




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
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
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PART I. GENERAL SITUATION

1. REVIEW OF SITUATION

Peace and security in Eureka have been breached by Dragoland's invasion of sovereign territory belonging to Slawia (SL). Dragoland (DL) have refused to comply with UNSC Resolution 1367 which demands that Dragoland withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces from Slawia. Dragoland is backed by Bizonia (BZ). United Nations requested Blue Alliance (BA), powerful politico-military worldwide organisation, for military assistance under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to carry out operations to restore international peace and security in Central Eureka (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Central Eureka crisis area.

Heads of the Blue Alliance have decided to support UN. Given Dragoland sixty days ultimatum to withdraw its forces from Slawia (UN Resolution 1371) will expire 162400Z MAY 2007.

Exercise AIR SHIELD 2007 starts on X-2 (two days before ultimatum date). Blue Alliance led Non-article 5 Crisis Response Operation RELIABLE GUARD is in the end of phase II – deployment and deterrence. COM CJTF has issued Joint Coordination Order 003 for phase III – decisive combat and stabilisation, which is planned to start on 17 MAY 2007. As a JFACC HQ Battle Staff you are to prepare Air Operation Directive and Prioritised Target List for CAOC on the first 48 hours the third phase of operation.

This document briefly describes background to the crisis, details information about opposing and friendly forces orders of battle on 142000Z MAY 2007.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS

Crisis in Central Eureka primarily involves three countries – Dragoland, Bizonia and Slawia. Over the past decades Slawia has emerged as a modern democracy with a prosperous economy which has been buoyed by recent oil discoveries in the Białogard Plain, not far from the border with Dragoland. These new sources of oil and gas have provided a major boost to the petrochemical industry on the Central Eureka. However, Slawia's neighbours – Dragoland on the west and Bizonia on the southwest – remain bastions of authoritarianism. Both have been facing rising political unrest and economic crisis at home. In particular, Dragoland's President Nowak has found it necessary to focus national attention on regaining the Western Pomeranian Province and access to oil reserves from Slawia in order to retain his grip on power. In this scheme he has elicited the support of Bizonia which economy has been dependent on Dragoland's economy. The resulting coalition between Dragoland and Bizonia has confronted Slawia with serious challenges to its security and sovereignty over territories coveted by its neighbours.




Figure 2. Crisis Hot Spots.

The underlying causes for the crisis in Eureka are rooted in the history of the region. During much of the 19th century, the large Grand Empire encompassed most of Central Eureka. Following the break-up of the empire at the end of the First World War the region entered a turbulent period in its history as political boundaries were again re-drawn creating the modern states of Slawia, Sambia, Bizonia, Dragoland and Tabor. Since then, changes in the political, economic, social and security conditions in each country have resulted in conflicting interests. In addition, competing historic claims to ancestral lands, especially those with economic significance, have led to ethnic strife

and border disputes between neighbours. Three situations in particular have contributed to the current crisis (Figure 2 on previous page).

Dragoland's historic interests in the Western Pomeranian Province. Over the centuries the Western Pomeranian Province (known in the past as the Pomeranian Duchy) has changed hands many times. It was finally ceded to Slawia in the 1921 Treaty of Monaco following a regional referendum. Nevertheless, a substantial number of Dragolandians remained in the area. More recently, growing numbers of Dragolandians have flocked to the region to take advantage of economic opportunities across the border in Slawia's petrochemical sector. While Dragoland initially benefited from the influx of capital, the longer term effects of economic migration and the accompanying "brain-drain" have added to its own lack of economic growth. Given Dragoland's historic interests in the Western Pomeranian Province and economic dependence on Slawia's petrochemical sector, President Nowak's beleaguered regime has increasingly looked to the Western Pomeranian Province as a source of economic and political salvation.

Exploitation of the Karlino oil fields. Slawia's discovery in 1995 of large oil and gas reserves in the area of the Białogard Plain, not far from the border with Dragoland, has underpinned a major boost to the economy of Slawia. The availability of high grade crude in the region has provided an important alternative to dependence on Middle East oil and many Eureka nations have invested heavily in exploration and development. Dragoland claims that the Karlino deposits extend much further to the south than had hitherto been established and therefore Dragoland should share in any economic benefit. The fact that the Western Pomeranian Province is also home to a large Dragolandian population further complicates the issue.

The ethnic Oderians issue. With the break-up of the Great Empire the homelands of ethnic Oderians were divided amongst Bizonia, Slawia and Dragoland, leaving them without a country to call their own. While assimilation in Slawia has gone largely unnoticed, the Oderians have been viewed with mistrust by Bizonian political leaders who have repressed, often violently, any Oderian efforts toward self-determination. A shadowy militant separatist group, calling itself the Oderian Resistance Group (ORG), has recently been associated with acts of violence in the area. There is suspicion that Bizonia is manipulating events to create instability in Slawia. The Bizonia government is committed to a final solution to the Oderian issue.

3. KEY EVENTS

October 2005 – Collapsing a number of Dragoland's state-owned enterprises. Army of unemployment have left Dragoland to take jobs in Slawia. Open oppositions to the President Nowak's regime become frequent with numerous strikes, marches and other civil disobedience.

December 2005 – Bizonia's President increased rhetoric over the status of ethnic Oderians living in the Tri-border area.

March 2006 – The emergence of a number of ethnic Oderians separatist groups, including militant Oderians Resistance Group (ORG). A spate of incidents along Bizonia-Slawia border had begun.

Between March and April 2006 – Number of Dragoland-Slawia border violations in the vicinity of Karlino oil fields reported by Slawia. Interrogation captured group revealed, that Dragoland had sent groups of geologists escorted by Special Forces detachments deep into the Białogard plain region with the aim of gathering geological

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data to prove that oil reserves did indeed extend under the Slawia-Dragoland border. After strong complaint at the UN, Slawia withdrew its Ambassador from Dragoland for consultation.

July beginning 2006 – Reported high level meetings between ministerial representatives from Dragoland and Bizonia.

July 2006 – Bizonia Special Forces, supported by units from 22 Corps and air forces conducted a major security operation in the border area targeting ethnic Oderians suspected of supporting ORG separatists. Large number of refugees fled east into Slawia.

October 2006 – Series of violent attacks against prominent Dragoland expatriates living in Slawia. Despite allegations that these attacks were actually the work of Dragoland notorious State Intelligence Service, President Nowak's state run media pumped out inflammatory stories describing systematic human right abuses by Slawia authorities. A terrorist attack on bus carrying Dragoland workers in Karlino left 22 dead and brought large-scale demonstrations in many cities demanding an end to the spiralling violence. Slawia authorities responded by temporarily closing the border to Dragoland workers entering Slawia.

November 2006 – Dragoland's military authorities announced annual, month-long military exercise HAIL STORM, during February 2007, in the east of Dragoland.

26th of January 2007 – brutal killing of the Bizonia's provincial governor in the Bizonia-Slawia border area, allegedly by ORG gunmen. Bizonia's search and destroy operations against the ORG killed a number of suspected terrorists and forces a new flood of refugees east onto Slawia. Faced with an estimated 45,000 refugees, the UNHCR mission in Slawia and NGO/PVO aid workers have struggled to provide food and shelter. Humanitarian efforts have been hampered further by terrorist attacks directed against refugees on both sides of the border. In response to this explosive situation on its southern border Slawia placed its forces in the area on heightened alert and dispatched additional forces to the area to support humanitarian operations and security. Bizonia and Slawia on the UN forum started to blame each other for the refugee problem. Dragoland president officially stated, that Dragoland was ready to help the UN resolve these unfortunate situations, peacefully.

February 2007 – against the backdrop of events between Slawia and Bizonia, the start of exercise HAIL STORM drew little international attention, even the scale of the exercise was significantly greater than previously anticipated and included elements of Bizonia 24th Corps (at least a Division and Forward C2 elements) and at least two Bizonia fighter squadrons. This coincided with an extensive command post exercise involving high level commands from both Dragoland and Bizonia.

17th February 2007 – Slawia began implementing emergency preparedness measures

26th February 2007, 4th March 2007 – terrorist bombing in Białogard a number of Dragolandians were killed and wounded.

7-13th March 2007 – Dragoland forces invaded the Pomeranian Province under the pretext of preventing further violence against Dragolandians. Dragoland's offensive rapidly overwhelmed Slawia defences. Dragoland special forces, attack helicopters and air forces neutralised Slawia's air defence system around the northwest part of country allowing Dragoland to gain air superiority over the Western Pomeranian Province and periodically further to Wisła River. Dragoland maritime forces isolated province and established control of the entrance to the Szczecińska Bay, Pomeranian coastal waters

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and part of Slawia's Economic Exclusive Zone west to the meridian 18⁰E. Elements of Dragoland's 6th and 75th Corpses reinforced by elements of 26th ABN Div, overran Slawia defences and sized control of the Western Pomeranian Province including the oil refineries and port facilities at Świnoujście and Szczecin, and substantial crude oil and refined petroleum stocks.

Dragoland forces secured most of the Pomerania Province and had control the approaches to the province as well as an airspace over this areas. Dragoland consolidated its position and transitioned to defensive operations. Advanced SAMs, including HAWKs, had been pushed forward. Dragoland offered to negotiate the future status of the Western Pomerania Province.

Bizonia had been continuing military operations against ethnic Oderians separatists in the Bizonia/Slawia border area with frequent cross border raids into Slawia. Bizonia's 22nd Corps was fully deployed in the eastern province and some elements were actively engaged in operations against suspected Oderians terrorists. Elements of BZ 22nd Corps stayed in south Dragoland.

Slawia had only limited warning of Dragoland's attack. Many of its forces were heavily engaged in humanitarian assistance and security operations in the southwest. Forces defending in the north were forced to withdraw to a line east of the 17⁰30'E longitude. Slawia losses were moderate, but Dragoland special forces capturing eight military airfields and 20 Fitters aircraft in the Western Pomerania Province. Finally Slawia stabilised its defences on the left bank of Wisła River in vicinity of the 17⁰30' east longitude. Slawia forces in the southwest Slawia were on alert and reported increased instances of sabotage and SOF activity. Slawia requested UN assistance.

8th March 2007 – The UN Security Council has been quick to condemn Dragoland's blatant aggression under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and issued UNSC Resolution 1367 (2007) calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of Dragoland forces from Slawia. In response Dragoland has made it clear that there will be no withdrawal until the future of the Western Pomerania Province is decided.

10th March 2007 – Stating its alarm at Dragoland's refusal to comply with UNSC Resolution 1367 (2007), the Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1369 (2007) which declares that all states shall prevent the import or export of goods to and from Dragoland.

12th March 2007 – When Dragoland announced that it had established a provisional provincial government to administer the Western Pomerania Province, the Security Council issued UNSC Resolution 1370 (2007), imposing an embargo on Dragoland.

17th March 2007 – Given Dragoland's intransigence on this and other issues with Slawia as well as its historic claims to the Western Pomerania Province, UNSC discussions had increasingly focussed on possible military action to expel Dragoland forces from Slawia. Under instructions from the UNSC, the Secretary General forwarded a formal request to the Blue Alliance Council for military assistance under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to carry out operations, if required, to restore international peace and security.

18th March 2007 – An UNSC Resolution 1371 (2007) establishing the mandate for Blue Alliance forces and gives Dragoland 60 days to withdraw its forces from Slawia. X-day for UN ultimatum is **162400B MAY 2007**.

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19th March 2007 – Based on the agreement of the Blue Alliance Ministers in the Oslo Council Summit in principle to support the UN in maintaining international peace and security in Eureka, the Blue Alliance Council have agreed to initiate military planning for the possible involvement operation in Central Eureka.

20th March 2007 – On this basis the Blue Alliance Council has directed Commander Blue Alliance Strategic Command (COMBASC), as a matter of urgency, to develop a concept of operations, including a further estimate of force requirements, including enabling forces, for the conduct of a Blue Alliance Led Operation in Central Eureka.

23rd March 2007 – Following Initiating Directive, COMBASC planning guidance has directed Blue Alliance Commander Joint Force Command North as a Commander of Combined Joint Task Force to prepare CONOPS for operation RELIABLE GUARD.

28th March 2007 – Blue Alliance Military Committee approved CONOPS for operation RELIABLE GUARD. CONOPS envisions five (5) phases of operation (See COMCJTF PLANNING GUIDANCE 01/07): warning and activation; deployment and deterrence; decisive combat and stabilisation (divided into three sub-phases: defence and containment, counter-offence, stabilisation), transition and the last – redeployment.

29th March 2007 – Blue Alliance Strategic Command (COMBASC) issued Activation Order for operation RELIABLE GUARD.

8th May 2007 – brutal killing of Bizonia's President. A rocket attack was conducted by an unidentified organization during official state ceremonies of the National Freedom Day held in the capital city of Bizonia. Attackers used rocket grenade launchers to hit the governmental officials taking part in the parade. As a result of the rocket attack the President of Bizonia and the Chief of Staff of Bizonian Armed Force have been killed and many officials wounded. The attack triggered riots in the capital. Demonstrators inspired and lead by undisclosed leaders taking part in the parade entered Bizonia's Parliament and Government buildings and started occupation. The stand off was settled next day in the afternoon

8th May 2007 – as a result of terrorist attack a shift of power occurred in Bizonia. The key assignments in the ruling socialist party were taken by members of a moderate faction, who have a strong support among territorial structures of the party.

9th May 2007 – in an official address to the nation, the new president of Bizonia (the vice-president of Bizonia, whom presidential swearing-in ceremony was made at night) stressed need for a new approach to internal and international policy issues. The president promised substantial changes in the policy on relations with ethnic minorities. Mutual understanding and respect for cultural differences, as the president pointed, are the only chance for the Bizonia's future. Addressing international policy issues, the President, pointed at traditional long lasting relations integrating Central Eureka countries. He expressed his conviction, that Dragoland will remain the closest ally of Bizonia. The President pledged support of his government for mutual initiatives in the field of politics, economy and culture. At the same time, he deeply renounced the policy of armed action in the international relations.

10th May 2007 – Bizonian troops deployed to Dragoland and located in the vicinity of Slawia order started withdrawal to permanent basing areas in Bizonia. This decision was commented by the President of Dragoland, who expressed his sorrow surprise that the new government of Bizonia took such a decision under so complicated international situation and viewed it as breaking mutual agreements in force. The President of Dragoland declared also that such a situation renders all previous economic agree-

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ments irrelevant and effectively non bonding. He stressed also that economic agreements should be renegotiated with respect to new economic circumstances.

11th May 2007 – At the press conference held at 17.00 the president of Bizonia announced that almost all Bizonian troops completed withdrawal and are now in their home bases. He added that, due to the complicated political and military situation in the region, all military units of Bizonian armed forces are still held in a high state of operational readiness. The president declared that the Government of Bizonia will do its best to meet UN directions and demands. Any form of cooperation with the states of Blue Alliance will not be accepted as long as their troops remain deployed to Slawia. The president assured that Bizonia is willing to accept UN observers and start talks with Slawia government on return of Oderian refugees. He also informed that a special parliamentary commission started its investigation on possible atrocities against Oderian minority. The president call separatist movement leaders to start a dialogue at the same time stressed that no terrorist acts will be tolerated.

12th May 2007 – Bizonian President statement was not commented by Dragoland. Intelligence sources of Blue Alliance still reports movements of troops in the border zone between Dragoland and Slawia. The Slawia Armed Forces Command coordinates withdrawal of its regular land troops from the Bizonia/Slawia border area with CJTF commander. It replaces them with Homeland Defence Brigades. Relieved regular land troops are incorporated in operational task force of Slawia. The replacement of regular units with territorial defence ones is planned to be completed till 14th May.

142000B MAY 2007 – Joint Force Air Component Command HQ Lutsk receives Joint Coordination Order 003.

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PART II. DETAILED SITUATION

1. OPPOSING FORCES – DRAGOLAND

After Bizonia changes its political and military posture, the only forces which may oppose Blue Alliance led operation under UN mandate in Central Eureka Joint Operations Area remained Dragoland. Dragoland's authorities are determined to oppose any external military intervention. With the new strategic conditions, President Nowak strategy seems to would be based on two major elements. First, he may focus his efforts to threaten a costly war of attrition that could quickly turn public opinion against the war. Second, President Nowak may calculate he can withdraw the bulk of his forces from Western Pomerania even after Blue Alliance military operation began, if necessary.

Until the collapse of the Dragoland/Bizonia military Coalition no direct armed actions against Blue Alliance forces were noted. Several cases of sabotage against transportation infrastructure in Slawia resulted in a few day delay of allied troop's deployment to the northern Slawia. Suspected Dragoland Special Forces teams were never caught out.

Dragoland Air Force and Navy were not observed crossing 17⁰30'E meridian. Dragoland military authorities put in effect prohibition of using its airspace by Slawia and Blue Alliance countries aircraft. Airspace above occupied Slawia territory along with its coastal waters (12 Nm) was declared military exclusion zones by Dragoland. Blue Alliance authorities after consultation with UN decided not to cross boundaries of this zone before ultimatum expired.

The Dragoland armed forces are, by any measure, a formidable exercise- and operational-tested fighting force. Dragoland has begun the crisis with armies equipped with great numbers of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery, some of which are state-of-the-art models. It has a sizable air force with many top-line fighters (Su-27, F-16s), light bombers (Su-24s) a modern air defence command and control (C2) system including Airborne Early Warning and a state-of-the art GBAD systems (SA-10).

The Dragoland military has increasingly focussed on developing the capability to conduct manoeuvre warfare with co-ordinated air-ground operations in high tempo operations. Additionally, Dragoland Air Force fighter aircraft have been observed participating in support of Dragoland Navy amphibious operations. These initiatives, together with training facilities have seen a marked modernisation of Dragoland military doctrine and the ability of senior commanders to plan and conduct operations oriented toward joint manoeuvre warfare.

Dragoland operation against Slawia has confirmed these assessments. During operation in Northern Slawia, the Dragoland army demonstrated a capability to conduct multi-axis, manoeuvre, combined-arms, joint operations deep into hostile territory. The staff could conduct planning; coordination of air, airmobile, Special Forces and artillery preparations and operations; timing of movements and operations; coordination of complicated logistics requirements; and movement of supplies, equipment, and troops to the right place at the designated time. They developed excellent operational security and deception.

Dragoland command and control system on the strategic and operational level is dominated by politically (leading nationalist party) approved personnel. The Supreme Commander of Dragoland Forces is the President Nowak, who exercises overall command

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


Figure 4. Dragoland Air Defence sectors.

Air defence weaponry includes SA-2, SA-3, SA-10 and HAWK SAM systems. Additional air defence is provided by Air Force interceptors and organic Army assets, including the SA-11, SA-13, SA-15, SA-18 missile systems, and the ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA system. In addition, the Dragoland air defence has more than 2,500 AAA pieces protecting all targets of value, some deployed on the roofs of numerous buildings in Berlinas housing government facilities. These weapons - 57-mm and 37-mm AAA pieces, ZSU-23/4 and ZSU-57/2 self-propelled AAA systems, and hundreds of 14.5-mm and 23-mm light anti-aircraft weapons - forms the backbone of the integrated air defence network. In major high value target areas (such as Berlinas, airfields, chemical agent production complexes) the combined arms air defences could prove lethal to aircraft operating below 3000 m.

The intelligence obtained by JFCC ELINT and SIGINT aircraft indicate an extensive build up of radar posts along Dragoland eastern border. War gaming and simulations suggest that enemy ground ASACS is capable to detect and track all aerial objects flying above 300 m. With Dragoland AEW on station air raid warning may be obtained for all aircraft flying above 100 m AGL up to 100 km deep into Slawia territory. Dragoland AEW aircraft orbits are located: one in the north and second in the south of the Dragoland territory, no closer than 100 km west of Odra river.

Dragoland Air Force Order of Battle is presented in Annexes B, C and D

(3) Dragoland Navy

The Dragoland Navy has small but modern naval task group consisting of a flotilla of frigates, a squadron of fast patrol boats (FPB) and a naval special operations commando unit based at main naval base at Lubeck. Additionally, a flotilla of submarines is based at newly constructed naval facility at Wismar. Dragoland also can request Air Force support for maritime attack. The navy also has the 100-km range Silkworm sur-

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face-to-surface missile, whose half-ton warhead could sink a frigate or damage a battleship.

Another weapon in the Dragoland naval arsenal is a diverse inventory of moored contact (approx. 100) and bottom (approx. 200) influence mines. Dragoland's minelayers could lay minefields in a nonhostile environment (ERNY Class) or hostile environment (FFG KOTOR Class).

(4) Dragoland Special Forces

Dragoland has significant Special Forces capability both in terms of size and quality. Special Forces undergo extensive training in covert border crossings, use of explosives, covert reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. Some are believed to have specialised in terrorist techniques. They can be inserted by parachute, helicopter, ground infiltration (often using commercial cover) and submarine.

Dragoland has three regiments of Special Forces Commando under the Joint High Command. Each Regiment is trained in covert entry, strategic reconnaissance, interdiction, and unconventional warfare and is capable of deploying up to 27 teams for a range of missions.

(5) Dragoland Paramilitary Forces

A home defence force based on a People's Militia assists in political control and provides mobilisable Army reserves for defence. Some of the People's Militia units are known to have been trained in the conduct of clandestine paramilitary operations.

(6) Conclusions

Dragoland's armed forces possess a range of conventional, unconventional and strategic capabilities. Although Dragoland forces are organised, trained and equipped for national defence, they have demonstrated the capability to conduct offensive operations beyond their borders, including air/airborne/air-landed operations.

Conventional forces are assessed to have the capability to conduct operational level offensive and defensive operations integrating all arms at operational levels.

The Navy, Air Force and Army have been reported to routinely be conducting joint attack operations in live-fire exercises.

Dragoland's logistics capabilities are well matched to the requirements of the active forces and they are developing a robust airfield damage repair capability.

Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs) with a range of up to 600 km are capable of conventional and chemical weapons.

Dragoland has a moderate chemical weapons capability, believed to be largely based on Sarin delivered by both aircraft and by artillery. Dragoland is not believed to be in possession of nuclear weapons.

2. FRIENDLY FORCES – COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE

After deployment to JOA, CJTF forces continued to refine operation plans. Cross training between Slawia and other Blue Alliance units built mutual understanding. Air component conduct regular rehearsals of the actions they would take during offensive operations.

The broad spectrum of mission-essential requirements was reviewed to determine the deployed and deploying forces' live-fire and manoeuvre area needs. Live-fire and live

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bombing practice ranges have been established in the north Slawia for training. Training to that point includes multi-echeloned training such as decontamination exercises, squad and platoon manoeuvre live fire exercises, CPXs at all levels, and indirect fire integration exercises that includes joint and combined forces.

The threat of chemical or biological attack forces Blue Alliance units to train and operate frequently in a Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP). All units deployed to Slawia with standard chemical and biological defence equipment. Extensive training, in the form of battle drills and rehearsals in full MOPP, acclimatizes forces so the additional stress of this protective equipment should not slow unduly the pace of operations. Based on this extensive training, commanders and troops expresses confidence in their ability to survive chemical/biological warfare (CW/BW) attacks and continue to fight.

(1) Joint Force Land Component Command

JFLCC conducts extensive rehearsal exercises to prepare for defensive and offensive operations. All troops of BA 1st Corps have been involved in rehearsal for one week now. LCC troops are declared to reach full operational readiness on X-day.

Corps size land component consists of three division, an airborne brigade, marine brigade, two AAVN brigades and supporting units (totally approx. 60,000). Two divisions are mechanized and one armoured. Divisions consists of three brigades, division artillery, air defence, reconnaissance, combat support and combat service support units, although temporary assignment of other units is common.

In case of phase III operations RELIABLE GUARD occurs, according to COM CJTF concept for the ground operation approved by COMBASC and coordinated with Slawia military authorities, the actual ground offensive is estimated to take up to two weeks, followed by a period of consolidation. Subsequent logistics build-up and force repositioning will occur simultaneously. Military objective and desired end state will be achieved through the destruction of the DL 75th in the Western Pomerania, preservation of the offensive capability of the combined forces, and restoration of the sovereignty of Slawia. Attacking ground forces are to penetrate and bypass Dragoland defensive forces. It is COM CJTF's intention to physically and psychologically isolate the Dragoland forces in Slawia. Operations should fix and block Dragoland's first operational echelon reserves, with the objective of securing Alliance flanks and LOCs by Slawia. Ground operations will culminate in the destruction of 75th Corps divisions in Slawia.

BA 1st Corps will be the main effort in this concept. Slawia's operational group consisted of two divisions will conducts supporting attack on the left flank. On the right, marine brigade embarked in LANCET will conduct synchronised amphibious operation with objective to gain control and secure Karlino oil fields.

CJTF LCC and SLAWIA Army ORBAT is presented in Annex E

(2) Joint Force Air Component Command

CJTF Air Component consists of nine (9) tactical wings deployed in eight airbases in Slawia and one in LANCET (Figure 5). In conjunctions to Slawia Air Force eight (8) squadrons resulted in 176 state-of-the-art AWX/FBX capable aircraft, supported by over 200 ESJ/ECR/TRO/TRI/AEW/AAR aircraft flown by excellent trained pilots.

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


Figure 5. Air Component Tactical Air Forces Deployment.

The main objectives assigned to JFACC in operation RELIABLE GUARD phase two (still pending) are successfully achieved. Air superiority over SLAWIA territory (excluding Western Pomerania) is maintained. ACC and Slawia radars and C2 equipments have been integrated into effective system providing RAP and surveillance, situation monitoring and intelligence collection capabilities. TMD capable SAM covers lodgement areas in the Northern Slawia and fighters protect approaches from north, west and south-west directions (MEZ and FAOR as on EXERCISE AIR SHIELD 2006 situation map).

Contribution to deterrence with visible presence of Blue Alliance defensive and offensive air capabilities is achieved by rehearsal exercises. The main effort of the exercises in offensive operation by COMAOs, with multinational packages of fighters, SEAD, RECCE and EW. Air attacks with dumb bombs and precision munitions for medium, low and very low altitudes is trained. The most effective platform to deliver precision munitions are F-15E. Because of the mutual interference between F-16C and F-15E while GBU-15 employment against the target in close vicinity, the decision has been made to employ F-15E only as a platform for GBU-15.

During the exercises, compatibility and interoperability of weapon systems and units is thoroughly checked. Due to the lack of IFF Mode 4 on MiG-29, those aircraft were excluded from cross FLOT operations. LAME DUCK procedures have been introduced and rehearsed.

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In case of phase three operations occurs, COMJFAC intends to conduct combined joint air operations, including first of all Counter-Air Operations and Air Operations for Strategic Effect. After achieving air superiority east to ODRA River, simultaneously to CAO and SA he intends to cut LOCs between the three Dragoland corpses and isolate them from supplies. Maintaining air superiority over Dragoland territory will allow JFACC to start destroying 75th Corps and prepare conditions for ground and amphibious operations. During this phase he intends to support Information Operations, Psychological Operations and Governmental / Non-Governmental Organisations. Restoring Slawia's territorial integrity is main objective phase III operations.

Detailed information concerning JFACC are presented in Annexes F, G, H, I

(3) Joint Force Maritime Component Command

CJTF Maritime Component consists of Blue Alliance Task Group (BATG) and Slawia's Navy three (3) flotillas. JFMCC main objectives for phase II operation RELIABLE GUARD have been not achieved yet. Sea control is expected to be achieved and maintain after new ROE implementation. Mine countermeasure ships operate two naval bases: Gdynia and Baltijsk. Frigate and destroyers operate from Lancet.

(4) Psychological Operations Forces

On RFI

(5) Special Operations Forces

On RFI

PART III.
WORK TO BE DONE

- a) Study the scenario.
- b) Prepare Exercise AIR SHIELD 2007 Situational Map.
- c) Be prepared to work on assigned posts.

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ANNEXES AND APPENDICES

ANNEX A. DRAGOLAND ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

APPENDIX 1. DRAGOLAND ARMY UNITS DATA

ANNEX B. DRAGOLAND AIR ORDER OF BATTLE.

APPENDIX 1. DRAGOLAND'S AIRFIELDS.

ANNEX C. DRAGOLAND SAM ORDER OF BATTLE.

ANNEX D. DRAGOLAND ASACS ORDER OF BATTLE.

ANNEX E. CJTF LAND ORDER OF BATTLE.

ANNEX F. CJTF AIR ORDER OF BATTLE.

ANNEX G. CJTF SAM ORDER OF BATTLE.

ANNEX H. CJTF ASACS ORDER OF BATTLE.

ANNEX I. JFACC TASK ORGANISATION FOR OPERATION RELIABLE GUARD.

ANNEX J. JFACC LOGISTIC SITUATION.

APPENDIX 1. STANDARD CONVENTIONAL LOAD (SCL) FOR JFACC
AIRCRAFT

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ANNEX A

DRAGOLAND ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE

UNIT	PEACE TIME LOCATION	N LAT	E LONG	ESTIMATED LOCATION AS OF 9 MAY 05	N LAT	E LONG
DL Army HQ	BERLINAS	5237	01317	BERLINAS	5237	01317
6 th Corps	GŁOGÓW	5138	01604	SWARZĘDZ	5209	01646
60 th Mech Div	GŁOGÓW	5138	01604	KŁECKO	5223	01707
61 st Mech Div	POZNAŃ	5222	01700	WRONKI	5227	01604
62 nd Mtz Div	LESZNO	5151	01634	KROBIA	5131	01641
611 th IMR Bde	GORZÓW WLKP.	5245	01515	WROCŁAW	5109	01707
612 th IMR Bde	WROCŁAW	5107	01705	ZĄBKOWICE ŚLĄSKIE	5020	01631
75 th Corps	WITTENBERGE	5301	01146	KARWICE	5319	01543
51 st Tank Div	WITTENBERGE	5301	01146	BOBOLICE	5357	01635
52 nd Inf Div	SCHWERIN	5335	01121	ZŁOTÓW	5322	01702
53 rd IMR Bde	ANKLAM	5350	01343	KALISZ POMORSKI	5303	01536
54 th IMR Bde	NEUSTRELITZ	5320	01303	GRYFICE	5339	01455
21 st Corps	DESSAU	5148	01215	SULĘCIN	5211	01449
2 nd Mech Div	DESSAU	5148	01215	KOLCZYN	5221	01450
28 th Tk Div	LEIPZIG	5123	01217	KROSNO ODRZAŃSKIE	5148	01449
29 th Tk Div	LUCKENWALDE	5206	01311	RZEPIN	5206	01433
1 st IMR Bde	RIESA	5118	01319	?		
26 th Airborne Div	RADEBERG	5107	01353	?		
1 st SF Regiment	LANGEN	5202	01135	?		
2 nd SF Regiment	HOHENDODELEBEN	5208	01130	?		
3 rd SF Regiment	SCHONFELDE	5227	01402	?		
7 th SSM Bde	SCHWERIN	5333	01123	?		
8 th SSM Bde	HERZBERG	5141	01314	?		
9 th SSM Bde	HALLENBECK	5335	01148	?		
1 st Arty Bde	HALLENBECK	5335	01148	BARWICE	5329	01603
2 nd Arty Bde	SCHLIEBEN	5143	01323	RADACZ	5327	01615
3 rd Arty Bde	STERNBERG	5342	01149	ŚREM	5150	01644

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APPENDIX 1
TO ANNEX A

DRAGOLAND ARMY UNITS DATA

Weapon System	6 Corps						75 Corps						21 Corps						Army Troops				ARMY TOTAL
	60 Mach Div	61 Mech Div	62 Miz Div	611 IMR Bde	612 IMR Bde	TOTAL	51 Tank Div	52 Inf Div	53 IMR Bde	54 IMR Bde	CORPS TROOPS	TOTAL	28 Tank Div	2 Mech Div	29 Tank Div	1 IMR Bde	CORPS TROOPS	TOTAL	26 Abn Div	Army Atk Bdes	Army SSM	Army FA	
AD, 2S6 30 mm SP	24	24		6	6	60	24		6	6	36	24	24	24	24	6		78	6				180
AD, S-60 57 mm AutoGun			54			54					54							0	18				126
AD, SA-11 Gadfly						24				24	24						24	24					72
AD, SA-13 Gopher	24	24		6	6	60	24		6		36	24	24	24	24	6		78	24				198
AD, SA-15 Gauntlet	20	20				40	20				20	20	20	20	20			60					120
AD, SA-18 Grouse	192	192		48	48	480	153		48	48	249	153	192	192	153	48		546	272				1547
AD, ZSU-23-4 23 mm			18			18					18							0					36
Arty, 2A65 152 mm How						36				36	36						36	36	56			90	254
Arty, 2S1 122 mm SP	72	72	72	18	18	252	72	72	18	18	180	72	72	72	18			234	72				738
Arty, 2S3 152 mm SP	54	54	54			162	36	54			90	36	54	36				126					378
Arty, 2S5 152 mm						36				36	36						36	36					108
Arty, BM-22 MRL						18				18	18						18	18				36	90

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Weapon System	6 Corps						75 Corps					21 Corps						Army Troops				ARMY TOTAL	
	60 Mach Div	61 Mech Div	62 Mz Div	611 IMR Bde	612 IMR Bde	TOTAL	51 Tank Div	52 Inf Div	53 IMR Bde	54 IMR Bde	CORPS TROOPS	TOTAL	28 Tank Div	2 Mech Div	29 Tank Div	1 IMR Bde	CORPS TROOPS	TOTAL	26 Abn Div	Army Atk Bdes	Army SSM		Army FA
Arty, SS-1 Scud						0						0						0			60		60
Arty, SS-21 Scud						0						0						0			90		90
MT-LB Mortar 120 mm	10	10				20	10					10	10	10	10			30					60
AT MT-12 100 mm Gun	30	30				60	6					6	6	30	6			42	48				156
AT RPG-7V	615	615	615	150	150	2199	423	615	150	150	54	1392	423	615	423	150	54	1665	728				5984
AT-4 ATGM	54	54				108	12					12	54	54	12			78					198
AT-5 ATGM	39	39	99			231	9	99		54	54	162	9	39	9		54	111	100				604
AT-7 ATGM	54	54				108	54					54	54	54	54			162					324
BMP-2 IFV	191	191		141	141	664	281		141			563	281	191	281	141		894	328				2449
Scout Car Engessa EE3	56	56		4	4	144	9		4	24	24	41	9	56	9	4	24	102					287
BRM-1 IFV				15	15	84			15	54	54	84				15	54	69					237
APC Wh Eland 90	302	302	136			740	12	136				148	12	302	12			326					1214
Helo, Mi-24						40				40	40	40					40	40	80				200
MBT 125 mm	187	187	72	31	31	508	314	72	31			448	314	187	314	31		846					1802

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EXERCISE AIR SHIELD 2007

DRAGOLAND AIR ORDER OF BATTLE

UNIT NAME	BASE / SITE NAME	BASE / SITE CODE	LOCATION (LATM)	A/C (EQUIP.) TYPE	A/C (EQUIP) No	LOSES	PRI ROLE	SEC ROLE	REMARKS
12 SQN	PARCHIM	EDPM	5323N 01155E	SU-24M	16		OFB		Poses anti-ship capabilities
13 SQN	PARCHIM	EDPM	5323N 01155E	SU-24M	16		OFB		
112 SQN	PARCHIM	EDPM	5323N 01155E	SU-24MP	16		ECR		
114 TPT SQN	DRESDEN	EDDO	5106N 01345E	IL-76M	10		THM		
				AN-26	24		TLM		
				IL-78M	6		AAR		
43 SQN	BABIMOST	EDBT	5208N 01548E	SU-25B	24		FBA	Tank killers	
21 SQN	BABIMOST	EDBT	5208N 01548E	SU-24M	16		OFB		
22 SQN	BABIMOST	EDBT	5208N 01548E	MIG-29A	14		AWX		
23 SQN	DREWITZ	EDDZ	5153N 1429E	MIG-29A	14		AWX		
41 SQN	SZPROTAWA	EDSZ	5137N 01530E	SU-22M4	14		FBA		
42 SQN	SZPROTAWA	EDSZ	5137N 01530E	SU-22M4	14		FBA		
116 TPT SQN	FURSTENWALDE	EDFE	5223N 01404E	MI-17	20		HMU		
117 AH SQN	FURSTENWALDE	EDFE	5223N 01404E	MI-24W	40		HMA	15 a/c CSAR	
31 SQN	GOLENIÓW	ESGW	5335N 01454E	SU-24M	16		OFB		
32 SQN	GOLENIÓW	ESGW	5335N 01454E	SU-24MP	14		ECR		
33 SQN	GOLENIÓW	ESGW	5335N 01454E	SU-27S	14		AWX		
110 SQN	BRANDENBURG GRIESE	EDBR	5226N 01232E	A-50	4		AEW		HVAA
				IL-20	3		SIR		
113 ATSQN	BRANDENBURG GRIESE	EDBR	5226N 01232E	C-130	20		TMM		
				KC-135R	4		AAR		
14 SQN	ŚWIDWIN	ESSN	5347N 01550E	SU-24M	14		OFB		
51 SQN	ŚWIDWIN	ESSN	5347N 01550E	SU-27S	14		AWX		

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APPENDIX 1
TO ANNEX B

DRAGOLAND'S AIRFIELDS

LOCATION	ICAO CODE	LAT N	LONG E	REMARKS
WALDENAU	EDWU	5338	00943	
PARCHIM	EDPM	5323	01155	
DRESDEN	EDDO	5106	01345	
BABIMOST	EDBT	5208	01548	
DREWITZ	EDDZ	5153	01429	
SZPROTAWA	EDSZ	5137	01530	
FURSTENWALDE	EDFE	5223	01404	
GOLENIÓW	ESGW	5335	01454	
BRANDENBURG GRIESE	EDBG	5226	01232	
ŻAGAŃ	EDZN	5138	01514	
ŚWIDWIN	ESSN	5347	01550	
WERNEUCHEN	EDWU	5237	01342	
EISENACH	EDEE	5059	01027	
ERFURT	EDEF	5059	01057	
LEIPZIG	EDLG	5123	01225	
ZERBST	EDZT	5202	01208	
WITTSTOCK	EDWT	5312	01232	
JUTERBOG	EDJG	5202	01302	
FALKENBERG	EDFL	5133	01313	
GROSSENHAIN	EDGS	5117	01328	
COTTBUS	EDCT	5146	01416	
GROSRASCHEN	EDGS	5134	01408	
KAŃKOLEWO	EDKO	5215	01615	
MIROSLAWIEC	ESMC	5323	01617	
ZEGRZE POM	ESZP	5402	01617	
DARŁOWO	ESDO	5423	01624	
WROCLAW	EDWW	5106	01653	
GOSTYŃ	EDGN	5152	01658	
ŁAWICA	EDLA	5225	01648	
KRZESINY	EDKY	5220	01658	
BEDNARY	EDBY	5232	01713	
OLEŚNICA	EDOL	5115	01720	
PEITZ	EDPZ	5152	01428	

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ANNEX C

DRAGOLAND SAM ORDER OF BATTLE

UNIT	NUMBER	TYPE	LOCATION	REMARKS
5 AD BDE	12xSAM SQN	SA-3D	9 X SAM SQN DEPLOYED IN AREA – BIAŁOGARD (5401N, 01601E) , ŁOBEZ (5308N 01503E), POŁCZYN ZDRÓJ (5316N, 01531E), ONE AT BIAŁOGARD (5401N 01601E), ONE AT RESKO (5347N 01532E) AND ONE AT ZŁOCIENIEC (5354N 01556E)	
54 AD RGT	4xSAM SQN	HAWK	3 X SAM SQN HAWK DEPLOYED IN AREA NEAR TOWN GOLENIÓW (5304N, 01415E)	
6 AD BDE	9xSAM SQN	SA-3D	9 X SAM SQN SA-3D, PROBABLY DEPLOYED 10 KM N-E BERLINAS (5230N 01320E)	
55 AD RGT	2xSAM SQN	SA-10	ONE SAM SQN DEPLOYED WEST OF BERLINAS (5230N 01320E), ONE AT NEURUPPIN (5257N 01245E)	
7 AD BDE	5xSAM SQN	SA-3D	5 X SAM SQN SA-3D, PROBABLY DEPLOYED IN AREA ZBAŚZYN (5145N 01521E), BUK (5115N 01557E), KOŚCIAN (5135N 01604E)	

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ANNEX D

DRAGOLAND ASACS ORDER OF BATTLE

UNIT NAME	BASE / SITE NAME	LAT N	LONG E	REMARKS
AD SOC NORTH	LAAGE	5355	01220	
AD SOC N-E	BABIMOST	5210	01550	
AD SOC S-W	KOTCHEN	5145	01158	
RRP-111	ŻMIGRÓD	5127	01651	
RRP-112	CHODZIEŻ	5258	01650	
RRP-113	DZIERŻONIÓW	5047	01642	
RRP-114	BOLESŁAWIEC	5127	01531	
RRP-115	WOLSZTYN	5207	01602	
RRP-116	SEELOW	5230	01420	
RRP-117	TORGAU	5131	01256	
RRP-118	FREIBERG	5051	01320	
RRP-119	BIAŁOGARD	5402	01555	
RRP-120	JASTROWIE	5327	01648	
RRP-211	REICHENBACH	5110	01447	
RRP-212	EISLEBEN	5130	01129	
RRP-311	EBERSWALDE	5251	01335	
RRP-312	FURSTENBERG	5311	01305	
RRP-313	PASEWALK	5330	01355	
RRP-314	DEMMIN	5353	01259	

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ANNEX E

CJTF LAND ORDER OF BATTLE

LCC

UNIT	LOCATION AS OF 9 MAY 2005	N LAT	E LONG
JFLCC	WARSZAWA	5216	02054
1 st Corps	BIAŁYSTOK	5305	02311
11 th Armd Div	NOWA WIEŚ OSTRÓDZKA	5320	02004
12 Armd Bde	LIDZBARK	5316	01950
13 Armd Bde	DZIALDOWO	5314	02010
14 Mech Bde	NIDZICA	5322	02025
16 AOAD Rgt	OLSZTYNEK	5334	02016
130 th Mech Div	PASŁĘK	5403	01939
131 Armd Bde	DZIERZGOŃ	5355	01921
132 Armd Bde	MORAĞ	5356	01954
133 Mech Bde	MIAŁAKOWO	5401	02004
135 AOAD Rgt	PASŁĘK	5405	01938
230 Mech Div	STAWISKI	5327	02210
231 Armd Bde	KOLNO	5324	02156
232 Armd Bde	KISILNICA	5316	02207
233 Mech Bde	SZCZUCZYN	5334	02217
235 AOAD Rgt	STAWISKI	5322	02209
5 ABN Bde	SUCHA WIEŚ	5358	02250
200 AAVN Bde	OSTRÓW MAZOWIECKA	5233	02137
201 AAVN Bde	LUBLIN	5058	02224

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SLAWIA ARMY

UNIT	LOCATION AS OF 9 MAY 2005	N LAT	E LONG
SL Army HQ	WARSZAWA	5216	02054
11 th Mech Div	ZAGNARSK	5056	02011
122 nd Mountain Bde	GOGOLIN	5014	01744
112 th Mech Bde	BRUSY	5353	01743
111 th Armd Div	JEDLANKA	5155	02208
110 th Armd Bde	SIEDLCE	5154	02159
115 th Armd Bde	ŁUKÓW	5140	02205
134 th Armd Bde	ZBUCZYNSKA	5149	02207
117 th Mech Bde	STOCZEK ŁUKOWSKI	5142	02140
14 th AOAD Rgt	MORDY	5156	02212
112 th Mech Div	KOSCIERZYNA	5408	01759
12 th Mech Bde	ŁĘBORK	5432	01745
17 th Coastal Defence Bde	ŁEBA	5445	01734
136 th Mech Bde	PUZDROWO	5420	01751
16 th Armd Bde	BYTÓW	5410	01730
13 th AOAD Rgt	TUCHOMIE	5407	01720
116 th Mech Div	CHEŁMNO	5306	01808
115 th Mech Bde	KORONOWO	5319	01757
120 th Mech Bde	SĘPÓLNO KRAJEŃSKIE	5327	01732
116 th Mech Bde	BARCIN	5251	01756
19 th Armd Bde	BIAŁE BŁOTA	5305	01755
113 th AOAD Rgt	OSOWA GÓRA	5309	01753
125 th Air Assault Bde	TOMASZÓW MAZOWIECKI	5117N	01943
16 th Airborne Bde	ŁĘCZYCA	5148	01855
123 rd Arty Bde	CZERSK	5332	01741
11 th Arty Bde	GNIEWKOWO	5238	01807
11 th Eng Bde	TORUŃ	5245	01819
149 th AAVN Rgt (27xMI-24; 16xMI-2)	SKARYSZEW	5349	01809
156 th AAVN Rgt (27xMI-24; 16xMI-2)	LUBRANIEC	5217	01833
Silesian Military District HQ	KRAKÓW	5002	02001
11 th Homeland Defence Bde	KLECZEW	5214	01801
12 th Homeland Defence Bde	RYCHWAŁ	5149	01753
118 th Homeland Defence Bde	KALISZ	5130	01748
13 th Homeland Defence Bde	GRABÓW N/ PROSNA	5115	01750
110 th Log Bde	CZĘSTOCHOWA	5033	01849
114 th Homeland Defence Bde	BYCZYNA	5009	01915

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CJTF AIR ORDER OF BATTLE

UNIT NAME	BASE / SITE NAME	BASE / SITE CODE	LOCATION (LATM)	A/C (EQUIP.) TYPE	A/C (EQUIP.) NO	LOSES	PRI ROLE	SEC ROLE	REMARKS
JFACC	ŁUCK	ELLK	5043N 02517E	ACC HQ	1		HQ		
CAOC 1	ŁUCK	ELLK	5043N 02517E	CAOC	1		HQ		
5 WING	KALININGRAD	ESKD	5437N 02035E	5 WOC	1		HQ		
51 SQN	KALININGRAD	ESKD	5437N 02035E	F-15C	16		ADX		
52 SQN	KALININGRAD	ESKD	5437N 02035E	F-15C	16		ADX		
53 SQN	KALININGRAD	ESKD	5437N 02035E	F-15E	16		FBX		FB PREC D/N
54 SQN	KALININGRAD	ESKD	5437N 02035E	F-15E	16		FBX		FB PREC D/N
6 WING	CZERNIACHOWSK	ESCK	5435N 02155E	6 WOC	1		HQ		
61 SQN	CZERNIACHOWSK	ESCK	5435N 02155E	TOR R	14		TRO	TRI	ALL WEATHER CAPABILITIES
62 SQN	CZERNIACHOWSK	ESCK	5435N 02155E	TOR R	14		TRO	TRI	ALL WEATHER CAPABILITIES
63 SQN	CZERNIACHOWSK	ESCK	5435N 02155E	TOR ECR	13		ETS	TRI	
64 SQN	CZERNIACHOWSK	ESCK	5435N 02155E	TOR ECR	13		ETS	TRI	
7 WING	TOMASZÓW MAZOWIECKI	ESTM	5135N 02005E	7 WOC	1		HQ		
71 SQN	TOMASZÓW MAZOWIECKI	ESTM	5135N 02005E	M2000RDI	16		ADR		
72 SQN	TOMASZÓW MAZOWIECKI	ESTM	5135N 02005E	M2000RDI	16		ADR		
73 SQN	TOMASZÓW MAZOWIECKI	ESTM	5135N 02005E	MIR F1CR	16		TRO	TRI	
8 WING	MODLIN	ESMD	5227N 02039E	8 WOC	1		HQ		

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UNIT NAME	BASE / SITE NAME	BASE / SITE CODE	LOCATION (LATM)	A/C (EQUIP.) TYPE	A/C (EQUIP.) NO	LOSES	PRI ROLE	SEC ROLE	REMARKS
81 SQN	MODLIN	ESMD	5227N 02039E	F-16C	16		FBX	AWX	
82 SQN	MODLIN	ESMD	5227N 02039E	F-16C	16		FBX	AWX	
83 SQN	MODLIN	ESMD	5227N 02039E	F-16CJ	16		ESJ		
84 SQN	MODLIN	ESMD	5227N 02039E	F-16CJ	16		ESJ		
9 WING	NOWE MIASTO	ESNM	5137N 02032E	9 WOC	1		HQ		
91 SQN	NOWE MIASTO	ESNM	5137N 02032E	TOR IDS	14		FBA		
92 SQN	NOWE MIASTO	ESNM	5137N 02032E	TOR IDS	14		FBA		
93 SQN	NOWE MIASTO	ESNM	5137N 02032E	EC-130H	4		ESJ		COMPASS CALL
				EA-6B	8		ESJ		
11 WING	MALBORK	ESMK	5401N 01908E	11 WOC	1		HQ		
111 SQN	MALBORK	ESMK	5401N 01908E	OA-10	12		ABFAC		
112 SQN	MALBORK	ESMK	5401N 01908E	PUMA	12		CSAR		
113 SQN	MALBORK	ESMK	5401N 01908E	PREDATOR	8		UAV		2 COY
13 WING	ROWNO	ELRW	5035N 02610E	13 WOC	1		HQ		
				E-3C	4		AEW		
131 SQN	ROWNO	ELRW	5035N 02610E	RC-135	4		SIR		
				E-8B	2		JSTARS		
132 SQN	ROWNO	ELRW	5035N 02610E	KC-135R	6		AAR		
				KC-10	6		AAR		
14 WING	BIALYSTOK	ESBK	5305N 02311E	14 WOC	1		HQ		
141 SQN	BIALYSTOK	ESBK	5305N 02311E	C-160	12		TLM		APOD
142 SQN	BIALYSTOK	ESBK	5305N 02311E	C-160	12		TLM		
AEREVAC GP	BIALYSTOK	ESBK	5305N 02311E	Boeing 727	4		AEREVAC		MEDICAL
15 WING	BIALA PODLASKA	ESBP	5200N 02309E	15 WOC	1		HQ		

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UNIT NAME	BASE / SITE NAME	BASE / SITE CODE	LOCATION (LATM)	A/C (EQUIP.) TYPE	A/C (EQUIP.) NO	LOSES	PRI ROLE	SEC ROLE	REMARKS
151 SQN	BIAŁA PODLASKA	ESBP	5200N 02309E	C-130	10		TMM		APOD
152 SQN	BIAŁA PODLASKA	ESBP	5200N 02309E	C-130	10		TMM		
PSYOPS GP	BIAŁA PODLASKA	ESBP	5200N 02309E	EC-130E	2		PSYOPS		
2 AIR BDE	ŁASK	ESLK	5133N 01910E	2 WOC	1		HQ		
7 SQN	ŁASK	ESLK	5133N 01910E	F-16C	16		FBX	AWX	
10 SQN	ŁASK	ESLK	5133N 01910E	F-16C	16		AWX	FBX	
3 SQN	MELEC	ESML	5019N 02127E	3 SQOC	1		HQ		
3 SQN	MIELEC	ESML	5019N 02127E	F-16C	16		AWX	FBX	
6 SQN	RADOM	ESRM	5123N 02112E	6 SQOC	1		HQ		
6 SQN	RADOM	ESRM	5123N 02112E	SU-22M4	16	2	FBA		
1 AIR BDE	MIŃSK MAZOWIECKI	ESMM	5211N 02139E	1 WOC	1		HQ		
1 SQN	MIŃSK MAZOWIECKI	ESMM	5211N 02139E	MIG-29	18	4	ADI		
8 SQN	SZYMANY	ESSY	5328N 02056E	8 SQOC	1		HQ		
8 SQN	SZYMANY	ESSY	5328N 02056E	SU-22M4	18	3	FBA		
40 SQN	PRAWDIŃSK	ESPK	5425N 02104E	40 SQOC	1		HQ		
40 SQN	PRAWDIŃSK	ESPK	5425N 02104E	SU-22M4	16	4	FBA		
41 SQN	ORNETA	ESOA	5405N 02013E	41 SQOC	1		HQ		
41 SQN	ORNETA	ESOA	5405N 02013E	MIG-29	16	2	ADI		
13 TPT SQN	RZESZÓW JASIONKA	ESRJ	5007N 02202E	13 SQOC	1		HQ		
13 TPT SQN	RZESZÓW JASIONKA	ESRJ	5007N 02202E	AN-26B	10		TLM		
36 TPT RGT	WARSZAWA OKĘCIE	ESWA	5210N 02058E	CASA295	8		TLM		
36 TPT RGT	WARSZAWA OKĘCIE	ESWA	5210N 02058E	36 SQOC	1		HQ		
36 TPT RGT	WARSZAWA OKĘCIE	ESWA	5210N 02058E	TU-154M	2		TMP		
				JAK-40M	7		TMP		

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ANNEX G

CJTF SAM ORDER OF BATTLE

UNIT NAME	BASE / SITE NAME	LAT N	LONG E	EQUIP. TYPE	EQUIP NO	REMARKS
110 SAM BDE	ELBLĄG	5411	01926	110 SAMOC	1	
111 SAM SQN	WĄBRZEŻNO	5314	01858	PATRIOT	8*	
112 SAM SQN	KWIDZYŃ	5347	01859	PATRIOT	8*	
113 SAM SQN	ELBLĄG	5411	01926	PATRIOT	8*	
120 SAM BDE	PISZ	5337	02146	120 SAMOC	1	
121 SAM SQN	MRAŁOWO	5352	02116	PATRIOT	8*	
122 SAM SQN	SZCZYTNO	5332	02056	PATRIOT	8*	
123 SAM SQN	BIAŁA PISKA	5336	02203	PATRIOT	8*	
61 SAM BDE	MORAĞ	5357	01952	61 SAMOC	1	
613 SAM SQN	MORAĞ	5357	01952	SA-4	6*	
612 SAM SQN	IKAWA	5338	01930	SA-4	6*	
611 SAM SQN	BRODNICA	5319	01930	SA-4	6*	
3 SAM BDE	WOŁOMIN	5150	02040	3 SAMOC	1	
31 SAM SQN	WYSZKÓW	5236	02111	SA-3	3*	
32 SAM SQN	TŁUSZCZ	5224	02126	SA-3	3*	
33 SAM SQN	OTWOCK	5208	02117	SA-3	3*	
34 SAM SQN	PRUSZKÓW	5206	02052	SA-3	3*	
35 SAM SQN	BŁONIE	5211	02032	SA-3	3*	
36 SAM SQN	WYSZOGRÓD	5221	02025	SA-3	3*	
37 SAM SQN	PŁOŃSK	5235	02043	SA-3	3*	
38 SAM SQN	NASIELSK	5239	02046	SA-3	3*	
39 SAM SQN	LEGIONOWO	5222	02100	SA-3	3*	
1 SAM BDE	KRZESZOWICE	5010	01937	1 SAMOC	1	
11 SAM SQN	WOLBROM	5021	01952	SA-3	3*	
12 SAM SQN	KRZESZOWICE	5010	01937	SA-3	3*	
13 SAM SQN	SPYTKOWICE	4957	01930	SA-3	3*	
14 SAM SQN	NOWA HUTA	5010	02004	SA-3	3*	
15 SAM SQN	KSIAŻ WIELKI	5026	01959	SA-3	3*	
16 SAM SQN	OGRODZIENIEC	5027	01933	SA-3	3*	
17 SAM SQN	ZĄBKOWICE	5022	01918	SA-3	3*	
18 SAM SQN	TRZEBINIA	5010	01928	SA-3	3*	

* Number of launchers

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
ANNEX H

CJTF ASACS ORDER OF BATTLE

UNIT NAME	BASE / SITE NAME	LAT N	LONG E	EQUIP. NO x EQUIP. TYPE	REMARKS
CRC 1	WARSZAWA	5207	01713	1 x HQ	
RRP 11	LĘBORK	5432	01747	1xNUR-31, 1xNUR-41, 1xRW-31, 1xNUR-11	
RRP 12	GRUDZIĄDZ	5332	01852	1xNUR-22, 1xNUR-41, 1xNUR-31, 1xRW-31	
RRP 13	INOWROCŁAW	5442	01820	1xNUR-11, 1xRW-31, 1xRT-17	
RRP 14	DZIAŁDOWO	5310	2010	1xRT-17W, 1xNUR-41, 1xNUR-21	
RRP 15	STEGNA	5420	01907	1xRT-17W, 1xNUR-41, 1xNUR-21	
RRP 16	OSTROŁĘKA	5305	02131	1xNUR-22, 1xNUR-41, 1xNUR-31, 1xRW-31	
RRP 17	EŁK	5350	02218	1xRT-17W, 1xNUR-41, 1xNUR-21	
RRP 18	BIAŁA PODLASKA	5202	02302	1xJ-2MP, 1xPRW-15, 1xNUR-12	
CRC 2	KRAKÓW	4959	01951	1 x HQ	
RRP 21	TUREK	5202	01832	1xNUR-41, 1xNUR-31, 1xRW-31	
RRP 22	PAJĘCZNO	5108	01900	1xNUR-41, 1xNUR-31, 1xRW-31, 1xNUR-22	
RRP 23	TARNOWSKIE GÓRY	5030	01852	1xRT-17W, 1xRW-31, 1xNUR-11	
RRP 24	STASZÓW	5035	02107	1xRT-17W, 1xNUR-41, 1xNUR-21	
RRP 25	PRZYSUCHA	5122	02037	1xRT-17W, 1xNUR-41	
RRP 26	ZAMOŚĆ	5047	02312	1xRT-17W, 1xNUR-41	

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JFACC TASK ORGANISATION FOR OPERATION RELIABLE GUARD



JFACC LOGISTIC SITUATION

1. Logistic support of BLUE ALLIANCE air force assets allotted to JFACC LUTSK is based on principle of use of national resources stored on required level by respective troop contributing nations in particular peacetime location bases and is conducted in accordance with their national logistic support rules.
2. In case of the necessity of their deployment on territory of other state - BLUE ALLIANCE member air force assets contributing nations use widely support provided by proper host nation as well as contract local resources. Depends on situation detailed HNS extent is agreed individually with appropriate support requesting nations.
3. In any case when respective weapon system is used by more than one nation there is realised level C aircraft cross-servicing in en-route bases located on territory of state-BLUE ALLIANCE members.
4. Anyway, taking into consideration specification and technical sophistication of owned weapon systems as well as achieved interoperability level, each troop contributing nation retains ultimate responsibility for its deployed air force assets logistic support assurance.
5. AFBs are separate from flying units organisation and are controlled along with operational level logistics assets directly by respective nations Air Force Logistics Chief.
6. Logistic assets have already achieved combat readiness. They are manned and equipped approximately at 90-95%. Tactical level supplies should allow 7-10 days air operations. Serious limitation on guided munitions, especially air to surface missiles.
7. Particular air force bases provide sufficient logistics support for flying units. Maintenance of aircraft is conducted by flying units organic personnel. In case of logistics support for aircraft of other types limitations in personnel, munitions as well as equipment have to be considered. In case of deployments of another squadron(s) to AFB, the deployment of ground support personnel, required equipment and munitions as well as increased time of maintenance have to be considered too. The maintenance equipment deployment may be not required if such squadrons use the

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same type of aircraft but in this case increased time of maintenance have to be considered.

8. Limitations for fighter bombers operations planning:

- air to surface missiles and rockets - 50%,
- bombs - 50%.

Detailed Logistic Information on Request: m.fornal@aon.edu.pl

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APPENDIX 1
TO ANNEX J

STANDARD CONVENTIONAL LOAD (SCL) FOR JFACC AIRCRAFT

SCL TYPE	WPNS TYPE	WPNS NO	WPNS TYPE	WPNS NO	WPNS TYPE	WPNS NO	REMARKS
EA-6B PROWLER							
EA6SCL1	AGM-88	2					
EA6SCL2	ANALQ-99F	5					
F-16C							
F16SCL1	AIM-120	4					
F16SCL2	AIM-9	6					
F16SCL3	AGM-65	4					
F16SCL4	MK 84	2					
F16SCL5	MK 83	4					
F16SCL6	CBU-87	4					
F16SCL7	GBU-24	2					
F16SCL8	GBU-12	4					
F-16CJ							
F16CJSCL1	AGM-88	2					
F16CJSCL2	CBU-87	4					
F16CJSCL3	AIM-120	2					
MIG-29							
M29SCL1	R-27R	2					
M29SCL2	R-73	6					
M29SCL3	R-60	6					
TORNADO ECR (TORGEE)							
TECRSCL1	AGM-88	4					
TECRSCL2	AIM-9	2					
TORNADO RECCE (TORGER)							
TRECSCL1	RECCEPOD	1					
TRECSCL2	AIM-9	2					
TORNADO IDS (TORGEA)							
TIDSCL1	MW 1	1					
TIDSCL2	GBU-12	4					
TIDSCL3	GBU-10	4					
TIDSCL4	MK 84	5					
TIDSCL5	MK 83	7					
TIDSCL6	MK 82	8					
TIDSCL7	BL 755	8					

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SCL TYPE	WPNS TYPE	WPNS NO	WPNS TYPE	WPNS NO	WPNS TYPE	WPNS NO	REMARKS
TIDSCL8	AIM-9	2					
F-15E							
F15ESCL1	GBU-24	2					
F15ESCL2	GBU-12	4					
F15ESCL3	GBU-15	2					
F15ESCL4	AGM-130	2					
F15ESCL5	CBU-87	6					
F15ESCL6	MK 84	2					
F15ESCL7	MK 83	8					
F15ESCL8	MK 82	12					
F15ESCL9	AIM-120	4					
F15ESCL10	AIM-9	4					
F-15C							
F15CSCL1	AIM-120	4					
F15CSCL2	AIM-9	4					
SU-22M4							
S22SCL1	H-29T	2					
S22SCL2	H-29L	2					
S22SCL3	H-25ML	4					
S22SCL4	H-25MT	4					
S22SCL6	S-24	4					
S22SCL7	B8	4					
S22SCL8	UB-32	6					
S22SCL9	FAB-500M62	4					
S22SCL11	BETAB-500	4					
S22SCL12	BETAB-250	8					
S22SCL13	OFAB-250	6					
S22SCL14	RBK-500	4					
S22SCL15	RBK-250	4					
S22SCL16	R-60	2					
OA-10							
OA10SCL1	LAU-68 (18)	4					
OA10SCL2	MK82	4					
OA10SCL2	AIM-9	1					
M2000RDI							
M2RDISCL1	R.530D	3					
M2RDISCL2	MAGIC 2	2					
MIRAGE F1FCR							
F1FCRSCL1	RECCE POD	1					
F1FCRSCL2	MAGIC 2	2					

EW PODS, FUEL TANKS AND OTHER EQUIPEMENT ACCORDING TO AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES

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**COM CJTF JOINT COORDINATION ORDER 003 FOR OPERATION
RELIABLE GUARD**

CJT/CJ3JC/304/07

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: OPERATION RELIABLE GUARD JOINT COORDINATION ORDER 003
(JCO) 14 MAY 2007 (X-2) EFFECTIVE FROM 17 MAY (X+1 – X+7)

DATE: 13 MAY 2007

REFERENCE:

- A. UNSC RESOLUTION 1371, DATED 18 MAR 2007.
- B. BLUE ALLIANCE COUNCIL MILITARY STAFF INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR A POSSIBLE UN PEACE OPERATION IN CENTRAL EUREKA, DATED 20 MAR 2007.
- C. COMBASC PLANNING GUIDANCE, DATED 23 MAR 2007.
- D. COMCJTF PLANNING GUIDANCE, DATED 28 MAR 2007.
- E. MC CONOPS APPROVAL, DATED 28 MAR 2007.
- F. COMBASC ACTWARN, DATED 29 MAR 2007.
- G. COMMANDER COMBINED JOINT TASAK FORCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR OPERATION RELIABLE GUARD, DATED 29 MAR 2007.
- H. ROEIMPL MESSAGE "003", DATED 14 MAY 2007.

1. COM CJTF'S D & G.

a. Review of Situation.

(1) General. The collapse of BIZONIA / DRAGOLAND military coalition caused major changes to political and military situation in JOA. New Bizonian authorities indicate willingness not to involve in military confrontation against Blue Alliance forces. By 13th May Bizonian forces major units completed withdrawal from BIZONIA/SLAWIA border area, but still remain in high readiness status. BIZONIA allow UN Observers to supervise situation on ethnic Oderian minorities' homeland. UN consultations with BLUE ALLIANCE and SLAWIA resulted in an agreement that BA forces will maintain deterrence posture without direct military actions against BIZONIA.

Not accepting the ultimatum DRAGOLAND indicates determination to oppose any external military intervention. With the new strategic conditions, DRAGOLAND strategic centre of gravity seems to be worldwide public opinion. Dragolandian authorities may focus their efforts to threaten a costly war of attrition that could quickly turn public opinion against the war. Second, they may

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calculate they can withdraw the bulk of DRGOLAND forces from WESTERN POMERANIA even after BLUE ALLIANCE military operation begin, if necessary.

BAC directed to conduct offensive operations against DRAGOLAND, if Dragolandian forces are not withdrew before 162400Z MAY 2007.

CMBASC ordered readiness to execute adapted to new strategic conditions COM CJTF CONOPS RELIABLE GUARD. He ordered to use concentrated decisive combat power against C2, lines of communications and key capabilities of DRAGOLAND forces in SLAWIA as well as in DRAGOLAND. COMBASC's strategic military objectives for the are to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA and implement UN resolutions.

(2) Combined Joint Task Force. COM CJTF mission remains unchanged. Deployment of the joint force has been accomplished as planned. SLAWIA operational forces were integrated into CJTF and COM CJTF TOA accepted.

Embargo operations have commenced and are executed according to Ref. D.

(b) Scope. This JCO encompasses in detail all changes to PHASE IIIB resulting from DRAGOLAND not escalate offensive operations and BIZONIA's living military coalition with DRAGOLAND.

2. COMMANDERS INTENT.

I intend to continue to demonstrate BLUE ALLIANCE's resolve by the demonstration of dominating military power in the JOA to deter any aggressive acts by DRAGOLAND and to discourage BIZONIA from re-entering the coalition with SLAWIA. If DRAGOLAND fails to comply with UNSC Resolution 1371, I intend to immediately initiate counter-offensive operations to isolate DRAGOLAND deployed against SLAWIA, interdict DRAGOLAND C3I, logistics and LOC's, and exploit operational manoeuvre with land and amphibious forces to force DRAGOLAND forces to withdrawal from SLAWIA territory.

I intend to conduct combined joint air operations, including first of all counter-air operations and air operations for strategic effect. After achieving air superiority east to Odra River, simultaneously to CAO and SA I intend to cut LOCs between DRAGOLAND 75th, 6th and 21st corps and isolate them from supplies. Maintaining air superiority over DRAGOLAND controlled territory will allow starting destroying 75th Corps and preparing conditions for ground and amphibious operations.

About 22nd May I intend to conduct ground offensive for achieving military objective and desired end state through the destruction of the DL 75th Corps in the WESTERN POMERANIA, preservation of the offensive capability of the combined forces, and restoration of the sovereignty of Slawia. It is my intention to physically and psychologically isolate the DRAGOLAND forces in SLAWIA. Operations should fix and block DRAGOLAND's first operational echelon reserves, with the objective of securing Alliance flanks and LOCs by SLAWIA. Ground operations will culminate in the destruction of 75th Corps divisions in SLAWIA. BA 1st Corps will be the main effort. SLAWIA's operational group consisted of two divisions will conducts supporting attack on the left flank. On the right, marine brigade embarked in LANCET will conduct synchronised amphibious operation with objective to gain control and secure KARLINO oil fields.

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I intend to conduct maritime operations for gaining and maintaining control of the sea in accordance with BA rules of engagement. After shaping battlefield for ground operations, my intention is to conduct synchronised amphibious assault to SLAWIA ashore. I will conduct maritime power projection to support air and ground operations.

3. AMPLIFIED GUIDANCE.

a. Supporting – Supported Commanding Relationships.

- (1) COM JFACC is supported commander until air superiority is achieved over DRAGOLAND air space.
- (2) COM JFLCC will then become supported commander.

b. Tasks

(1) COM ACC is to:

- (a) Maintain air superiority over own forces and expand air superiority over required territory and waters for conduct of the counter offensive.
- (b) Isolate DRAGOLAND leadership and deter the DRAGOLAND from responding to the BLUE ALLIANCE operations with WMD.
- (c) Isolate forward deployed Coalition Forces.
- (d) Disrupt Coalition Logistics and C2.
- (e) Shape the battlefield for the ground offensive.
- (f) Support LCC.
- (g) Be prepared to conduct strategic attacks against TBM systems, WMD production and storage facilities on order.

(2) COM LCC is to:

- (a) Conduct counter attack to defeat DL 75th Corps.
- (b) Restore SLAWIA territory.
- (c) Conduct operations to degrade DRAGOLAND's operational level offensive capabilities east to ODRA river.
- (d) Within capabilities, assist the local authorities in the initial restoration of civil control.

(3) COM MCC is to:

- (a) Prevent re-supply of DRAGOLAND forces by sea.
- (b) Conduct unopposed amphibious landing in the area of Karlino with forces required to receive one LCC brigade size force. On order MCC is to transfer amphibious forces OPCON to COMLCC.
- (c) Conduct sea denial operations in southern Baltic Sea.
- (d) Support COMACC with air defence operations within JOA.

(4) COM SOTF.

- (a) Conduct surveillance and reconnaissance (SR) and on order direct attack (DA) against operational and strategic high value targets.

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(b) Conduct SR and on order DA, against DRAGOLAND's WMD related targets like WMD research, production, storage and test facilities and WMD delivery means.

(c) Continue the direct support to LCC.

(5) COM POTF

(a) Exploit the course of military and political events to further reinforce perceptions of the Blue Alliance's resolve and capability within Dragolandian populace in order to isolate DRAGOLAND political leadership and deter BIZONIA from supporting.

(b) Weaken enemy forces will to fight, concentrating on Logistic/CIS personnel and Reserve, and induce surrender of line units on tactical level, exploiting the effects of Blue Alliance counter-attack.

(c) Disseminate programmes to deter the use of WMD.

(d) Develop programmes to support conflict termination and post conflict operations.

c. Prioritised Defended Asset List

PRIORITY	
1	C3 Centre Warszawa
2	APOD (Białystok, Biała Podlaska)
3	CJTF Troops Assembly Areas
4	Air Bases
5	Log Bases
6	Large Population Centres in SLAWIA
7	Infrastructure used by UN ; IO and NGO HQ

d. CINC prioritisation and apportionment of air assets

PHASE III	PRI	WOE
COM CJTF prioritisation and apportionment of air assets		
Maintain Air Superiority over SLAWIA not occupied by DRAGOLAND forces.	1	Low
Gain and maintain Air Superiority over DRAGOLAND, territory occupied by DRAGOLAND armed forces.	1	High
Offensive Counter Air against air defence C2, GBAD, and airfields.	1	High
ASFAO to support LCC offensive operations	2	High
Strategic attacks against strategic level C4I capability. On order SA against TBM systems, WMD production and storage facilities.	1	Med
ASFAO to support amphibious operations	2	Low

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4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

a. Phase IIIB is expected to commence early 17 May, BCA accordingly to ROEIMPL "03".

b. Joint Targeting.

(1) Targets on SLAWIA territory not occupied are prohibited.

(2) Engagement of targets on SLAWIA territory occupied by DRAGOLAND forces is to be coordinated with SLAWIA.

(3) Targeting has to be synchronised and reflect operational requirements of all components.

(4) Targeting has to be IAW International Law of Armed Conflict (i.e. Installations used by civilian authorities and installations hosting IDP and /or Refugees).

c. COM LCC coordinates amphibious operations in WESTERN POMERANIA with COM MCC.

d. Assistance to UN, IO, NGO and SLAWIA authorities in SLAWIA are to be coordinated via CJTF.

e. **INFO OPS.** Offensive INFO OPS primary intent is to gain and maintain Information Superiority throughout the battle space. INFO OPS activities are primarily aiming to influence DRAGOLAND governments, the public opinion and military decision makers to deter the DRAGOLAND from using WMD weapons. The primary audiences are the key military and political decision makers of the DRAGOLAND and their supporting C2 structure and decision making processes.

FOR THE COMMANDER COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE

XX.X.XXXX

Lieutenant General, LAN

Chief of Staff

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141910B MAY 07

RELAU

CLASSIFICATION

FROM: COMCJTF

SUBJECT: CJTF ROEIMPL MSG No "3" EFFECTIVE 142000B MAY 2007

TO: COMJFACC

SIC CBC/CBE/CBD

REFERENCES: A. MC362

B. ROEAUTH MSG BY BAC

1. SITUATION

GIVEN DRAGOLAND ULTIMATUM TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM SLAWIA (UNSC RESOLUTION 1371) WILL EXPIRE 162400Z MAY 2007.

DESIGNATOR COUNTRY (DESIG) IS DRAGOLAND.

POLITICAL POLICY INDICATOR (PPI) IS BRAVO.

DRAGOLAND AND DRAGOLAND CONTROLLED TERRITORY BORDER CROSSING AUTHORIZED EFFECTIVE 170015B MAY 07.

2. ROE IMPLEMENTATION

A. PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY

PI ON ROE IS RESTRICTED.

B. IMPLEMENTATION / CANCELLATION

FOR JFACC IMPLEMENT: 232, 374, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427 AND 428 ON DRAGOLAND; BUT OBSERVE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW.

3. REMARKS

ROE IMPLEMENTATION DELEGATED TO TACOM LEVEL OF COMMAND.

STRICTLY OBSERVE BIZONIA AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES.

ADMIRAL, COMCJTF

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281530B MAR 07

RELAU

CLASSIFICATION

FROM: COMCJTF

SUBJECT: COMCJTF PLANNING GUIDANCE 01/07 FOR OPERATION
RELIABLE GUARD

TO: COMJFLCC

COMJFACC

COMJFMCC

COMCJSOTF

INFO: COMBASC

REFERENCES:

A. BLUE ALLIANCE COUNCIL INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR PREPARATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE DEVELOPING CRISIS BETWEEN THE BLUE ALLIANCE AND DRAGOLAND AND BIZONIA, DATED 20 MAR 2007.

B. COMBASC STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE DEVELOPING CRISIS BETWEEN THE BLUE ALLIANCE AND DRAGOLAND AND BIZONIA, 231020B MAR 07.

1. REVIEW OF SITUATION.

a. General.

(1) Background.

(a) Peace and security in CENTRAL EUREKA have been breached by DRAGOLAND's invasion of sovereign territory belonging to SLAWIA and are further threatened by the continued instability in the border area between BIZONIA and SLAWIA as a result of BIZONIA's military operations against suspected ethnic ODERIANS terrorists. The emerging military coalition between DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA further increases the threat to SLAWIA. DRAGOLAND has refused to comply with UNSC Resolution 1367 which demands that DRAGOLAND withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces from SLAWIA. BIZONIA backs DRAGOLAND although has not yet committed forces to attack on SLAWIA.

(b) The UNSC has requested BLUE ALLIANCE support to uphold and implement UNSC Resolution 1367 and subsequent resolutions to compel DRAGOLAND to withdraw its forces from the territory of SLAWIA and to restore international peace and security in the region. A UNSC Resolution 1371 established the mandate of BLUE ALLIANCE forces. The UN Security Council has agreed the following mandates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter:

1. UNSC Resolution 1367 demands that DRAGOLAND withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 07 MAR 2007.

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2. UNSC Resolution 1369 establishes that all states shall prevent the import or export of goods to and from DRAGOLAND.

3. UNSC Resolution 1370 calls upon member states cooperating with SLAWIA which are deploying maritime forces to the area to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in Resolution 1369.

4. UNSC Resolution 1371 authorises states cooperating with SLAWIA, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 1367 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area, unless DRAGOLAND fully implements all foregoing resolutions to **162400B MAY 2007.**

(c) On this basis the BLUE ALLIANCE Council has directed Commander BLUE ALLIANCE Strategic Command (COMBASC), as a matter of urgency, to develop a concept of operations, including a further estimate of force requirements, including enabling forces, for the conduct of a BLUE ALLIANCE Led Operation in CENTRAL EUREKA.

(2) Current Situation.

(a) DRAGOLAND forces have secured most of the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE and control the approaches to the GDAŃSKA BAY as well as the airspace over these areas. DRAGOLAND is consolidating its position and transitioning to defensive operations. Advanced SAMs (including HAWK) and maritime SSMS (STYX) have been pushed forward. Movement and load out of DL sea mines have been reported. DRAGOLAND mobilisation continues and its forces remain in a high state of readiness. DRAGOLAND has offered to negotiate the future status of the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE as well as other issues.

(b) SLAWIA has stabilised its defences west of the WISŁA RIVER in the vicinity of the 17^{030'} east longitude. SLAWIA forces in the southwest part of country are on alert and have reported increased instances of sabotage and SOF activity. SLAWIA has requested UN assistance.

(c) BIZONIA is continuing military operations in the east of BIZONIA against ethnic Oderians separatists with frequent cross border raids into SLAWIA. BZ 12 Corps is now fully deployed in the eastern province and some elements are actively engaged in operations against suspected Oderians terrorists. Elements of 14 Corps remain in north-east DRAGOLAND following their participation with DRAGOLAND forces in exercise HAIL STORM.

b. Opposing Forces.

(1) DRAGOLAND.

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(a) Intent. DRAGOLAND's overall objective is to enhance its strategic international position in order to consolidate the political power of the current authoritarian regime. This includes retention of the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE, gaining profits of the KARLINO oil fields and preventing international intervention.

(b) Capabilities.

1. DRAGOLAND can launch attacks using air, maritime and SSM forces at any time.

2. DRAGOLAND is capable of renewing limited ground offensive within 3 to 5 days but would require 10-15 days to mount a major new ground offensive. A major ground offensive cannot be sustained beyond 2-3 weeks without an operational pause.

3. DRAGOLAND surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) (SCUD B and C) have ranges up to 600 km giving DRAGOLAND the capability of striking most of SLAWIA.

4. DRAGOLAND possesses chemical weapons and is believed to have the capability to produce biological weapons. There is no evidence of a nuclear weapons capability.

(c) Assessment. DRAGOLAND's deployment of surface-to-air missiles systems into the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE indicate its intention to defend captured SLAWIA territory. Continued mobilisation may indicate further military action. However, DRAGOLAND is unlikely to launch any new major offensive action unilaterally unless there is a significant change in the strategic situation. In such case, DRAGOLAND may act in coalition with BIZONIA to set conditions using military force. DRAGOLAND's future actions in order of likelihood would be to:

1. Further reinforcement and consolidation of its control over WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.

2. Increase information operations to isolate SLAWIA and forestall an effective international challenge.

3. Continue, in coalition with BIZONIA, to threaten and coerce SLAWIA into acceding to their demands for a share in BI-AŁOGARD Plain oil reserves.

4. Deny points of entry and oppose the deployment of outside forces into the region.

5. Use military force in coalition with BIZONIA to exploit opportunities to gain control of WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.

(2) BIZONIA.

(a) Intent. BIZONIA's totalitarian regime appears to be willing to exploit the current situation in order to expand its regional dominance and safeguard the regime. They will likely seek to gain a share of the

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KARLINO oil fields and eradicate the armed Oderians Separatist Movement in order to secure its border with SLAWIA.

(b) Capabilities.

1. BIZONIA Air Forces are capable of offensive operations including long range attack against targets anywhere in SLAWIA.
2. BIZONIA is capable of initiating limited ground offensive action against SLAWIA within 3-5 days with forces deployed close to border areas.
3. BIZONIA is capable of mounting a major offensive from either east BIZONIA or through DRAGOLAND with 20-30 days further preparation.
4. BIZONIA does not have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability.

(c) Assessment. The continued build up of BIZONIA military forces has raised military tensions and could forecast a BIZONIA attack against SLAWIA. BIZONIA's future actions in order of likelihood would be to:

1. Continue to threaten southwest SLAWIA in order to pressure SLAWIA into acceding to the demands of the DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition.
2. Continue special operations and small scale operations against ethnic Oderians separatists in the border area.
3. Conduct limited offensive operations to impose a security zone in western SLAWIA territory, possible in coordination with military action by DRAGOLAND.
4. Use military force in coalition with DRAGOLAND to exploit opportunities to gain control of WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.

(3) SLAWIA.

(a) Intent. SLAWIA has indicated that its intent is to achieve the restoration of SLAWIA territorial integrity and to deter further DRAGOLAND / BIZONIA aggression in order to safeguard its vital resources and the Oderians.

(b) Capabilities.

1. SLAWIA's Armed Forces are capable of defending against further aggression by DRAGOLAND or BIZONIA but not both.
2. SLAWIA air defences are not capable of defending SLAWIA airspace against air attacks by DRAGOLAND and defending vital areas against air attacks by BIZONIA. Further more, SLAWIA does not possess a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) capability.

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3. In the event of a major attack by both DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA, SLAWIA could defend for 1 to 2 weeks without external assistance by trading territory for time.

4. SLAWIA lacks the offensive capabilities to retake the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE and would require significant external support.

5. SLAWIA is capable of mobilising territorial army within 60-90 additional days.

(c) Assessment. SLAWIA is unable to counter the growing military threat posed by a DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition. SLAWIA is total dependent on external assistance to stabilise the situation in the north-west and restore its sovereignty over the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE. SLAWIA's likely actions will be to:

1. Continue to press the UN and the international community for assistance.

2. Continue mobilisation and preparations to defend against further aggression by DRAGOLAND in the north and possible BIZONIA's military actions in the southeast.

3. Attempt to stabilise the situation in the southeast without precipitating a military confrontation with BIZONIA.

4. Increase protection of land and sea approaches to SLAWIA.

5. Increase security at potential ports of disembarkation (PODs) and preparations for receiving outside forces.

c. Friendly Force Situation. BLUE ALLIANCE Joint Force Command South (supporting commander). In accordance with CMBASC's direction, COMJFC-S will:

(1) Be prepared to provide augmentation staff and component HQs and CIS support to COMCJTF.

(2) Be prepared to assist troop contributing nations in movement coordination.

(3) Assist nations in training and other activities to achieve readiness of allocated forces.

d. COMBASC's Direction and Guidance.

(1) COMBASC's Preliminary Mission Statement. Directed by the BLUE ALLIANCE Council, COMCJTF will conduct military operations in the CENTRAL EUREKA Joint Operations Area to implement appropriate UNSC resolutions and set the military conditions for the restoration of international peace and security in CENTRAL EUREKA.

(2) Preliminary Intent. The purpose of this operation will be to deter and defeat any further acts of aggression against SLAWIA and to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA territory. The operation will focus on splitting the DRAGOLAND / BIZONIA Coalition and defeating their capabil-

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ity to carry out combined operations against SLAWIA. This will be achieved by:

(a) First, demonstrating to each that the use of force will be at great cost and will not achieve Coalition aims. The rapid deployment and visible presence of deterrent forces in the JOA will demonstrate the BLUE ALLIANCE's will and its capability to respond to any further DL/BZ aggression with its own attacks against strategic military targets in the aggressors' homeland.

(b) Second, preventing the Coalition from synchronising combined operations against SLAWIA by dominating the operational space and the information domain in the JOA. BLUE ALLIANCE forces must quickly gain air superiority and sea control to deny Coalition forces freedom of action while simultaneously degrading the Coalition C2 system.

(c) Third, isolating DRAGOLAND. This will require BLUE ALLIANCE forces to enforce the UN maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND, interdict the flow of essential war supplies, and cut off DRAGOLAND political leadership from the Coalition command structure.

(d) Finally, if required, BLUE ALLIANCE forces will initiate offensive operations to decisively defeat any Coalition forces in SLAWIA. This will require the concentration of decisive combat power against C2, lines of communications and key capabilities of DRAGOLAND forces in SLAWIA as well as in DRAGOLAND and then, if required, shifting the concentration of combat power similarly against BIZONIA forces.

(3) Strategic Objectives. COMBASC's strategic military objectives for the are to:

- (a) Deter/defeat any further aggression by DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA.
- (b) Expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA.
- (c) Implement and enforce UN resolutions.
- (d) Safeguard Oderians.
- (e) Safeguard international air and sea lines of communications.

(4) COMBASC's End State and Criteria for Success.

(a) End State. At the end of this operation:

- 1. Relevant UNSC resolutions are implemented.
- 2. SLAWIA's territorial integrity is restored.
- 3. International air and sea lanes are no longer threatened.
- 4. Military conditions are set for the safe return of refugees.
- 5. Military conditions are set for negotiating a political settlement.

(b) Criteria for Success. The following are measures for determining that the desired end state has been achieved:

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1. The flow of inward and outward maritime shipping to and from DRAGOLAND has been halted.
2. There are no DRAGOLAND forces on SLAWIA territory.
3. DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA air and maritime threats to international air and sea lines have been neutralised.
4. Ethnic Oderians homelands in SLAWIA are no longer threatened.
5. BIZONIA is deterred from further aggression against ethnic Oderians.
6. BIZONIA not able to violate SLAWIA territory.

(5) Assumptions.

- (a) Authority for the operation is provided by an UNSC Resolution 1371 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
- (b) BIZONIA will continue to operate in coalition with DRAGOLAND in a regional conflict against SLAWIA.
- (c) DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA will oppose the introduction of BLUE ALLIANCE forces into the region.
- (d) SLAWIA will continue to hold politically and militarily within its capabilities against threatened or actual aggression by DRAGOLAND and/or BIZONIA.
- (e) SAMBIA likely will allow overflight, transit and staging by BLUE ALLIANCE forces.
- (f) TABOR will stay neutral.
- (g) An appropriate follow-on force will be available to relieve BLUE ALLIANCE forces.
- (h) Nations will generate sufficient forces to conduct the operation.
- (i) Pre-deployment of enabling forces will be authorised prior to the activation and deployment of BLUE ALLIANCE forces.
- (j) The BLUE ALLIANCE Council will authorise the activation and deployment of Alliance forces following an appropriate UN resolutions.
- (k) The use of WMD against BLUE ALLIANCE forces cannot be ruled out.
- (l) Points of entry into SLAWIA remain under SLAWIA control.

(6) Limitations.

(a) Constraints.

1. BLUE ALLIANCE operations will be conducted within the constraints of an UN mandate.

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2. BLUE ALLIANCE forces will operate initially in/over SLAWIA and adjacent waters of the BALTIC SEA under BLUE ALLIANCE ROE.

3. The multinational force will be organised around BLUE ALLIANCE Joint Task Force under Alliance command and control.

4. BLUE ALLIANCE forces will minimise collateral damage and civilian casualties.

5. BLUE ALLIANCE forces will be limited to 100,000 troops in SLAWIA.

(b) Political restraints.

1. Pre-emptive action by BLUE ALLIANCE military forces is not permitted without an UN mandate and Alliance approval.

2. Covert military action is not permitted without approval by the BLUE ALLIANCE Council/Defence Planning Committee.

3. The sovereignty of neutral nations will not be violated.

4. BLUE ALLIANCE forces operating on SLAWIA territory will not emplace anti-personnel land mines.

5. No Border Crossing Authority including WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE without BLUE ALLIANCE approval.

(7) Assigned tasks. The following tasks have been assigned by COMBASC to COMCJTF:

(a) Develop, in coordination with other commands, an OPLAN for BLUE ALLIANCE operations in CENTRAL EUREKA.

(b) Prepare HQs and assigned components for deployment to SLAWIA.

(c) On order, establish and build up C2 in the JOA.

(d) Upon arrival in the JOA, assume command of the JOA, receive assigned forces and accept transfer of authority.

(e) Secure lodgement area and PODs.

(f) Enforce maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND.

(g) Safeguard international air and sea lanes.

(h) Deter/defeat any further acts of aggression by DRAGOLAND and/or BIZONIA.

(i) Compel withdrawal of DRAGOLAND, if necessary, expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA.

(j) Assist SLAWIA in stabilising situation on its border with BIZONIA.

(k) Assist UNHCR in providing humanitarian assistance and relief.

(l) Handover a stable situation to an appropriate follow on force.

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(8) Implied tasks. The following tasks are implicit in COMBASC's Guidance and Direction:

- (a) Increase surveillance and reconnaissance measures in JOA.
- (b) Establish and operate PODs in JOA.
- (c) Establish sea control in JOA.
- (d) Establish control of the air in JOA.
- (e) Establish overt military force posture to demonstrate BLUE ALLIANCE presence and/or show of force.
- (f) Monitor and be prepared to neutralise DRAGOLAND WMD.
- (g) Conduct headquarters training, interoperability and integrated forces training and mission rehearsals.
- (h) Conduct Information Operations in support of COMBASC's strategic objectives.

2. OPERATIONAL DESIGN.

a. Key Factors and Deductions.

(1) Implementing a maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND will require the ability to monitor international waters adjacent to more than 100 km of DRAGOLAND's coastline. BLUE ALLIANCE forces enforcing the embargo must also be capable of countering DRAGOLAND's maritime surface and sub-surface capabilities.

(2) The UNSC Resolution 1371 gives DRAGOLAND 60 days to withdraw its forces from SLAWIA. When the ultimatum expires the BLUE ALLIANCE forces must be capable of initiating operations to evict DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA territory. This will require the rapid build-up of counter-offensive forces in the JOA.

(3) DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA may react to the UN ultimatum or BLUE ALLIANCE deployments with military action to interdict the entry of Alliance forces. The primary means would include submarines, sea mines, SSM systems and SOF. Initial force deployments must present a credible deterrence and be capable of protecting BLUE ALLIANCE forces and vital areas against these threats from the outset.

(4) A DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition could have a military advantage of up to 3 to 1 over SLAWIA. SLAWIA could not likely defend for more than 1 to 2 weeks (by trading territory for time) without external assistance. In the event of a combined Coalition attack, the CJTF must be capable of reinforcing SLAWIA's defences with priority to containing any attack in the north well forward in order not to put the build up of CJTF forces at risk.

(5) Large numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees (DPRE) will be vulnerable to the effects of military operations and the environment. In the event of a major attack by BIZONIA, DPRE in the south may have to be evacuated to safe areas to allow SLAWIA to defend in depth. This may require major logistical assistance by the BLUE ALLI-

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ANCE forces. Additionally, the DPRE situation in the northwest of SLAWIA is critical.

(6) The ability of the BLUE ALLIANCE to reinforce SLAWIA rapidly will be constrained by DRAGOLAND's control of the approaches to GDAŃSKA BAY and by limited availability of strategic airlift.

(7) The CJTF will be able to build up decisive maritime and air forces to dominate the airspace and sea areas in the JOA early in the operation. This will allow the CJTF to exploit opportunities for operational manoeuvre by Land Forces and amphibious operations to expel DRAGOLAND forces from the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.

b. COMCJTF's Planning Assumptions.

(1) Appropriate SOFA and MOUs will be negotiated to allow BLUE ALLIANCE forces to operate in and over SLAWIA as well as in SAMBIA airspace.

(2) Appropriate Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be granted to allow adequate defence of BLUE ALLIANCE forces and installations in the JOA.

(3) Cross-border operations will be authorised in response to major aggression.

(4) DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA may employ Air Force, SOF operations and asymmetric means such as terrorism to oppose the introduction of BLUE ALLIANCE forces into the region. Additionally DRAGOLAND may employ SSM and maritime (submarine and mining) forces.

(5) The CJTF will receive at least 5 days strategic warning that either DRAGOLAND or BIZONIA is preparing for major offensive operations.

c. Key strengths and weaknesses.

(1) DRAGOLAND.

(a) Strengths.

1. Offensive capability of the 75 Corps and 26 ABN Div with offensive air support.

2. Maritime interdiction capabilities, including ASUW, mining warfare and submarine warfare.

3. Air Defence capabilities of advanced mobile SAMs.

4. Capability to conduct counter air operations in cooperation with BIZONIA air forces.

5. WMD capabilities of SS-1B/C SSMS and chemical weapons.

(b) Weaknesses.

1. Limited operational logistics to sustain extended offensive operations.

2. Limited strategic reserves.

3. Limited maritime air defence.

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4. Lack of technical intelligence.
 5. Limited popular support for the regime.
- (2) BIZONIA.
 - (a) Strengths.
 1. Modern integrated air defences.
 2. Land/air offensive capabilities including up two corps (12 and 14 Corps).
 3. Capable special forces.
 - (b) Weaknesses.
 1. Extended LOCs to support an operational offensive from west BIZONIA to objectives deep in SLAWIA.
 2. Limited logistics to sustain extended offensive operations.
 3. Limited technical intelligence.
- (3) SLAWIA.
 - (a) Strengths.
 1. Modern and capable multirole fighters.
 2. Good defensive terrain in the north and south.
 3. Industrial base and strategic energy resources.
 4. Logistical sustainment.
 - (b) Weaknesses.
 1. Lack of TMD capability.
 2. Poor defensive terrain in the west.
 3. Lack of fully integrated Air Defence.
 4. Lack of operational reserves.
- (4) BLUE ALLIANCE.
 - (a) Strengths.
 1. Dominant air power.
 2. Capability to dominate sea areas in JOA.
 3. Ability to build-up decisive combat power in the JOA over time.
 4. Ability to achieve information dominance.
 5. Superior reconnaissance, surveillance and technical intelligence capabilities.
 6. Logistics and sustainment capabilities.
 - (b) Weaknesses.
 1. Limited sea points of entry into SLAWIA.

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2. Exposure and vulnerability of SLOCs and SPODs to interdiction.
3. Lack of forward operating bases (FOB) and staging areas to support initial entry into SLAWIA.
4. Limited airbases suitable for CJTF beddown.
5. Lack of initial presence in JOA.
6. Impact of refugees on CJTF operations in Southwest SLAWIA.

d. Objectives, Centres of Gravity and Decisive Points.

(1) DRAGOLAND.

(a) Strategic Military Objectives.

1. Retain the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
2. Gain control of the KARLINO oil fields.
3. Prevent international intervention.

(b) Strategic Centre of Gravity. Acting alone, DRAGOLAND lacks the capability to achieve these strategic objectives. However, by acting in coalition with BIZONIA, these objectives can be achieved. Consequently, DRAGOLAND's strategic centre of gravity is the combined Coalition military capability to dominate SLAWIA.

(c) Operational Objectives. DRAGOLAND's operational objectives would likely be:

1. Consolidation and defence of the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
2. Prevent CJTF from establishing a secure lodgement in SLAWIA.
3. Defeat SLAWIA defences in north of SLAWIA.
4. Securing the KARLINO oil fields.

(d) Operational Centre of Gravity. At the operational level DRAGOLAND's primary requirement is to prevent the entry of CJTF forces. Its primary strength comes from its air / ground offensive capabilities concentrated in the north of DRAGOLAND and the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE (75 Corps, 26 ABN Div). Therefore, DRAGOLAND's operational centre of gravity is – DRAGOLAND's offensive capabilities to interdict entry and lodgement of external forces in northern SLAWIA.

(e) Decisive Points and Conditions. (Relative to DRAGOLAND's operational COG)

1. Approaches to WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE – denied.
2. POL stocks at KARLINO – protected.

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3. Submarine operations – sustained/preserved for use versus BLUE ALLIANCE high value units.
4. Integrated Air Defence System in north – maintained.
5. Land LOCs between main operational units (DL 75 Corps, DL 6 Corps and DL 21 Corps) – maintained.
6. Reaching the WISŁA RIVER – achieved.

(2) BIZONIA.

(a) Strategic Military Objectives.

1. Gain control over WESTERN SILESIA.
2. Eradicate the Oderians Separatist Movement.
3. Secure the border area with SLAWIA.
4. Together with DRAGOLAND exploit control of the KARLINO oil fields.

(b) Strategic Centre of Gravity. Acting alone, BIZONIA lacks the capability to achieve these strategic objectives. However, by acting in coalition with DRAGOLAND, these objectives can be achieved. BIZONIA's strategic centre of gravity is the combined Coalition military capability to dominate SLAWIA.

(c) Operational Objectives. BIZONIA's operational objectives would likely be:

1. Securing the WESTERN SILESIA and borders with SLAWIA.
2. Elimination of Oderians sanctuaries.

(d) Operational Centre of Gravity. At the operational level BIZONIA's primary requirement is to project power to secure key areas in SLAWIA. Its primary strength comes from its air/land capabilities for offensive operations in depth. This including its offensive air forces, airborne forces and mobile corps (BZ 14 Corps). Therefore, BIZONIA's operational centre of gravity is – BIZONIA's air/land capabilities for offensive operations in depth.

(e) Decisive Points and Conditions. (Relative to BIZONIA's operational COG)

1. Approaches to the WESTERN SILESIA – denied / seized / held.
2. Availability of tactical airlift for BZ 14 Corps airborne units.
3. Air defence and airspace control over eastern BIZONIA.
4. Land LOCs to move and support 12 and 14 Corps.
5. SLAWIA air infrastructure – interdicted.

(3) SLAWIA.

(a) SLAWIA's Strategic Military Objectives.

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1. Deter further DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA aggression.
2. Restore SLAWIA's territorial integrity.
3. Protect vital resources.
4. Safeguard ethnic Oderians.

(b) Strategic Centre of Gravity. SLAWIA cannot successfully oppose the DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition or retake the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE without international assistance. However, given the level of interest the international community has in protecting free market access to SLAWIA's energy reserves, SLAWIA can expect international military assistance. SLAWIA's strategic centre of gravity is SLAWIA's ability to secure international military assistance.

(c) Operational Objectives. SLAWIA's operational objectives are to:

1. Retain the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
2. Secure points of entry and lodgement areas for external forces.
3. Contain Coalition attacks west of the WISŁA RIVER and south of 51st parallel.
4. Protect Oderians safe areas.

(d) Operational Centre of Gravity. At the operational level SLAWIA's primary requirement is defend those areas essential for the reception and onward movement of international military assistance. The primary strength comes from SLAWIA's air and land defences in north of SLAWIA, particularly armoured and mechanized divisions defence west of WISŁA RIVER. Therefore, SLAWIA's operational centre of gravity is – SLAWIA's air and land defence of north SLAWIA.

(e) Decisive Points and Conditions. (Relative to SLAWIA's operational COG).

1. SLAWIA defence forward of west WISŁA RIVER and south of 51st parallel – maintained.
2. Bridges on WISŁA RIVER north from WARSZAWA – maintained.
3. Points of entry and lodgement areas in north of SLAWIA including MCM operations – secure.
4. Host Nation Support – sustained.
5. Air superiority over northern SLAWIA – established.
6. CJTF operational fires – integrated.
7. KARLINO oil field infrastructure – protected.
8. Oderians camps – protected.

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(4) BLUE ALLIANCE.

(a) Strategic Military Objective. The BLUE ALLIANCE's strategic military objective are to:

1. Deter/defeat further aggression by DRAGOLAND / BIZONIA.
2. Expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA.
3. Implement and enforce UN resolutions.
4. Safeguard ethnic Oderians.
5. Safeguard international air and sea lines of communications.

(b) Strategic Centre of Gravity. The primary source of strength comes from the willingness and capability of BLUE ALLIANCE nations to activate and deploy required forces to CENTRAL EUREKA before SLAWIA's defences culminate. Therefore, the BLUE ALLIANCE strategic centre of gravity is – the BLUE ALLIANCE's ability to project credible forces into the JOA in a timely manner.

(c) Operational Objectives. The CJTF's operational objectives are to:

1. Convince Coalition leaders of the BLUE ALLIANCE Joint Task Force capability to punish Coalition aggression.
2. Secure airspace over SLAWIA and adjacent waters in the JOA.
3. Secure international waters around SLAWIA and SLOCs within the JOA.
4. Assist SLAWIA in containing and defeating Coalition attacks west of the WISŁA RIVER and south of the 51st parallel.
5. Assist SLAWIA in securing its border with BIZONIA.
6. Expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA and secure the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
7. Fully implement the maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND.
8. Assist SLAWIA in securing safe areas for ethnic Oderians.

(d) Operational Centre of Gravity. At the operational level the CJTF will rely on its superior joint counter-offensive capabilities to control and dominate the airspace and waters over and around northern SLAWIA and to expel DRAGOLAND forces from the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE. Critical capabilities will include maritime power projection, counter-air, strategic attack, and anti-surface force air capabilities as well as third generation ground manoeuvre forces. Therefore, the CJTF's operational centre of gravity is – the CJTF's ability to concentrate superior joint counteroffensive capabilities in and around northern SLAWIA.

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(e) Decisive Points and Conditions. (Relative to CJTF's operational COG):

1. Forward operating bases and staging areas for long range attack forces outside of SLAWIA – established prior to AC-TORD.
2. SLAWIA defence forward of west WISŁA RIVER and south of 51 parallel – maintained.
3. Air and maritime approaches to north SLAWIA – secured.
4. Points of entry and lodgement areas in north of SLAWIA - useable, secure and protected.
5. DRAGOLAND submarine operations – neutralised.
6. Land LOCs between DL 75 Corps, DL 6 Corps and DL 21 Corps – interdicted.
7. Oderians camps – protected.

e. End State and Criteria for Success.

(1) COMCJTF Desired End-state. The military conditions which will be achieved by the conclusion of this operation are:

- (a) Air and sea LOCs safe and secure.
- (b) Integrity of SLAWIA territory restored.
- (c) Coalition C3 neutralised.
- (d) DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA unable to conduct offensive operations.
- (e) BIZONIA unable to conduct offensive operations.
- (f) SLAWIA capable of defending own territory.
- (g) BLUE ALLIANCE forces prepared for re-deployment.

(2) Criteria for Success.

- (a) No DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA forces on SLAWIA territory.
- (b) Critical Coalition C3 nodes destroyed.
- (c) DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA offensive capabilities neutralised including: submarines and naval SSM; offensive aircraft and support; WMD capabilities; 50 per cent of offensive armoured forces.
- (d) Flow of arms into DRAGOLAND halted.
- (e) SLAWIA defensive forces reconstituted to pre-conflict level.
- (f) Ethnic Oderians homelands in SLAWIA no longer threatened.

3. MISSION.

On order, CJTF will conduct military operations in the CENTRAL EUREKA JOA to deter or defeat further aggression, restore the territorial integrity of SLAWIA, and to enforce applicable UN resolutions in order to contribute to the restoration of peace and security in CENTRAL EUREKA.

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4. INITIAL FORCE ESTIMATE.

a. COMCJTF's preliminary estimate of BLUE ALLIANCE military force requirements follows.

(1) Land Forces.

1 x LCC HQ and Support Group
1 x CORPS HQ and Support Group
2 x Mech Div
1 x Armd Div
1 x INF ABN Bde
1 x MLRS Bde
1 x ATK HELO Bde
2 x AD Bde
2 x INTEL Bde
2 x ENGR Group
1 x PSYOPS TF
3 x SIG Bde
2 x NBC Bn
1 x CIMIC TF
2 x MED Group
3 x MP Bn

(2) Maritime Forces. BLUE ALLIANCE Task Group (BATG) consisting of Standing Naval Force (SNF) enhanced by deterrent and presence capabilities:

BATG Cdr and Staff
1 x CG
8 x DD/FF
6 x SSK
12 x MCMV
3 x Auxiliary Vessels (2 x Replenishment, 1 x Repair)
1 x Multinational Amphibious Task Group (MNATG) (1 x Marine Bde / 4 AMW)
1 x AMCM Sqn

(3) Air Forces.

ACC HQ
1 x CAOC
3 x ABCCC a/c

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1 x AOCC(L)
4 x ADX/ADR Sq
6 x FBX/FBA Sq
1 x AEW Wg (4 a/c)
2 x JSTARS
1 x TRO Sqn
2 x TRI/TRX Sq
2 x ECR Sqn
3 x ESJ Sqn
4 x ECM a/c
12 x AAR a/c
44 x TTA a/c
12 x SAR a/c
1 x ABN FAC Sqn
8 x SHORAD Bty
4 x SAMOC
2 x SAM Bde (TMD capable)
8 x Base Operations/Support Units

(4) Special Operations Forces.

1 x CJSOTF HQ
1 x Special Forces Group
1 x Special Air Service Sqn
1 x Special Forces Coy
1 x Ranger BN
1 x Special Boat Service SQN

b. Psychological Operations Forces.

1 x CJPOTF HQ
1 x PSYOPS Group
1 x OI Coy
2 x EC -130

c. Joint Rear Area.

1 x Rear Area Command HQ
1 x CIMIC TF
1 x APIC

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Theatre Logistic Support Troop Rear Area Security Troops (POD/LOCs, C2, Infrastructure)

2 x APOD Operational/Support Groups

1 x SPOD Operational/Support Groups

1 x Transport Group

5. PLANNING GUIDANCE.

a. COMCJTF Initial Intent.

(1) The purpose of the CJTF deployment to CENTRAL EUREKA is to enforce compliance with appropriate UN resolutions by deterring the DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition from further aggression against SLAWIA and, if deterrence fails, to defend and restore SLAWIA's territorial integrity by a decisively defeating Coalition offensive.

(2) Method. Upon authorisation, it is my intent to rapidly deploy those maritime, air and ground forces into the JOA that will be required to enforce the UN embargo on DRAGOLAND and that provide for an effective deterrence posture. The objective of these initial operations is to prevent DRAGOLAND from re-initiating her offensive and to discourage BIZONIA from entering the conflict.

(a) If deterrence succeeds but DRAGOLAND fails to comply with appropriate UN resolutions, I intend to immediately initiate air and maritime operations against DRAGOLAND's forces and to build up the CJTF force posture required to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA territory.

(b) If deterrence fails and a DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA initiate offensive operations in and against SLAWIA, I intend to support SLAWIA's defences with air and maritime operations with the aim of containing the Coalition ground offensive as far forward as possible, to ensure the unimpeded flow of CJTF forces into SLAWIA their build up for counter-offensive operations.

(c) I intend to initiate counter offensive operations first against DRAGOLAND's forces in order to defeat them decisively, while containing the BIZONIA's offensive at the furthest at the 51 north parallel. Thereafter, the CJTF will re-deploy forces, if required, to initiate counteroffensive operations against BIZONIA's forces.

(d) Throughout the campaign I intend to closely monitor DRAGOLAND WMD posture and will be prepared to neutralise them if required and authorised.

(3) End-state. The end-state will be attained when:

(a) Coalition forces have withdrawn from SLAWIA's territory.

(b) Military operations have been terminated and post-conflict conditions are set for a safe return of refugees and hand-over to follow-on forces.

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(c) The post conflict disposition of the Coalition and its forces rules out the resumption of hostilities by DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA prevents them from threatening international air and sea lanes in the near-term.

b. **Operational Phases.** The operation is envisioned in five (5) phases:

(1) **Phase 1: Warning and Activation.** This phase begins with COMBASC's Activation Warning (ACTWARN). It includes the preparation of CJTF Component Commands and forces for deployment and positioning deterrence forces outside the JOA. When authorised, the CJTF commences enabling operations to establish forward C2 and liaison with SLAWIA, increase surveillance and prepare for the arrival of CJTF forces into the JOA and establish maritime presence. The CJTF initiates information operations to establish the legitimacy of the operation. Phase ends with forward C2 established and the JOA prepared to receive CJTF forces once an Activation Order is issued.

(2) **Phase 2: Deployment and Deterrence.** This phase begins with COMBASC's Activation Order (ACTORD). It includes the immediate deployment of deterrent forces into the JOA and Info Operations to deter Coalition leaders from further acts of aggression. This is followed by the rapid build up of forces required to secure LOCs and points of entry into SLAWIA as well as to demonstrate the Blue Alliance's capability to defend SLAWIA. CJTF forces implement the UN maritime embargo and conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence operations to identify indications of Coalition intentions to comply with UNSC resolutions or commit further aggression. Phase ends with BLUE ALLIANCE forces in the JOA under OPCOM/OPCON of COMCJTF and postured for deterrence and defence.

(3) **Phase 3: Decisive Combat and Stabilisation.** This phase begins when the UN ultimatum has expired and Coalition forces have failed to comply with the UN ultimatum to withdraw its force from SLAWIA or in the event that Coalition forces commit further aggression against SLAWIA or BLUE ALLIANCE forces. In either case, CJTF forces commence operations to gain/maintain control of the air, sea and land areas in SLAWIA and build up counter-offensive forces required to expel Coalition forces from SLAWIA and restore SLAWIA's internationally recognised borders. Phase ends with a stable situation in which SLAWIA's territorial integrity is intact and the conflict is terminated on terms favourable to the BLUE ALLIANCE and the UN. Depending on Coalition actions in response to UNSC resolutions, CJTF forces will be prepared for the following:

(a) **Phase 3A – Defence and Containment.** In the event of further aggression by DRAGOLAND and or BIZONIA, the CJTF will conduct defensive operations to maintain air superiority over SLAWIA, establish sea control in waters adjacent to SLAWIA, and to assist SLAWIA forces in containing and defeating attacks against its territory. The CJTF will respond with long range attacks against targets vital to Coalition command and control and offensive capabilities. The aim will be to force Coalition leaders to halt their attacks and to bring any offensive to early culmination.

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(b) Phase 3B – Counter-offence. The culmination of Coalition offensive operations and build-up decisive CJTF counteroffensive capabilities will be pre-conditions for the initiation of counter-offensive operations. CJTF operations will isolate Coalition forces deployed against SLAWIA, interdict Coalition C3I, logistics and LOCs, and exploit operational manoeuvre with land and amphibious forces to force Coalition forces to withdrawal from SLAWIA territory.

(c) Phase 3C – Stabilisation. Following the withdrawal of DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA territory, either in voluntary compliance with the UN ultimatum or as result of being forced to withdraw by CJTF action, CJTF forces will establish control of former occupied areas, monitor and enforce DRAGOLAND's compliance with military technical provisions and assist SLAWIA in re-establishing its authority and control over its territory.

(4) Phase 4 – Transition. This phase begins with the arrival of an approved follow-on force. BLUE ALLIANCE forces are relieved of post conflict monitoring and enforcement responsibilities and transfer authority to the follow-on force. Phase ends with all responsibilities transferred to the follow-on force.

(5) Phase 5 – Redeployment. This phase begins with the relief of CJTF forces by a follow-on force. It includes the movement of forces to marshalling areas, preparation for redeployment and transfer of Operational Command and Control back to national authorities. Phase ends with CJTF HQs and forces redeployed in accordance with BLUE ALLIANCE and National Directives and the CJTF dissolved.

6. DIRECTION TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS.

a. Joint Force Land Component (JFLCC).

- (1) On arrival in SLAWIA establish and build up C2 and liaison structure with SLAWIA Defence Forces.
- (2) Receive assigned forces, accept transfer of authority (TOA) and assume OPCOM/OPCON.
- (3) Secure lodgement areas in SLAWIA.
- (4) Assist SLAWIA in maintaining a cohesive forward defence in the north-west and west against further aggression by DRAGOLAND.
- (5) Assist SLAWIA in containing any aggression by BIZONIA.
- (6) Build up forces required to decisively defeat Coalition attacks sequentially.
- (7) Be prepared to conduct counter-offensive operations to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA and restore SLAWIA's territorial integrity on the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
- (8) Assist UN humanitarian assistance efforts within capabilities.

b. Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC).

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- (1) Establish theatre surveillance, situation monitoring and intelligence collection capability.
- (2) Establish air superiority over lodgement areas in SLAWIA.
- (3) Develop and maintain a Recognised Air Picture (RAP).
- (4) Assume responsibilities of Joint Air Component Commander (JFACC), Area Air Defence Commander (AADC) and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) in JOA.
- (5) Receive assigned forces, accept transfer of authority (TOA) and assume OPCOM/OPCON.
- (6) Build up forces required to establish and maintain air superiority within JOA.
- (7) Support JFMCC in maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND.
- (8) Contribute to deterrence with visible presence of BLUE ALLIANCE defensive and offensive air capabilities.
- (9) Provide close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI) in support of SLAWIA and Joint Force Land Component forces to contain and defeat any further aggression by DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA.
- (10) Establish and maintain theatre air defence of vital areas against air and missile attacks.
- (11) Plan for ASFAO including air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS) to land component.
- (12) Be prepared to support CJTF counter-offensive operations to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA.

c. Joint Force Maritime Component (JFMCC).

- (1) Conduct maritime surveillance and reconnaissance.
- (2) Establish a maritime presence to deter DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA from further aggression.
- (3) Receive assigned forces, accept transfer of authority (TOA) and assume OPCOM/OPCON.
- (4) Provide sea control in JOA in accordance with BLUE ALLIANCE rules of engagement (ROE).
- (5) Enforce maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND.
- (6) Secure sea lines of communications (SLOC) within JOA.
- (7) Be prepared to conduct maritime power projection to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA.

d. Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).

- (1) Be prepared to provide special surveillance and reconnaissance to monitor WMD, provide target acquisition and support specific maritime, land or air operations in the JOA.

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- (2) Receive assigned forces, accept transfer of authority (TOA) and assume OPCON/TACON.
- (3) Be prepared to conduct direct action neutralise critical targets and facilities and to recover friendly personnel.
- (4) Provide military assistance including liaison, co-ordination, advice and training to SLAWIA military to enhance interoperability with BLUE ALLIANCE forces.
- (5) Be prepared to provide military assistance including liaison, co-ordination and training to SLAWIA paramilitary forces in west and south-west SLAWIA.
- (6) Provide combat search and rescue for CJTF forces in the JOA.

e. Joint Rear Area Commander.

- (1) Establish, secure and operate secure PODs and lodgement areas.
- (2) Support reception, staging and onward movement of arriving BLUE ALLIANCE forces.
- (3) Ensure protection of rear areas in conjunction with SLAWIA.
- (4) Establish a rear logistics infrastructure.
- (5) Assist UNHCR in providing humanitarian assistance and relief.

f. Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) planning tasks.

- (1) Conduct battlefield psychological operations (BPA) in the JOA to degrade the operational effectiveness of BIZONIA's military forces.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct psychological consolidation activities (PCA) on request.
- (3) Support Information Operations and C2W in the JOA.
- (4) Support the JFLCC, JFACC and JFMCC with battlefield psychological activities (BPA).

7. COORDINATION

a. Critical Timings for the Operation.

- (1) Pre-deployment of Enabling Forces. COMCJTF will request authorisation for the activation and pre-deployment of enabling forces as soon as possible following approval of the CONOPS and the initiation of force generation.
- (2) X-day. Will follow an UNSC Resolution 1371.

b. Intelligence. COMCJTF will establish the intelligence architecture for the JOA, including the co-ordination of allied and national intelligence, based on Prioritised Intelligence Requirements (PIR) from subordinate commands.

c. Precautionary Measures. Subordinate commands are to recommend prudent precautionary measures to ensure that BLUE ALLIANCE forces and HQs as well as essential national arrangements, resources and capabilities are prepared for rapid activation and deployment.

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d. **Pre-deployment of Enabling Forces.** Subordinate commands are to identify key tasks to be accomplished by enabling forces.

e. **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Initial BLUE ALLIANCE political policy emphasis will be on de-escalation of the situation. Subordinate commands are to recommend ROE in accordance with BLUE ALLIANCE ROE policy. ROE profiles requested should cover all contingencies envisioned for BLUE ALLIANCE forces en route to or operating within the JOA. Component commanders are to forward ROE requirements needed to conduct assigned tasks with full justification and detailed military consequences if not granted.

f. **Airspace Management.** Co-ordinate airspace requirements within the JOA with the JFACC.

g. **Joint Targeting.** Targeting will focus on identifying and developing high pay-off C3I nodes, power generation and transportation infrastructure, logistical bases, WMD and military production facilities, especially chemical/biological weapons, and TBM production. Components should identify and prioritise target sets.

h. **Information Operations (IO).** IAW COMBASC guidance, the IO objective will be to convince the leadership of DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA that the Blue Alliance, with the support of the international community, has the will and the means to oppose aggression and to enforce the UN mandate, specifically to target the perception of Coalition decision makers that aggression will be punished and there will be no sanctuary within DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA. Supporting operations will focus on this objective.

i. **Psychological Operations.**

(1) Preliminary psychological objectives for battlefield psychological activities (BPA) are:

(a) To degrade the moral of Coalition fighting forces to reduce Coalition operational effectiveness.

(b) To inform the Coalition population of the legitimacy of the international intervention and the futility of Coalition actions in order to increase civil disobedience.

(2) Psychological consolidation activities (PCA) on request of SLAWIA to establish and maintain freedom of action for COMJFC North and support UNHCR.

j. **Public Information guidance.** An overall active PI policy will apply subject to operational security requirements. More restrictive guidelines will apply during specific operational phases. Consistent with these guidelines, international media representative will have open access to BLUE ALLIANCE military activities throughout the JOA. PIO will support BLUE ALLIANCE Info Ops objectives.

k. **Host Nation Support.** Identify and prioritise HNS requirements in the JOA for co-ordination with SLAWIA.

l. **Logistical guidance.**

(1) Movement requirements and priorities within the JOA will be established, coordinated and controlled by COMCJTF.

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(3) Theatre stocks levels should be based on the maintenance of 10 days of supplies in the JOA. Detailed requirements are to be included in the sustainability statement.

(4) POL management should be organised on a Lead Nation basis (Lancet) to the extent allowed by the operational plan. Subordinate commands are to develop plans to centrally manage critical supplies and services as required.

8. COMMAND AND CONTROL.

a. Preliminary C2 arrangements.

(1) Overall political guidance and direction will be provided by the BLUE ALLIANCE Council through the Defence Planning Committee to COMBASC.

(2) COMBASC will be the BLUE ALLIANCE Strategic Military Commander with overall Operational Command of the operation.

(3) COMBASC will delegate command of the JOA and Operational Control of assigned forces to Commander Joint Forces Command North as a Commander Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).

(4) The Joint Operations Area will initially include the surface area and corresponding air space over SLAWIA, DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA; the adjacent waters of the Baltic Sea.

(5) COMCJTF will exercise command and control through functional component commands for land, air, maritime operations, special operations, and support.

(6) COMCJTF will establish a Combined Coordination Centre (CCC) with SLAWIA to coordinate Combined Joint Operations within SLAWIA.

b. Transfer of Authority.

(1) Nations will delegate coordinating authority to COMBASC and COMCJTF for planning and preparation of the BLUE ALLIANCE Joint Force.

(2) Nations retain command of forces during deployment and transfer OPCOM to COMBASC not later than upon arrival in the JOA.

(3) COMBASC delegates TACON of forces to CJTF, as a minimum, upon their arrival in the JOA.

(4) When forces are declared operationally ready by National Command Authorities COMBASC passes OPCOM/OPCON to CJTF in accordance with national ORBATTOA messages.

c. Joint Operations Area. The Joint Operations Area (JOA) will include the surface area and corresponding airspace over SLAWIA and its territorial waters, DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA, as well as the adjacent waters of the BALTIC SEA to the coastal waters limits of the BALTIC SEA Countries not involved in conflict.

COMCJTF John D. Smith, Admiral, sends.

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XXX/YYYY/ZZZ/

2 APRIL 2007

**COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMAND HEADQUARTER
LUTSK, LANCET**

**COMMANDER JFACC CONOPS FOR OPERATION
RELIABLE GUARD**

- REFERENCE: A. UNSC RESOLUTION 1371, DATED 18 MAR 2007
B. BLUE ALLIANCE COUNCIL MILITARY STAFF INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR A POSSIBLE UN PEACE OPERATION IN CENTRAL EUREKA, DATED 20 MAR 2007.
C. COMBASC PLANNING GUIDANCE, DATED 23 MAR 2007
D. COMCJTF PLANNING GUIDANCE, DATED 28 MAR 2007
E. MC CONOPS APPROVAL, DATED 28 MAR 2007
F. COMBASC ACTWARN, DATED 29 MAR 2007
G. COMMANDER COMBINED JOINT TASAK FORCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR OPERATION RELIABLE GUARD, DATED 29 MAR 2007.

1. SITUATION.

a. General.

(1) Background.

(a) Peace and security in EUREKA have been breached by DRAGOLAND's invasion of sovereign territory belonging to SLAWIA. DRAGOLAND have refused to comply with UNSC Resolution 1367 which demands that DRAGOLAND withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces from SLAWIA. DRAGOLAND is backed by BIZONIA. In addition, BIZONIA's military operation against suspected ethnic Oderians terrorist in the border area between BIZONIA and SLAWIA further threatens the security of SLAWIA. The emerging military coalition between DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA now poses a significant threat to regional stability and security. BIZONIA has not yet committed forces to attack on SLAWIA.

(b) The UNSC has requested BLUE ALLIANCE support to uphold and implement UNSC Resolution 1367 and subsequent resolutions to compel DRAGOLAND to withdraw its forces from the territory of DRAGOLAND and to restore international peace and security in the CENTRAL EUREKA. A UNSC Resolution 1371 establishing the mandate for BLUE ALLIANCE forces and gives DRAGOLAND 60 days to withdraw its forces from SLAWIA (Ref. A).

(c) Based on the agreement of the BLUE ALLIANCE Ministers in the Oslo Council Summit in principle to support the UN in maintaining international

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peace and security in EUREKA, the BLUE ALLIANCE Council have agreed to initiate military planning for the possible involvement operation in CENTRAL EUREKA .

(d) On this basis the BLUE ALLIANCE Council has directed Commander BLUE ALLIANCE Strategic Command (COMBASC), as a matter of urgency, to develop a concept of operations, including a further estimate of force requirements, including enabling forces, for the conduct of a BLUE ALLIANCE Led Operation in CENTRAL EUREKA (Ref. B). Following directive, COMBASC planning guidance (Ref. C) has directed Commander Joint Force Command North as a Commander of Combined Joint Task Force to prepare CONOPS for operation RELIABLE GUARD. According to COMCJTF planning guidance (Ref. D), component commands were to prepare appropriate SUPLANs.

(2) Strategic Conditions.

(a) COMCJTF's Mission. On order, CJTF will conduct military operations in the CENTRAL EUREKA JOA to deter or defeat further aggression, restore the territorial integrity of SLAWIA, and to enforce applicable UN resolutions in order to contribute to the restoration of peace and security in CENTRAL EUREKA.

(b) COMCJTF's Intent. The purpose of the CJTF deployment to CENTRAL EUREKA is to enforce compliance with appropriate UN resolutions by deterring the DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition from further aggression against SLAWIA and, if deterrence fails, to defend and restore SLAWIA's territorial integrity by a decisively defeating Coalition offensive.

COMJTF intends to rapidly deploy those maritime, air and ground forces into the JOA that will be required to enforce the UN embargo on DRAGOLAND and that provide for an effective deterrence posture. The objective of these initial operations is to prevent DRAGOLAND from re-initiating her offensive and to discourage BIZONIA from entering the conflict.

1. If deterrence succeeds but DRAGOLAND fails to comply with appropriate UN resolutions, COMCJTF intends immediately initiate air and maritime operations against DRAGOLAND's forces and to build up the CJTF force posture required to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA territory.

2. If deterrence fails and a DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA initiate offensive operations in and against SLAWIA, COMCJTF intends to support SLAWIA's defences with air and maritime operations with the aim of containing the Coalition ground offensive as far forward as possible, to ensure the unimpeded flow of CJTF forces into SLAWIA their build up for counter-offensive operations.

3. COMCJTF intends to initiate counter offensive operations first against DRAGOLAND's forces in order to defeat them decisively, while containing the BIZONIA's offensive at the furthest at the 51 north parallel. Thereafter, the CJTF will re-deploy forces, if required, to initiate counteroffensive operations against BIZONIA's forces.

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4. Throughout the campaign COMCJTF intends to closely monitor DRAGOLAND WMD posture and will be prepared to neutralise them if required and authorised.

(3) Desired End State. The military conditions which will be achieved by the conclusion of this operation are:

- (a) Air and sea LOCs safe and secure.
- (b) Integrity of SLAWIA territory restored.
- (c) DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition C3 neutralised.
- (d) DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA unable to conduct offensive operations.
- (e) BIZONIA unable to conduct offensive operations.
- (f) SLAWIA capable of defending own territory.
- (g) BLUE ALLIANCE forces prepared for re-deployment.

(4) Objectives. Centres of Gravity and Decisive Points.

(a) DRAGOLAND.

1. Strategic Military Objectives.

- (ii) Retain the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
- (iii) Gain control of the KARLINO oil fields.
- (iv) Prevent international intervention.

2. Strategic Centre of Gravity. Combined Coalition military capability to isolate and dominate SLAWIA.

3. Operational Objectives.

- (i) Consolidation and defence of the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
- (ii) Prevent CJTF from establishing a secure lodgement in SLAWIA.
- (iii) Defeat SLAWIA defences in north of SLAWIA.
- (iv) Securing the KARLINO oil fields.

4. Operational Centre of Gravity. DRAGOLAND's offensive capabilities to interdict entry and lodgement of external forces in northern SLAWIA.

5. Decisive Points and Conditions.

- (i) Approaches to WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE – denied.
- (ii) Entrance to the Gdańska Bay – denied.
- (iii) POL stocks at KARLINO – protected.
- (iv) Submarine operations – sustained/preserved for use versus BLUE ALLIANCE high value units.
- (v) Integrated Air Defence System in north – maintained.

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- (vi) Availability of tactical airlift (20 x C-130 and 24 x AN-26) for 26 ABN Div.
- (vii) Land LOCs between DL 75 Corps, DL 6 Corps and DL 21 Corps – maintained.
- (viii) Reaching the WISŁA RIVER– achieved.

(b) BIZONIA.

1. Strategic Military Objectives.

- (i) Gain control over WESTERN SILESIA.
- (ii) Eradicate the Oderians Separatist Movement.
- (iii) Secure the border area with SLAWIA.
- (iv) Together with DRAGOLAND exploit control of the KAR-LINO oil fields.

2. Strategic Centre of Gravity. Combined Coalition military capability to isolate and dominate SLAWIA.

3. Operational Objectives.

- (i) Securing the WESTERN SILESIA and borders with SLAWIA.
- (ii) Elimination of Oderians sanctuaries.

4. Operational Centre of Gravity. BIZONIA's air/land capabilities for offensive operations in depth.

5. Decisive Points and Conditions.

- (i) Approaches to the WESTERN SILESIA – denied / seized / held.
- (ii) Air defence and air control over Eastern BIZONIA – maintained.
- (iii) SLAWIA air infrastructure – interdicted.

(c) SLAWIA.

1. SLAWIA's Strategic Military Objectives.

- (i) Deter further DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA aggression.
- (ii) Restore SLAWIA's territorial integrity.
- (iii) Protect vital resources.
- (iv) Safeguard ethnic Oderians.

2. Strategic Centre of Gravity. SLAWIA's ability to secure international military assistance.

3. Operational Objectives.

- (i) Retain the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
- (ii) Secure points of entry and lodgement areas for external forces.

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- (iii) Contain Coalition attacks west of the WISŁA RIVER and south of 51st parallel.
- (iv) Held the eastern SILESIA.
- (v) Protect Oderians safe areas.

4. Operational Centre of Gravity. SLAWIA's air and land defence of north SLAWIA.

5. Decisive Points and Conditions.

- (i) SLAWIA defence forward of west WISŁA RIVER and south of 51st parallel – maintained.
- (ii) Bridges on WISŁA RIVER north from WARSZAWA – maintained.
- (iii) Points of entry and lodgement areas in north of SLAWIA including MCM operations – secure.
- (iv) Host Nation Support – sustained.
- (v) Air superiority over northern SLAWIA – established.
- (vi) CJTF operational fires – integrated.
- (vii) KARLINO oil field infrastructure – protected.
- (viii) Oderians camps – protected.

(d) BLUE ALLIANCE.

1. Strategic Military Objective.

- (i) Deter/defeat further aggression by DRAGOLAND /BIZONIA.
- (ii) Expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA.
- (iii) Implement and enforce UN resolutions.
- (iv) Safeguard ethnic Oderians.
- (v) Safeguard international air and sea lines of communications.

2. Strategic Centre of Gravity. BLUE ALLIANCE's ability to project credible forces into the JOA in a timely manner.

3. Operational Objectives.

- (i) Convince Coalition leaders of the BLUE ALLIANCE Joint Task Force capability to punish Coalition aggression.
- (ii) Secure airspace over SLAWIA and adjacent waters in the JOA.
- (iii) Secure international waters around SLAWIA and SLOCs within the JOA.
- (iv) Assist SLAWIA in containing and defeating Coalition attacks west of the WISŁA RIVER and south of the 51st Parallel.

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- (v) Assist SLAWIA in securing its border with BIZONIA.
- (vi) Expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA and secure the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
- (vii) Fully implement the maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND.
- (viii) Assist SLAWIA in securing safe areas for ethnic Oderians.

4. Operational Centre of Gravity. CJTF's ability to concentrate superior joint counteroffensive capabilities in and around northern SLAWIA.

5. Decisive Points and Conditions.

- (i) Forward operating bases and staging areas for long range attack forces outside of SLAWIA – established prior to ACTORD.
- (ii) SLAWIA defence forward of west WISŁA RIVER and south of 51 parallel – maintained.
- (iii) Air and maritime approaches to north SLAWIA – secured.
- (iv) Points of entry and lodgement areas in north of SLAWIA - useable, secure and protected.
- (v) DRAGOLAND submarine operations – neutralised.
- (vi) Land LOCs between DL 75 Corps, DL 6 Corps and DL 21 Corps – interdicted.
- (vii) Oderians camps – protected.

(5) Planning Limitations.

(a) Constraints.

1. BLUE ALLIANCE operations will be conducted within the constraints of an UN mandate.
2. BLUE ALLIANCE forces will operate initially in/over SLAWIA and adjacent waters of the Baltic Sea under BLUE ALLIANCE ROE.
3. The multinational force will be organised around BLUE ALLIANCE Joint Task Force under Alliance command and control.
4. BLUE ALLIANCE forces will minimise collateral damage and civilian casualties.
5. BLUE ALLIANCE forces will be limited to 100,000 troops in SLAWIA.

(b) Restraints.

1. Pre-emptive action by BLUE ALLIANCE military forces is not permitted without an UN mandate and alliance approval.

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2. Covert military action is not permitted without approval by the BLUE ALLIANCE Council/Defence Planning Committee.
3. The sovereignty of neutral nations will not be violated.
4. BLUE ALLIANCE forces operating on SLAWIA territory will not emplace anti-personnel land mines.
5. No Border Crossing Authority including WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE without BLUE ALLIANCE approval.

b. Opposing Forces.

(1) DRAGOLAND.

(a) Intent. DRAGOLAND's overall objective is to enhance its strategic international position in order to consolidate the political power of the current authoritarian regime. This includes retention of the WESTERN POMERANIAN PROVINCE, gaining profits of the KARLINO oil fields and preventing international intervention.

(b) Capabilities.

1. DRAGOLAND can launch attacks using air, maritime and SSM forces at any time.
2. DRAGOLAND is capable to renewing limited ground offensive within 3 to 5 days but would require 10-15 days to mount a major new ground offensive. A major ground offensive cannot be sustained beyond 2-3 weeks without an operational pause.
3. DRAGOLAND surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) (SCUD B and C) have ranges up to 600 km giving DRAGOLAND the capability of striking most of SLAWIA.
4. DRAGOLAND possesses chemical weapons and is believed to have the capability to produce biological weapons. There is no evidence of a nuclear weapons capability.

(c) Assessment. DRAGOLAND's deployment of surface-to-air missile systems into the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE indicate its intention to defend captured SLAWIA territory. Continued mobilisation may indicate further military action. However, DRAGOLAND is unlikely to launch any new major offensive action unilaterally unless there is a significant change in the strategic situation. In such case, DRAGOLAND may act in coalition with BIZONIA to set conditions using military force. DRAGOLAND's future actions in order of likelihood would be to:

1. Further reinforcement and consolidation of its control over WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.
2. Increase information operations to isolate SLAWIA and forestall an effective international challenge.
3. Continue, in coalition with BIZONIA, to threaten and coerce SLAWIA into acceding to their demands for a share in BIAŁOGARD PLATEAU oil reserves.

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4. Deny points of entry and oppose the deployment of outside forces into the region.

5. Use military force in coalition with BIZONIA to exploit opportunities to gain control of WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.

(2) BIZONIA.

(a) Intent. BIZONIA's totalitarian regime appears to be willing to exploit the current situation in order to expand its regional dominance and safeguard the regime. They will likely seek to gain a share of the KARLINO oil fields and eradicate the armed Oderians Separatist Movement in order to secure its border with SLAWIA.

(b) Capabilities.

1. BIZONIA Air Forces are capable of offensive operations including long range attack against targets anywhere in SLAWIA.

2. BIZONIA is capable of initiating limited ground offensive action against SLAWIA within 3-5 days with forces deployed close to border areas.

3. BIZONIA is capable of mounting a major offensive from either east BIZONIA or through DRAGOLAND with 20-30 days further preparation.

4. BIZONIA does not have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability.

(c) Assessment. The continued build up of BIZONIA military forces has raised military tensions and could forecast a BIZONIA attack against SLAWIA. BIZONIA's future actions in order of likelihood would be to:

1. Continue to threaten SOUTHWEST SLAWIA in order to pressure SLAWIA into acceding to the demands of the DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition.

2. Continue special operations and small scale operations against ethnic Oderians separatists in the border area.

3. Conduct limited offensive operations to impose a security zone in western SLAWIA territory, possible in coordination with military action by DRAGOLAND.

4. Use military force in coalition with DRAGOLAND to exploit opportunities to gain control of WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) SLAWIA.

(a) Intent. SLAWIA has indicated that its intent is to achieve the restoration of SLAWIA territorial integrity and to deter further DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA aggression in order to safeguard its vital resources and the Oderians.

(b) Capabilities.

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1. SLAWIA's Armed Forces are capable of defending against further aggression by DRAGOLAND or BIZONIA but not both.
2. SLAWIA air defences are capable of defending SLAWIA airspace against air attacks by DRAGOLAND and defending vital areas against air attacks by BIZONIA. However, SLAWIA does not possess a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) capability.
3. In the event of a major attack by both DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA, SLAWIA could defend for 1 to 2 weeks without external assistance by trading territory for time.
4. SLAWIA lacks the offensive capabilities to retake the WESTERN POMERANIAN PROVINCE and would require significant external support.
5. SLAWIA is capable of mobilising territorial army within 60-90 additional days.

(c) Assessment. SLAWIA is unable to counter the growing military threat posed by a DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition. SLAWIA is total dependent on external assistance to stabilise the situation in the north-west and restore its sovereignty over the WESTERN POMERANIA PROVINCE. SLAWIA's likely actions will be to:

1. Continue to press the UN and the international community for assistance.
2. Continue mobilisation and preparations to defend against further aggression by DRAGOLAND in the north and possible BIZONIA's military actions in the southeast.
3. Attempt to stabilise the situation in the southeast without precipitating a military confrontation with BIZONIA.
4. Increase protection of land and sea approaches to SLAWIA.
5. Increase security at potential ports of disembarkation (PODs) and preparations for receiving outside forces.

d. Attachment and Detachments.

(1) Attachment. In accordance to SLAWIA / BLUE ALLIANCE agreements, forces capable of JFACC operations will become available in the Central Eureka JOA from the following sources in SLAWIA:

- (a) Two (2) tactical air brigades consisted of 8 squadrons (132 a/c).
- (b) Three (3) SAM brigades.
- (c) Radar posts and other air surveillance and control system facilities.
- (d) SLAWIA Air Force liaison elements to facilitate planning and coordination.

(2) Detachments. To assure needed level of coordination and specialists advise, JFACC will dispatch liaison elements to SLAWIA Air Force commands and units, dependently of future assessments.

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e. Given Assumption.

(1) Political Assumptions.

- (a) Authority for the operation is provided by an UNSC Resolution 1371 under chapter VII of the UN Charter.
- (b) DRAGOLAND will continue to operate in coalition with BIZONIA in a regional conflict against SLAWIA.
- (c) BIZONIA and DRAGOLAND will oppose the introduction of BLUE ALLIANCE forces into the region.
- (d) SLAWIA will continue to hold politically and militarily within its capabilities against threatened or actual aggression by BIZONIA and/or DRAGOLAND.
- (e) TABOR and SAMBIA will remain neutral during the conflict but SAMBIA actively contributes to the peace process.
- (f) An appropriate follow-on force will be available to relieve BLUE ALLIANCE forces.
- (g) Enforcement of UN mandated embargo against DRAGOLAND will be strongly supported by the Baltic Sea countries neighbouring north DRAGOLAND.

(2) Military Assumptions.

- (a) Nations will generate sufficient forces to conduct the operation.
- (b) Pre-deployment of enabling forces will be authorised prior to the activation and deployment of BLUE ALLIANCE forces.
- (c) BLUE ALLIANCE Council will authorise the activation and deployment of Alliance forces following an appropriate UN resolution.
- (d) The use of WMD against BLUE ALLIANCE forces cannot be ruled out.
- (e) Points of entry into SLAWIA remain under SLAWIA control.
- (f) Appropriate SOFA and MOUs will be negotiated to allow BLUE ALLIANCE forces to operate in airspace over SAMBIA as well as operate in and over SLAWIA.
- (g) Cross-border operations will be authorised in response to major aggression.
- (h) Appropriate Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be granted to allow adequate defence of BLUE ALLIANCE Forces and installations in the Joint Operating Area (JOA).
- (i) BIZONIA and DRAGOLAND may employ SSM and asymmetric means such as terrorism to oppose the introduction of BLUE ALLIANCE forces into the region.
- (j) The CJTF will receive at least 5 days' strategic warning that either BIZONIA or DRAGOLAND is preparing for major offensive operations.

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(k) SLAWIA Air Force bases/facilities and other installations required for BLUE ALLIANCE air forces operations will be made available for use of BLUE ALLIANCE air forces.

(l) SLAWIA Government will authorise SLAWIA Air Force forces to coordinate operational activities with the JFACC.

(m) SLAWIA will provide local security for air bases and installations where BLUE ALLIANCE air forces will be operating.

(n) Host Nation Support (HNS) will be available for some services and supplies.

(o) CJTF will be provided requisite Space-Based High/Low Resolution Electro-Optical & Infrared; Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and High Resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar products.

f. Tasks.

- (1) Establish theatre surveillance, situation monitoring and intelligence collection capability.
- (2) Establish air superiority over lodgement areas in SLAWIA.
- (3) Establish Recognised Air Picture (RAP).
- (4) Assume responsibilities of Joint Air Component Commander (JFACC), Area Air Defence Commander (AADC) and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) in JOA.
- (5) Receive assigned forces, accept transfer of authority (TOA) and assume OPCOM/OPCON.
- (6) Build up forces required to establish and maintain air superiority within JOA.
- (7) Support JFMCC in maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND.
- (8) Contribute to deterrence with visible presence of BLUE ALLIANCE defensive and offensive air capabilities.
- (9) Provide Close Air Support (CAS) and Air Interdiction (AI) in support of SLAWIA and BLUE ALLIANCE land forces to contain and defeat any further aggression by DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA.
- (10) Be prepared to support CJTF counter-offensive operations to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA.
- (11) Deploy enabling forces and forward C2 with planning and liaison elements to co-ordinate with SLAWIA Air Forces.
- (12) Prepare for the arrival of BLUE ALLIANCE air forces in SLAWIA.
- (13) Sustain ACC forces.
- (14) Support CJTF Information Operations Campaign.
- (15) Assist UN humanitarian assistance efforts within capabilities.
- (16) Be prepared to transition/handover ACC responsibilities prior to redeployment.

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(17) Be prepared to execute redeployment of BLUE ALLIANCE Air Forces upon mission completion.

2. MISSION. On order, COM JFACC will conduct combined joint air operations in the CENTRAL EUREKA JOA to contribute achieving COMCJTF objectives established for operation RELIABLE GUARD. As an Area Air Defence Commander, COM JFACC will conduct defensive, offensive and supporting air operations as directed by COM CJTF to ensure security of BLUE ALLIANCE forces in the JOA, and ensure security and territorial integrity of SLAWIA. As an Airspace Control Authority, COM JFACC will establish airspace control procedures within the CENTRAL EUREKA JOA to minimise fratricide and provide air defence forces with the appropriate means to maximise the effectiveness of military operations.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Commander's Intent.

(1) The aim of JFACC operation in CENTRAL EUREKA is to support COMCJTF in enforcement compliance with appropriate UN resolutions by deterring the DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition from further aggression against SLAWIA and, if deterrence fails, to defend and restore SLAWIA's territorial integrity by a decisively defeating Coalition offensive.

(2) On order, it is my intent to rapidly deploy those air forces into the JOA that will be required to support JFMCC enforcing the UN embargo on DRAGOLAND and that provide for an effective deterrence posture.

(3) If deterrence succeeds but DRAGOLAND fails to comply with appropriate UN resolutions, on order I intend to initiate counter air operations against DRAGOLAND's forces and to build up the JFACC offensive capabilities required to contribute COM CJTF in expelling DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA territory.

(4) If deterrence fails and a DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA initiate offensive operations in and against SLAWIA, I intend to maintain air superiority over SLAWIA territory and provide close air support and air interdiction in support SLAWIA and BLUE ALLIANCE land forces to contain and defeat any further aggression. Simultaneously I intend to build up the JFACC offensive capabilities required for CJTF counter-offensive operations.

(5) I intend to provide air force capabilities during counter offensive operations first against DRAGOLAND's forces and after redeployment CJTF land forces, against BIZONIA's forces.

(6) Throughout the campaign I intend to be prepared to neutralise DRAGOLAND WMD when ordered.

(7) Military Objectives. Accordingly to COM JFACC intend, military objectives are to:

(a) Prevent DRAGOLAND from re-initiating its offensive and to discourage BIZONIA from entering the conflict by contribution to deterrence with visible presence of BLUE ALLIANCE defensive and offensive air capabilities.

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- (b) Secure airspace over SLAWIA and adjacent waters in the JOA.
 - (c) Achieve capabilities to participate in synchronised, combined joint operations.
 - (d) Prevent DRAGOLAND / BIZONIA air forces to support operations of own ground and maritime forces.
 - (c) Secure refugees camps in SLAWIA.
- (7) Desired Military End State.
- (a) DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA Coalition forces have withdrawn from SLAWIA's territory.
 - (b) Military operations have been terminated and post-conflict conditions are set for a safe return of refugees and hand-over to follow-on forces.
 - (c) The post conflict disposition of the Coalition and its forces rules out the resumption of hostilities by DRAGOLAND/BIZONIA prevents them from threatening international air and sea lanes in the near-term.

b. Commander's Analysis.

- (1) Commander's Evaluation. BLUE ALLIANCE air operations will initially focus on establishing and maintaining air superiority over the theatre LOCs and lodgement areas to support the build-up of CJTF combat power in SLAWIA. This will require establishment of operational in-theatre airbases as early as possible to reduce the necessity of operating from ex-theatre airbases. It will be essential to have early availability of reconnaissance, theatre surveillance and space surveillance assets to improve SLAWIA and CJTF defensive capabilities. A credible defensive and offensive air forces capability will be required to deter DRAGOLAND from further aggression against SLAWIA in any sector and to deter BIZONIA from any aggression against SLAWIA. BLUE ALLIANCE air superiority will be required over SLAWIA throughout. BLUE ALLIANCE air forces must be prepared to support the CJTF land, maritime and amphibious forces with defensive and offensive air operations throughout the theatre including combat operations by BIZONIA and DRAGOLAND operating in coalition. Air forces committed to the CJTF should be selected to exploit BLUE ALLIANCE Air Forces capabilities in joint operations and weapons delivery technology.
- (2) Centres of Gravity. Capability to conduct combined joint air operations in JOA.
- (3) Pre-conditions for Success. Successfully fulfilling COM JFACC mission will require the following support from COM CJTF and other Components:
- (a) Commander CJTF.
 - 1. All source intelligence.
 - (b) Joint Force Land Component Command.
 - 1. JFLCC area security support in environs of BLUE ALLIANCE air bases and installations.

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2. Accommodation and support for the Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land) (AOCC(L)).
 3. Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) co-located with the CAOC.
 4. JFLCC ground liaison teams to BLUE ALLIANCE air units provide specialist advice and to coordinate JFLCC forces' activities.
 5. Close coordination between JFLCC organic air defence forces and JFACC air defence forces.
 6. Signal Intelligence/Electronic Intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT) support.
- (c) Joint Force Maritime Component Command.
1. Accommodation and support for the Air Operations Coordination Centre (Maritime) (AOCC(M)).
 2. Stand-off land attack (TLAM) of interdiction targets.
- (d) Joint Special Operations.
1. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) support for aircrew downed in high threat territory.
 2. JSOTF liaison teams to HQ ACC to provide specialist advice and to coordinate JSOTF activities.
- (e) Joint Rear Area.
1. Reception, staging and onward movement support for arriving BLUE ALLIANCE air units.
 2. Rear area security support in environs of BLUE ALLIANCE airbases and installations.
 3. Class III (POL) distribution.
 4. Theatre medical staging and evacuation.
 5. Medical Role 3 back up.
 6. Contracting, salvage, and mortuary support for BLUE ALLIANCE airbases and installations.
 7. Assistance in handover of installations upon mission completion.

c. **Conduct of Operations.** In accordance to COM CJTF planning guidance, operation is envisioned in five (5) phases:

(1) Phase 1: Warning and Activation.

First, JFACC is to establish theatre surveillance, situation monitoring and intelligence collection capability. Because SLAWIA's capabilities in this sector are limited, ACC must have the ability to establish a Recognised Air Picture and to contribute to intelligence collection whilst operating from bases outside of SLAWIA.

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Second, JFACC is to prepare for the arrival of BLUE ALLIANCE air forces in SLAWIA. Establishment and manning of forward planning, liaison and coordinating posts with host nation Air C2 entities should be established as soon as practicable.

(2) Phase 2: Deployment and Deterrence.

First, JFACC is to deploy enabling forces and forward C2 with planning and liaison elements to co-ordinate with SLAWIA Air Forces. At least 2 airbases in SLAWIA are needed to support initial air defence operations as well as APOD operations.

Second, COMJFACC is to receive assigned forces, accept transfer of authority and assume OPCOM/OPCON. Command and Control of BLUE ALLIANCE air forces must be established in JOA as soon as possible prior to the graduated deployment of air forces. Insofar as practicable, SLAWIA Air Forces will be incorporated into cohesive integrated air defence system.

Third, JFACC must establish air superiority over lodgement areas in SLAWIA. This requires air surveillance and control, air defence aircraft, Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence and GBAD. Initial air defence aircraft will operate from the APOD airbases.

Fourth, JFACC is to establish Recognised Air Picture. Initial RAP establishment will require integration of AEW, GBAD and available SLAWIA systems under the CAOC 1.

Fifth, JFACC must build up forces required to establish and maintain air superiority within JOA. Initially BLUE ALLIANCE air defence forces will be bedded down at 4 airbases including 2 dedicated APODs. Finally, BLUE ALLIANCE air forces will operate 8 airbases in SLAWIA and 1 airbase in LANCET.

Sixth, JFACC will support JFMCC in maritime embargo against DRAGOLAND. This task would require basing of land-based maritime patrol aircraft and other forces which could complement the JFMCC forces (e.g. AEW).

Seventh, JFACC is to contribute to deterrence with visible presence of BLUE ALLIANCE defensive and offensive air capabilities. The JFACC defensive and offensive forces will be conducting visible realistic training and exercises in preparation for actual missions. Missions to be practised in theatre include, inter alia: Air Interdiction, Close Air Support, Offensive Counter-Air, Combat SAR, Air Refuelling, Suppression of Enemy Air Defence, joint offensive operations, tactical reconnaissance and ASFAO in maritime environment.

Eight, in case of further aggression by DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA, JFACC will provide Close Air Support and Air Interdiction in support SLAWIA and BLUE ALLIANCE land forces to contain and defeat opposing forces.

Ninth, JFACC is to be prepared to support CJTF counter-offensive operations to expel DRAGOLAND forces from SLAWIA. It demands additional air forces capabilities which will be required to carry out combat operations against DRAGOLAND and BIZONIA forces.

Tenth, JFACC will support COMCJTF Information Operations Campaign and assist UN humanitarian assistance efforts within capabilities.

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(3) Phase 3: Decisive Combat and Stabilisation. If this phase occurs, JFACC will conduct combined joint air operations, including Counter-Air Operations, Air Operations for Strategic Effect, Anti-Surface Force Air Operations in the Land Environment, Anti-Surface Force Air Operations in the Maritime Environment, Anti-Surface Force Air Operations in Amphibious Operations, and Supporting Air Operations. JFACC will support COMCJTF Information Operations Campaign and assist UN humanitarian assistance efforts within capabilities.

(4) Phase 4: Transition. In this phase COMJFACC will implement military agreements which require establishment and enforcement of restricted / prohibited fly zones. On order, COMJFACC will handover operational responsibilities to follow-on forces and be prepared to conduct redeployment of BLUE ALLIANCE air forces.

(5) Phase 5: Redeployment. In this phase JFACC operational responsibilities will turnover for restricted/prohibited fly zones. After mission completion, JFACC hand back ACC occupied airbases and installations to Host Nation.

d. Force Capability Requirements. Forces OPCON to COMJFACC must provide the acceptance to use a common package of Rules of Engagement within the JOA. MC 362 refers.

e. Tasks. For CAOC 1 with allocated units

- (1) Build up and maintain a Recognized Air Picture (RAP) at all times.
- (2) Establish and report operational readiness at beddown bases (a/c) and field positions (GBAD) as soon as possible.
- (3) Build up a credible defensive posture and maintain air superiority over SLAWIA territory.
- (4) Build up Theatre Missile Defence of critical assets/locations.
- (5) Support embargo in Phase 1.
- (6) On order, to be expected NET 17 MAY 2007, conduct offensive air operations against DRAGOLAND air forces and achieve air superiority in DRAGOLAND airspace NLT 20 MAY 2007.
- (7) During own ground operations against DRAGOLAND forces, expected NET 21 MAY 2007, support with AI and CAS to the max. extend possible. Enforce withdrawal of DRAGOLAND land forces from SLAWIA.
- (8) If BIZONIA forces crossing SLAWIA border, on order to be expected conduct AI and CAS to SLAWIA and BLUE ALLIANCE forces for containing BIZONIA military actions.
- (9) Be prepared to support possible employment of own amphibious operations.
- (10) Be prepared to attack DRAGOLAND's WMD on special order.
- (11) Perform reconnaissance for own operations as well as for JFLCC and JFMCC.

f. Co-ordinating Instructions.

- (1) Timeline.

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- (a) Time schedule according to UNSC Resolution 1371 ultimatum X day (16 MAY 2006).
 - (b) Deployment of advanced parties and HRF commences immediately after ACTORD according to national guidance.
 - (c) Deployment main body commences 17 APR 2007.
- (2) Transfer of Authority (TOA).
- (a) Nations will delegate coordinating authority to COMBASC and COMCJTF for planning and preparation of the BLUE ALLIANCE forces.
 - (b) Nations retain command of forces during deployment and transfer OPCOM to COMBASC not later than upon arrival in the JOA.
 - (c) COMBASC delegates TACON of forces to CJTF, as a minimum, upon their arrival in the JOA.
 - (d) When forces are declared operationally ready by National Command Authorities COMBASC passes OPCOM/OPCON to CJTF in according with national ORBATTOA messages.
 - (e) COMJFACC will assume OPCOM as an Area Air Defence Commander and OPCON after TOA by COMCJTF.
 - (f) COM CAOC1 will assume TACOM/TACON after TOA by COMJFACC.
- (3) Mandate and Border Crossing Authority. Operations in CENTRAL EUREKA is UN mandated. Border crossing authority remains with BLUE ALLIANCE Council.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. Logistics Standards and Requirements.

- (1) Theatre stocks levels should be based on the maintenance of 10 days of supplies in the JOA. Detailed requirements are to be included in the sustainability statement.
- (2) Individual units are to carry a minimum of 7 days of supplies.
- (4) POL management should be organised on a Lead Nation basis (LANCET) to the extent allowed by the operational plan. Subordinate commands are to develop plans to centrally manage critical supplies and services as required.
- (4) Maximum use will be made of existing BLUE ALLIANCE logistic installations, augmented by Host Nation Support (HNS) where possible.
- (5) TCN are responsible for establishing national LOCs in coordination with Host Nations and BLUE ALLIANCE commanders.

b. Movement. n/a

c. Medical Support. While roles 1, 2 and 4 remain a purely national responsibility multinational solutions on role 3 are highly encouraged. COMJFMCC will co-ordinate MEDEVAC from forces afloat in JOA.

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- d. Personnel. n/a
- e. Host Nations Support. n/a
- f. Funding and Contracting Support. n/a

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- a. Command and Control. n/a
- b. Communications. n/a

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DRAGOLAND
COUNTRY INFORMATION FOR
EXERCISE AIR SHIELD 2007

WARSAW

MAY 2007

EXERCISE AIR SHIELD 2007
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IDENTIFICATION

Conventional long form: Republic of Dragoland
Conventional short form: Dragoland
Country Code: DRL

GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION

Exclusively for Exercise AIR SHIELD 2007 purpose, all geospatial data concerning Dragoland (physical geography, topography, hydrography, oceanography, climate) are the same as those of regions within real world Central Europe boundaries depicted on the Exercise AS 07 Situational Map.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Relations with Bizonia. Dragoland and Bizonia have traditionally enjoyed friendly relations often finding common ground on regional issues. Recently, the level of cooperation in economic, political and military activities has increased and a number of agreements have been reached in areas of tariff free trade, military technology transfers, and common energy policies.

Relations with Kadryl. Relations with Kadryl are generally good and the two countries participate in a wide range of economic exchanges. However, the large number of ethnic Dragolandians living on the Jutland Peninsula have been a source of problems for both countries.

PEOPLE

Population. The population of Dragoland is 33,231,546 with a growth rate of 0.18% (1998 est).

The infant mortality rate in 1998 was 7.6 deaths/1,000 live births and life expectancy at birth for the total population is 75.28. Literacy among the total population of age 15 and over who can read and write is 92% (1996 est).

Settlement patterns. The Urban/Rural split is approximately 63% / 37%.

Ethnic and Religious Divisions. The population is a composite mix of Atlantic, Mediterranean and Nordic types. Dragolandians comprise 47% of the population. Oderians make up a large minority (13%) of the population. The major religions are Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant. Sects accounting for less than 3% of the population.

Labour Force. The total labour force of 13,957 million is comprised of occupations in services (18%), industry (38%), agriculture (21%), construction (14%) and Government service (9%) (1996 est).

GOVERNMENT

Governmental Type and Structure. In the wake of World War II, Dragoland underwent a sweeping revolution which saw political power consolidated under an authoritarian nationalistic oligarchy, led by General Nowak, which has now been in power for nearly five decades. The political zenith of the current regime came during the first two decades immediately after the War when Dragoland exercised considerable political influence in shaping the destiny of the region. Since then, economic decline, a corrupt bureaucracy, and the failure of centralist states world-wide have seen Dragoland's po-

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litical influence fall dramatically. Administratively, Dragoland is divided into seven administrative provinces. These provinces are governed by local party elements.

Capital. The seat of the Dragoland government is in BERLINAS.

Executive Branch – Offices and Incumbents. General Nowak is the President and serves also as the head of government. The government, which is highly bureaucratic, retains a distinctly planned economy.

Political Parties and Leaders. The Nationalists Party of General Nowak is the only legally constituted political party in Dragoland. It constitutes the ruling party in which Nowak heads a political oligarchy which has dominated the political scene in Dragoland since the shortly after the Second World War. It includes not only extended family but also an extensive party membership in Nationalists Party and is heavily dominated by ethnic Dragolandians. Gen Nowak comes from a prominent ethnic Dragolandian family and virtually all positions of authority are held by ethnic Dragolandians in Nationalists Party. The second in command is Taras Jakow - a protégé of Nowak. Jakow is assessed as being loyal and a very capable potential leader who is likely to continue in the same vein as Nowak. Removal of Nowak would possibly disrupt the exercise of political power by Nationalists in the short term but would not likely result in a major shift in policy given the current Nationalistic Party manifesto. A major change in political leadership would be required.

Other Political or Pressure Groups. There is no evidence of a viable political opposition which could oppose Nationalists in the short term.

Internal Stability. Any opposition to the Dragoland government has been ruthlessly eradicated. The mainly peasant population has known little else but a dictatorship and appears subdued. In recent years, the emergence of the Oderian Resistance Group (ORG) has offered some challenges to Dragolandian domination, primarily in the north-east of the country.

International Organisation Membership. Dragoland's international organisation membership status as of 31 December 2006 is shown in Figure 1 below:

Organisation	Status
United Nations (UN)	Yes (not on Security Council)
Regional Affiliation	Aligned with Bizonia politically
Eureka Economic Union	Non-Member

Figure 1. Dragoland's International Organisation Membership

ECONOMY

Overview. Despite pressures to reform its economic system, Dragoland's economy continues to be command directed. The private sector is limited to small business while the state maintains ownership of all major industry and infrastructure. Inflation has risen as the value of the Dragoland currency has fallen under the burden of rising imports and falling exports.

Economic Capacity.

Industries: The industries of steel, mining (coal, chromite, copper, boron minerals), textiles, food processing, petroleum, construction, lumber and paper account for 32% of GDP. Industrial production growth rate was 1.3% in 2005.

Agriculture: Agriculture and animal husbandry account for 16% of GDP and employ about a fourth of the working force. Dragoland is self-sufficient in food most years.

Energy.

Electricity: Dragoland has the capability to produce 42,000,000 kW with an annual production estimated at 185 billion kWh. The 1995 consumption per capita is estimated at 4,550 kWh. The nationally owned electrical generation capability includes four nuclear powered facilities. The national electrical power grid is designed with redundant cross-over/back-up capabilities. The major Dragoland electrical production facilities are shown in Figure 2.

Location	Power Source	Capacity	Production
Halle (512700N 0081500E)	Coal	2,000,000 kW	12.3 billion kWh
Leipzig (511800N 0122000E)	Nuclear	6,000,000 kW	24.6 billion kWh
Pirna (505800N 0135600E)	Hydro	5,000,000 kW	28.7 billion kWh
Spremberg (513300N 0142200E)	Hydro	6,000,000 kW	17.4 billion kWh
Hamburg (533300N 0100000E)	Gas	2,000,000 kW	13.3 billion kWh
Magdeburg (521000N 0114000E)	Nuclear	4,000,000 kW	21.5 billion kWh
Dessau (524900N 0112900E)	Coal	3,000,000 kW	14.3 billion kWh
Ludwigslust (531900N 0113000E)	Coal	3,000,000 kW	14.1 billion kWh
Greifswald (485400N 0130200E)	Nuclear	5,000,000 kW	25.6 billion kWh
Świebodzin (501600N 0205500E)	Gas	3,000,000 kW	13.7 billion kWh

Figure 2. The Major Dragoland Electrical Production Facilities

Petroleum Production/Storage: Dragoland produces approximately 60% of its oil and gas requirements and imports the remainder. The major Dragolandian oil and gas production area is in the southeast of the country near its border with Bizonia. Dragoland has significant petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) storage and distribution facilities in the northwest near the seaports of Kiel and Lubeck. Major POL facilities are presented in Figure 3.

Facility	Capacity (t)
Lubeck (535200N 0104200E)	23 000
Kiel (543300N 0091000E)	18 000
Gardelegen (523200N 0112200E)	9 000
Eisenhüttenstadt (520900N 0143900E)	10 000

Figure 3. Major Dragoland POL Facilities

TRANSPORTATION

General. The major transport networks and facilities are portrayed in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Dragoland's Major Transportation Networks

Roads. There is an excellent road network throughout the region. Major thoroughfares link all major cities with secondary roads throughout Dragoland. Roads are generally in excellent condition.

Railroads. Berlinas is the rail hub of Dragoland. Built during the early 1950's, a standard gauge rail system links the major cities in Dragoland. These rail networks generally parallel major roads and would support military movements to and from the border areas of Dragoland.

Inland Waterways. Dragoland has no significant inland waterways.

Surface Transportation.

Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs): Dragoland is a producer and exporter of heavy goods vehicles. Current estimates suggest that as many as 2500 (> 5-tonne) HGVs may be available at any time in a national emergency. The availability of commercial heavy equipment transporters is unknown.

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Trains: Total rolling stock in Dragoland totals 3,156 rail wagons of all categories with 22 electric and 62 diesel locomotives. Freight trains average 20-25 cars in length (550 m long) and carry 600-800 tons, each.

Merchant Marine.

Dragoland has only a limited merchant marine consisting of 96 ships rated at 1,000 GRT or over. These include the vessels shown in Figure 5.

Type	Ships	Type	Ships	Type	Ships
Bulk	18	Combination ore/oil	2	Passenger-cargo	7
Cargo	33	Container	4	Refrigerated cargo	4
Chemical tanker	4	Liquefied gas	2	Roll-on/roll-off cargo	2
Combination bulk	2	Oil tanker	12	Short-sea passenger	7

Figure 5. Dragoland Merchant Marine Vessels

Sea Ports and Harbours.

Locations and data of Dragoland seaports are shown in Figure 6 and 7.




Figure 6. Dragoland's Baltic Sea Ports Location

Seaports	Size	N Lat	E Long	No of Births	Max Ship Length	Max Ship Draft	Max Crane Tonnes	RoRo Offload/Day	Containers/day	POL cu m/Day	PCL cu m Storage	Ammo	Remarks
KIEL	Large	5420	01009	19	267 m	14.5 m	90 (2)	3	200	5500	150000	Yes	
LUBECK	Large	5354	01009	20	267 m	12 m	90	3	12000	2000	6000	Yes	
ROSTOCK	Medium	5407	01204	10	250 m	10 m	80	2	600	700	1500	No	
STRALSUND	Medium	5418	01306	16	200 m	9.5 m	75	2	600	1000	2000	Yes	
HEILIGEN-HAFEN	Small	5422	01059	3	200 m	8 m	70	1	200	500	1000	Yes	
SASSNITZ	Small	5430	01338	4	214 m	8 m	75	2	600	500	1000	Yes	

Figure 7. Dragoland Baltic Sea Seaports Data

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Airports and Facilities. Dragoland has a substantial number of civil, military and civil-military joint use airfields as tabled in Figure 8.

	Total	Usable	Hard Surface	Longest Runway		
				Over 3,659 m	2,440-3,659 m	1,220-2,439 m
Joint	14	12	3	3	2	7
Civilian	56	49	32	0	0	0
Military	34	32	32	0	10	13
Total	104	93	67	3	12	20

Figure 8. Dragoland Airfields Summary

Air Traffic Control. Dragoland air space control is jointly managed by military and civil authorities with the military being overall responsible. The air traffic control facilities and their associated communications systems, although antiquated in the south of the Bizonia country, are generally well maintained and the civil air control operations have an adequate safety record.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Dragoland has a well developed telecommunications system with extensive cable and microwave radio relay networks. Satellite systems are available for domestic and international communications and optical-fibre systems are being introduced. All telecommunication services are fully available for the military defence forces on mobilisation.

Telephone, Telex and data services systems are becoming increasingly automated in the south and east of Dragoland. Telephone service includes 12200000 telephones and over 150000 GSM units. Approximately 75% of Dragoland is covered by the national mobile phone system.

Signal transmission is via an extensive and redundant system of high capacity, multi-conductor cables, including 2 buried coaxial cable systems, supplemented by microwave radio relay trunks.

Radio broadcasting includes 23 AM stations, 300 (mostly repeaters) FM stations and 184 (mostly repeaters) TV stations.

Dragoland is connected internationally by 2 coaxial submarine cables through the Baltic Sea and 2 underground terrestrial cable connections from the East and the West; 1 INTELSAT earth station (with total of 2 antennas – 1 for the Baltic Sea INTELSAT and 1 for the Atlantic Ocean INTELSAT); HF radio communications with more than 11 countries; INMARSAT service; and ATLANTELSAT TV.

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Dragoland has begun making use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). Commercial off the shelf receivers such as the Rockwell International 5-channel NavC or V GPS using both GPS and GLONASS are in use within both civil and military sectors. Civilian use of satellite navigation systems provides reliable and redundant positioning information with a high probability of accuracy to within 100 metres.

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

AVIATION AND AIR DEFENCE FACULTY

**STANDARDOWE
PROCEDURY OPERACYJNE**
(Standard Operating Procedures)

**STANOWISK DOWODZENIA
ĆWICZENIA „POWIETRZNA TARCZA 2007”
EXERCISE AIR SHIELD 2007 EXERCISE'S
HEADQUARTERS**

WARSAW

MAY 2007

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)
AIR COMPONENT COMMAND
(Exercise)




Figure 1. ACC - Overall Battle Staff Organization (Exercise)

ACC Battle Staff Organization

Battle Staff (depicted in Figure 1) has a divisional structure. The divisional structure has the intent to provide the Battle Staff Director (BSD) with officer's expertise for guidance support and operation's insights. Furthermore, the Division Chiefs can re-organize the priorities of functional working inside the division that means i.e. more attention to defensive than offensive or vice versa.

BATTLE STAFF DIRECTOR

BSD Responsibilities. The BDS supports the Air Component Commander (COMAIR) in all command issues and is directly responsible to COMAIR for:

- monitoring the air portion of the Joint Campaign.
- directing all operational staff functions.

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- serving as COMAIR in his absence.
- releasing the AOD and PTL when authorized.
- arrangements of the agenda and conducting of the Planning Meetings (Air Operation Meeting – AOM) and Commander's Meeting (AOD Decision Meeting – ADM).

A2 - INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

A2 Responsibilities. The overall responsibility of A2 is to provide just in time and constantly mission-related intelligence data. Those data should be available at any time and any place to support successfully air operations with sufficient accuracy.

The A-2 Division is responsible for:

- evaluating the intelligence requirements of the COMAIR staff and deciding whether these requirements can be fulfilled with current sources.
- releasing intelligence information to the operations and planning divisions.
- preparing intelligence assessments on enemy capabilities and intentions for COMMAIR.
- preparing and updating maps (displays) with intelligence information and informing the Battle Staff Director of significant developments.

The major inputs, tasks and outputs for A2 are:

Inputs:

- CINC's JCO.
- Information Data Base (i.e. aircraft's technical data, infrastructure of air bases, etc.)
- JPTL.

Tasks:

- Assessment of opposing forces (air, land, maritime) operations, capabilities and intentions that means Air Order of Battle (AOB), Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) and Missile Order of Battle (MOB)
- Preparation of current intelligence briefings.
- Providing target information as required.
- Tracking of Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) reports and results.
- Producing and Reporting BDA as part of the Combat Assessment process.

Outputs

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- Intelligence Briefings (during AOM and ADM)
- Request for Information (RFI) response
- PTL

JOB DESCRIPTIONS

Chief of Intelligence Division

The Chief of Intelligence Division is responsible to COMAIR through the BSD for the efficient conduct of intelligence functions, and for the overall supervision of the intelligence division. In particular he is responsible for:

- collecting and analyzing of all related information concerning enemy air, land, maritime and info ops activity, capabilities, and intentions;
- supervising, preparing and presenting intelligence briefings, reports, and assessments especially during AOM and ADM;
- coordinating the exchange of information with all relevant divisions;
- developing and distributing of the PTL.

Staff officers (SO A2-2, 3)

They are responsible for:

- assessing opposing Air Force operations, capabilities, and intentions;
- preparing intelligence briefings, reports, and assessments and other required reports;
- collecting and summarizing incoming intelligence information and ensuring correct internal distribution;
- coordinating information to facilitate analysis of enemies' capabilities, movement, and attrition;
- ensuring actual intelligence on maps and displays;
- submitting also RFIs if necessary;
- writing enemy assessments to AOD;
- performing other duties as assigned by the Chief of A2 Division.

A3 - OPERATIONS DIVISION

A3 Responsibilities. The Operations Division creates the air operations plan, and translates this into the AOD with support of A2 for intelligence support, A4 for logis-

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tics, A5 for strategy and planning considerations and GLO. The AOD in combination with the PTL and specific operational guidance, forms the basis for directing the CAOC in achieving COMAIR's objectives in harmony with the CINC's campaign.

The major inputs, tasks and outputs for A-3 are:

Inputs:

- JFC JCO
- JPTL
- Land Force update from GLO
- Logistic constraints

Tasks:

- producing the AOD
- monitoring ongoing air operations

Outputs:

- AOD

JOB DESCRIPTIONS

Chief of Operations Division

The Chief of Operations Division is responsible for:

- ensuring the iteration process between JCO, ACC Guidance and AOD/PTLs.
- producing the AOD.
- developing the Air OPS Plan and the ADM
- producing the AOD

Staff officers (SO A3 Off. -1, 2, 3)

They are responsible for:

- all aspects of offensive operations.
- coordinating with the AIR staff for conventional support for offensive operations.
- ensuring resources and capabilities assigned to CAOCs taking into consideration of PTL.
- developing the daily air ops plan, taking into consideration CAOC's assets
- producing corresponding part of the AOD.

Staff officers (SO A3 Def. - 4, 5, 6)

They are responsible for:

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- coordinating defensive capabilities with Fighters/GBAD/ASACS to ensure consistency of air defence coverage with guidance.
- developing the daily air ops plan taking into consideration CAOC's assets.
- developing, adjusting and presenting ACOs.
- producing corresponding part of the AOD.
- coordinating all ACM requests, which are received for implementing into the ACO.
- assisting the Chief of Operations Division in producing briefing material.
- performing other duties as assigned by the Chief of Operations Division

Staff officers (SO A3 Supp. -7, 8)

They are responsible for:

- developing the daily air ops plan regarding Air Transport (AT), Air to Air Refueling (AAR), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Electronic Warfare, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) taking into consideration CAOC's assets.
- producing corresponding part of the AOD.
- assisting the Chief of Operations Division in producing briefing material.
- performing other duties as assigned by the Chief of Operations Division

A4 - LOGISTIC DIVISION

A4 Responsibilities. The Logistic Division ensures the co-ordination and smooth flow of resources to support ACC operations. In achieving the mission's objective the Logistic Division is responsible for:

- monitoring the status of logistics assets and capabilities of assigned units and assessing the impact on ACC plans
- evaluating logistic plans and initiating actions to reduce redundancies through cooperative efforts and ensuring the economic use of resources and services.
- taking actions to reduce or eliminate logistic limitations and shortfalls through the redistribution of resources.

JOB DESCRIPTION

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Chief of Logistic Division

The Chief of Logistic Division is responsible for:

- monitoring status of basic resources (POL)
- proposing redistribution of logistic resources
- taking action to reduce logistic constraints and shortfalls.
- examining all incoming messages for distribution of resources and allocating actions to appropriate logistic personnel.
- ensuring just in time updates and submission of briefings and reports.

Staff officer

The staff officer is responsible for:

- providing advice on the status of NATO assigned infrastructure assets and infrastructure damage repair actions.
- assessing air base capabilities within the theatre of operations to develop options for forces' apportionment. Therefore, A4 coordinates A3's and A5's weapon system requirements with A2's analysis of potential threats to own basis.
- monitoring and updating basis' inventory.
- producing annexes to AOD.
- monitoring and assessing the availability of logistic assets to meet operational requirements (personnel, munitions, supply facilities, air base maintenance, and damage repair capabilities).
- informing and advising the Chief of Logistic Division on all constraints and shortfalls affecting support resources
- assisting the Chief of Logistic Division in producing briefing material.
- performing other duties as assigned by the Chief of Logistic Division.

A5 - PLANS DIVISION

A5 Responsibilities.

The overall responsibility of A5 is to evaluate the development of the short term air strategy and the air operations based on JCO, CONOPS, and ongoing operational, intelligence and logistic constraints. A5 takes the lead in translating the JFC's JCO into a comprehensive, detailed air strategy for short term execution (for exercise purpose 24 hours), as well as the general development of plans for medium and longer term (for exercise purpose 96 hours). In the process of monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of air operations A5 will recommend new Courses of Action (COAs), as appropriate, to COMAIR.

Specific responsibilities for the A5 staff include:

- review JFC's JCO and transform his mission intent and statement into COMAIR guidance.
- advise, as necessary, on new COAs, and their repercussions to the COMAIR's apportionment
- establish Terms of References (TOR) for the AOM and provide input to the AOD

The major inputs, tasks and outputs for A5 are:

Inputs:

- Existing CONOPS
- JCO
- JPTL

Tasks:

- analysis of the JCO
- preparing for and conducting the AOM
- preparing input for the CDM
- assessing current apportionment and its impact on air operations
- recommending to COMAIR any changes of apportionment proposals
- monitoring progress of air operations.

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- analysing and reporting on operational effectiveness of air operations and trends
- conducting decision briefings for new COAs as required

Outputs:

- Apportionment recommendations
- AOM
- Contribution to AOD

JOB DESCRIPTION

Chief of Plans Division

The Chief of Planning Division is responsible to COMAIR, through the Battle Staff Director. The Chief of Planning Division has overall responsibility for the functions and tasks of A5 Plans, providing the lead in the development of short term air strategy, long term plans and overall strategy of air operations based on JCO and CONOPS, and ongoing operational, intelligence and logistic constraints.

He is responsible for ensuring that the COMAIR guidance is reflected in the final AOD. He provides recommendations, on COAs and updates all planning issues and decision briefings.

Staff officer (SO A5-1,2,3)

The Staff officers are responsible for:

- monitoring overall status of air operations.
- determining and interpreting operational trends
- assisting Chief of Planning Division in coordinating with supported/supporting commanders in developing recommendations for air apportionment and weight of effort.
- coordinating with A4 that logistic constraints are dissolved.
- coordinating air operations planning with A2.

GROUND LIAISON ELEMENT

GLE Responsibilities: GLE is a permanent position within the ACC-Staff. GLE advises on Land Forces' assets/capabilities and acts as the focal point for Land Forces' issues within AIR HQ. The following duties are included:

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- liaison on apportionment of Land Forces' air capabilities in support of the overall campaign;
- coordinating of input assets from Land Forces into the AOD.
- liaison on theatre-wide arrangements for air defence, including allocation of air surveillance, electronic warfare (EW) co-ordination, communication and data link architectures.
- liaison on AOD distribution to other CCs.
- supporting COMAIR staff in developing and maintaining the AOD, and PTL.
- responsible to Chief of Intelligence Division for ground related intelligence
- performs research on intelligence analysis of enemy ground activity to support intelligence articles and briefings produced by Intelligence Division.
- COMAIR briefings during AOM and ADM about own and enemy's Land Forces.

ANNEX A: Joint Force Air Component Command HQ ALPHA Battle Staff manning.

ANNEX B: Joint Force Air Component Command HQ BRAVO Battle Staff manning.

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ANNEX A

JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMAND HQ ALPHA BATTLE STAFF
MANNING

	Position	Rank, name and surname
1.	CHIEF OF BATTLE STAFF – COS	Capt. Paweł MRÓZ
2.	CHIEF INTELL (ACOS A-2)	Capt. Grzegorz MICHNO
3.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Krzysztof BIEN
4.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Piotr EJANKOWSKI
5.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Norbert CZERBNIAK
6.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Jacek GUZ
7.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Jarosław MASIEWICZ
8.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	German officer
9.	CHIEF OPERATIONS (ACOS A-3/5)	Capt. Maciej SŁAWIŃSKI
10.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Artur KUPTEL CINCHO I 10FF
11.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Arkadiusz PIETRZYK I 1
12.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Sławomir FIGAJ I 2
13.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Zbigniew GAŁCZYŃSKI I 1
14.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Józef TREJDER II 2
15.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Paweł GRABOWIEC II 2
16.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Piotr WANICKI II 1
17.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Czech officer J.H I 1
18.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	USA officer Rob "Atlas" II 2
19.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	Capt. Piotr JANICKI I 1
20.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	Capt. Dariusz JAZOWSKI 2
21.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	Capt. Piotr SZERER
22.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	German officer Ronald II 2
23.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	Slovak officer Vladimír II 2
24.	CHIEF LOGISTIC (ACOS A-4)	Capt. Paweł BECZAK
25.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-4)	Capt. Andrzej JANISZEWSKI
26.	CHIEF GROUND LIAISON ELEMENT (CH GLE)	Capt. Marek MADEJA
27.	STAFF OFFICER GLE (SO GLE)	Capt. Paweł ŁOZOWSKI

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ANNEX B

JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMAND HQ BRAVO BATTLE STAFF
MANNING

	Position	Rank, name and surname
1.	CHIEF OF BATTLE STAFF – COS	Capt. Sebastian MAŚLANKA
2.	CHIEF INTELL (ACOS A-2)	Capt. Tomasz KOŁODZIEJCZYK
3.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Damian WILCZYŃSKI
4.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Włodzimierz ZALEWSKI
5.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Krzysztof JEWGIEJUK
6.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Maciej MOROŃ
7.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	Capt. Paweł CZAJKOWSKI
8.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-2)	<i>German officer</i>
9.	CHIEF OPERATIONS (ACOS A-3/5)	Capt. Marek KEJNA
10.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Maciej ZIOŁO
11.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Grzegorz MATYJA
12.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Krzysztof JAJE
13.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Grzegorz JUŁGA
14.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Ireneusz ŁYCZEK
15.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Jarosław NOWAK
16.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	Capt. Piotr BADOWICZ
17.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	<i>USA officer</i>
18.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-3)	<i>Slovak officer</i>
19.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	Capt. Mariusz PILIPCZUK
20.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	Capt. Zbigniew PIŁAT
21.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	Capt. Adam RZESZOTEK
22.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	<i>German officer</i>
23.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-5)	<i>Czech officer</i>
24.	CHIEF LOGISTIC (ACOS A-4)	Capt. Wojciech SKRABALAK
25.	STAFF OFFICER (SO A-4)	Capt. Przemysław RUDNICKI
26.	CHIEF GROUND LIAISON ELEMENT (CH GLE)	Capt. Jarosław JĘDRZEJCZYK
27.	GLE STAFF OFFICER (SO GLE)	Capt. Andrzej PYRA

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EXERCISE AIR SHIELD 2007

AKADEMIA OBRONY NARODOWEJ

WYDZIAŁ LOTNICTWA I OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ

**STANDARDOWE
PROCEDURY OPERACYJNE**


**STANOWISK DOWODZENIA
ĆWICZENIA „POWIETRZNA TARCZA 2007”**

WARSZAWA

2007

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) COMBINED AIR OPERATIONS CENTER (CAOC)

Obowiązki osób funkcyjnych Wielonarodowego Centrum Operacji Powietrznych (ćwiczebne)



Rys. 1. Organizacja ćwiczącego wielonarodowego centrum operacji powietrznych (COAC)

Szef operacji powietrznych (DIR OPS) jest odpowiedzialny przed dowódcą CAOC za efekty pracy podległych pionów organizacyjnych sztabu. Kieruje przebiegiem procesu planowania w sztabie oraz wydaje w razie potrzeby stosowne wytyczne w zakresie pracy i funkcjonowania sztabu ukierunkowane na jak najlepsze wykonanie postawionego zadania. Określa ramy czasowe pracy sztabu i realizacji poszczególnych przedsięwzięć procesu planowania. Zastępuje Dowódcę CAOC i podczas jego nieobecności podejmuje decyzje w jego imieniu.

Szef rozpoznania (CH INTEL) – koordynuje całość działań rozpoznawczych ukierunkowanych na wsparcie procesu planowania realizowanego przez wszystkie komórki sztabu. Do jego obowiązków należy:

- organizacja i kierowanie pracą oficerów komórki rozpoznawczej sztabu;
- prowadzenie aktualnego obrazu sytuacji rozpoznawczej;
- utrzymywanie stałych kontaktów z przedstawicielami innych komórek organizacyjnych oraz oficerami łącznikowymi innych rodzajów sił zbrojnych (kierownictwem ćwiczenia, rozjemcą);
- opracowanie i przesyłanie do wyższych przełożonych zapotrzebowań na informację (Requests for Information);
- analiza dostępnych informacji rozpoznawczych o przeciwniku oraz przygotowanie wystąpień na konferencje planistyczną i decyzyjną
- uczestnictwo w konferencjach planistycznej i decyzyjnej.

Oficerowie sekcji rozpoznania 1/2/3/4/ (SO Intel) – podlegają szefowi sekcji i wykonują wszystkie jego polecenia w zakresie działalności komórki. Muszą być oni w stałej gotowości do zameldowania aktualnej sytuacji rozpoznawczej szefowi sekcji rozpoznawczej, szefowi operacji powietrznych lub innym osobom funkcyjnym. Ponadto do ich obowiązków należy:

- koordynowanie i składanie poprzez szefa sekcji rozpoznawczej zapotrzebowań na informacje (RFI) niezbędnych do planowania działań bojowych;
- utrzymywanie aktualnego obrazu polu walki w zakresie sytuacji powietrznej, systemu OP przeciwnika a także sytuacji elektronicznej;
- udział w przygotowaniu oceny przeciwnika oraz wariantów jego działania przedstawianych następnie przez szefa komórki na konferencji planistycznej i decyzyjnej;
- przygotowanie danych i uczestnictwo w opracowaniu ATO.

Szef planowania operacji powietrznych (CH OPS PLANS) odpowiada za tworzenie i dystrybucję części defensywnej, ofensywnej i wsparcia ATO. Przekłada on wymagania zawarte w AOD i PTL do części defensywnej, ofensywnej i wsparcia ATO (siłom defensywnym stawiane są zadania wsparcia działań ofensywnych w za-

kresie eskortowania i wymiatania poza FLOT przez sekcję opracowującą część defensywną ATO). W szczególności szef planowania odpowiada za:

- organizację pracy w podległych komórkach organizacyjnych;
- koordynowanie i nadzorowanie planowania działań powietrznych i tworzenie ATO;
- współpracę z szefami innych pionów;
- reprezentowanie sekcji planowania podczas odpraw;
- informowanie szefa operacji powietrznych o problemach, które mogłyby mieć wpływ na proces planowania;
- organizację w imieniu szefa operacji powietrznych konferencję decyzyjną oraz
- Przedstawienie optymalnego wariantu działań do zatwierdzenia przez dowódcę CAOC.

Szef sekcji planowania działań ofensywnych i wspierających 1/2 (CH PLANS OFF/SUPP) podlega szefowi planowania operacji. Do jego obowiązków należy:

- organizacja i kierowanie pracą komórki działań ofensywnych i wsparcia;
- przygotowanie wariantów realizacji zadań w zakresie działań ofensywnych i wspierających;
- uczestnictwo w konferencji planistycznej i decyzyjnej;
- utrzymywanie stałych kontaktów z innymi komórkami organizacyjnymi sztabu.

Ponadto, wspiera szefa planowania operacji w przygotowaniu konferencji decyzyjnej oraz wykonuje jego polecenia w zakresie działalności sztabowej.

Oficer Sztabu 1/2 (SO OCA) podlega szefowi planowania działań ofensywnych i wspierających. Do jego obowiązków należy:

- opracowywanie wariantów działań lotnictwa w ramach OCA z uwzględnieniem zadania zawartego w AOD (Allocation, Tasking);
- udział w opracowaniu ATO – misje OCA;
- wsparcie szefa planowania działań ofensywnych i wspierających w zakresie przygotowania danych na konferencję planistyczną oraz opracowania wariantów działań ofensywnych na konferencję decyzyjną CDM;

- stała koordynacja planowania działań ofensywnych z oficerami planowania działań defensywnych (osłona myśliwska, AEW, sweep i escort);

Ponadto, oficer sztabu ma być w gotowości do zameldowania aktualnej sytuacji operacyjnej (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sytuacji sił ofensywnych) oraz realizowanego etapu procesu planistycznego.

Oficer Sztabu 3 (SO AI/CAS) podlega szefowi planowania działań ofensywnych i wspierających. Do jego obowiązków należy:

- opracowywanie wariantów działań sił w ramach AI/CAS z uwzględnieniem zadania zawartego w AOD (Allocation, Tasking);
- udział w opracowaniu ATO – misje AI/CAS;
- wsparcie szefa planowania działań ofensywnych i wspierających w zakresie przygotowania danych na konferencję planistyczną oraz opracowania wariantów działań w ramach AI/CAS na konferencję decyzyjną CDM;
- stała koordynacja planowania działań ofensywnych z oficerami planowania działań defensywnych;

Ponadto, oficer sztabu ma być w gotowości do zameldowania aktualnej sytuacji operacyjnej (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sytuacji sił realizujących zadania w ramach AI/CAS) oraz realizowanego etapu procesu planistycznego.

Oficer Sztabu 4 (SO Supp) podlega szefowi planowania działań ofensywnych i wspierających. Do jego obowiązku należy:

- opracowywanie wariantów działań sił w ramach TAR, AAR, EW, SEAD, TASMO z uwzględnieniem zadania zawartego w AOD (Allocation, Tasking);
- udział w opracowaniu rozkazu bojowego (ATO) w zakresie misji TAR, AAR, EW, SEAD, TASMO;
- wsparcie szefa planowania działań ofensywnych i wspierających w zakresie przygotowania danych na konferencję planistyczną oraz opracowania wariantów działań sił w ramach TAR, AAR, EW, SEAD, TASMO na konferencję decyzyjną CDM;
- stała koordynacja planowania działań wspierających z oficerami planowania działań ofensywnych i defensywnych.

Ponadto, oficer sztabu ma być w gotowości do zameldowania aktualnej sytuacji operacyjnej (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sytuacji sił realizujących zadania wspierające) oraz realizowanego etapu procesu planistycznego.

Szef sekcji planowania działań defensywnych 1/2 (CH PLANS DEF) podlega szefowi planowania operacji. Do jego obowiązków należy:

- organizacja i kierowanie pracą komórki działań defensywnych;
- przygotowanie wariantów działań sił w ramach działań defensywnych;
- uczestnictwo w konferencji planistycznej i decyzyjnej;
- utrzymywanie stałych kontaktów z innymi komórkami organizacyjnymi sztabu.

Ponadto, wspiera szefa planowania operacji w przygotowaniu konferencji decyzyjnej oraz wykonuje jego polecenia w zakresie działalności sztabowej.

Oficer Sztabu 1 (SO Def FTR) podlega szefowi planowania działań defensywnych. Do jego obowiązku należy:

- opracowywanie wariantów działań sił w ramach DCA (FAOR, CAP) z uwzględnieniem zadania zawartego w AOD (Allocation, Tasking);
- udział w opracowaniu ATO – misje Air Defence;
- wsparcie szefa planowania działań defensywnych w zakresie przygotowania danych na konferencję planistyczną oraz opracowania wariantów działań defensywnych na konferencję decyzyjną CDM;
- stała koordynacja planowania działań defensywnych z oficerami planowania działań ofensywnych i komórką rozpoznawczą sztabu (sweep i escort).

Ponadto, oficer sztabu ma być w gotowości do zameldowania aktualnej sytuacji operacyjnej (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sytuacji sił defensywnych) oraz realizowanego etapu procesu planistycznego.

Oficer Sztabu 2 (SO Def SAM) podlega szefowi planowania działań defensywnych. Do jego obowiązku należy:

- opracowywanie wariantów działań sił w ramach DCA z uwzględnieniem zadania zawartego w AOD,
- udział w opracowaniu ATO – zadania Air Defence;

- wsparcie szefa planowania działań defensywnych w zakresie przygotowania danych na konferencję planistyczną oraz opracowania wariantów działań ofensywnych na konferencję decyzyjną CDM;
- stała koordynacja planowania działań defensywnych z oficerami planowania działań ofensywnych i komórka rozpoznawczą.

Ponadto, oficer sztabu ma być w gotowości do zameldowania aktualnej sytuacji operacyjnej (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sytuacji sił defensywnych) oraz realizowanego etapu procesu planistycznego.

Oficer Sztabu 3 (SO Def AEW / ASACS) podlega szefowi planowania działań defensywnych. Do jego obowiązku należy:

- opracowywanie wariantów działań sił w ramach DCA z uwzględnieniem zadania zawartego w rozkazie operacyjnym (AOD),
- udział w opracowaniu ATO – misje Air Defence;
- wsparcie szefa planowania działań defensywnych w zakresie przygotowania danych na konferencję planistyczną oraz opracowania wariantów działań ofensywnych na konferencję decyzyjną CDM;
- stała koordynacja planowania działań defensywnych z oficerami planowania działań ofensywnych i komórka rozpoznawczą.

Ponadto, oficer sztabu ma być w gotowości do zameldowania aktualnej sytuacji operacyjnej (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sytuacji sił defensywnych) oraz realizowanego etapu procesu planistycznego.

Szef Logistyki (CH LOG) – podlega Szefowi Operacji Powietrznych. Jest odpowiedzialny za wszelkie zagadnienia dotyczące zabezpieczenia logistycznego planowanych działań sił podległych i podporządkowanych dowódcy CAOC. Do jego obowiązków należy:

- aktualizacja bazy danych zasobów logistycznych;
- informowanie przełożonego i szefów komórek planistycznych o ograniczeniach w zasobach logistycznych;
- opracowanie i przesyłanie do wyższych przełożonych zapotrzebowań na informację (Requests for Information);
- analiza dostępnych informacji o zasobach logistycznych oraz przygotowanie wystąpień na odprawy planistyczną i decyzyjną;

- uczestnictwo w odprawach planistycznej i decyzyjnej.

Oficer Łącznikowy Sił Lądowych (GLO -1, 2) podlega Szefowi Operacji Powietrznych. Jest odpowiedzialny za wszelkie zagadnienia dotyczące informowania o bieżących i planowanych działaniach komponentu lądowego. Do jego obowiązków należy:

- aktualizacja danych dotyczących działań komponentu lądowego;
- wspieranie personelu rozpoznania w ocenie sytuacji przeciwnika lądowego;
- informowanie przełożonego i szefów komórek planistycznych o potrzebach i możliwościach komponentu lądowego;
- opracowanie i przesyłanie do wyższych przełożonych zapotrzebowań na informację (Requests for Information);
- uczestnictwo w odprawach planistycznej i decyzyjnej.

Załączniki:

ZAŁĄCZNIK A – OBSADA WIELONARODOWEGO CENTRUM OPERACJI
POWIETRZNYCH – CAOC ALPHA

ZAŁĄCZNIK B – OBSADA WIELONARODOWEGO CENTRUM OPERACJI
POWIETRZNYCH – CAOC BRAVO

ZAŁĄCZNIK A**OBSADA WIELONARODOWEGO CENTRUM OPERACJI POWIETRZNYCH
CAOC ALPHA**

Lp.	Stanowisko	Stopień, imię i nazwisko
1.	SZEF OPERACJI POWIETRZNYCH (DIR OPS)	kpt. Marek MADEJA
2.	SZEF ROZPOZNANIA (CH INTEL)	kpt. Krzysztof BIEN
3.	SPECJALISTA DS. ROZPOZNANIA (SO INTEL)	kpt. Paweł ŁOZOWSKI
4.	SPECJALISTA DS. ROZPOZNANIA (SO INTEL)	kpt. Piotr JANICKI
5.	SPECJALISTA DS. ROZPOZNANIA (SO INTEL)	kpt. Norbert CZERBNIAK
6.	SPECJALISTA DS. ROZPOZNANIA (SO INTEL)	kpt. Piotr SZERER
7.	SZEF PLANOWANIA DZIAŁAŃ OFENSYWNYCH / WSPARCIA (CH OFF)	kpt. Artur KUPTEL
8.	SPECJALISTA DS. OFENSYWNYCH (SO OFF)	kpt. Piotr WANICKI
9.	SPECJALISTA DS. OFENSYWNYCH (SO OFF)	kpt. Sławomir FIGAJ
10.	SPECJALISTA DS. OFENSYWNYCH (SO OFF)	kpt. Grzegorz MICHNO
11.	SPECJALISTA DS. OFENSYWNYCH (SO OFF)	kpt. Maciej SŁAWIŃSKI
12.	SPECJALISTA DS. WSPARCIA (SO SUPP)	kpt. Piotr EJANKOWSKI
13.	SPECJALISTA DS. WSPARCIA (SO SUPP)	kpt. Dariusz JAZOWSKI
14.	SPECJALISTA DS. WSPARCIA (SO SUPP)	Kpt. Jacek GUZ
15.	SZEF PLANOWANIA DZIAŁAŃ DEFENSYWNYCH (CH DEF)	kpt. Arkadiusz PIETRZYK
16.	SPECJALISTA DS. DEFENSYWNYCH (SO DEF)	kpt. Józef TREJDER
17.	SPECJALISTA DS. DEFENSYWNYCH (SO DEF)	kpt. Paweł GRABOWIEC
18.	SPECJALISTA DS. DEFENSYWNYCH (SO DEF)	kpt. Zbigniew GAŁCZYŃSKI
19.	SPECJALISTA DS. DEFENSYWNYCH (SO DEF)	kpt. Paweł MRÓZ
20.	SZEF LOGISTYKI (CH LOG)	kpt. Andrzej JANISZEWSKI
21.	OFICER ŁĄCZNIKOWY SIŁ LĄDOWYCH (GLO-1)	kpt. Paweł BECZAK
22.	OFICER ŁĄCZNIKOWY SIŁ LĄDOWYCH (GLO-2)	Kpt. Jarosław MASIEWICZ

ZAŁĄCZNIK B**OBSADA WIELONARODOWEGO CENTRUM OPERACJI POWIETRZNYCH
CAOC BRAVO**

Lp.	Stanowisko	Stopień, imię i nazwisko
1.	SZEF OPERACJI POWIETRZNYCH (DIR OPS)	kpt. Maciej MOROŃ
2.	SZEF ROZPOZNANIA (CH INTEL)	kpt. Sebastian MAŚLANKA
3.	SPECJALISTA DS. ROZPOZNANIA (SO INTEL)	kpt. Tomasz KOŁODZIEJCZYK
4.	SPECJALISTA DS. ROZPOZNANIA (SO INTEL)	kpt. Krzysztof JAJE
5.	SPECJALISTA DS. ROZPOZNANIA (SO INTEL)	kpt. Piotr BADOWICZ
6.	SPECJALISTA DS. ROZPOZNANIA (SO INTEL)	kpt. Włodzimierz ZALEWSKI
7.	SZEF PLANOWANIA DZIAŁAŃ OFENSYWNYCH / WSPARCIA (CH OFF)	kpt. Ireneusz ŁYCZEK
8.	SPECJALISTA DS. OFENSYWNYCH (SO OFF)	kpt. Marek KEJNA
9.	SPECJALISTA DS. OFENSYWNYCH (SO OFF)	kpt. Grzegorz JUŁGA
10.	SPECJALISTA DS. OFENSYWNYCH (SO OFF)	kpt. Jarosław NOWAK
11.	SPECJALISTA DS. OFENSYWNYCH (SO OFF)	kpt. Zbigniew PIŁAT
12.	SPECJALISTA DS. WSPARCIA (SO SUPP)	kpt. Paweł CZAJKOWSKI
13.	SPECJALISTA DS. WSPARCIA (SO SUPP)	kpt. Krzysztof JEWGIEJCZUK
14.	SPECJALISTA DS. WSPARCIA (SO SUPP)	kpt. Maciej ZIOŁO
15.	SZEF PLANOWANIA DZIAŁAŃ DEFENSYWNYCH (CH DEF)	kpt. Grzegorz MATYJA
16.	SPECJALISTA DS. DEFENSYWNYCH (SO DEF)	kpt. Mariusz PILIPCZUK
17.	SPECJALISTA DS. DEFENSYWNYCH (SO DEF)	kpt. Jarosław JĘDRZEJCZYK
18.	SPECJALISTA DS. DEFENSYWNYCH (SO DEF)	kpt. Damian WILCZYŃSKI
19.	SPECJALISTA DS. DEFENSYWNYCH (SO DEF)	kpt. Arkadiusz PYRA
20.	SZEF LOGISTYKI (CH LOG)	kpt. Adam RZESZOTEK
21.	OFICER ŁĄCZNIKOWY SIŁ LĄDOWYCH (GLO-1)	kpt. Przemysław RUDNICKI
22.	OFICER ŁĄCZNIKOWY SIŁ LĄDOWYCH (GLO-2)	kpt. Wojciech SKRABALAK

RAMOWY PLAN PRZEBIEGU ĆWICZENIA pk. POWIETRZNA TARCZA 2007

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
09.05.07/13.45	2	Szkolenie kierownictwa ćwiczenia.	Ppłk W. Marud	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	Wg odrębnego planu.
10.05.07/13.45	2	Instruktaż dla ćwiczących.	Ppłk W. Marud	Uczestnicy PSOT	Wg odrębnego planu.
14.05.07		ETAP I (anglojęzyczny) – DOWÓDZTWO KOMPONENTU POWIETRZNEGO			
do 09.50		Przygotowanie ACC do pracy.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	
08.15 ÷ 09.30		Przywitanie uczestników zagranicznych ćwiczenia. Pamiętkowa fotografia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	Wg odrębnego planu.
09.45 ÷ 10.00		Rozpoczęcie ćwiczenia, przedstawienie zagranicznych uczestników ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Zespół ćwiczący Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
10.00 ÷ 14.45		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	
13.45 ÷ 14.15		Odprawa kierownictwa ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
14.45 ÷ 15.15		Odprawa w ćwiczących zespołach.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	Wg decyzji kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia	Wg potrzeb – decyduje kierownik zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.
15.15 ÷ 19.00		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	Dyżury rozjemców wg ustaleń kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
15.05.07		ODPRAWA PLANISTYCZNA (AOM – AIR OPERATIONS MEETING)			
od 08.15		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	
10.30 ÷ 11.30		Odprawa planistyczna ACC Bravo.	Szef sztabu ACC Bravo	Zespół ćwiczący ACC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
11.45 ÷ 12.45		Odprawa planistyczna ACC Alpha.	Szef sztabu ACC Alpha	Zespół ćwiczący ACC Alpha Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
13.00 ÷ 13.30		Omówienie odpraw planistycznych zespołów ACC Alpha i ACC Bravo.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	ACC Alpha i ACC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	Z udziałem zagranicznej kadry dydaktycznej.
13.40 ÷ 14.45		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	
13.45 ÷ 14.15		Odprawa kierownictwa ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
14.45 ÷ 15.15		Odprawa w ćwiczących zespołach.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	Wg decyzji kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia	Wg potrzeb – decyduje kierownik zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.
15.15 ÷ 19.00		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	Dyżury rozjemców wg ustaleń kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
16.05.07					
PLANOWANIE DZIAŁAŃ					
08.15 ÷ 14.45		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	
13.45 ÷ 14.15		Odprawa kierownictwa ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
14.45 ÷ 15.15		Odprawa w ćwiczących zespołach.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	Wg decyzji kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia	Wg potrzeb – decyduje kierownik zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.
15.15 ÷ 19.00		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	Dyżury rozjemców wg ustaleń kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
17.05.07 ODPRAWA DECYZYJNA (ADM – AOD DECISION MEETING)					
od 08.15		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	
09.30 ÷ 10.45		Odprawa decyzyjna ACC Alpha.	Szef sztabu ACC Alpha	Zespół ćwiczący ACC Alpha Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
11.00 ÷ 12.15		Odprawa decyzyjna ACC Bravo.	Szef sztabu ACC Bravo	Zespół ćwiczący ACC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	Przedsięwzięcia z możliwym udziałem Komendanta AON. Terminy mogą ulec zmianie.
12.20 ÷ 12.55	Sala senatu	Spotkanie delegacji zagranicznych z przedstawicielem Komendy AON (pamiątkowe zdjęcie).	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Płk Makowski, płk Cieślak, ppłk Szulc, ppłk Marud Delegacje zagraniczne	
13.10 ÷ 13.40		Omówienie odpraw decyzyjnych zespołów ACC Alpha i ACC Bravo.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	ACC Alpha i ACC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	Z udziałem zagranicznej kadry dydaktycznej.
14.00 ÷ 15.00	Kasyno	Obiad.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Delegacje zagraniczne Delegacja AON	
15.10 ÷ 16.15		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	Zespół ćwiczący	
17.00 ÷ 21.00	Kasyno	Ognisko – grill.	Kierownik ćwiczenia Szef zespołu protokołu i zabezpieczenia wizyt	Wszyscy uczestnicy ćwiczenia	

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
18. 05.07					
OPRACOWANIE DOKUMENTÓW DOWODZENIA / ZAKOŃCZENIE I ETAPU ĆWICZENIA					
do 09.30		Przekazanie opracowanych dokumentów: AOD i PTL zespołowi rozjemców.	Szef pionu operacji A-3		
10.30 ÷ 12.00	419	Prezentowanie głównych ustaleń zawartych w AOD i PTL.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	ACC Alpha i ACC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	Wg układu opisanego w Standardowych Procedurach Operacyjnych.
12.10 ÷ 12.40		Przekazanie uwag dotyczących opracowanych przez ćwiczących dokumentów.	Płk W. Marud Płk S. Szulc	ACC Alpha i ACC Bravo	
12.50 ÷ 13.30		Omówienie I etapu ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	ACC Alpha i ACC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	Wg odrębnego planu.
13.30 ÷ 15.00		Praca wg planu szefa sztabu ACC.	Szef sztabu ACC	ACC Alpha i ACC Bravo	Wnoszenie poprawek do AOD i PTL.

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
ETAP II – WIELONARODOWE CENTRUM OPERACJI POWIETRZNYCH (CAOC)					
21.05.07					
08.00 ÷ 08.10		Rozpoczęcie II-go etapu ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
09.00 ÷ 14.45		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef operacji powietrznych CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	
13.45 ÷ 14.15		Odprawa kierownictwa ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
14.45 ÷ 15.15		Odprawa w ćwiczącym zespole.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	Wg decyzji kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia	Wg potrzeb – decyduje kierownik zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.
15.15 ÷ 19.00		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef operacji powietrznych CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	Dyżury rozjemców wg ustaleń kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
22.05.07	WTOREK	ODPRAWA INICJUJĄCA PLANOWANIE (IPM – INITIAL PLANNING MEETING)			
od 08.15		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	
09.00 ÷ 10.00		Odprawa inicjująca planowanie (IPM) CAOC Alpha.	Szef OPow CAOC Alpha	Zespół ćwiczący CAOC Alpha Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
10.15 ÷ 11.15		Odprawa inicjująca planowanie (IPM) CAOC Bravo.	Szef OPow CAOC Bravo	Zespół ćwiczący CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
11.30 ÷ 12.30		Omówienie odpraw inicjujących planowanie zespołów CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
12.30 ÷ 14.45		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	
13.45 ÷ 14.15		Odprawa kierownictwa ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
14.45 ÷ 15.15		Odprawa w ćwiczącym zespole.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	Wg decyzji kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia	Wg potrzeb – decyduje kierownik zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.
15.15 ÷ 19.00		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	Dyżury rozjemców wg ustaleń kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
23.05.07	SRODA	ODPRAWA DECYZYJNA (CDM – COMMANDER'S DECISION MEETING)			
od 08.00		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	
09.00 ÷ 10.00		Odprawa decyzyjna (CDM) CAOC Bravo.	Szef OPow. CAOC Bravo	Zespół ćwiczący CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
10.15 ÷ 11.15		Odprawa decyzyjna (CDM) CAOC Alpha.	Szef OPow. CAOC Alpha	Zespół ćwiczący CAOC Alpha Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
11.30 ÷ 12.30		Omówienie odprawy decyzyjnej.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
12.30 ÷ 14.45		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	
13.45 ÷ 14.15		Odprawa kierownictwa ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
14.45 ÷ 15.15		Odprawa w ćwiczącym zespole.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	Wg decyzji kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia	Wg potrzeb – decyduje kierownik zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.
15.15 ÷ 19.00		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	Dyżury rozjemców wg ustaleń kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
24.05.07		Przedsięwzięcie CZWARTEK			
		PREZENTACJA OGÓLNEGO PLANU DZIAŁAŃ POWIETRZNYCH (MAOP – MASTER AIR OPERATIONS PLAN)			
od. 08.00		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	
10.00 ÷ 10.30		Prezentowanie MAOP – CAOC Alpha	Szef OPow. CAOC Alpha	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
10.40 ÷ 11.10		Prezentowanie MAOP – CAOC Bravo	Szef OPow. CAOC Bravo	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
11.20 ÷ 12.00		Dyskusja i uzasadnianie przyjętych rozwiązań.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
12.15 ÷ 13.50		Instruktaż do konferencji prasowej.	Kierownik zespołu prasowo-informac.	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo	Osoby uczestniczące w konferencji prasowej.
od 12.15		Przygotowanie eksperymentu symulacyjnego.	Kierownik zespołu zabezpieczenia teleinformatycznego	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo	Osoby wyznaczone przez szefów OPow. CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo.
Od 14.00		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef operacji powietrznych CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	
13.45 ÷ 14.15		Odprawa kierownictwa ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
14.45 ÷ 15.15		Odprawa w ćwiczącym zespole.	Kierownik zespołu monitorowania	Wg decyzji kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia	Wg potrzeb – decyduje kierownik zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.
15.15 ÷ 19.00		Praca wg planu szefa operacji powietrznych.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	Dyżury rozjemców wg ustaleń kierownika zespołu monitorowania ćwiczenia.

Czas astronom.	Sala	Przedsięwzięcie	Prowadzący	Uczestnicy	Uwagi
25.05.07		KONFERENCJA PRASOWA / OMÓWIENIE ĆWICZENIA			
		PIĄTEK			
08.15 ÷ 10.45		Konferencja prasowa (wg oddzielnego planu)	Kierownik zespołu prasowo-informac.	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
11.00 ÷ 12.20		Eksperyment symulacyjny	Szef sztabu ćwiczenia	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	
12.30 ÷ 13.30		Omówienie ćwiczenia.	Kierownik ćwiczenia	CAOC Alpha i CAOC Bravo Kierownictwo ćwiczenia	Wg oddzielnego planu
13.40 ÷ 14.00		Rozliczenie dokumentów i sprzętu; zakończenie ćwiczenia.	Szef OPow. CAOC	Zespół ćwiczący	

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AVIATION AND AIR DEFENCE FACULTY

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AIR SHIELD 2007

WARSAW

MAY 2007

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A

Alpha

A/C	Aircraft
A2	Intelligence Division (Branch)
A3	Operations Division (Branch)
A4	Logistic Division (Branch)
A5	Plans Division (Branch)
AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AADC	Area Air Defence Commander
AAR	Air-to-Air Refuelling
AAVN	Army Aviation
AB	Air Base
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Centre
ABFAC	Airborne Forward Air Controller
ABN Div	Airborne Division
ABN FAC	Airborne Forward Air Controller
ACA	Airspace Control Authority
ACC	Air Component Command
ACM	Airspace Control Means
ACMREQ	Airspace Control Means Request
ACO	Airspace Control Order
ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACTORD	Activation Order
ACTWARN	Activation Warning
AD	Air Defence
AD BDE, AD Bde	Air Defence Brigade
AD RGT, AD Rgt	Air Defence Regiment
ADI	Air Defence Interceptor, Infrared
ADM	AOD Decision Meeting
ADR	Air Defence Interceptor, Radar
ADS	Air Defence Sector
ADX	Air Defence Interceptor, All Weather
AEREVAC	Aero Medical Evacuation
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFLD, Afld	Airfield
AGL	Above Ground Level
AH	Attack Helicopter
AI	Air Interdiction
AM	Amplitude Modulation
AMCM	Airborne Mine Countermeasures
AMW	Amphibious Warfare
AOAD	Army Organic Air Defence
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOCC(L)	Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land)
AOCC(M)	Air Operations Coordination Centre (Maritime)
AOD	Air Operations Directive
AOM	Air Operations Meeting

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APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
APIC	Allied Press Information Centre
APOD	Air Port of Debarkation
ARM	Anti-Radiation Missile
ARM	Anti-Radiation Missile
Armd	Armoured
Arty	Artillery
AS	Air-to-Surface Missile
AS06	Air Shield 2006
ASACS	Air Surveillance and Control System
ASFAO	Anti Surface Force Air Operations
AT	Air Transport
AT	Antitank
ATGM	Antitank Guided Missile
ATK	Attack
ATK HELO	Attack Helicopter
AWX	All Weather Fighter

B

Bravo

BA	Blue Alliance
BAC	Blue Alliance Council
BASC	Blue Alliance Strategic Command
BATG	Blue Alliance Task Group
BCA	Border Crossing Authority
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BDE, Bde	Brigade
BN, Bn	Battalion
BPA	Battle Psychological Activities
BSD	Battle Staff Director
BW	Biological Warfare
BZ	Bizonia

C

Charlie

C2	Command and Control
C2W	Command and Control Warfare
C3	Command Control Communication
C3I	Command Control Communication Intelligence
C4I	Command Control Communication Computers Intelligence
CAO	Counter Air Operations
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Centre
CAS	Close Air Support
CC	Component Command
CCC	Combined Co-ordination Centre
CDM	Commander's Decision Meeting
CG	Cruiser
CHEXDISTAFF	Chief of Exercise Directing Staff
CIMIC	Civil Military Co-operation
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CIS	Communications and Information System

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CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COAs	Courses of Action
COG	Centre of Gravity
COM	Commander
COM CJTF	Commander Combined Joint Task Force
COMAIR	Air Component Commander
COMAO	Composite Air Operations
COMBASC	Commander Blue Alliance Strategic Command
COMJFACC	Commander Joint Force Air Component Command
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COS	Chief of Staff
COY, Coy	Company
CPX	Command Post Exercises
CRC	Control and Reporting Centre
CRP	Control and Reporting Post
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CW	Chemical Warfare

D

Delta

D&G	Directives and Guidance
DA	Direct Attack
DCHXDISTAFF	Deputy Chief of Exercise Directing Staff
DD	Destroyer
DEPEXDIR	Deputy Exercise Director
DL	Dragoland
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DPRE	Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees

E

Echo

ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
ECR	Electronic Combat and Recce
EEZ	Economic Exclusive Zone
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ENGR, Engr	Engineer
EO	Electro-optical
EOB	Electronic Order of Battle
ESJ	Electronic Standoff Jammer
ETS	Electronic Tactical Suppression
EW	Electronic Warfare
EXCOORD	Exercise Co-ordination Centre
EXDICONSTAFF	Exercise Directing & Controlling Staff
EXDIR	Exercise Director
EXDISTAFF	Exercise Directing Staff
EXEVAL	Exercise Evaluation Team
EXMOTeamDIR	Exercise Monitoring Team Director

F

Foxtrot

FA	Field Artillery
FAOR	Fighter Area of Responsibility

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FBA	Fighter Bomber Attack
FBX	Fighter Bomber Attack, All Weather
FEZ	Fighter Engagement Zone
FF, FFG	Frigate
FLOT	Forward Lane of Own Troops
FM	Frequency Modulation
FOB	Forward Operations Base
FPB	Fast Patrol Boats
FTR	Fighter

G

Golf

GBAD	Ground Based Air Defence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLO	Ground Liaison Officer
GLONASS	Global Navigation Satellite System
GO	Governmental Organizations
GPS	Global Positioning System
GRT	Gross Tonnage
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications

H

Hotel

Helo	Helicopter
HGV	Heavy Goods Vehicles
HMA	Helicopter Medium, Air Assault
HMP	Helicopter Medium, Personnel
HMU	Helicopter Medium, Utility Unspecified
HNS	Host Nation Support
How	Howitzer
HQ	Headquarter
HRF	High Readiness Forces
HUMINT	Human Intelligence

I

India

IAW	In Accordance With
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFF	Identification Friend-or-Foe
IFV	Infantry Fighting Vehicle
iMR Bde	Independent Motorised Rifle Brigade
Inf Div	Infantry Division
INF, Inf	Infantry
INTEL	Intelligence
IO	Information Operations
IO	International Organisation

J

Juliet

JCO	Joint Coordination Order
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Command
JFCC	Joint Force Component Command
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Command

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JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Command
JHC	Joint High Command
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JPOTF	Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JPTL	Joint Prioritised Target List
JRAC	Joint Rear Area Commander
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance System

L

Lima

LAT	Latitude
LATM	Latitude Longitude Minutes
LATS	Latitude Longitude Seconds
LCC	Land Component Command
LOB	Land Order of Battle
LOC	Lane of Communications
LONG	Longitude

M

Mike

MAPEX	Map Exercise
MBT	Main Battle Tank
MCC	Maritime Component Command
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
MCMV	Mine Countermeasures Vessel
Mech Div	Mechanised Division
MED	Medical
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEZ	Missile Engagement Zone
MLRS	Multiple-Launch Rocket System
MNATG	Multinational Amphibious Task Group
MOB	Main Operations Base
MOB	Missile Order of Battle
MOPP	Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police
MRL	Multi-Rocket Launcher
Mtz Div	Motorised Division

N

November

NAS	Naval Air Station
NBC	Nuclear Biological Chemical
NET	Not Earlier Than
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NLT	No Later Than
No	Number

O

Oscar

OFB	Offensive Fighter Bomber
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OOB	Order of Battle
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPR	Officer of Primary Responsibility
ORBATTOA Msg	Order of Battle Transfer of Authority Message
ORG	Oderians Resistance Group

P

Papa

PCA	Psychological Consolidation Activities
PGM	Precision Guided Munitions
PIC	Press Information Centre
PIO	Press Information Officer
PIO	Public Information Operations
PIR	Prioritised Intelligence Requirements
PO	Psychological Operations
POD	Port of Debarkation
POL	Petroleum Oil Lubricants
POTF	Psychological Operations Task Force
PRI	Priority
PRI Role	Primary Role
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PTL	Prioritised Target List
PVO	Private Volunteer Organisation
RAP	Recognised Air Picture
RECCE	Reconnaissance
RFI	Request For Information
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROEIMPL	Rules of Engagement Implementation
RRP	Remote Radar Post

S

Sierra

SA	Strategic Attack / Air Operations for Strategic Effect
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SAMOC	SAM Operations Centre
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCL	Standard Conventional Load
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
SEC Role	Secondary Role
SF	Special Forces
SHORAD	Short Range Air Defence
SIG	Signal
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
Silkworm	100-km range, half-tonne warhead, surface-to-surface missile
SIR	Signals, Intelligence Collection Reconnaissance
SL	Slawia
SLOC	Sea Lane of Communication
SO	Staff Officer

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SOC	Sector Operations Centre
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SP	Self-propelled
SPOD	Sea Port of Debarkation
SQN, Sqn	Squadron
SQOC	Squadron Operations Centre
SR	Surveillance and Reconnaissance
SSK	Diesel-powered Attack Submarine
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missiles
SSMS	Shore-to-Ship Missile System
STO	Survive-To-Operate
SUPLAN	Supporting Plan

T

Tango

TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TACOM	Tactical Command
TACON	Tactical Control
Tank Div	Tank Division
TBM	Tactical Ballistic Missile
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TEL	Transport – Erector – Launcher
TF	Task Force
THM	Transport Heavy, Multipurpose
TLM	Transport Light, Multipurpose
TMD	Tactical Missiles Defence
TMM	Transport Medium, Multipurpose
TMP	Transport Medium, Personnel
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOR	Terms of References
TOR ECR	Tornado Electronic Combat and Recce
TOR IDS	Tornado Interdictor/Strike
TOR R	Tornado Recce
TPT	Transport
TRI	Tactical Reconnaissance, Infrared
TRO	Tactical Reconnaissance, Optical
TRX	Tactical Reconnaissance, All Weather
TTA	Tactical Transport Aircraft

U

Uniform

UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
V	Victor
VOB	Visitors and Observers Bureau

W

Whiskey

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WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WOC	Wing Operations Centre
WOE	Weight of Effort

Other

3D	Three-dimensional
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through a Joint High Command (JHC) headquarters situated in Berlinas and over the individual forces through subordinate service component commands for the Army, Air Force, Naval and Special Forces as well as People's Militia. JHC HQ is dominated by ground force officers.

The Dragoland military supply and transportation infrastructure is extensive and well-equipped, with ample supplies of ammunition, water, food and fuels. A modern transportation system has been built to ease unit movement to and from combat areas and to keep them supplied. The logistic system is a hybrid of the former Warsaw Pact system, in which materiel is delivered forward from higher echelons before it is needed, and the NATO system, in which lower echelons draw materiel as needed. In the Dragoland system, materiel is sent automatically from JHC to the corps, based on estimated consumption requirements. Once at the corps depot, divisions and brigades drew replenishment supplies.

Operational units are reported to hold between three and five days combat supplies at unit level and an additional 15 days of supplies in forward logistical depots. National supply depots are estimated to hold at least another 30 days of supplies.

(1) Dragoland Army

Dragoland Army consists of three corps, an airborne division, border guards and Army troops under a single Land Command. Most divisions are armoured (3) and mechanized (3).

The basic operational level formation is the corps, which consists of three (3) divisions (75th Corps – 2 divisions), two (2) independent motorised rifle brigades (21 Corps – one IMR Bde) and support units. Dragoland Army divisions are of two basic types: armoured and mechanized. Divisions normally consists of three brigades, division artillery, air defence, reconnaissance, combat support and combat service support units, although temporary assignment of other units is common. Armoured and mechanized divisions are triangular in organization; armoured divisions have two armoured brigades and a mechanized brigade, while mechanized divisions have two mechanized brigades and an armoured brigade. The 26th Airborne Division is composed of four regiments and is supported by adequate medium range airlift (C-130, An-26) to conduct regimental-size airborne operations.

DL 75th Corps mission is to defend Western Pomerania Province. Corps unit are supported by 26th ABN Div, Special Forces, Navy and Air Force units. According to Blue Alliance intelligence estimates, main tasks of defences in Western Pomerania Province is to deny Blue Alliance forces access to occupied territories and to inflict on them as heavy losses as possible.

DL 6th Corps troops are fielded in the Dragoland/Slawia border area and tasked to defend area east to the Odra River.

DL 21st Corps mission is strategic reserve, withheld until it could influence the battle decisively with a counterattack, or shore up collapsing 75th or 6th Corpses positions. Despite intensive actions by Peoples Militia, mobilization of 21st Corps has been delayed.

Dragoland is assessed to have up to 60 SCUD missiles, in which 26 SCUD C variant is capable to accommodate a chemical payload with an air burst proximity fuse. Present location of SCUD missiles is unknown. Multinational Forces HUMINT confirmed information, that no one mobile SCUD Transport – Erector – Launcher (TEL) remained at

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peacetime locations in Schwerin (5333N 01123E) and Hallenbeck (5335N 01148E). The last information about a column of 6 SCUD-C TELs with supporting equipment departing from Herzberg base (5141N 01314E) and heading north-east is dated on 17 March 2007, before Blue Alliance engagement.

Dragoland Army order of battle is presented in Annex A.

(2) Dragoland Air Force

Dragoland possesses a modern and robust tactical air force. More than 150 combat aircraft are fourth generation (MIG-29, SU-24, SU-27 and F-16) and about 50 fighter-bomber aircraft are the third generation (SU-22 and SU-25). They are flown by pilots of marginal quality, compared with Blue Alliance aviators.

The 28 modernised F-16A and 28 SU-27 and their pilots are the Dragoland Air Force elite. Dragoland has acquired a wide range of weapons and electronic warfare gear for the F-16, including laser-guided air-to-surface missiles (AS-30L) and state-of-the-art, beyond visual range air-to-air missiles AIM-120. Well trained pilots exhibited a high degree of skill and determination when attacking Slawia surface targets, and were more willing to engage in air-to-air combat than their colleagues flying MIG-29 aircraft. F-16 and SU-27 pilots downed all 15 Slawia aircraft during 7-days operations in March. A flotilla of SU-24M aircraft has limited precision air-to-surface engagement capabilities because of lack of modern, fifth generation PGM missiles (e.g. AS-13 Kingbolt) and only limited stocks of laser guided, half-tonne bombs (about 50 pieces at Parchim AB and Babimost AB). Main precision air-to-surface munitions are EO and laser guided AS-10 Karen and AS-14 Kedge (approximately 300 pieces totally at Szprotawa, Goleniów and Świdwin ABs). DL 12 Sqn is prepared to operate AS-18 Kazoo, anti-ship fifth-generation missiles, and SEAD squadrons operate AS-10 and AS-11 ARMs.

All of the Dragoland Air Force aircraft and surface to air missile units are located and operating from main (MOB) and standby (FOB) airbases, including dispersal air bases. The main operating bases are well constructed, built to withstand conventional attack. Special emphasis is placed upon conducting joint operations of the Dragoland Army (SU-22, SU-25, MI-24 and MI-17 equipped squadrons) and Navy.

The Dragoland Air Force has divided Dragoland airspace into three air defence sectors (Figure 4). Each sector is under control of its Sector Operations Centre (SOC) which is located at Laage (Air Defence Sector North), Kotchen (Air Defence Sector Southwest) and Babimost (Air Defence Sector Southeast). The SOC and the DL AF HQ at Berlinas are connected by the DUNAJ command and control system. This modern, computerized system links the diverse inventory of Eastern and Western radar and air defence weaponry. It provides a redundant C2 capability. Dragoland radar posts are equipped with double sets of radars (normally one 3D and minimum one rangefinder and one height-finder) which provide survive-to-operate (STO) capabilities and gives capabilities to double number of radar posts.

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