality. Moreover, a potential gap between force structure requirements and personnel authorizations could cast a shadow over the credibility of the U.S. commitment to European security and, therefore, adversely affect U.S.

political influence. Therefore, in designing the future U.S. forward presence in Europe, it is crucial that the U.S. Army not focus attention simply on numbers. Far more important is the requirement to identify capabilities that will convince our allies of the U.S. commitment to European security and, then, to adjust the numbers to ensure those capabilities.

A delicate balance will have to be maintained between combat forces and personnel needed to facilitate theater reinforcement from CONUS, as well as combat support and combat service support units needed at echelons above corps for sustained combat operations to ensure that all required capabilities can be executed. A point may arrive, however, when U.S. personnel levels may not be capable of effectively carrying out all missions. When this point is reached, U.S. forward presence in Europe should focus on the reinforcement mission. For, it is the ability of the United States to reinforce rapidly and to establish a credible combat force that contributes most to a credible U.S. forward presence. Moreover, reinforcement infrastructure takes longer to rebuild and, therefore, represents a clearer commitment to European defense. Again, the numbers required to perform these missions will vary and will depend on the dynamic balance between residual combat force potential and reinforcement requirements.

ENDNOTES

1. See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Press Communique S-1(91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991; National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1991; and The National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1992.

2. National Security Strategy of the United States, pp. 25-31 and The National Military Strategy of the United States, pp. 6-8.

3. Apropos the issue of the desire of all of America's allies in NATO for the United States to retain forces in Europe, the reaction by European governments following President Bush's challenge to his colleagues at the Rome NATO Summit concerning the objective of European defense objective is instructive. See the comments by French President Francois Mitterrand's spokesman, Jean Musitelli in, The Washington Post, November 8, 1991. For more recent declarations see the activities of Britain's Ambassador to the U.S., in James Adams Washington, "Rebel Allies Flex Muscles as Britain Tries to Save NATO," Sunday Times (London), May 10, 1992, p. 18; or Stanley Meisler, "Kohl to U.S.: Keep Troops in Europe," Los Angeles Times (Washington edition), May 6, 1992, p. 2. Governor Clinton's position is not specific, but calls for fewer U.S. forces in Eurcpe than proposed by the Bush Administration. See Army Times, March 23, 1992, pp. 12-13.

4. The National Military Strategy of the United States, p. 7.

5. In all fairness, it must be recognized that the Bush Administration figures are based on the assessment that the United States needs to retain a robust Army corps (to include corps headquarters, corps troops, and two divisions), supplemented by appropriate levels of air forces (currently 3 wings, or approximately 200-225 combat aircraft), maritime forces, and rapid reinforcement capability, a combat capable U.S. Army corps, supplemented by appropriate air and maritime forces. National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 27 and National Military Strategy of the United States, pp. 20-21. The argument here is whether the number of 150,000 personnel in Europe stipulated as necessary to provide such a forward presence is sustainable in today's fiscal environment.

6. For example, at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich in February 1992, key Congressional leaders indicated force levels of this size. See Marc Fisher, "Europeans Told of U.S. Isolationism," The Washington Post, February 10, 1992, p. A1.

7. In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, April 4, 1949.

8. Concomitantly, it should be noted, such a U.S. presence may provide limited solace to our newly found friends in Central and Eastern Europe.

9. The U.S. contribution to the Immediate Reaction Force consists of the Airborne Task Force stationed in Vicenza, Italy. For background on the Alliance's new rapid reaction formations see the authors' Reforming NATO's Command and Operational Control Structures: Progress and Problems, SSI Special Report, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

10. The example of the commitment of VII (US) Corps to Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM is an example of the degree of force that might be required.

11. Even in an era of reduced threat, the Central Region remains NATO's heartland. At the same time, it appears unlikely that permission could be obtained to station forces on the flanks, as these nations have been reluctant to permit stationing of foreign forces on their soil in the past and are not likely to change in the near future. For example, Norway has long prohibited the stationing of foreign forces in Norway during times of peace. Bruce George, ed., Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-1990, 2nd ed., Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, Ltd., 1989, p. 125. For an example of Turkish hesitation see Nilufer Yalcin, "A Federal System Cannot Be Established in Turkey," Milliyet (Istanbul), January 22, 1992, p. 10 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-92-020, January 30, 1992. Even if such permission could be obtained, moving costs would likely be prohibitive.

12. Additionally, the United States may participate with the Federal Republic in contributing a brigade each to the Belgian-led multinational corps. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin C. Powell speaks of only two divisions being stationed in Europe. Therefore, it is likely that one of these divisions will have the additional mission of supporting the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps; or, another unit would have to be made available from CONUS. For Powell's remarks see, General Colin C. Powell, "Let's Not Break the Force," Defense 92, April/May 1992, pp. 16-17. Given the flexibility inherent in assigning units to the corps support structure, final totals of personnel could vary considerably, depending upon the number and type of units assigned. Historically, however, theater and corps support activities have accounted for roughly one-half to two-thirds of the strength of the U.S. Army's presence in Europe. Therefore,

at a limit of 92,500 U.S. Army personnel in Europe, approximately 50-60,000 would be absorbed at echelons above division.

13. For example, while risks are greatly reduced relative to the past, some residual risks could prove formidable given anticipated force structures. Moreover, warning times may not be as long as many perceive and strategic lift may not be able to meet the demands of the moment. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the on-going civil war in Yugoslavia offer only two of several pertinent examples.

14. See note 11, above.

15. The dispatch of the VII (U.S.) Corps from Europe to Saudi Arabia in support of Operation DESERT STORM is an excellent example of what may come to pass.

16. On the other hand, should sufficient fast sea lift be procured, such augmentation could come from CONUS.

17. For brief description of contingency forces, see The National Military Strategy of the United States, pp. 23-24.

18. Logistical support operations, particularly, the trans-shipment of supplies from CONUS through Europe to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM carried out by USEUCOM are an excellent example.

19. See, Angus Watt, "The Hand of Friendship: the Military Contacts Programme," *NATO Review*, Volume 40, No. 1, February 1992, pp. 19-22.

20. See, AirLand Operations: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B, Final Draft, June 13, 1991.

21. Note that this is a significant decrease in the previous envisaged wartime size of the *Bundeswehr* which was 1,300,000. See, DPA (Hamburg), February 19, 1992 in, FBIS-WEU-92-034, February 20, 1992, p. 9. For a description of the new force structure of the German Army see, Erhard Drews, et al., "Das neue deutsche Heer: Zielsetzung, Konzeption und Elemente der Heerestruktur 5," Truppenpraxis (4), 1991, pp. 356-367.

22. Such a capability is contingent upon procuring requisite levels of strategic air and sea lift to support such reinforcement.

23. For example, units withdrawn from Europe such as the 8th Infantry Division and 3rd Armored Division, as well as smaller organizations, have been eliminated from the overall forces structure. In an era when fiscal constraints may see further reductions in the end strength of the U.S. Army, any further withdrawals from Europe will also likely be eliminated.

24. It must be pointed out that such a debate over the "requisite" size of the U.S. physical presence is nothing new. Such discussions have taken place throughout the history of the Alliance; e.g., what level of troops constituted a credible "trip wire" for Massive Retaliation; or, what level of forces provided a credible pledge of U.S. support under the doctrine of Flexible Response.

25. Although on a scale much smaller than could be anticipated in Europe, the experience with Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras and Central America provides an excellent example of such operations.

26. This figure is a function of one brigade deployed, one brigade recently returned, and one brigade preparing to deploy.

27. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General John Galvin raised this issue in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 24, 1992. See William Matthews, "Galvin: U.S. Military Would 'Lose Control" of Faster Withdrawal," Army Times, April 13, 1992, pp. 27,30.

28. See, The New York Times, October 20, 1991. For a critical view of this proposal see Michael Inacker's article in Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt (Bonn), October 25, 1991. Note that the French government in February 1992 assured the Bonn government that this corps would fall under NATO command and control in the event of a NATO member being attacked, while for out-of-area campaigns, it would fall under WEU command. Whether this has clarified the issue of the WEU's future military relationship with NATO, or only made it more complicated, remains to be seen. See, Defense News (Washington, DC), March 2, 1992.

29. It is instructive to note that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell has already indicated a need to review the number and scope of missions currently assigned to the U.S. military. See Neil Munro, "Powell: Military Must Cut Missions," Defense News (Washington, DC), April 6, 1992, p. 3.

30. U.S. Army, Japan offers an excellent example, albeit on a reduced scale, of such augmentation.

31. For instance, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William Taft, VI asked NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that NATO infrastructure funds be used to support the maintenance of some U.S. facilities in Europe. Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Holst has publicly supported this proposal. See, Defense News (Washington, DC), February 17, 1992, p. 3.

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NATO IN THE SECURITY POLICY OF POLAND

1. Like its Central European partners Poland is going through not only a process of profound political and economic change, but also a search for external security.

There are no easy answers to this problem. However, in a situation of non-engagement in any military alliance and limited defense capabilities our relations with European security structures and organizations assume a special value. This applies in particular to our relations with the North Atlantic Alliance.

2. The North Atlantic Alliance is seen by Poles as the most successful security association in postwar history. It is also believed that NATO continues to play a key role in ensuring European security. In particular:

- Its integrated defense potential can deter any major threat within the province of the Washington Treaty and can be used as a basis for military action "out-of-the-area" (e.g. the Gulf experience).
- The integrated NATO military structure is protection against renationalization of defense programs. This military integration is also helping to change the European philosophy of national military effort so disastrous in European history.

- It is an organization which provides the essential link between Europe and North America.

3. Poland sees the US presence in, and commitment to, Europe is one of the basic premises of European security and stability now and in the future.

Europe and North America must be regarded as single security zone. This is the lesson of the first and second world wars and the cold war period. The oneness of Euro-Atlantic security was recognized and formally established by the Washington Treaty. In recent years the end of the division of Europe has extended this zone to the whole area between Vancouver and Vladivostok, which is one of the greatest political achievements of the final decade of our century. This oneness must be maintained.

It is also interesting to note the rethinking on this issue in Moscow. It has reversed its traditional objective ("decoupling") and today accepts that both NATO and the USA play an important stabilizing role in European affairs.

4. In recent years the Alliance has exhibited excellent ability to adapt to a changing international environment. This has been reflected in:

- establishment of a new relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
- development of a constructive stance on West European aspirations to build a European identity in security and defense matters;

- modification of the NATO attitude to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and recognition of the CSCE role in security.

5. From the Polish point of view special attention is merited by NATO's proffer of a hand to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The following elements in this development should be noted:

- adoption or confirmation of the principle of the indivisibility of security in Europe, as expressed in a number of documents, most notably the August 1991 declaration of the NATO Council that the security of Central and Eastern European countries is inseparably linked to that of the NATO region;
- institutionalization of contacts with Central and Eastern Europe through establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

At the same time, despite mixed signals, the Alliance has made it clear that in the immediate future it does not intend either to invite Central European countries to join NATO or to offer them security guarantees.

Nevertheless we see our relationship with NATO as a dynamic process. We believe that there is no reason to assume that the present stage in the evolution of the NATO position vis-a-vis our region is a final one, though it is difficult to predict the direction it will take.

6. In the perspective of the Triangle nations, that is,

Poland, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, NATO is viewed in the present circumstances not so much as a military alliance as a multinational agency dealing with security matters. Close links with NATO are looked upon as:

- contributing to these countries' security;
- advancing internal transformation;
- moving them closer to Western structures;
- helping to prevent Central Europe being considered a "gray area" or buffer zone.

These countries want to see the organization anchored in their region and consider it to be beneficial to them and Europe as a whole.

7. The establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was greeted by Poland with satisfaction. Speaking at its inaugural meeting, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski expressed Poland's wish to build "genuine partnership with the nations of the North Atlantic Alliance". He emphasized three potential NACC functions:

[a] as a forum for discussion and consultation - on a regular basis and in emergency situations - on security and security-related matters;

[b] as a structure contributing to stability and giving the NATO countries a kind of "droit de regard" over developments in Central and Eastern Europe;

[c] as a channel of cooperation and assistance in solving specific political, military, economic or other problems where NATO's knowledge and expertise can be

shared with new democracies.

8. New developments can also be expected in our relations with the Western European Union. On 18 November last year the WEU Committee of Ministers decided to invite the foreign and defense ministers of the Baltic states and Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania to a special meeting scheduled for 19 June. Hopefully, this meeting will introduce new elements to our relationship.

One aspect of our relations with the WEU needs emphasis. It is intended to make the WEU a defense component of the European integration process. To join this process is one of the basic aims of Polish foreign policy. Consequently, regular contacts with the WEU and increasing participation in its activities are not only desirable but, quite simply, indispensible.

The Maastricht agreement has led to discussion within the WEU of the possibility of establishing observer or associate member status. Should this come about, there could arise the question of whether such status might also be extended to countries which have recently been admitted to associate membership of the Community, that is, Poland, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. That would be a logical development from both their and the EC point of view.

Our prospective rapprochement with the WEU is an important part of our European policy. It does not reflect any kind of "security choice". The question of the "European" vs. "Atlantic" security option is in truth a false dilemma.

"European defense" is an important aim, but it cannot function effectively on its own nor become fully credible without its "Atlantic dimension". In Europe's new political conditions it is difficult to assume that European public opinion will accept the enormous costs of creating a fully credible European nuclear and conventional potential which could make "Atlantic" links superfluous.

9. NATO is also perceived in Poland as a basic element of the so-called "European security architecture" as well as the main security arrangement in Europe.

It is our strongly held view that present circumstances call for a growing amount of cooperation between existing security organizations.

This is a basic requirement of both their harmonious development and their effectiveness. Otherwise, instead of these structures being mutually complementary and mutually reinforcing, we are likely to find unhealthy competition blocking their proper functioning. This applies especially to NATO and CSCE. They should recognize each other not as threats and alternatives but as supplementaries. An "interlocking system of institutions" should become a reality.

It is true that finding the right answers to how to make these security arrangement more compatible and cooperative can be difficult. But these answers must be found. In particular, Poland strongly supports efforts which could lead to CSCE peacekeeping with the participation of other security organizations, NATO in the first place.

We are pleased to see views within NATO evolving in the same direction.

10. In conclusion let me stress again the basic elements of Polish thinking on the role of NATO in Polish security policy:

[a] NATO continues to play a key role in European security matters.

[b] Poland's intention is to further develop contacts and cooperation with NATO and to keep all options in this relationship open. Cooperation should cover the whole range of problems within the NATO purview and be developed on both the multilateral and bilateral levels.

[c] The process of adaptation of NATO to the new European conditions and its growing openness to the East is hailed.

[d] The establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council is important for both our relationship with the Alliance and stability in Europe.

[e] There is no contradiction in our concurrent efforts to establish new forms of cooperation and, if possible, association with the Western European Union. In military terms the WEU is and will remain a complement to NATO, not a competitor.

[f] We strongly believe that cooperation between the existing European and transatlantic institutions has become one of the prime issues in the great debate

on European security. Particular importance is attached to cooperation between NATO and CSCE in the security and security-related field.

The Intellectual Dimensions of U.S.- Polish Military Cooperation: A Proposal

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Parameters of Cooperation

Since thought must undergird intelligent action, successful military cooperation in all spheres depends directly on cooperation in intellectual realms. The parameters of military cooperation can be easily defined by listing those subjects which collectively comprise the realm of military thought. At a minimum, these include:

-- military policy (and national security issues);

-- military doctrine and its Western equivalent;

-- military strategy;

-- operational art (the operational level);

-- tactics;

-- military institutions;

-- the military and society;

-- the military and the media;

-- military experience (history).

The most critical subjects are those which reflect political relationships at the highest level within and between states. These often have global consequences. Most critical are the subjects of military policy, doctrine, and strategy since mutual understanding in these areas can have an impact on world peace. An appreciation of developments in the less important operational and tactical arenas serves to validate and lend credibility to understanding at higher levels.

In recent history, the military establishments of our two nations have related differently to their respective political

authorities and the populations of their respective nations. Unlike the U.S. military, the Polish military occupied a unique and dominant position in the state. While a servant of the party (and hence the state), it served as a bulwark of order and an obstacle to both democracy and economic reform. Understanding how and why these systems differed is fundamental to the growth of mutual understanding.

The joint study of military experience (history) is important, since mutual examination of experience affects virtually every subject and provides a necessary basis for better understanding. Candor and thorough historiographical work can produce requisite knowledge for mutual understanding and provide more fertile ground for future cooperation.

Forms of Intellectual Cooperation

Intellectual cooperation can take a variety of forms, whether official or unofficial, and they correspond to basic forms of communication. A simple list could include the following, arranged in order of increasing comprehensiveness and complexity:

-- sharing of materials: archival, narrative, and analytical;

-- conduct of joint conferences and symposia;

-- exchange of written products (for publication);

-- joint sponsorship of book projects (official or commercial);

-- publication of articles (in official or commercial venues);

-- networking of editorial boards (journals);

-- joint research on unique or common themes for joint or individual use;

-- exchange of lecturers;

-- exchange of researchers (fellowships);

-- work on joint film and video projects;

-- conduct of staff ride exchanges (battlefield tours);

-- reciprocal exchanges of students and instructors (fellowships).

Each measure is easily definable and achievable, provided the will and resources are available to implement it. While state sponsorship of official cooperative ventures has merit, particularly from the standpoint of funding and the development of coordinated national policy, there is an equally cogent argument for the utility of unofficial contacts and even use of one another's commercial contacts and outlets. The latter can be even more productive, for they offer escape from possible political agendas and can serve as a model of how the military functions in a democratic market society. Therefore, it is logical to envision both official and unofficial programs coexisting and reinforcing one another.

Prerequisites for a Solution

For understanding to grow and cooperation to flourish, there are several essential criteria which must be met. Each satisfied criterion will help reduce historical barriers which have impeded or prevented joint efforts in the past. Candor, the mother of

understanding, requires that all cooperating parties address these prerequisites and recognize them as valid. In essence, the following agreements, in principle, form context for the scope, means, and success of future cooperation.

Within existing legal constraints, there must be maximum reciprocal access to military archival materials within Poland and the United States, either on an individual or an institutional basis. Archival access provides the necessary foundation for objective consideration of historical and contemporary issues and for expanded cooperation. Further, participating organizations should exchange historical and current analytical materials and seek reciprocal critiques of this analytical work. All parties must be willing and able to share candid perspectives on their respective military experiences.

Cooperating organizations should agree to join in planning and conducting joint conferences and symposia and participate in joint publications, in terms of journals and books. Military establishments should agree, in principle, to the exchange of doctrinal publications such as manuals, instructions, and regulations pertaining to the organization of forces and the conduct of combat and operations at every level. Finally, all parties should be willing to serve in appropriate positions on the editorial boards of their respective military journals to facilitate open exchange of ideas and printed materials. It goes without saying that all of this should be done within the limits of

negotiated and reciprocal official constraints (such as official classification requirements).

To facilitate necessary coordination of a negotiated program of cooperation, a standing committee should by formed, made up of representatives from each cooperating organization. The committee should be responsible for identifying potential cooperative ventures, planning a coherent program of cooperation, and investigating and mobilizing sources of financial and other types of necessary support for the program of cooperation (such as publishing conduits). The standing committee should also designate points of contact (POCs) to carry on routine correspondence for the committee, particularly when it is not meeting.

Once agreement is achieved in principle on proposed measures, the way is open for defining and implementing formal or informal agreements on military cooperation in the intellectual realm, as well as in broader arenas. Realizing cooperation then becomes a simple question of will and fiscal and material resources.

The Solution: Concrete Proposals

Once agreements have been reached concerning the need for and substance of cooperative efforts, a specific program is required to implement the search for understanding and cooperation. That program should encompass the following measures:

1. Identification of military and civilian research organizations, individuals, and journals which wish to cooperate.

2. Exchange of correspondence and conduct of liaison visits between potential cooperating organizations.

3. Formation of a standing committee made up of the heads or representatives of cooperating organizations and designate points of contact.

4. Development of a list of subjects suitable for joint research, discussion, and publication and initiation of joint research and publication projects.

5. Immediate exchange of editorial board members of appropriate participating military journals and commencement of an exchange of articles for publication.

6. Investigation and development of publishing conduits for the research work (articles and books, joint or individual) of cooperating organizations.

7. Organization of a series of annual conferences or symposia to focus cooperative efforts.

8. Development of a list of researchers and establishment of a "fellows" program for research exchanges between cooperating organizations on a reciprocal basis for a negotiated period (3-12 months) in pursuit of specific research aims agreed upon by cooperating organizations.

9. Organization of a "speakers exchange" program of candidates drawn from participating organizations for the benefit of these or other organizations.

As a measure of commitment and to underscore the importance of

the cooperative program, a timetable should be established to guide its implementation.

Conclusion

Confronted as we are by an historic opportunity to end years of hostility and bridge vast chasms of misunderstanding, it is imperative that we act. Overcoming the "knowledge gap" that has existed for almost half a century will be no easy task. But it is an essential one if understanding is to grow, and with it cooperation in military as well as other realms. The climate is right, and the need is clear. Only will is required to make the promise of intellectual cooperation a reality.

Lt.Col. Dr. Grzegorz WISNIEWSKI

THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE FOR THE SECURITY OF POLAND AND THE CONTINENT

When the Soviet bonds which as a result of Yalta encircled a large part of our continent at last burst in the fall of 1989 the nations concerned found themselves confronted not only by such challenges as reconstruction of democracy and economies but also the necessity of developing economic and political cooperation with both former adversaries and former allies.

Europe can now be perceived as a continent with a western half which is to a substantial degree politically, militarily and economically integrated and a central and east-central part which is totally disintegrated militarily and trying to find common ground politically and economically.

Moreover, there is no question that it is the "Visegrad Triangle" of countries which have gone farthest down the road toward Western structures and, more important, are cooperating with one another in these endeavors.

In the sphere of European security an absolutely preeminent role is played by NATO, at present the only organization which, in addition to joint meetings and declarations, is capable of rapid and effective action on the political and economic as well as the military plane.

It seems fair to say that this is an opinion universally accepted in Europe. If so, I think it important to examine the

question of which of this alliance's internal forces are the ones that determine its immense capabilities.

In the interests of communication my analysis will be very limited and confined to a comparison of some of the factors in the USA-European Nato states relationship (1989 data).

	USA	Europe	Remarks	
area [sq.km.]	9,363,123	3,457,246		
population [mn]	246.3	379.5		
defense expenditures			F	39
[US$bn]	293	157	RFN	36
			GB	35

It will be seen from just a comparison of the volume of military appropriations that the United States spends twice as much as all the European NATO countries while such European powers as Germany, France and Britain spend almost ten times less than the USA.

If we add the American capabilities in strategic weapons, global surveillance and command systems, sea and air transport and size and location of stockpiles it will be no exaggeration to say that the USA is the cornerstone of NATO.

I realiize that these are cliches but I consider that they occasionally bear repeating. Especially today when in the wake of the breakup of the USSR some countries are inclining to the view that Europe can now take care of its own security.

It is true that the danger of a global conflict has much receded. But that does not mean that it has disappeared. A huge, well-equipped, trained and frustrated army continues to be stationed on the territory of the former Soviet Union. An army which still has the capacity to act globally.

Observing the positive, democratic changes in progress in the old USSR we must keep in mind that this is an area which is, and for a long time will remain, a scene of upheavals of chiefly economic and ethnic origin. It needs to be remembered that Russia is not *returning* to democracy, but for the first time in its history embarking on construction of a democratic society.

I can say that there is probably no country with a bigger stake in the peaceful course of this process than Poland, that Poles pray for peace in the East. However, no matter how deeply religious our society may be, we cannot place everything in the hands of the Almighty.

You Americans often tell your friends: "Help God to help you". That is precisely the advice that we want to follow.

On the assumption that the United States is the mainstay of NATO and NATO in turn the bulwark of European security we are going forward in Poland with changes which could make the United States sympathetic to the possibility of becoming our

ally at some time in the future.

I consider that there are realistic grounds for believing that Poland could eventually become, alongside Great Britain, America's principal ally in Europe. I am aware that Americans have unfortunate memories of certain seasonal allies. First, you are petitioned for assistance, then greeted as liberators and later asked, not always politely, to leave.

Poland has also suffered her share of painful experiences. They are connected mainly with the geopolitical situation of our state.

We realize that by ourselves we cannot match either of our neighbors. Nor does alliance with one of them look an attractive proposition since it would antagonize the other, while neutrality could lead to deals being struck above our heads.

Thus what we need and will always need is an ally elsewhere. This could be United Europe or the USA.

The United Europe vision is truly a stirring one, but visions cannot be a guarantee of security. This is a lesson Poland has learned the hard way, which is why we have a particular interest in advancing this vision but at the same time preserving the existing and proven security systems for as long as necessary.

Until a new system has been hammered out, put in place and seen to work, it would be wrong to dismantle or even weaken the old one; in other words, there must be no scaling down of NATO, still less its American component.

We know that our Polish fears are sometimes perceived by our Western interlocutors as exaggerated. In the light of past experience they are, however, hard to shed.

We are often told that, if threatened, we would not be left in the lurch and we trust that this is so. Nevertheless people in Poland would undoubtedly feel much safer if NATO had a contingency plan for security guarantees to a state that does not belong to the alliance.

In the long term we want to become part of Western security structures. We realize that movement in that direction cannot be quicker than economic integration. But that said, we also believe that the United State could even at the present stage propose steps that would provide NATO with the legal framework for emergency decisions in this respect.

Looking at other ways in which America could help Poland in a crisis, we see precedents in the World War II period when, though not yet at war with Germany, it extended all kinds of assistance to the allied side. It is possible that in a crisis situation the US Congress would consent to supplies of larger quantities of modern equipment to Poland. To entertain hopes of such aid, we have to be sufficiently prepared that it will not be wasted. And it could be for a very prosaic reason: inability to handle sophisticated American equipment.

Thus what we have in mind is a very simple proposal. We now need to furnish our military schools with individual items of American hardware. We appeal to you for help in making this possible.

I believe that through such small practical projects we can make a significant contribution to strengthening security in Europe and America´s contribution to that security.

17 May 1991

Waldemar Czarnecki

The assessment of the situation in the newly created states on the territory of the former Soviet Union

The prognosis of the military sphere

For the interests of Polish security, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fact that new independent states have been created in place of one superpower is recognized as a positive event.

In other words, a few relatively smaller and weaker states on our eastern border create new conditions for security policy, which should properly exploit this fact.

Economical troubles of Russia and its withdrawal beyond independent Belarus, Ukraine and Baltic States besides their known internal discrepencies and ambition quarrels can partly exclude this particular zone from full participation in European and world policy.

Nevertheless we should remember that above mentioned events /besides the weakness of that region/ can be seen as a potential source of instability or even of military conflict which, however, cannot be aimed directly against Poland, but they can bring physical contact with such a conflict in different ways.

In this respect two eastern states - Russia and Ukraine remain as military strong powers for a long time, no matter how their economy can develop.

This fact has a specific influence on Polish security. Therefore the situation in these two states is the subject of our great concern.

1. Russia - Economic defeat, social disquiets, terrible polution of natural environment and also "political hangover" of military staff will not disturbe the restoration of an idea of the Great Russian Empire.
   The factors mentioned above will rather support these tendencies in Russian society and especially in their armed forces.

The main trump of the power of Russia, i.e. its nuclear weapon, remains and will be seen in future as a political attribute on one hand and on the other as a factor of instability in case of intentions to transfer it for economical reasons to hypotetically danger zones, e.g. to Iraq or Iran. All provisions of the START and other similar agreements /NPT, INF/ have positive influence in this respect.

In fact, we are the witnesses of the foundation of the new national Russian armed forces. In all probability this process will be connected with the implementation of the CFE Treaty, and after the reduction period the new military structures of the armed forces can appear.

It means that the new Russian government should consider not only new administration needs for this task but also economic factors.

According to our estimations after the implementation of the CFE Treaty provisions, the new Russian armed forces will have at their disposal in the zone of application as follows:

- approx 7000 battle tanks, 11000 APVs, 6000 artillery pieces, 400 combat aircraft and 1000 attack helicopters.

It is possible that former division-army structure of the ground forces will be changed to brigade - corps system.

Anyway, all this process will last to the end of the 90-ties.

The army will be equipped with advanced armaments, mostly from troops withdrawn from Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The older armaments will be reduced in the framework of the CFE Treaty obligations or kept in storage sites.

The personnel of the new armed forces can be adapted to their new model, including larger proportion of professional soldiers.

From the Polish point of view the transitional period is the most dangerous. We believe that the reduction of almost 20000 TLE´s in connection with economic trouble and both political and social instability in Russia can be seen as a main threat. Low standard of discipline in the armed forces, reduction of manpower, lack of perspectives in case of the older part of Russian officer corps may be a very dangerous source of instability or even the begining of the whole variety of threats.

One cannot exclude that even a single action of a small insubordinated unit can move ahead others and in a very short time, as a result of the "chain reaction", several units or even formations can change into unguided rolling "war machine" without any possibility to stop it.
It is hardly to forsee what so many armed and hungry solidiers can do.

The second possible reason of a conflict seems to be the competition between Russia and Ukraine on the way to succession of the former Soviet Union.

The clue of the conflict is the fact that Russia is going to remain as a main successor with all elements of its imperial policy, whereas Ukraine clearly aims, to Europe but without rejecting its role as a future regional power in this continent.

Whatever can be said, military ambitions of Russia mostly depend on economic and psychological conditions. The western aid has its great importance in this respect.

Perhaps the "food drip" can prevent the degradation of the living standards and create the security feeling and the trust in the better future.
But, financial and credit aid should be considered very carefully. Especially the financial aid can appear as a from of survival and support to those functions and elements of Russion administration system which would be a motor of possible threat in future.

2. Ukraine - as a new independent state it is for us a big question mark. The process of building of the Ukrainian state is full of such question marks. Until it forms its visible shape we will still be afraid of the ambitions of our former countrymen. The ambitions of Kiew can reach far away. We can see an apparent "national spirit" and the determination of the nation that the chance for real independence must not be lost.
Russia with its imperial ambitions is seen as a main enemy for the time being. A great bid is going on there, concerning the partition of the TLE level of holdings of the former Soviet Union.

The compromise in this matter can mean militarily strong Ukraine in relation to other state of Europe, even Germany.
Ukrainian armed forces can dispose: more than 4000 battle tanks, 5000 APVs, 3500 artillery pieces, 700-800 combat aricraft and 200-300 attack helicopters.
The personnel of U.A.F. can count approx 350000 soldiers.Additionaly, the National Guards which can support police and border troops may number 100000 quardsmen.
Ground forces can have at its disposal 12-14 divisions or 36-42 brigades, but it is hardly to forsee a military structure of U.A.F. because of the lack of clear information.
This army can achieve very quickly a high level of combat readiness and efficiency. There exist all needed facilities, resources and personnel, including very important patriotic factor.
The deployment of units and formations will likely cover the former regions of Kiew MD and along Russian border. A part of the armed forces, approx 1/3, can be deployed in the west of the conutry.
Poland wishes all the best to the new independent Ukraine, but we do realize that soon our new neighbour can be very strong and able to conduct its own independent policy. Therefore its real intentions towards our state are so essential for us.

3. Belarus - The state without a long national tradition and character can be considered as a very close satelite of Russia.
In spite of this fact, however, Belarus can also fulfill some formal functions of a soverepin state. In other words it will possess its own armed forces and approx 50000 men in national guards, equipped with Soviet-made armaments.
The number of troops can be estimated as 5-8 divisions or 15-24 brigades having approx: 1800 battle tanks, 2600 APVs, 1600 artillery pieces, 180 - 250 combat aircraft and 50 attack helicopters.
It is hardly to exclude that these particular forces can consist of Russian units /part of the presently stationing/ under Belorussian command. It would mean that Russia can cover in that way a part of its own armed forces reduced according to the provitions of CFE Treaty.

In such case the quality of the armaments will depend on the national factor - better in Rusian hands, and the worse in Belarussian ones.
The formations and units will be deployed mainly at the same bases and barracks as the former Red Army, mostly close to the Polish border.
The combat value of these forces - presently doubtful - can grow up according to the improvment of economic situation.

4. Lithuania - The state with the bag full of phobies against Poland, as a result of different reasons. The main one is a national complex of the historic past, which can disappear in face of proper flexibile Polish policy in a longer period of time.
Lithuania is needed for Poland as far as its border can be secured by western guaranties.
The significance of this safeguard can be limited to the lenght of the border between these two conutries.
The L.A.F. and its internal guards are not dangerous for Poland, even in case of local conflicts.
In general their main task, similar to ours, is to provide the defence of its own territory.
It is hardly to imagine that their forces can be involved in any kind of coalition against Poland.
The size of L.A.F. can reach 2-3 brigades and symbolic own air force. The N.G. can probably amount 15-20000 men.
The quality of armaments is very hardly to forsee.
Perhaps at the begining they will be equipped mostly with older Soviet-made armaments which can be replaced later by other ones, may be of western origin.
Because of the very strong historic tradition, the personnel of L.A.F. will present a good combat training and, of course, this fact should also be taken into account.

x x x

Poland is involved in the creation of its new eastern security policy which should take into account all events and factors mentioned above.

We estimate that presently and in the nearest future any political questions of such value which can lead Poland or one of our eastern neighbours to war against each other do not exist. Nevertheless the present situation in the CIS states and especially in Russia is so not clear, instable and unpredictable that we can have some misgivings that even a local conflict in this region may indirectly bring a threat.
Besides of such conflict, whatever can happen there, Poland should also be prepared to react properly in case of hunger, pestilence, pollution disaster and finally in face of the great wave of refugees.

Lt Col. D.Sc. Włodzimierz IDCZAK

The possible areas of cooperation between Poland and the United States in the process of establishing of the European security system

There are many possible civilian and military areas of cooperation which could increase the European security. In this paper the problem is limited only to the military aspects of cooperation which should exist in the framework of military-political agreements signed by states that have been building the new safety Europe for over 20 years now.

The cooperation between the armed forces of Poland and the USA should be fitted to the framework of agreements of the CSCE forum and especially those existing under the provisions of the Vienna Document. Moreover, it should coincide with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe signed on Nov. 19 th. 1990. We assume that the CFE Treaty will be ratified in the nearest future.

It is convenient to consider the problems included in the CFE Treaty in the three following dimensions:

1/ continental dimension - setting up maximum levels of holding in five main categories of conventional armaments and equipment for the two groups of States Parties so as to provide a military balance in Europe,

2/ regional dimension - setting up maximum levels of holding in the same categories of TLE for the regions of the area of application so as to provide military balance in those regions,

3/ national dimension - for each State Party which is to fulfil its obligations and exercise its rights set forth in the CFE Treaty.

So, one can say that the spirit of the Treaty is included in the set of maximun levels of holding set for the five main categories of TLE defined in the CFE Treaty within the area of application. The spirit expresses a tendency to build a military secure

Europe both in the continental and non-continental dimensions.

We should also take into account the situation in which stationing armed forces of the former Soviet Union are being withdrawn mainly to the territory of Russia. So, the direct threat of the NATO states by the close deployment of the large armed forces of the CIS will no longer exist. Moreover, comparing the regional ceilings for Central Europe on the side of the "group of 16" with the aggregate national maximum levels of holding in this region we come to the conclusion that there is no room for the armed forces of the other NATO states in this region.

The facts and tendencies mentioned above can be used as a basis for mutually profitable cooperation between the armed forces of Poland and the USA.

The USA has to look for justification for its military presence in Central Europe. Moreover, the USA should comply with the provisions of the CFE Treaty utilizing even those of them which at first seem to be unprofitable in the relation to homogeneous diployment of conventional armaments in Central Europe.

The armed forces of Poland are still awaiting for modernization which is to be accomplished in the way which would guarantee the proper dismantling of the old relations in the framework of which they were to exist as the technically and operationally weak element.

Therefore, restructuring of the armed forces of Poland should finally result in making them an acceptable element of the European military structure which remains the only pillar of stability and security in our continent.

The USA could have a significant role in the process of building the modern armed forces of Poland.

The USA is interested in its military presence in Europe against increasing tendencies within the West European states to build new institutions and organizations of their own. They do not foresee any room for the overseas countries in such organizations and institutions. Along with the withdrawal of the armed forces of the CIS, considered as the direct enemy of the USA,

from the territories of Germany and Poland the reason for the American military presence in this region decreases.

The withdrawal of its forces from Central Europe creates a theoretical possibility of temporary but not coincidental military presence of the USA in this region.

Taking the advantage of this theoretical opportunity the Polish and American armed forces could develop wide cooperation between themselves. But the two main criteria that such cooperation should meet are as follows:

1/ it should coincide with the CFE Treaty provisions,

2/ it should be profitable for both the USA and Poland.

Mutual profits should be considered in both political and economic aspects.

We can list some fields of the cooperation which seem to be of special importance:

1/ common efforts in building of the new structures of the Polish armed forces,

2/ training of personnel for operational and logistic HQs,

3/ American support of our efforts towards the sequential inclusion of the Polish armed forces into NATO structures,

4/ participation in the modernization of the military industry of Poland,

5/ lifting of the still existing obstacles in the access to the modern military technologies and then developing the cooperation in this field.

The American assistance in restructuring of the Polish armed forces could be based mainly on the expertises and a broad opportunity to learn from American rich experience in this field. Training and education of personnel could be conducted at both American and Polish military schools and civilian universities. The practical training of Polish officers in the American armed forces would be also useful. The sequentional inclusion of our armed forces to NATO structures could start with a development of institutional contacts with NATO HQ and commands in Europe.

Such contacts should comprise the permanent participation of our staff officers in the routine works of NATO military staffs. The modernization of the Polish armed forces should be accompanied with relevant changes in the Polish military industry and military research works.

In this specific fields the USA could play an essential role, thus achieving some of its political objectives in Central Europe.

In this paper we have focused only on the military aspects of the Polish-American future cooperation. Indispensably, however, this cooperation must be supplemented by relevant cooperation in many fields of civilian life.

The Assessment of the Situation in the Post-Soviet States and a Forecast of Their Development. The Political Aspects.

By Lech Kościuk, PISM

The Soviet Union is today only a historical term. A return to the former state of things is no longer possible, both in the geographical sense nor political nor ideological all the more. The place of the former USSRR on the map has been filled by the independent states, and this may last for a long time. However the agenda now has to include the item in which direction may develop events in this part of the world.

The overall situation in the post-Soviet states will develop under the impact of three main processes. These are as follows:

1. The transformation of the economic system, principally through the introduction of free market principles;
2. The creation of political systems, mainly new political regimes and new political parties and elites;
3. The creation of new states and the development of mutual relations between these in all spheres.

It is difficult to indicate which of the aforementioned will be decisive. The events stimulated by them are closely related. It seems however that the transformations in the economic sphere will determine the overall development tendencies. The common challenge for all post-Soviet is civilization progress. The measures taken in the economic sphere at the same time will be the factor which will consolidate the face and shape of the region. The process of economic transformations must be perceived furthermore as a search for equilibrium between the traditional ties of cooperation and establishing the economic base for the sovereignity of each and all new states. The dominant tendency however appears to be to hold full control on the particular countries' economies. The factual symptom of this is, for example, the introduction of national curriencies or a para-currencies (trade coupons). This takes place although all the state agreed to keep the roubel zone.

It is more clear that the post-Soviet states will not follow the Polish way of a shock therapy. But this does not mean that they will be able to avoid the trials related to growth of prices, unemployment, reduction of social programmes etc. It will take a long time and be a source of social dissatisfaction and very likely political convulsions. In order to battle hyperinflation and to make up for the losses in external trade, resulting from the disintegration of the former Soviet economic area, all these countries will need more generous financial and technical assistance. Without it, the countries in question will continue to suffer indefinitively and cannot accelerate the pace of their transformations. If these countries do not receive substantial assistance from the developed industrial states in the form of access to markets, capital investment and support for their national balance of payments, their economic prospects could become even bleaker in the coming years. The state of the economy of the post-Soviet states is obviously not neutral for Poland and the other Central and Eastern Europe countries, which for long decades have been linked to the economy of the USSR. Therefore, the Western countries which will implement such assistance should take into consideration the interests of this group of countries as well.

The smooth and successful transformation of the post-Soviet economy, in particular in Russia and the Ukraine, are of key importance for the prospects of political reforms, preserving democracy or establishing it, in this region.

All the post-Soviet states are just after the first stage of creation of their new political systems. The first stage since we face presently only the closing down of the Communist party rule principle. These are not however stable political regimes. They have to decide their provenience and origin. When establishing the basis of sovereignity it was not important that this sovereignity was declared by supreme councils in which Communist representation dominated; this process developed on the ground of ancient mechanisms and the former architecture of these states. It is

likely that such an arrangement cannot remain for a long time. One finds that an important symptom of the forthcoming changes in this field are the events in Lithuania, Azerbaidjan and Tadzikistan.

The post-Soviet states are only at the threshold of the form of their political systems. In this process the following factors will play the major role:

- the need to reflect on developing differentiation in social, political and economic terms of the particular societies;
- the inevitable debate regarding the definition of national interest;
- the pressure to restore and strenghten elements of national identity, cultural and religious heritage;
- the inevitable dispute about direction of social and economic development.

The Polish experience and for example that of Georgia show that in the political arena new conflicts may arise between yesterday's allies, conservatively oriented nationalists with adherents of a modern state, the partisans of a dictatorship with defenders of democracy, etc.

One finds that the political scene in all post-Soviet states will be under the influence of relations with Russia. In this context one should not forget the different significance of changes in Russia and in the other states. For Russia they are in fact connected to the reduction of its global influence and international position. For the other post-Soviet states the crucial sense of the changes discussed is the receiving and consolidating their sovereignity through elimination of their subordination to Moscow.

Despite the creation of the CIS and the signed numerous agreements and lastly the treaty on common security, the post-Sovier states region remains of great potential instability. To be decided, among other, are the territorial claims, diffusion of the great number of national minorities and the presence of former Soviet armies in places where they are no longer accepted, for example in the Baltic state or in Moldavia.

One fully agrees with the opinion expressed in the first report prepared by the Gorbachev Foundation that possibilities to preserve the CIS are slight. By the very nature of things the march to full sovereignity will stimulate rather decentralizing tendencies than integration. But it cannot be excluded that the greatest chance for the further existence is for the security commonwealth, which was created in Tashkent. Of leading importance however for the security of the region will be the relations between Russia, the Ukraine and Kazahstan. The important element of the situation in the post-Soviet territory is the internationalization of the many problems and conflicts as well. This will be true not only because the states engaged are now independent. Of importance is the fact that power which dominated here - Russia today cannot or does not want to resolve conflicts. The one effect is that the post-Soviet territory progressively will become an area of direct activities of European security institutions. The signal for such processes is the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict.

LTCol Dr Kazimierz SIKORSKI
The ACADEMY of NATIONAL DEFENCE

The Possible Areas of Cooperation Between Poland and the United States in the Process of Establishing of the European Security System.

(commentary)

If You do not mind Gentlemen, I would like to say a few words on the subject of possible areas of cooperation between Poland and the United States in the process of establishing the European security system. I find this subject very important, and therefore, I think, the generals and details of it should be deeply discussed and worked out carefully.

The very general problem of establishing any stable international security system is to build the confidence and friendly relations among the concerned nations.

In the case of Europe it means the necessity to solve many ethnical, economical and religion problems, as well as military ones, it means that profound changes of individual and social attitudes have to be done. It seems to me that these questions ought to be solved mainly within the existing institutions modified under CSCE concept (i.e. military problems managed by NATO), and, I think, activities undertaken by Poland and/or USA to solve these problems create the possible areas of cooperation.

Shaping the proper individual and social attitudes seems to be one of the most important mission which has to be fulfilled in the process of establishing the System of European Security and it may be a broad area of cooperation.

A lot of barriers should be eliminated to overwhelm the resistance to change the existing individual and social attitudes. I think that this has been demonstrated clearly by Mr. Charles W. Taylor (from Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania) in his "Barriers Pyramid" (it is illustrated in figure 1).

He has mentioned the following barriers:

- ignorance (cognitive aversion, wilful ignorance, notion infertility, creative impotency);
- hang-ups (biases, mind sets, stereotypes, monomania);
- conformity (traditions, establishment, norms, regulations);
- fear and anxiety (mistrust, insecurity, jealousy, ego-satisfaction);
- mistakes (misperception, misconception, misunderstanding);
- involvement (ethos, pathos, love, empathy);

Efforts to eliminate those barriers could be possible areas of our cooperation.

Usually ignorance resulting from insufficient knowledge or educated incapacity as well as inadequate information and its selective preservation form the basis of "The Barriers Pyramid".

I think, that this basic barrier should be eliminated first of all, and as a militaryman, I would like to stress that military cooperation in this sphere between Poland and the USA has been successfully developing. In the period between 1990-1992




Figure 1. The Barriers Pyramid.

there were held 27 meetings, 10 top official visit, 7 Polish officers were trained in the USA, and currently 10 others are being qualified there, 11 officers are to attend various courses in the nearest future, 15 other undertakings have already been planned.

I believe that the future will face further intensified cooperation on lower levels (i.e. the language courses, job practice on exchange terms and periodic meetings).

Moreover, further collaboration as regards international computer information system and facilitation of other information systems (mass media) should also be continued vigorously.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.

Col. Prof. Stanislaw KOZIEJ
National Defense Academy

THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE POLISH ARMY WITH THE ARMED FORCES OF WESTERN STATES

There is no question that in the process of movement toward the joint Euro-Atlantic military structures of the future we will have to overcome a variety of barriers. It therefore seems worth taking a closer look at these and see where they might lie.

One such barrier could be the psychological factor. For years the armed forces of the West were officially treated as potential adversaries. It was in this capacity that they featured in doctrinal assumptions, theoretical analysis, training practice, etc. Now we want to go into partnership with them in construction of joint security. The difference between an adversary and a partner or ally is significant enough to raise questions about the difficulties involved in revising mutual perceptions (after all, for NATO we were the potential adversary).

I think it is fair to say that a decided majority of the officer corps saw for what it was the propaganda about Western imperialists and militarists plotting aggression against Poland. Nevertheless it was obvious that if it came to war between the two politico-military blocs Poland would be the chief battleground and that we would be on opposite sides of the front. In this sense, too, we were potential

adversaries and, needless to say, it was a contingency for which we had to prepare. But with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and Poland´s recovery of full sovereignty even this rationale disappeared. I doubt therefore that on this plane there are any major barriers to military rapprochement and integration with the Western systems. On the evidence of contacts to date there seem to be no particular problems on the Western side either.

The second plane of integration has a conceptual and doctrinal dimension. Adjustment of doctrinal concepts to the prospective requirements and conditions of a joint security system will, of course, call for an intellectual effort if previous concepts, habits or plain cliches are to be shed. This applies to both sides. After all, it is not the case that it is only Poland and the states of Eastern and Central Europe which have to change their military doctrines. NATO, too, faces a no less serious challenge. Indeed I would say that NATO´s present situation in this respect resembles to a certain extent our situation two years ago when the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact allowed and forced us to embark on a complete reorientation of our approach to national defense, military doctrine included. Now that the communist system has collapsed entirely and the Soviet Union disintegrated NATO must also carry out a radical change of doctrine. I think it would be unfortunate if the day were to be won by thinking in conservative terms based on the belief that NATO is and will remain the surest security structure since it has proved out, been shown to

be effective, came out the winner over the opposite system. It must be remembered that while all this is perfectly true, it holds good only for the past, for circumstances wholly different from those of today and tomorrow. NATO did the job under the conditions of cold war, but that is not necessarily proof of its effectiveness in the future, in a multi-actor configuration, in a situation when it will have to confront not a single, if formidable threat - invasion of Western Europe - but all sorts of local threats of varying scale and character (such as the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia or Nagorno-Karabakh). This point has been grasped by Western politicians and strategists who are modifying the doctrine and working on a new role, new structures and new rules of operation for NATO in a future security system.

It follows that movement toward compatibility between Polish and Western military structures on the doctrinal plane cannot be perceived solely as modification of our doctrinal concepts. It is a Euro-Atlantic process which requires doctrinal changes by all states in the common interests of general security. Our involvement in it is by no means that of a suppliant nor do we expect favored treatment. Adjustment of approaches to security, military doctrines included, to qualitatively new conditions is a matter for all Euro-Atlantic partners and in their obvious interest.

I am convinced that the joining of forces in surmounting the barriers and difficulties down this particular road

will be well served by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. For one thing, it could facilitate joint work on modification of military doctrines, including formulation and adoption of a single model of a partnership-oriented military doctrine.

If doctrinal obstacles to military integration can be overcome relatively easily given the political will and intellectual commitment, serious problems are going to arise on the organizational and technical plane. This applies in particular to such critical military systems as intelligence, command, radio-electronic warfare, precision weapons, in other words, ones directly connected with so basic an element (next to fire and movement) of warfare as information in the broadest sense. Our arrears in this area are too great to be rapidly eliminated and allow attainment of informatic compatibility with the armed forces of the Western states. Given the nature of the operational tasks that can be expected in the future, modernization of our forces in other fields will also be necessary, especially procurement on a wide scale of various types of helicopters and air defense equipment.

In contrast to the technical sphere, attainment of the necessary structural compatibility will doubtless be much easier, at any rate at all tactical and operational levels. Here unification of arrangements should not present any major problems. Nor should participation in creation of international formations (corps, divisions). On the other hand, there is no need, or indeed possibility, of unifying

structures directly at the tactical level. This applies in particular to sub-units where organization is strictly related to technical equipment and weaponry and other materiel are the principal determinants of organizational structures.

The next plane of military integration with the West is the professional training of armed forces. I doubt that we need fear comparisons of the proficiency (tactical and operational) of our officers. The situation is undoubtedly worse, as we ourselves realize, when it comes to general qualifications. Thus reforms in military education should aim at introducing what is standard practice in the West whereby an officer is ensured a complete general education at the start of his career followed by a permanent system of post-experience training at regular courses.

It is probable that, in contrast to the qualifications of the officer corps, there are greater disproportions in the combat training of enlisted men, subunits and units. This is simply due to cutbacks in the funds and resources (fuel, ammunition) indispensible to implementing training programs in all units. There can be no question that lack of money has the most severe and immediate repercussions for combat efficiency and training standards. No future joint security system will want poorly trained personnel. However large, an army with a low level of combat-readiness cannot expect to be compatible with Western forces; not will it be capable of performing the kind of tasks that may be required under a Euro-Atlantic joint security system.

Thus, in terms of adjustment to Euro-Atlantic standards and the nature of the foreseeable military threats to Poland defense appropriations are better spent on maintaining a smaller, but efficient, properly trained and well equipped army than a large one of which only a part consists of well-trained personnel in fighting units.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning one other very tangible barrier: scant knowledge of foreign languages in the Polish armed forces. For obvious reasons western languages are known to only a tiny proportion of officers. Moreover, they are for the most part to be found outside the basic command and staff structure and to a large extent lack operational training. To remedy this steps the process of language instruction has recently been intensified. At a optimistic estimate it will, however, be 3-4 years before we have a significant body of officers with both operational and language qualifications.

To sum up this look at the compatibility of the Polish armed forces with Western military structures, it can be said that to meet the challenge presented by the prospect of inclusion in Euro-Atlantic military structures we must embark forthwith on structural and functional upgrading measures that are feasible even with the meager resources currently available, such as abandonment of non-combat functions, reduction of a costly deadweight of administrative and service units, concentration of inordinately dispersed combat structures, reorganization of military education, intensification of combat training, etc. In

short, the object is to optimize military inputs through investment in efficiency and quality. It is this factor - and not sheer size - which in contemporary conditions is decisive (as cogently demonstrated by the war in the Persian Gulf). There is no question that in the future Euro-Atlantic joint security system quality and efficiency will also delineate the basic demands made on the armed forces of its member nations.

POLSKI INSTYTUT SPRAW
MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH

POLISH INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

April 9,1992

The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the inter-agency Strategic Analysis Group (SAG) cordially invite you to a seminar on "European Security: Polish and American Perspectives". The seminar will be held June 8-9, 1992 in Warsaw, Poland.

The seminar will focus on current and future European security issues. Seminar participants from a variety of Polish and US research (and government) organizations will discuss their perspectives on European and international security structures and mechanisms.

The purpose of the seminar is to explore the ways to bring Poland closer into the European security mainstream.

Proposed topics of the seminar.

US viewpoints:

- the role of Europe in the US security concept;
- the future of the US military presence in Europe;
- the role and importance of Poland in the US European policy;
- the American assessment of the situation in the post-Soviet states and he US prognosis as to the stability of the region;
- the US viewpoint on the potential areas of cooperation with Poland in the process of establishing of the European security system.

Polish viewpoints:

- Polish security policy;
- NATO in the Polish security policy;
- the role and importance of the US miliary presence in Europe for the Polish and continental security;

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- the Polish assessment of the situation in the post-Soviet states and prognosis as to the stability of the region;
- suggestions for the security policy initiatives in the region;
- the possible areas of cooperation between Poland and the United States in the process of establishing of the European security system.

Please inform PISM, asap, if you plan to attend, or will send someone else from your organization.

The organizers would appreciate if the participants bring their presentations in a written form (5-6 pages), in order to facilitate the dissemination of the main ideas.

We regret to be unable to cover the cost of travel and hotel.

We are looking forward to seeing you in June.

Yours sincerely

Prof. Antoni Z. Kamiński

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