




THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE

THE FULL TEXTS OF

*Letters between the Communist Parties
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
20 March to 22 May 1948*

*Statement of the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia to the Cominform
20 June 1948*

*The Cominform Communiqué
28 June 1948*

*Reply of the Communist Party
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TEXT OF THE DISSENTING
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THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
ON THE DISSENTING
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YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

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
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INTRODUCTION

THE Communist Information Bureau, subsequently known as the Cominform or Informbureau, was established in September 1947, and consisted of the Communist Parties of the following nine countries: The Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, France, and Italy. Its headquarters were set up in Belgrade, and a fortnightly paper was issued in a number of languages.

The Cominform communiqué announcing the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was first made public on 28 June 1948 in *Rudé Právo*, organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. At the same time the headquarters of the Cominform were removed from Belgrade to Bucarest. The text used here is that published in the English language edition of the Cominform paper, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, of 1 July 1948.

On 29 June the Yugoslav Communist Party issued a statement on the Cominform communiqué, and the text of its letter of 20 June to the Bureau, announcing its decision not to attend the Cominform Conference, which was held in Bucarest in the latter half of June.

Late in August, a pamphlet in Serbo-Croat, published by *Pravda*, organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was in circulation in Belgrade, containing three letters addressed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party on matters in dispute between them, dated 27 March, 4 May, and 22 May 1948. The letters as given here are translated from that pamphlet (*Pisma Ts.K. SKP(b) Tsentralnom Komitetu Komunistichke Partije Jugoslavije*, Izdavachko preduzecdje Pravda, Moscow, 1948).

Shortly afterwards, a second pamphlet in Serbo-Croat appeared containing, in addition to the three Soviet letters, three letters from the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, dated 20 March, 13 April, and 17 May 1948. It included also the Cominform communiqué and the Yugoslav reply, and a lengthy introduction elaborating the position taken in the Yugoslav letters. The Yugoslav letters, and the Yugoslav statement of

Introduction

29 June as given here, are translated from that pamphlet (*Pisma Ts.K. KPY i Pisma Ts.K. SKP(b)*, Belgrade, 1948).

The Yugoslav letters of 18 March and 20 May referred to in the Soviet letters of 27 March and 22 May have not so far been made public.

In this publication the documents have been arranged chronologically. The footnotes were not in the original texts, but have been inserted as a help to the reader.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA
TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION

LETTER FROM J. B. TITO TO V. M. MOLOTOV

20 March 1948

On 18 March General Barskov told us that he had received a telegram from Marshal Bulganin, Minister of People's Defence of the USSR, in which we are informed that the Government of the USSR has decided to withdraw immediately all military advisers and instructors because they are 'surrounded by hostility', that is, they are not treated in a friendly fashion in Yugoslavia.

Of course, the Government of the USSR can, when it wishes, recall its military experts, but we have been dismayed by the reason which the Government of the USSR advances for its decision. Investigating, on the basis of this accusation, the relations of the junior leading people of our country towards the Soviet military advisers and instructors, we are deeply convinced that there is no basis for this reason for their withdrawal, that during their entire stay in Yugoslavia relations with them were not only good, but actually brotherly and most hospitable, which is the custom towards all Soviet people in the new Yugoslavia. Therefore, we are amazed, we cannot understand, and we are deeply hurt by not being informed of the true reason for this decision by the Government of the USSR.

Secondly, on 19 March 1948, I was visited by the Chargé d'Affaires Armaninov and informed of the contents of a telegram in which the Government of the USSR orders the withdrawal of all civilian experts in Yugoslavia also. We cannot understand the reason for this decision and it amazes us. It is true that the Assistant of Minister Kidric,¹ Srzentic, stated to your commercial representative Lebedev that, according to a decision of the Government of the FPRY,² he has not the right to give important economic

¹ Boris Kidric, head of the Yugoslav State Planning Commission.

² Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

CPY to CPSU, 20 March 1948

information to any one but that for such information the Soviet people should go higher, that is, to the CC of the CPY¹ and the Government. At the same time Srzentic told Lebedev to approach Minister Kidric for the information which interested him. Your people were told long ago that the official representatives of the Soviet Government could obtain all important and necessary information direct from the leaders of our country.

This decision was issued on our part because all the civil servants in our Ministries gave information to any one, whether it was necessary or not. This meant that they gave various people State economic secrets which could, and in some cases did, fall into the hands of our common enemies.

We have no special agreement, as mentioned in the telegram, regarding the fact that our people have the right to give economic information, without the approval of our Government or Central Committee, to Soviet workers in economy, except such information as is necessary to them in their line of duty. Whenever the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Lavrentiev, asked me personally for necessary information, I gave it to him without any reservation, and this was also done by our other responsible leaders. We would be very much surprised if the Soviet Government were not in agreement with this attitude of ours from a State standpoint.

At the same time, in regard to this case, we are forced to reject the reason about some sort of 'lack of hospitality and lack of confidence' towards Soviet experts and Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia. Until now not one of them has complained to us of anything like this, although they have all had the opportunity to do so personally with me, because I have never refused to see any of the Soviet people. This is also valid for all of our responsible leaders.

From all this it can be seen that the above reasons are not the cause of the measures taken by the Government of the USSR, and it is our desire that the USSR openly inform us what the trouble is, that it point out everything which it feels is inconsistent with good relations between our two countries. We feel that this course of events is harmful to both countries and that sooner or later everything that is interfering with friendly relations between our countries must be eliminated.

¹ Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

CPY to CPSU, 20 March 1948

Inasmuch as the Government of the USSR is obtaining its information from various other people, we feel that it should use it cautiously, because such information is not always objective, accurate, and given with good intentions.

Once again, accept the expression of my respect.

President of the Ministerial Council,

J. B. Tito

20 March 1948

LETTER FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION
TO COMRADE TITO AND OTHER MEMBERS OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF
YUGOSLAVIA

27 March 1948

Your answers of 18 and 20 March have been received.

We regard your answer as incorrect and therefore completely unsatisfactory.

1. The question of Gagarinov¹ can be considered closed, since you have withdrawn your accusations against him, although we still consider that they were slanderous.

The statement attributed to Comrade Krutikov² that the Soviet Government has allegedly refused to enter into trade negotiations this year, does not, as can be seen, correspond to the facts, as Krutikov has categorically denied it.

2. In regard to the withdrawal of military advisers, the sources of our information are the statements of the representatives of the Ministry of Armed Forces and of the advisers themselves. As is known, our military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia upon the repeated request of the Yugoslav Government, and far fewer advisers were sent than had been requested. It is therefore obvious that the Soviet Government had no desire to force its advisers on Yugoslavia.

Later, however, the Yugoslav military leaders, among them Koca Popovic, thought it possible to announce that it was essential to reduce the number of advisers by 60 per cent. They gave various reasons for this; some maintained that the Soviet advisers were too great an expense for Yugoslavia; others held that the Yugoslav army was in no need of the experience of the Soviet army; some said that the rules of the Soviet army were hidebound, stereotyped and without value to the Yugoslav army, and that there was no point in paying the Soviet advisers since there was no benefit to be derived from them.

In the light of these facts we can understand the well-known and

¹ Member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Yugoslavia.

² Aleksei D. Krutikov, Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade.

CPSU to CPY, 27 March 1948

insulting statement made by Djilas¹ about the Soviet army, at a session of the CC of the CPY, namely that the Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British army. As is known, this anti-Soviet statement by Djilas met with no opposition from the other members of the CC of the CPY.

So, instead of seeking a friendly agreement with the Soviet Government on the question of Soviet military advisers, the Yugoslav military leaders began to abuse the Soviet military advisers and to discredit the Soviet army.

It is clear that this situation was bound to create an atmosphere of hostility around the Soviet military advisers. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet Government would consent to leave its advisers in Yugoslavia under such conditions. Since the Yugoslav Government took no measures to counteract these attempts to discredit the Soviet army, it bears the responsibility for the situation created.

3. The sources of our information leading to the withdrawal of Soviet civilian specialists are, for the most part, the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Lavrentiev, as also the statements of the specialists themselves. Your statement, that Srzentic allegedly told the trade representative, Lebedev, that the Soviet specialists seeking economic information should direct their requests to higher authorities, namely to the CC of the CPY and the Yugoslav Government, does not correspond to the truth. Here is the report made by Lavrentiev on 9 March :

Srzentic, Kidric's assistant in the Economic Council, informed Lebedev, the trade representative, of a Government decree forbidding the state organs to give economic information to any one at all. Therefore, regardless of earlier promises, he could not give Lebedev the particulars required. It was one of the duties of the state security organs to exercise control in this matter. Srzentic also said that Kidric himself intended to speak about this with Lebedev.

From Lavrentiev's report it can be seen, firstly, that Srzentic did not even mention the possibility of obtaining economic information from the CC of the CPY or the Yugoslav Government. In any case, it would be ridiculous to think that it would be necessary to approach the CC of the CPY for all economic information while there still existed the appropriate ministries from which Soviet

¹ Milovan Djilas, head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

CPSU to CPY, 27 March 1948

specialists had previously obtained the necessary economic information direct.

Secondly, it is clear from Lavrentiev's report that the reverse of what you write is true, namely that the Yugoslav security organs controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia.

One might well mention that we have come across a similar practice of secret supervision over Soviet representatives in bourgeois States, although not in all of them. It should also be emphasized that the Yugoslav Security agents not only follow representatives of the Soviet Government, but also the representative of the CPSU¹ in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet Government would agree to keep its civilian specialists in Yugoslavia in such circumstances. As can be seen in this case, too, the responsibility for the conditions created rests with the Yugoslav Government.

4. In your letter you express the desire to be informed of the other facts which led to Soviet dissatisfaction and to the straining of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Such facts actually exist, although they are not connected with the withdrawal of the civilian and military advisers. We consider it necessary to inform you of them.

(a) We know that there are anti-Soviet rumours circulating among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia, for instance that 'the CPSU is degenerate', 'great-power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR', 'the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically' and 'the Cominform is a means of controlling the other Parties by the CPSU,' etc. These anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as 'socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary' and that Yugoslavia alone is the exponent of 'revolutionary socialism'. It was naturally laughable to hear such statements about the CPSU from such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanovic,² Kidric, Rankovic³ and others. However, the fact remains that such rumours have been circulating for a long time among many high-ranking Yugoslav officials, that they are still circulating, and that they are naturally creating an anti-Soviet atmosphere which is endangering relations between the CPSU and the CPY.

¹ Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

² General Vukmanovic, formerly Assistant Minister of Defence, appointed Minister of Mines in August 1948.

³ Col. Gen. Alexander Rankovic, Yugoslav Minister of the Interior; in August 1948 he became Vice-Premier.

CPSU to CPY, 27 March 1948

We readily admit that every Communist Party, among them the Yugoslav, has the right to criticize the CPSU, even as the CPSU has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. But Marxism demands that criticism be above-board and not underhand and slanderous, thus depriving those criticized of the opportunity to reply to the criticism. However, the criticism by the Yugoslav officials is neither open nor honest; it is both underhand and dishonest and of a hypocritical nature, because, while discrediting the CPSU behind its back, publicly they pharisaically praise it to the skies. Thus criticism is transformed into slander, into an attempt to discredit the CPSU and to blacken the Soviet system.

We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism as alien and hostile if they knew about it. We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses.

Again, one might mention that, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU, Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers. Naturally he camouflaged all this with left slogans about world revolution. However, it is well known that Trotsky himself became degenerate, and when he was exposed, crossed over into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive.

(b) We are disturbed by the present condition of the CPY. We are amazed by the fact that the CPY, which is the leading party, is still not completely legalized and still has a semi-legal status. Decisions of the Party organs are never published in the press, neither are the reports of Party assemblies.

Democracy is not evident within the CPY itself. The Central Committee, in its majority, was not elected but co-opted. Criticism and self-criticism within the Party does not exist or barely exists. It is characteristic that the Personnel Secretary of the Party is also the Minister of State Security. In other words, the Party cadres are under the supervision of the Minister of State Security. According to the theory of Marxism, the Party should control all the State organs in the country, including the Ministry of State Security, while in Yugoslavia we have just the opposite: the Ministry of State Security actually controlling the Party. This probably explains the fact that the initiative of the Party masses in Yugoslavia is not on the required level.

CPSU to CPY, 27 March 1948

It is understandable that we cannot consider such an organization of a Communist Party as Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik.

The spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY. The increase in the capitalist elements in the villages and cities is in full swing, and the leadership of the Party is taking no measures to check these capitalist elements. The CPY is being hoodwinked by the degenerate and opportunist theory of the peaceful absorption of capitalist elements by a socialist system, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin¹.

According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the Party is considered as the leading force in the country, which has its specific programme and which cannot merge with the non-party masses. In Yugoslavia, on the contrary, the People's Front is considered the chief leading force and there was an attempt to get the Party submerged within the Front. In his speech at the Second Congress of the People's Front, Comrade Tito said: 'Does the CPY have any other programme but that of the People's Front? No, the CPY has no other programme. The programme of the People's Front is its programme.'

It thus appears that in Yugoslavia this amazing theory of Party organization is considered a new theory. Actually, it is far from new. In Russia forty years ago a part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-party workers' mass organization and that the second should supplant the first; the other part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-party mass organization of workers and peasants, with the latter again supplanting the former. As is known, Lenin described these Mensheviks as malicious opportunists and liquidators of the Party.

(c) We cannot understand why the English spy, Velebit,² still remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia as the first Assistant Minister. The Yugoslav comrades know that Velebit is an English spy. They also know that the representatives of the Soviet Government consider Velebit a spy. Nevertheless, Velebit remains in the position of first Assistant Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia. It is possible that the Yugoslav Government in-

¹ Eduard Bernstein and Georg Vollmar were leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party; Nikolai Bukharin was a prominent Bolshevik, executed in 1936.

² Vladimir Velebit was reported to have resigned from the Foreign Ministry in June 1948, and was appointed to the Chairmanship of the Yugoslav Federal Committee on Social Welfare.

CPSU to CPY, 27 March 1948

tends to use Velebit precisely as an English spy. As is known, bourgeois governments think it permissible to have spies of great imperialist States on their staffs with a view to insuring their goodwill, and would even agree to placing their peoples under the tutelage of these States for this purpose. We consider this practice as entirely impermissible for Marxists. Be it as it may, the Soviet Government cannot place its correspondence with the Yugoslav Government under the censorship of an English spy. It is understandable, that as long as Velebit remains in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Government considers itself placed in a difficult situation and deprived of the possibility of carrying on open correspondence with the Yugoslav Government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

These are the facts which are causing the dissatisfaction of the Soviet Government and the CC of the CPSU and which are endangering relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

These facts, as has already been mentioned, are not related to the question of the withdrawal of the military and civilian specialists. However, they are an important factor in the worsening of relations between our countries.

CC of the CPSU

Moscow,
27 March 1948

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY
OF YUGOSLAVIA TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION

LETTER FROM J. B. TITO AND E. KARDELJ TO
J. V. STALIN AND V. M. MOLOTOV

13 April 1948

In answering your letter of 27 March 1948, we must first of all emphasize that we were terribly surprised by its tone and contents. We feel that the reason for its contents, that is, for the accusations and attitudes towards individual questions, is insufficient knowledge of the situation here. We cannot explain your conclusions otherwise than by the fact that the Government of the USSR is obtaining inaccurate and tendentious information from its representatives, who, because of lack of knowledge, must obtain such information from various people, either from known anti-Party elements or from various dissatisfied persons. At the Plenum of the CC of the CPY, it became abundantly clear and was confirmed that S. Zhujovic and A. Hebrang¹ were the main culprits in providing inaccurate and slanderous information to the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia, both about alleged statements of certain leading people and about our Party in general. By this inaccurate, slanderous information, they desired to hide their anti-Party work and their tendencies and attempts, exposed earlier, to break up the unity of the leadership and the Party in general. Besides this, information from such people cannot be objective, or full of good intentions, or accurate, and usually has a definite purpose. In this concrete case, that information had as its aim to cause difficulties for the leadership of our Party, that is, for the new Yugoslavia; to make more difficult the already difficult task of the development of our country; to make the Five Year Plan impossible, and so to make impossible the realization of socialism in our country. We cannot understand why the representatives of the USSR, up to to-day, have not insisted on confirming such infor-

¹ Hebrang and Zhujovic, formerly members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with high positions in the Government, were expelled from the Yugoslav Communist Party in April 1948 and subsequently arrested.

mation with responsible people in our country, that is, on verifying such information from the CC of the CPY or from the Government. We regard the issuing of such information as anti-Party work and anti-State because it spoils the relations between our two countries.

No matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case, love his country less, which also is developing socialism—in this concrete case the FPRY, for which so many thousands of its most progressive people fell. We know very well that this is also similarly understood in the Soviet Union.

It particularly surprises us that none of this was mentioned when Kardelj,¹ Djilas, and Bakaric² were in Moscow as delegates of our Party and Government. As can be seen from your letter, your Government had the information in question, and similar information, prior to the arrival of our delegation in Moscow. It appears to us that at that time the question of relations with military and civilian experts, as well as other questions, could have been presented to our delegation.

We maintain that it was necessary to inform our Government through this delegation, and even before, that the Soviet Government was not satisfied with the behaviour of our people towards the Soviet experts, and that the situation should be cleared up in one manner or another. What happened was that the Government of the USSR, by its decision to withdraw military experts without any official notification, confronted us with a *fait accompli*, and in this way created unnecessary difficulties for us.

As for the withdrawal of Soviet military experts, we see no other reason for it than that we decided to reduce their number to the necessary minimum because of financial difficulties. In 1946 Premier of the Federal Government Tito officially informed the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Lavrentiev, that, for many reasons, it was almost impossible for us to pay such high wages to the Soviet military experts and begged him to inform the USSR of this and of our desire that it moderate the conditions for paying the experts. Ambassador Lavrentiev received an answer from the USSR that the salaries could not be decreased and we could do as we pleased. Tito immediately told Lavrentiev that because of this we would have to reduce the number of experts as soon as it was

¹ Edward Kardelj, Yugoslav Vice-Premier, appointed Foreign Minister in August 1948.

² Vladimir Bakaric, Croat Prime Minister.

CPY to CPSU, 13 April 1948

possible to do so without creating great difficulties in the building up of our army. The wages of the Soviet experts were four times as high as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our Federal Ministers. The commander of one of our armies, a lieutenant-general or a colonel-general, then had 9,000 to 11,000 dinars a month, and a Soviet military expert, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general, had from 30,000 to 40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers had a salary of 12,000 dinars a month. It is understandable that we felt that this was not only a financial burden but also politically incorrect because it led to misunderstanding among our men. Therefore, our decision to decrease the number of Soviet military experts was made for the reasons mentioned and for no other. On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility that some of our men made untimely remarks. In these cases it is necessary to present us with the relevant information, duly substantiated, and without a doubt we would see that it did not happen again. Here we must mention that some of the Soviet experts did not always behave as they should and this caused dissatisfaction as a result of which, and against our will, various remarks came to be made which were later twisted and in this twisted version passed on to the command of the Soviet army. However, we consider these matters too insignificant to be allowed to play any part in straining relations between our States.

We were especially surprised by the part of the letter containing old matters about Djilas. There it states: 'In the light of these facts we can understand the insulting statement made by Djilas about the Soviet army, at a session of the CC of the CPY, namely that the Soviet officers were from a moral standpoint inferior to the officers of the British army'. Djilas never made such a statement in such a form. Tito explained this orally and in writing in 1945. Comrade Stalin and the other members of the Politbureau¹ of the CC of the CPSU were satisfied then with this explanation. We cannot understand why you again repeat, as an argument, a charge which was proved to be distorted and inaccurate. We again emphasize that neither Djilas nor any one of our leading people has such an opinion of Soviet officers. Only a person who is not only an enemy of the USSR but also an enemy of Yugoslavia can have such an opinion.

¹ Political Bureau, the most powerful body in a Communist Party, composed of members of its Central Committee.

CPY to CPSU, 13 April 1948

There are matters which should be eliminated from our trade relations so that they can develop properly. We do not deny, in connection with this, that on our part there were oversights in commercial affairs, but we cannot believe that they could be reason enough to weaken our commercial co-operation. We cannot believe that the incident between Krutikov and our Foreign Trade representatives was a mere misunderstanding. Krutikov clearly told our representatives that our trade delegation, which was already waiting in Belgrade to leave for Moscow, did not have to go because the Government of the USSR would not be able to sign a protocol for further exchanges of goods in 1948 and that it would not be possible to discuss this question again until the end of 1948. Krutikov told this to our Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Comrade Crnobrnja, and to our Commercial Attaché in Moscow. When our commercial representatives asked if that was the attitude of the Soviet Government, Krutikov said that it was.

We think that if there were some irregularities on the part of our trade organs—and we believe that there might have been such cases in regard to the deliveries of materials and trade relations in general—then some means could have been found to agree on and eliminate all that interferes with the proper development of trade relations between our two countries.

We think that we should jointly investigate and eliminate everything which interferes with the proper functioning of economic co-operation between our two countries.

The allegations in your letter that UDBa¹ follows Soviet specialists and other Soviet people are not true. No one has ever issued a decision of this sort, and it is not true that Soviet citizens are followed. This is some one's fabricated information. It is even less accurate that the representatives of the Soviet Government and Comrade Yudin of the Cominform were followed.

We cannot understand for whom such a slander, which led the Government of the USSR into error, was necessary. And in this case we would again like to be given concrete facts.

Your letter of 27 March states that we are making anti-Soviet criticisms and criticisms of the CPSU. It states that this criticism is being made among the leaders of the CPY. It further states that this criticism is being carried on behind the backs of the mass of the Party members; that this criticism is dishonourable, underhanded, hypocritical, etc. The names of Djilas, Vukmanovic, Kidric, and

¹ Yugoslav State Security Department.

CPY to CPSU, 13 April 1948

Rankovic are mentioned, and, it is said, some others. That is, the letter mentions the names of some of the best known and most popular leaders of new Yugoslavia, who have proved themselves in many situations difficult for our Party.

It is very difficult for us to understand how such serious accusations can be advanced without mentioning their source. Further, it is more amazing to compare statements by our leaders with the one-time statements of Trotsky. The letter quotes parts of alleged statements, for example, 'the CPSU is degenerate', 'the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically', 'great-power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR', 'the Cominform is a means of controlling the other Parties by the CPSU'. Further 'these anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as, "socialism in the USSR has ceased to be revolutionary", that only Yugoslavia is the true exponent of "revolutionary socialism".'

On the basis of this and similar information gathered through a long period from various suspicious sources, which was tendentially attributed to the leading men of the new Yugoslavia as if it were theirs and thus presented to the leaders of the USSR, it is without doubt possible to draw wrong conclusions and describe them as anti-Soviet statements. However, we feel that on the basis of unidentified persons and suspicious information, it is incorrect to draw conclusions and make accusations like those brought in the letter, against men who have performed invaluable services in popularizing the USSR in Yugoslavia and won priceless renown in the war of liberation. Is it possible to believe that people who spent six, eight, ten and more years in prison—among other things because of their work in popularizing the USSR—can be such as shown in your letter of 27 March? No. But these are the majority of the present high-ranking leaders of the new Yugoslavia, who on 27 March 1941, led the masses through the streets against the anti-popular régime of Cvetkovic-Macek, which signed the anti-Comintern pact and desired to harness Yugoslavia to the fascist axis wagon. They are the same people who in 1941 organized the uprising against the fascist invader, deeply believing in the Soviet Union. They are the same people who, at the head of the insurgent Yugoslav people, with gun in hand, fought under the most difficult conditions on the side of the Soviet Union as the only true ally, believing in the victory of the USSR in the darkest days, just because they believed and believe to-day in the Soviet system, in Socialism.

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Such people cannot work 'to blacken the Soviet system' because that would mean betraying their convictions, their past. We feel that these people should not be assessed on the basis of dubious information but on the basis of their long revolutionary activity.

To call such people two-faced because, in front of the masses they praise the CPSU 'to the skies'—as stated in the letter—is really terrible and insulting. In the letter it further states: 'We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism, as alien and hostile, if they knew about it.' Yes, and we believe it too, if it were as shown in the letter. 'We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses.' However, there could be no concealment from the masses for the simple reason that there was not and could not be any such criticism of the Soviet Union or the CPSU.

To oppose the leadership to the masses is incorrect. It is incorrect because the present leaders of Yugoslavia and the masses are one; because they are inseparably tied by their struggle against the anti-popular régime before the war, their struggle during the great war of liberation, and today by the great working efforts for the development of the country and the realization of socialism.

Among many Soviet people there exists the mistaken idea that the sympathy of the broad masses in Yugoslavia towards the USSR came of itself, on the basis of some traditions which go back to the time of Tsarist Russia. This is not so. Love for the USSR did not come of itself. It was stubbornly inculcated into the masses of the Party and the people in general by the present leaders of the new Yugoslavia, including, in the first rank, those so seriously accused in the letter. The present leaders of new Yugoslavia are the same who, long before the war, sparing neither efforts nor sacrifices, persistently revealed to the masses the truth about the Soviet Union and planted among the masses of Yugoslavia love for the land of Socialism.

Comrade Molotov, for example, said that Djilas gave orders that the *History of the CPSU* should not be studied in Party schools and courses. This is completely inaccurate. Such an order does not exist nor did any one give it. Even now the *History of the CPSU* is being studied in all our Party schools and in many courses. Of all this, the only thing true is that Djilas more than once said at Party meetings that the undeveloped membership in

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the basic Party organizations understood particular problems in the *History of the CPSU* erroneously, and mechanically compared them with the development of Yugoslavia. For example, the question of two periods of revolution, the question of war communism, the question of NEP, etc. He said it was better at the beginning to give these members the *Problems of Leninism* by Stalin, to study.

In connection with this it is necessary to emphasize that the *History of the CPSU* was issued four times illegally before and during the war and that it was printed in all national languages in 250,000 copies after the war. It is the same with the other works of Stalin and Lenin. The *Problems of Leninism*, for example, was issued in 125,000 copies.

As regards the question of the internal life of the CPY which is mentioned in your letter, it can be seen that you have received completely inaccurate information and have formed an erroneous picture. Accordingly we cannot agree with your evaluation of our Party.

The majority of the members of the CC of the CPY are not co-opted as is alleged in your letter. The matter stands thus. At the Fifth Party Conference, held in December 1940, when the CPY was completely illegal, attended by 110 delegates from all Yugoslavia, and which, by a decision of the Comintern, had all the powers of a congress, a CC of the CPY of thirty-one members and ten candidates was elected. Of this number, ten members and six candidates died during the war. Of the seven members of the Politbureau elected in 1940, five are still alive and working to-day. The Politbureau invites those members of the CC of the CPY who are in Belgrade to its sessions. In the CC of the CPY, in all only seven new members have been co-opted, and these were from the candidates and best leaders of the Party. Finally, during the war, two members were expelled from the CC of the CPY, so that there remain at work to-day nineteen members of the CC of the CPY elected at the Conference and seven co-opted members. Accordingly, the CC of the CPY is composed of twenty-six members; this is how the matter stands.

As regards the remark of not holding a Party congress, it is necessary to mention here that the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY has been making preparations for a congress of the CPY for a year. We feel that this congress should be prepared so that it has not only a demonstrational character, but that it be a congress in which a statute and a Party programme will be brought forth. This

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programme will later be adopted in its essentials by the People's Front at its congress.

What is the basis of the allegation in the letter that there is no democracy in our Party? Perhaps information from Lavrentiev? Where did he get this information? We consider that he, as an ambassador, has no right to ask any one for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business. This information can be obtained by the CC of the CPSU from the CC of the CPY.

The fact that the Organization Secretary in the CPY is also Minister of State Security in no case interferes with the self-initiative of Party organizations. The Party is not placed under the control of UDBa; this control is exercised through the CC of the CPY, of which the Minister of State Security is a member. Besides this, we must add that the chief of the Administration of Cadres under the CC of the CPY is Zekovic and not Rankovic.

It is not true that there is no freedom of criticism in our Party. Freedom of criticism and self-criticism exists in our Party and is carried out at regular Party meetings and conferences of the *aktiv*.¹ Therefore, some one thought up this falsehood and passed it on as information to the CC of the CPSU.

The allegation that the policy of the class struggle is not realized in the CPY, and that capitalist elements in the villages and cities are being strengthened, etc., is completely inaccurate. Where did this information come from, when the entire world knows that since the October revolution, nowhere in the world have there been such firm, consistent social changes as in Yugoslavia? These are facts which no one can dispute with us. Therefore, it is not understandable how any one can speak of Bernstein, Vollmar, Bukharin and rotten opportunism in connection with our Party. We cannot do other than defend ourselves against such inaccuracies and insults to our Party.

The letter further mentions the report of Tito to the Second Congress of the People's Front in Yugoslavia. A small extract is made from this report and a comparison is drawn with the attempt of the Mensheviks to break up the Social Democratic Party forty years ago.

First, that was forty years ago under Tsarism, and to-day we in Yugoslavia have power in our hands. That is, the CPY has the leading role in the Government. In watching social development in

¹ *Aktiv* is used by Communists to denote those members of their Party holding official Party positions and actively engaged in Party work.

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process, it is inevitable that organizational forms must be changed somewhat, methods of work changed, as well as forms of the leadership of the masses in order to achieve specific ends more easily.

Second, the People's Front of Yugoslavia, by its quality, is not only equal to some other Communist Parties, which accept any one into their ranks, but is even better in its organization and activity. Not every one can be a member of the People's Front of Yugoslavia, even though to-day it has approximately 7,000,000 members.

Third, the CPY has a completely assured leadership in the People's Front because the CPY is the nucleus of the People's Front. Therefore, there is no danger of its dissolving into the People's Front—as is said in the letter. Through the People's Front the CPY gradually realizes its programme, which the People's Front voluntarily adopts, considering it as its own programme. This is the basis of Tito's statement that the CPY has no other programme.

We are sorry that such things are written about us and we would like to draw attention to the fact that in some countries some CPs are changing, not only the forms of work but also the name of the Party, as is the case in Bulgaria and Poland, and this not without the approval of the CPSU. Probably in these countries it is necessary for the Parties to take this course. However, here the combination of the People's Front, headed by the CPY, which is firmly organized from within, and which strongly binds about itself the million-strong masses of the People's Front, has shown itself most correct. And yet no one tells these other Parties that they will dissolve into the masses even though they have forms of work and forms of organization in harmony with the new given conditions in their country.

Why then does any one dispute facts which are undeniable and have been known for a long time? We are deeply convinced that the results achieved by our Party during the war and after the war speak for themselves: that the CPY is strong, monolithic, capable of leading the country to socialism, capable of leading the people of Yugoslavia in every situation however difficult it be.

Our Party is not semi-legal, as is mentioned in the letter. It is completely legal and known to every man in Yugoslavia as the leading force.

The fact of the matter is that unfortunately you are not acquainted with the nature of the Front in Yugoslavia and criticize us for

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not publishing reports of Party meetings and conferences. All the important decisions, from those of the Federal Government down, regarding all questions of social and state life, are either decisions of the Party or made on the initiative of the Party, and the people understand and accept them as such. Therefore, we do not feel it necessary to emphasize that this or that decision was made at this or that Party conference. The great reputation of our Party, won not only in our country but in the whole world, on the basis of the results it has obtained, speaks for itself. On the other hand, we emphasize that our Party achieved all this thanks to the fact that it followed the doctrine of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin; that it benefited by the experiences of the CPSU, applying these experiences to the given conditions. Therefore, we do not understand the allegation made in your letter that our leaders hypocritically and 'pharisaically praise the CPSU to the skies' and at the same time work against it.

We cannot believe that the CC of the CPSU can dispute the services and results achieved by our Party up to today because we remember that such acknowledgement was given us many times by many Soviet leaders and by Comrade Stalin himself. We are also of the opinion that there are many specific aspects in the social transformation of Yugoslavia which can be of benefit to the revolutionary development in other countries, and are already being used. This does not mean that we place the role of the CPSU and the social system of the USSR in the background. On the contrary, we study and take as an example the Soviet system, but we are developing socialism in our country in somewhat different forms. In the given period under the specific conditions which exist in our country, in consideration of the international conditions which were created after the war of liberation, we are attempting to apply the best forms of work in the realization of socialism. We do not do this, in order to prove that our road is better than that taken by the Soviet Union, that we are inventing something new, but because this is forced upon us by our daily life.

As to Velebit and why he still remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The matter stands thus. Kardelj and Djilas once told Molotov that we are not all clear about Velebit, we never had any proof then and we have none to-day. The matter is still under investigation and we would not care to remove and destroy a man on the basis of suspicion.

What induces us not to be too hasty with Velebit, is, first, that

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he has been a Party member since 1939 and before that he did great services for the Party. In 1940 Tito gave him the confidential task of renting a villa in Zagreb in his name in which to place the radio station of the Comintern, and in which Valdes lived with his wife as wireless operator. Velebit was at the same time a courier. All this continued some time under the occupation and of course represented a danger to his life. Upon the decision of the Party, Velebit joined the Partisans in 1942 and conducted himself well. Later he received a task abroad and performed it well. We are now investigating his entire past. If the Soviet Government has something concrete about him we beg it to give us the facts. However, regardless of this we cannot immediately remove him from his position in the Ministry.

Therefore, the accusations in your letter in this connection are surprising and insulting to the CC of the CPY and to the entire Government. You compare us with some bourgeois States which tolerate spies so that they may curry favour with certain great Powers. This is what is stated in your letter and what we consider impossible about a Government which is more than friendly and allied: 'it is possible that the Yugoslav Government intends to use Velebit precisely as an English spy. As is known, bourgeois governments think it permissible to have spies of great imperialist States on their staffs, with a view to insuring their goodwill, and would even agree to placing themselves under the tutelage of these States for this purpose.' That is how it is written in the letter. A man cannot read it without being deeply embittered and shocked by its manner, in a letter to a Government which represents a nation of 16 million people, which in the war of liberation on the side of the USSR sacrificed the most, and which in the future, if need be, will be a most faithful ally in the struggle.

If you were to ask us if there were anything with which we were not satisfied on your part then we should openly say there are many reasons why we are dissatisfied. What are these reasons? It is impossible to mention all the reasons in this letter but we will mention a few. First, we regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet Intelligence Service to recruit in our country, which is going toward socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service. We cannot consider this as anything else but detrimental to the interests of our country. This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders and UDBa have protested against this and made it known that it cannot be tolerated. Those being recruited include officers, various

leaders, and those who are negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia.

We have proof that certain agents of the Soviet Intelligence Service in recruiting our Party members cast doubts on our leaders, sought to ruin their reputation, showed them as inefficient and unreliable. For example, Colonel Stepanov did not hesitate in 1945, in recruiting one of our good comrades who was working in the central division of coding and decoding in UDBa, to blacken and cast doubts on all our leaders, stating 'for the present Marshal Tito works as he should.' Such cases are still occurring to-day. This also means that such recruiting is not done for the purpose of a struggle against some capitalist country, and we must inevitably come to the conclusion that this recruiting is destroying our internal unity, that it kills confidence in the leadership, demoralises people, leads to the compromising of leading people and becomes a channel for collecting false information day by day. This work by the agents of the Soviet Intelligence Service cannot be called loyal and friendly towards our country, which is going toward socialism and which is the most faithful ally of the USSR.

We cannot allow the Soviet Intelligence Service to spread its net in our country. We have our state security and our intelligence service for the struggle against various foreign capitalist elements and class enemies within the country, and if the Soviet intelligence agents need information or assistance in this direction they can obtain it whenever they want to; on our part, this has been done until now.

These and similar matters with which we are not satisfied are numerous. However, can this be the reason for the straining of our mutual relations? No. These are questions which can be eliminated and explained.

It is evident that it is to the living interest of the USSR and Yugoslavia to be firmly tied. However, absolute mutual confidence is necessary for this; without it enduring and firm relations between our two countries cannot exist. The Soviet people, and in the first place the leaders, should believe the fact that the new Yugoslavia, under its present leadership, is unwaveringly going towards socialism.

Further, they must believe that the USSR has in the present Yugoslavia under its present leadership, a most faithful friend and ally prepared to share good and evil with the people of the USSR in case of severe trial.

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Finally, even though we know that the USSR has tremendous difficulties with the reconstruction of the devastated lands we rightfully expect the assistance of the USSR in the development of our country and the realization of the Five Year Plan without material deprivation to the people of the USSR, because we feel it is to the interest of the USSR for the new Yugoslavia to be stronger, since it is face to face with the capitalist world which is endangering not only its peaceful development but the development of other countries of people's democracy and even the development of the USSR.

On the basis of everything set out above, the plenary session of the CC of the CPY cannot accept as justified the criticisms in your letter about the work of our Party and its leaders. We are deeply convinced that this is the result of a grave misunderstanding, which should not have happened and which must rapidly be liquidated in the interest of matters concerning our Parties.

Our only desire is to eliminate every doubt and disbelief in the purity of the comradely and brotherly feeling of loyalty of our CC of the CPY to the CPSU, to whom we will always remain thankful for the Marxist-Leninist doctrine which has led us until now and will lead us in the future—loyalty to the Soviet Union which has served us and will continue to serve us as a great example and whose assistance to our people we so highly appreciate.

We are convinced that this disagreement can be liquidated only by full mutual explanation between our two Central Committees on the spot, that is, here.

Therefore, we propose that the CC of the CPSU send one or more of its members, who will have every opportunity here of studying every question thoroughly.

In the hope that you will accept our proposal we send you our comradely greetings.

By order of the CC of the CPY

TITO

KARDELJ

Belgrade,
13 April 1948

LETTER FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION TO
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF
YUGOSLAVIA

4 May 1948

Your answer and the announcement of the decision of the Plenum of the CC of the CPY of 13 April 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received.

Unfortunately, these documents, and especially the document signed by Tito and Kardelj, do not improve on the earlier Yugoslav documents; on the contrary, they further complicate matters and sharpen the conflict.

Our attention is drawn to the tone of the documents, which can only be described as exaggeratedly ambitious. In the documents one does not see any desire to establish the truth, honestly to admit errors, and to recognize the necessity of eliminating those errors. Yugoslav comrades do not accept criticism in a Marxist manner, but in a bourgeois manner, i.e. they regard it as an insult to the prestige of the CC of the CPY and as undermining the ambitions of the Yugoslav leaders.

So, in order to extricate themselves from the difficult situation for which they are themselves to blame, the Yugoslav leaders are using a 'new' method, a method of complete denial of their errors regardless of their obvious existence. The facts and the documents mentioned in the letter of the CC of the CPSU of 27 March 1948 are denied. Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it seems, do not understand that this childish method of groundless denial of facts and documents can never be convincing, but merely laughable.

I. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS
FROM YUGOSLAVIA

In its letter of 27 March the CC of the CPSU stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet military advisers, and said that the information of the CC of the CPSU was based on the complaints of these advisers of the unfriendly attitude of the responsible Yugoslav officials towards the Soviet army and its representatives in

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Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj denounce these complaints as unsubstantiated. Why should the CC of the CPSU believe the unfounded statements of Tito and Kardelj rather than the numerous complaints of the Soviet military advisers? On what grounds? The USSR has its military advisers in almost all the countries of people's democracy. We must emphasize that until now we have had no complaints from our advisers in these countries. This explains the fact that we have had no misunderstandings in these countries arising from the work of the Soviet military advisers. Complaints and misunderstandings, in this field, exist only in Yugoslavia. Is it not clear that this can be explained only by the special unfriendly atmosphere which has been created in Yugoslavia around these military advisers?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to the large expenses in connection with the salaries of the Soviet military advisers, emphasizing that the Soviet generals receive three to four times as much, in dinars, as Yugoslav generals, and that such conditions may give rise to discontent on the part of Yugoslav military personnel. But the Yugoslav generals, apart from drawing salaries, are provided with apartments, servants, food, etc. Secondly, the pay of the Soviet generals in Yugoslavia corresponds to the pay of Soviet generals in the USSR. It is understandable that the Soviet Government could not consider reducing the salaries of Soviet generals who are in Yugoslavia on official duty.

Perhaps the expense of the Soviet generals was too great a burden for the Yugoslav budget. In that case the Yugoslav Government should have approached the Soviet Government and proposed that it take over part of the expenses. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government would have done this. However, the Yugoslavs took another course; instead of solving this question in an amicable manner, they began to abuse our military advisers, to call them loafers, and to discredit the Soviet army. Only after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers did the Yugoslav Government approach the Soviet Government. It is understandable that the Soviet Government could not accept this situation.

2. CONCERNING THE SOVIET CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

In its letter of 27 March the CC of the CPSU stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet civilian specialists from Yugo-

slavia. In the given case the CC of the CPSU relied on the complaints of the civilian specialists and on the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia. From these statements it can be seen that the Soviet civilian specialists, as well as the representative of the CPSU in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin, were placed under the supervision of the UDBa.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj in their letter deny the truth of these complaints and reports, stating that the UDBa does not supervise Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia. But why should the CC of the CPSU believe the unfounded assertions of Comrades Tito and Kardelj and not the complaints of Soviet men, among them Comrade Yudin?

The Soviet Government has many of its civilian specialists in all the countries of people's democracy but it does not receive any complaints from them and there are no disagreements with the Governments of these countries. Why have these disagreements and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia? Is it not because the Yugoslav Government has created a special unfriendly atmosphere around the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, among them Comrade Yudin himself?

It is understandable that the Soviet Government could not tolerate such a situation and was forced to withdraw its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia.

3. REGARDING VELEBIT AND OTHER SPIES IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA

It is not true, as Tito and Kardelj say, that Comrades Kardelj and Djilas, on the occasion of a meeting with Molotov, confined their doubts regarding Velebit to the remark 'that all was not clear about Velebit' to them. Actually, in their meeting with Molotov there was talk that Velebit was suspected of spying for England. It was very strange that Tito and Kardelj identified the removal of Velebit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his ruin. Why could not Velebit be removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without being ruined?

Also strange was the statement by Tito and Kardelj of the reasons for leaving Velebit in his position of First Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; it appears that Velebit was not removed from his position because he was under supervision. Would it not be better to remove Velebit just because he was under supervision?

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Why so much consideration for an English spy, who at the same time is so uncompromisingly hostile towards the Soviet Union?

However, Velebit is not the only spy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet representatives have many times told the Yugoslav leaders that the Yugoslav Ambassador in London, Leontic,¹ is an English spy. It is not known why this old and trusted English spy remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet Government is aware that besides Leontic three other members of the Yugoslav Embassy in London, whose names are not yet disclosed, are in the English Intelligence Service. The Soviet Government makes this statement with full responsibility. It is also hard to understand why the United States Ambassador in Belgrade behaves as if he owned the place and why his 'intelligence agents', whose number is increasing, move about freely, or why the friends and relations of the executioner of the Yugoslav people, Nedic,² so easily obtain positions in the State and Party apparatus in Yugoslavia.

It is clear that since the Yugoslav Government persistently refuses to purge its Ministry of Foreign Affairs of spies, the Soviet Government is forced to refrain from open correspondence with the Yugoslav Government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. CONCERNING THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET STATE

In their letter of 13 April 1948 Tito and Kardelj wrote: 'We consider that he (the Soviet Ambassador), as an ambassador, has no right to ask any one for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business.'

We feel that this statement by Tito and Kardelj is essentially incorrect and anti-Soviet. They identify the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible communist who represents the Communist Government of the USSR, with an ordinary bourgeois ambassador, a simple official of a bourgeois State, who is called upon to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav State. It is difficult to understand how Tito and Kardelj could sink so low. Do these comrades understand that such an attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador

¹ Leontic was officially recalled from London early in June 1948; he had left earlier.

² General Nedic was head of the puppet Serbian Government set up by Germany in 1941.

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means the negation of all friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do these comrades understand that the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible communist, who represents a friendly power which liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupation, not only has the right but is obliged, from time to time, to discuss with the communists in Yugoslavia all questions which interest them? How can they be suspicious of these simple elementary matters if they intend to remain in friendly relation with the Soviet Union?

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it is necessary to mention that, unlike the Yugoslavs, we do not consider the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow as a simple official; we do not treat him as a mere bourgeois ambassador and we do not deny his 'right to seek information about the work of our Party from any one he chooses.' Because he became an ambassador, he did not stop being a communist. We consider him as a comrade and a high-ranking communist. He has friends and acquaintances among the Soviet people. Is he 'acquiring' information about the work of our Party? Most likely he is. Let him 'acquire' it. We have no reason to hide from comrades the shortcomings in our Party. We expose them ourselves in order to eliminate them.

We consider that this attitude of the Yugoslav comrades towards the Soviet Ambassador cannot be regarded as accidental. It arises from the general attitude of the Yugoslav Government, which is also the cause of the inability of the Yugoslav leaders to see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and the foreign policy of the Anglo-Americans; they, therefore, put the foreign policy of the USSR on a par with the foreign policy of the English and Americans and feel that they should follow the same policy towards the Soviet Union as towards the imperialist States, Great Britain and the United States.

In this respect, the speech by Comrade Tito in Ljubljana in May 1945 is very characteristic. He said:

It is said that this war is a just war and we have considered it as such. However, we seek also a just end; we demand that every one shall be master in his own house; we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest.

This was said in connection with the question of Trieste. As is well known, after a series of territorial concessions for the benefit

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of Yugoslavia, which the Soviet Union extracted from the Anglo-Americans, the latter, together with the French, rejected the Soviet proposal to hand Trieste over to Yugoslavia and occupied Trieste with their own forces, which were then in Italy. Since all other means were exhausted, the Soviet Union had only one other method left for gaining Trieste for Yugoslavia—to start war with the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and take it by force. The Yugoslav comrades could not fail to realize that after such a hard war the USSR could not enter another. However, this fact caused dissatisfaction among the Yugoslav leaders, whose attitude was described by Comrade Tito. The statement by Tito in Ljubljana that 'Yugoslavia would not pay for others', 'would not be used as a bribe', 'would not be involved in any policy of spheres of interest', was directed not only against the imperialist States but also against the USSR, and in the given circumstances the relations of Tito towards the USSR are no different from his relations towards the imperialist States, as he does not recognize any difference between the USSR and the imperialist States.

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito, which met no resistance in the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY, pursued in the narrow circles of the Yugoslav Party cadres, regarding the 'degeneration' of the USSR into an imperialist State, its desire to 'dominate Yugoslavia economically', also the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY regarding the 'degeneration' of the CPSU and its desire 'through the Cominform, to control the other parties' and the 'socialism in the USSR, which has ceased being revolutionary'.

The Soviet Government was obliged to draw the attention of the Yugoslav Government to the fact that this statement could not be tolerated, and since the explanations given by Tito and Kardelj were unfounded, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Sadchikov, was instructed by the Soviet Government to make the following statement to the Yugoslav Government, which he did on 5 June 1945:

We regard Comrade Tito's speech as an unfriendly attack on the Soviet Union, and the explanation by Comrade Kardelj as unsatisfactory. Our readers understood Comrade Tito's speech in this way, and it cannot be understood in any other. Tell Comrade Tito that if he should once again permit such an attack on the Soviet Union we shall be forced to reply with open criticism in the press and disavow him.

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From this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito to the USSR arises the attitude of the Yugoslav leaders towards the Soviet Ambassador, by which the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade is put on a level with bourgeois ambassadors.

It seems that the Yugoslav leaders intend to retain this anti-Soviet attitude in future. The Yugoslav leaders should bear in mind that retaining this attitude means renouncing all friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and betraying the united socialist front of the Soviet Union and the people's democratic republics. They should also bear in mind that retaining this attitude means depriving themselves of the right to demand material and any other assistance from the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union can only offer aid to friends.

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, we emphasize that this anti-Soviet attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet State is only found in Yugoslavia; in other countries of people's democracy the relations were and remain friendly and perfectly correct.

It is interesting to note that Comrade Kardelj, who is now in complete agreement with Comrade Tito, three years ago had a completely different opinion of Tito's speech in Ljubljana. Here is what the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Sadchikov, reported about his conversation with Kardelj on 5 June 1945:

To-day, 5 June, I spoke to Kardelj as you suggested. (Tito has not yet returned.) The communication made a serious impression on him. After some thought he said he regarded our opinion of Tito's speech as correct. He also agreed that the Soviet Union could no longer tolerate similar statements. Naturally, in such difficult times for Yugoslavia, Kardelj said, open criticism of Tito's statement would have serious consequences for them, and for this reason they would try to avoid similar statements. However, the Soviet Union would have the right to make open criticism should similar statements be made. Such criticism would benefit them. Kardelj asked me to convey to you his gratitude for this well-timed criticism. He said it would help to improve their work. The criticism of the political mistakes made in the Government declaration in March had been of great benefit. Kardelj was sure that this criticism would also help improve the political leadership.

In an attempt to analyse (very carefully) the causes of the mistakes, Kardelj said that Tito had done great work in liquidating fractionalism in the CP and in organizing the people's liberation struggle, but he was inclined to regard Yugoslavia as a self-sufficient unit outside the general

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development of the proletarian revolution and socialism. Secondly, such a situation had arisen in the Party that the Central Committee does not exist as an organisational and political centre. We meet by chance, and we make decisions by chance. In practice every one of us is left to himself. The style of work is bad, and there is not enough co-ordination in our work. Kardelj said he would like the Soviet Union to regard them, not as representatives of another country, capable of solving questions independently, but as representatives of one of the future Soviet Republics, and the CPY as a part of the All-Union Communist Party, that is, that our relations should be based on the prospect of Yugoslavia becoming in the future a constituent part of the USSR. For this reason they would like us to criticize them frankly and openly and to give them advice which would direct the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia along the right path.

I told Kardelj it was necessary to recognize the facts as they are at present, namely to treat Yugoslavia as an independent State and the Yugoslav Communist Party as an independent Party. You can and must, I said, present and solve your problems independently, while we would never refuse advice should you ask for it.

As regards Yugoslavia we have obligations, undertaken by our treaties, and still more, we have moral obligations. As far as possible we have never refused advice and assistance, when these were needed. Whenever I pass Marshal Tito's communications on to Moscow, I receive replies immediately. However, such advice is possible and beneficial only if we are approached in time, prior to any decision being reached or any statement being made.

We leave aside the primitive and fallacious reasoning of Comrade Kardelj about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR and the CPY as a part of the CPSU. However, we would like to draw attention to Kardelj's criticisms of Tito's anti-Soviet declaration in Ljubljana and the bad conditions in the CC of the CPY.

5. REGARDING THE ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENT BY COMRADE DJILAS ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

In our letter of 27 March, we mentioned the anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Djilas made at a session of the CC of the CPY, in which he said that the Soviet officers, from a moral standpoint, were inferior to the officers in the English army. This statement by Djilas was made in connection with the fact that a few officers of

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the Soviet army in Yugoslavia indulged in actions of an immoral nature. We described this statement by Djilas as anti-Soviet because in referring to the behaviour of Soviet officers this pitiful Marxist, Comrade Djilas, did not recall the main differences between the Socialist Soviet army, which liberated the peoples of Europe, and the bourgeois English army, whose function is to oppress and not to liberate the peoples of the world.

In their letter of 13 April 1948, Tito and Kardelj state 'that Djilas never made such a statement in such a form', and that 'Tito explained this in writing and orally in 1945' and that 'Comrade Stalin and other members of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPSU' accepted this explanation.

We feel it necessary to emphasize that this statement by Tito and Kardelj does not correspond with the facts. This is how Stalin reacted to the statement by Djilas in a telegram to Tito:

I understand the difficulty of your situation after the liberation of Belgrade. However, you must know that the Soviet Government, in spite of colossal sacrifices and losses, is doing all in its power and beyond its power to help you. However, I am surprised at the fact that a few incidents and offences committed by individual officers and soldiers of the Red Army in Yugoslavia are generalized and extended to the whole Red Army. You should not so offend an army which is helping you to get rid of the Germans and which is shedding its blood in the battle against the German invader. It is not difficult to understand that there are black sheep in every family, but it would be strange to condemn the whole family because of one black sheep.

If the soldiers of the Red Army find out that Comrade Djilas, and those who did not challenge him, consider the English officers, from a moral standpoint, superior to the Soviet officers, they would cry out in pain at such undeserved insults.

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Djilas, which passed unchallenged among the other members of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous campaign conducted by the leaders of the CPY against the representatives of the Red Army in Yugoslavia, which was the reason for the withdrawal of our military advisers.

How did the matter with Djilas end? It ended with Comrade Djilas arriving in Moscow, together with the Yugoslav delegation, where he apologized to Stalin and begged that this unpleasant error, which he committed at the session of the CC of the CPY, be forgotten. As can be seen, the matter appears entirely different

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when presented in the letter of Tito and Kardelj. Unfortunately, Djilas's error was not an accident.

* * *

Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse the Soviet representatives of recruiting Yugoslavs for their intelligence service. They write:

We regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet intelligence service to recruit, in our country, which is going towards socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service. We cannot consider this as anything else but detrimental to the interests of our country. This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders and UDBa have protested against this and made it known that it cannot be tolerated. Those being recruited include officers, various leaders, and those who are negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia.

We declare that this statement by Tito and Kardelj, which is full of hostile attacks against the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, does not at all correspond to the facts.

It would be monstrous to demand that the Soviet people who are working in Yugoslavia should fill their mouths with water and talk with no one. Soviet workers are politically mature people and not simple hired labourers, who have no right to be interested in what is happening in Yugoslavia. It is only natural for them to talk with Yugoslav citizens, to ask them questions and to gain information, etc. One would have to be an incorrigible anti-Soviet to consider these talks as attempts to recruit people for the intelligence service, especially such people, who are 'negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia'. Only anti-Soviet people can think that the leaders of the Soviet Union care less for the welfare of new Yugoslavia than do the members of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY.

It is significant that these strange accusations against the Soviet representatives are met only in Yugoslavia. To us it appears that this accusation against the Soviet workers is made solely for the purpose of justifying the actions of UDBa in placing the Soviet workers in Yugoslavia under surveillance.

It must be emphasized that Yugoslav comrades visiting Moscow frequently visit other cities in the USSR, meet our people and freely talk with them. In no case did the Soviet Government place any restrictions on them. During his last visit to Moscow, Djilas went to Leningrad for a few days to talk with Soviet comrades.

According to the Yugoslav scheme, information about the Party and State work can only be obtained from the leading organs of the

CC of the CPY or from the Government. Comrade Djilas did not obtain information from these organs of the USSR but from the local organs of the Leningrad organizations. We did not consider it necessary to inquire into what he did there, and what facts he picked up. We think he did not collect material for the Anglo-American or French intelligence service but for the leading organs of Yugoslavia. Since this was correct we did not see any harm in it because this information might have contained instructive material for the Yugoslav comrades. Comrade Djilas cannot say that he met with any restrictions.

It may be asked now: Why should Soviet communists in Yugoslavia have fewer rights than Yugoslavs in the USSR?

* * *

In their letter of 27 March,¹ Tito and Kardelj again refer to the question of trade relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, namely the alleged refusal of Comrade Krutikov to continue trade negotiations with the Yugoslav representatives. We have already explained to the Yugoslav comrades that Krutikov has denied the statements attributed to him. We have already explained that the Soviet Government never raised the question of suspending trade agreements and trade operations with Yugoslavia. Consequently we consider this question closed and have no intention of returning to it.

6. ON THE INCORRECT POLITICAL LINE OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE CC OF THE CPY IN REGARD TO THE
CLASS STRUGGLE IN YUGOSLAVIA

In our letter we wrote that the spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY, that the capitalist elements are increasing in the cities and the villages and that the leaders of the Party are not undertaking any measures to check the capitalist elements.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this and consider our statements, which are a matter of principle, as insults to the CPY, avoiding an answer to the essential question. Their proofs are based only on the fact that consistent social reforms are being undertaken in Yugoslavia. However, this is almost negligible. The denial on the part of these comrades of the strengthening of the capitalist elements, and in connection with this, the sharpening of the class struggle in the village under the conditions of contemporary

¹ This should read 13 April.

Yugoslavia, arises from the opportunist contention that, in the transition period between capitalism and socialism, the class struggle does not become sharper, as taught by Marxism-Leninism, but dies out, as averred by opportunists of the type of Bukharin, who postulated a decadent theory of the peaceful absorption of the capitalist elements into the socialist structure.

No one will deny that the social reforms which occurred in the USSR after the October revolution were all-embracing and consistent with our teaching. However, this did not cause the CPSU to conclude that the class struggle in our country was weakening, nor that there was no danger of the strengthening of the capitalist elements. In 1920-21 Lenin stated that 'while we live in a country of smallholders there is a stronger economic basis for capitalism in Russia, than there is for communism', since 'small-scale individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale'. It is known that for fifteen years after the October revolution, the question of measures for checking capitalist elements and later the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class, was never taken off the daily agenda of our Party. To underestimate the experiences of the CPSU in matters relating to the development of socialism in Yugoslavia, is a great political danger, and cannot be allowed for Marxists, because socialism cannot be developed only in the cities, and in industry, but must also be developed in the villages and in agriculture.

It is no accident that the leaders of the CPY are avoiding the question of the class struggle and the checking of the capitalist elements in the village. What is more, in the speeches of the Yugoslav leaders there is no mention of the question of class differentiation in the village; the peasantry are considered as an organic whole, and the Party does not mobilize its forces in an effort to overcome the difficulties arising from the increase of the exploiting elements in the village.

However, the political situation in the village gives no cause for complacency. Where, as in Yugoslavia, there is no nationalization of the land, where private ownership of the land exists and land is bought and sold, where considerable portions of land are concentrated in the hands of the kulaks, where hired labour is used, etc. the Party cannot be educated in the spirit of camouflaging the class struggle and smoothing over class controversies without disarming itself for the struggle with the main difficulties in the

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development of socialism. This means that the CPY is being lulled to sleep by the decadent opportunist theory of the peaceful infiltration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.

Nor is it by accident that some of the most prominent leaders of the CPY are deviating from the Marxist-Leninist road on the question of the leading role of the working class. While Marxism-Leninism starts by recognizing the leading role of the working class in the process of liquidating capitalism and developing a socialist society, the leaders of the CPY have an entirely different opinion. It is enough to quote the following speech by Comrade Tito in Zagreb on 2 November 1946 (*Borba*, 2 November 1946): 'We do not tell the peasants that they are the strongest pillar of our State in order that, eventually, we may get their votes, but because we know that that is what they are, and because they should be aware of what they are.'

This attitude is in complete contradiction to Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism considers that in Europe and in the countries of people's democracy, the working class and not the peasantry is the most progressive, the most revolutionary class. As regards the peasantry, or rather its majority—the poor and middle peasants—they can be or are in a union with the working class, while the leading role in this union still belongs to the working class. However, the passage quoted not only denies the leading role to the working class, but proclaims that the entire peasantry, including that is the kulaks, is the strongest pillar in the new Yugoslavia. As can be seen this attitude expresses opinions which are natural to petty-bourgeois politicians but not to Marxist-Leninists.

7. ON THE INCORRECT POLICY OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPY ON THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE'S FRONT

In our previous letter we wrote that in Yugoslavia the CPY is not considered as the main leading force, but rather the People's Front; that Yugoslav leaders diminish the role of the Party and are in fact dissolving the Party into a non-party People's Front, allowing in this way the same cardinal error committed by the Mensheviks in Russia forty years ago.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny this, stating that all decisions

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of the People's Front are decisions of the Party, but that they do not consider it necessary to state at what Party conference these decisions were approved.

In this lies the greatest error of the Yugoslav comrades. They are afraid openly to acclaim the Party and its decisions before the entire people so that the people may know that the leading force is the Party, that the Party leads the Front and not the reverse. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the CP is the highest form of organization of workers, which stands over all other organizations of workers, among others over the Soviet in the USSR, over the People's Front in Yugoslavia. The Party stands above all these organizations of working men not only because it has drawn in all the best elements of the workers, but because it has its own special programme, its special policy, on the basis of which it leads all the organizations of the workers. But the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY is afraid to admit this openly and proclaim it at the top of its voice to the working class and all the people of Yugoslavia. The Politbureau of the CC of the CPY feels that if it does not emphasize this factor, the other parties will not have occasion to develop their strength in their struggle. It also appears that Tito and Kardelj think that by this cheap cunning they can abolish the laws of historical development, fool the classes, fool history. But this is an illusion and self-deception. As long as there are antagonistic classes there will be a struggle between them, and as long as there is a struggle it will be expressed in the work of various groups and parties, legally or illegally.

Lenin said that the Party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the leaders is to keep this weapon in readiness. However, since the Yugoslav leaders are hiding the banner of their Party and will not emphasize the role of the Party before the masses, they are blunting this weapon, diminishing the role of the Party and disarming the working class. It is ridiculous to think that because of the cheap cunning of the Yugoslav leaders the enemies will relinquish the fight. Because of this the Party should be kept fighting fit and ever-ready for the struggle against the enemy. Its banner should not be hidden and it should not be lulled to sleep by the thought that the enemy will relinquish the struggle. The Party should not stop organizing its forces, legally or illegally.

We feel that this limiting of the role of the CPY has gone too far. We refer here to the relations between the CPY and the People's

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Front, which we consider incorrect in principle. It must be borne in mind that in the People's Front a variety of classes are admitted: kulaks, merchants, small manufacturers, bourgeois intelligentsia, various political groups, including some bourgeois parties. The fact that, in Yugoslavia, only the People's Front enters the political arena and that the Party and its organizations do not take part in political life openly under their own name, not only diminishes the role of the Party in the political life of the country but also undermines the Party as an independent political force, called upon to gain the confidence of the people and to spread its influence over ever broader masses of workers through open political work, through open propaganda of its opinions and its programme. Comrades Tito and Kardelj forget that the Party develops and that it can develop only in an open struggle with the enemy; that cheap cunning and machinations of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY cannot replace this struggle as a school for educating Party cadres. Their determined lack of desire to admit the error of their statements—namely that the CPY has no other programme than the programme of the People's Front—shows how far the Yugoslav leaders have deviated from Marxist-Leninist views on the Party. This might start liquidation tendencies regarding the CPY which would be a danger to the CPY itself and lead eventually to the degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj state that the errors of the Mensheviks regarding the merging of the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization were committed forty years ago and therefore can have no connection with the present mistakes of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY. Comrades Tito and Kardelj are profoundly mistaken. There can be no doubt of the theoretical and political connections between these two events, because, like the Mensheviks in 1907 so, to-day, Tito and Kardelj forty years later, are equally debasing the Marxist Party, equally denying the role of the Party as the supreme form of organization which stands over all other mass workers' organizations, equally dissolving the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization. The difference lies in the fact that the Mensheviks committed their errors in 1906-07, and, after being tried by the Marxist Party in Russia at the London Conference, did not return to these errors, whereas the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, in spite of this instructive lesson, are bringing the same error back to life after forty years, and are passing it off as their own Party theory. This circumstance

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does not lessen but, on the contrary, aggravates the error of the Yugoslav comrades.

8. REGARDING THE ALARMING SITUATION IN THE CPY

In our previous letter we wrote that the CPY retains a semi-legal status, in spite of the fact that it came into power more than three and a half years ago; that there is no democracy in the Party; there is no system of elections; there is no criticism or self-criticism, that the CPY Central Committee is not composed of elected persons but of co-opted persons.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all these charges.

They write that 'the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY are not co-opted', that 'in December 1940, when the CPY was completely illegal . . . at the Fifth Conference, which by the decision of the Comintern, had all the powers of a congress, a CC of the CPY was elected consisting of thirty-one members and ten candidates. . . .' that 'of this number ten members and six candidates died during the war' that besides this 'two members were expelled from the CC', that the CC of the CPY now has 'nineteen members elected at the Conference and seven co-opted members', that now 'the CC of the CPY is composed of twenty-six members'.

This statement does not correspond to the facts. As can be seen from the archives of the Comintern, at the Fifth Conference, which was held in October and not in December of 1940, thirty-one members of the CC of the CPY and ten candidates were not elected, but twenty-two members of the CC and sixteen candidates. Here is what Comrade Valter (Tito) reported from Belgrade at the end of October 1940: 'To Comrade Dimitrov: The Fifth Conference of the CPY was held from 19-23 October. One hundred and one delegates from all over the country participated. A CC of twenty-two members was elected, among them two women, and sixteen candidates. Complete unity was manifested. Valter'.

If, out of twenty-two elected members of the CC, ten died, this would leave twelve elected members. If two were expelled this would leave ten. Tito and Kardelj say that now there are twenty-six members of the CC of the CPY—therefore, if from this number we subtract ten, this leaves sixteen co-opted members of the present CC of the CPY. It thus appears that the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY were co-opted. This applies not

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only to the members of the CC of the CPY but also to the local leaders, who are not elected but appointed.

We consider that such a system of creating leading organs of the Party, when the Party is in power and when it can use complete legality, cannot be called anything but semi-legal, and the nature of the organization sectarian-bureaucratic. It cannot be tolerated that Party meetings should not be held or held secretly; this must undermine the influence of the Party among the masses; nor can it be tolerated that acceptance into the Party is concealed from the workers; acceptance into the Party should play an important educational role in linking the Party to the working class and to all the workers.

If the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY had regard for the Party it would not tolerate such a condition in the Party and would, immediately on gaining power, that is, three and a half years ago, have asked the Party to call a Congress in order to reorganize on the lines of democratic centralism and start work as a completely legal Party.

It is entirely understandable that under such conditions in the Party, when there is no election of the leading organs, but only their appointment, there can be no talk of internal Party democracy, and much less of criticism and self-criticism. We know that members are afraid to state their opinions, are afraid to criticize the system in the Party and prefer to keep their mouths shut, in order to avoid reprisals. It is no accident that the Minister of State Security is at the same time the Secretary of the CC for Party cadres or, as Tito and Kardelj say, the organization secretary of the CC of the CPY. It is evident that the members and cadres of the Party are left to the supervision of the Ministry of State Security, which is completely impermissible and cannot be tolerated. It was sufficient for Zhujovic, at a session of the CC of the CPY, not to agree with a draft of the answer of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY to the letter from the CC of the CPSU, to be immediately expelled from the Central Committee.

As can be seen, the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY does not consider the Party as an independent entity, with the right to its own opinion, but as a partisan detachment, whose members have no right to discuss any questions but are obliged to fulfil all the desires of the 'chief' without comment. We call this cultivating militarism in the Party, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy within a Marxist Party.

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As is known, Trotsky also attempted to force a leadership based on militarist principles on the CPSU, but the Party, headed by Lenin, triumphed over him and condemned him; militarist measures were rejected and internal Party democracy was confirmed as the most important principle of Party development.

We feel that this abnormal condition inside the CPY represents a serious danger to the life and development of the Party. The sooner this sectarian-bureaucratic régime within the Party is put an end to, the better it will be both for the CPY and for the Yugoslav Democratic Republic.

9. ON THE ARROGANCE OF THE LEADERS OF THE CC OF THE CPY AND THEIR INCORRECT ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEIR MISTAKES

As can be seen from the letter by Tito and Kardelj, they completely deny the existence of any mistake in the work of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, as well as the slander and propaganda being conducted among the inner circles of Party cadres in Yugoslavia about the 'degeneration' of the USSR into an imperialist State and so forth. They consider that this arises entirely from the inaccurate information received by the CPSU regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. They consider that the CC of the CPSU has been a 'victim' of the slanderous and inaccurate information spread by Zhujovic and Hebrang, and maintain that if there had been no such false information regarding conditions in Yugoslavia there would have been no disagreements between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Because of this they came to the conclusion that it is not a matter of mistakes of the CC of the CPY and the criticism of these mistakes by the CC of the CPSU, but of the inaccurate information of Zhujovic and Hebrang who 'fooled' the CPSU with their information. They feel that everything would be put right if they punished Hebrang and Zhujovic. In this way a scapegoat has been found for their sins. We doubt whether Comrades Tito and Kardelj themselves believe the truth of this version, even though they seize on it as if it were true. They do this because they feel it is the easiest way out of the difficult situation, in which the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY finds itself. In emphasizing this false and apparently naive version they desire, not only to clear themselves of the responsibility for strained Yugoslav-Soviet relations by throwing the blame on the USSR,

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but also to blacken the CC of the CPSU by representing it as being greedy for all 'tendentious' and 'anti-Party' information.

We feel that this attitude of Tito and Kardelj towards the CC of the CPSU and their critical remarks regarding the errors of the Yugoslav comrades is not only dangerously unwise and false, but also deeply anti-Party.

If Tito and Kardelj were interested in discovering the truth and if the truth were not painful to them, they should think seriously about the following:

- (a) Why should the CPSU's information about the affairs in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania appear correct, and not cause any misunderstanding with the Communist Parties of those countries, while the information about Yugoslavia appears, according to the Yugoslav comrades, tendentious and anti-Party' and causes from their side anti-Soviet attacks and an unfriendly attitude towards the CPSU?
- (b) Why do friendly relations between the USSR and the countries of people's democracies develop and strengthen while Soviet-Yugoslav relations deteriorate?
- (c) Why did the CPs of the people's democracies support the CPSU's letter of 27 March and condemn the mistakes of the CPY, while the Politbureau of the CPY, which would not admit its errors, remained isolated?

Was all this accidental?

In order to reveal the errors of the Politbureau of the CPY it is not necessary to obtain information from individual comrades such as, for example, Hebrang and Zhujovic. More than enough can be found in the official statements of the leaders of the CPY, such as Tito, Djilas, Kardelj and others, which appeared in the press.

We declare that Soviet citizens did not obtain any information from Hebrang. We declare that the talk between Zhujovic and the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Lavrentiev, did not reveal a tenth of what was contained in the erroneous and anti-Soviet speeches of Yugoslav leaders. The reprisals taken against these comrades are not only an impermissible settling of private accounts incompatible with the principles of internal Party democracy, but also bear witness to the anti-Soviet attitude of the Yugoslav leaders, who consider talk between a Yugoslav communist and the Soviet Ambassador a crime.

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We feel that behind the attempts of the Yugoslav leaders to clear themselves of the responsibility for straining Soviet-Yugoslav relations, lies the lack of desire by these comrades to admit their mistakes and their intention to continue an unfriendly policy towards the USSR.

Lenin says:

The attitude of a political party towards its mistakes is one of the most important and most significant criteria of the seriousness of the party and the fulfilment of its obligations toward its class and towards the working masses. To admit errors frankly, to discover their cause, to analyse the situation which has been created by these errors, to discuss measures for correcting them—that is the sign of a serious party, that is the fulfilment of its obligations, that is the education of the class and the masses.

Unfortunately, we must state that the leaders of the CPY, who will not admit and correct their errors, are crudely destroying this principal directive of Lenin.

We must also emphasize that, in contrast to the Yugoslav leaders, the leaders of the French and Italian Communist Parties honourably admitted their errors at the Conference of nine Parties, conscientiously corrected them and thus enabled their Parties to strengthen their ranks and to educate their cadres.

We feel that underlying the unwillingness of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY honourably to admit their errors and to correct them is the unbounded arrogance of the Yugoslav leaders. Their heads were turned by the successes achieved. They became arrogant and now feel that the depth of the sea reaches only up to their knees. Not only have they become arrogant, but they even preach arrogance, not understanding that arrogance can be their own ruin.

Lenin says: 'All revolutionary parties, which have existed in the past, perished because they were arrogant and because they did not see where their strength lay and were afraid to speak of their weaknesses. We will not perish because we are not afraid to speak of our weaknesses and we will learn to overcome them.'

Unfortunately we must state that the Yugoslav leaders, who do not suffer from undue modesty and who are still intoxicated with their successes, which are not so very great, have forgotten Lenin's teaching.

Tito and Kardelj, in their letter, speak of the merits and successes of the CPY, saying that the CC of the CPSU earlier

acknowledged these services and successes, but is now supposedly silent about them. This, naturally, is not true. No one can deny the services and successes of the CPY. There is no doubt about this. However, we must also say that the services of the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania are not less than those of the CPY. However, the leaders of these Parties behave modestly and do not boast about their successes, as do the Yugoslav leaders, who have pierced every one's ears by their unlimited self-praises. It is also necessary to emphasize that the services of the French and Italian CPs to the revolution were not less but greater than those of Yugoslavia. Even though the French and Italian CPs have so far achieved less success than the CPY, this is not due to any special qualities of the CPY, but mainly because after the destruction of the Yugoslav Partisan Headquarters by German paratroopers, at a moment when the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia was passing through a serious crisis, the Soviet army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, crushed the German invader, liberated Belgrade and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the CPY to achieve power. Unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian CPs. If Comrade Tito and Comrade Kardelj bore this fact in mind they would be less boastful about their merits and successes and would behave with greater propriety and modesty.

The conceit of the Yugoslav leaders goes so far that they even attribute to themselves such merits as can in no way be justified. Take, for example, the question of military science. The Yugoslav leaders claim that they have improved on the Marxist science of war with a new theory according to which war is regarded as a combined operation by regular troops, partisan units and popular insurrections. However, this so-called theory is as old as the world and is not new to Marxism. As is known, the Bolsheviks applied combined action of regular troops, partisan units and popular insurrections for the entire period of the civil war in Russia (1918-21), and applied it on a much wider scale than was done in Yugoslavia. However, the Bolsheviks did not say that by applying this method of military activity, they produced anything new in the science of war, because the same method was successfully applied long before the Bolsheviks by Field-Marshal Kutuzov in the war against Napoleon's troops in Russia in 1812.

However, even Field-Marshal Kutuzov did not claim to be the

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innovator in applying this method because the Spaniards in 1808 applied it in the war against Napoleon's troops. It thus appears that this science of war is actually 140 years old and this which they claim as their own service is actually the service of the Spaniards.

Besides this, we should bear in mind that the services of any leader in the past do not exclude the possibility of his committing serious errors later. We must not close our eyes to present errors because of past services. In his time Trotsky also rendered revolutionary services, but this does not mean that the CPSU could close its eyes to his crude opportunist mistakes which followed later, making him an enemy of the Soviet Union.

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Tito and Kardelj in their letter proposed that the CPSU should send representatives to Yugoslavia to study the Soviet-Yugoslav differences. We feel this course would be incorrect, since it is not a matter of verifying individual facts but of differences of principle.

As is known, the question of Soviet-Yugoslav differences has already become the property of the CC of the nine Communist Parties who have their Cominform. It would be highly irregular to exclude them from this matter. Therefore, we propose that this question be discussed at the next session of the Cominform.

CC of the CPSU

Moscow,
4 May 1948.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY
OF YUGOSLAVIA TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION

LETTER FROM J. B. TITO AND E. KARDELJ TO
COMRADES J. V. STALIN AND V. M. MOLOTOV

17 May 1948

We received your letter of 4 May 1948. It would be superfluous to write of the discouraging impression created on us by this letter. It has convinced us of the fact that all our explanations, though supported by facts showing that all the accusations against us were the result of wrong information, are in vain.

We do not flee from criticism about questions of principle, but in this matter we feel so unequal that it is impossible for us to agree to have this matter decided now by the Cominform. Even before we were informed, the nine Parties received your first letter and took their stand in resolutions. The contents of your letter did not remain an internal matter for individual Parties but were carried outside the permissible circle, and the results are that to-day, in some countries such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary, not only our Party but our country as a whole is being insulted, as was the case with our parliamentary delegation in Prague.

The results of all this have been very serious for our country.

We desire that the matter be liquidated in such manner as we prove, by deeds, that the accusations against us are unjust. That is, we will resolutely construct socialism and remain loyal to the Soviet Union; remain loyal to the doctrine of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The future will show, as did the past, that we will realize all that we promise you.

By order of the CC of the CPY

J. B. TITO
E. KARDELJ

Belgrade,
17 May 1948

LETTER FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION TO
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF
YUGOSLAVIA

22 May 1948

Your letters of 17 May 1948, and 20 May 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received. The CPSU considers that in these letters the leaders of the CPY have gone a step further in aggravating their crude mistakes in matters of principle, the harmfulness and danger of which the CPSU indicated in its letter of 4 May 1948.

1. Comrades Tito and Kardelj write that they feel 'so unequal that it is impossible for us to agree to have this matter decided now by the Informbureau,' and further they allowed themselves the allusion that the Yugoslav leaders had allegedly been placed in that position by the CPSU. The CC of the CPSU considers that there is not a scrap of truth in this assertion. There is no inequality for the Yugoslav Communist Party nor can there be in the Informbureau of nine Parties. All know that during the organization of the Informbureau of nine Communist Parties, all Communist Parties started from the indisputable position, that every Party should submit a report to the Informbureau, just as every Party has the right to criticize other Parties. From this point the Conference of nine Parties started when, at its meetings in September 1947, it listened to the reports of the Central Committees of all Parties without exception. The Conference of nine Communist Parties initiated the right that each Party has the right to criticize any other Party. The Italian and French comrades did not dispute the right of other Parties to criticize their mistakes, and they accepted harshness of criticism in a Bolshevik manner.

It is a known fact that the Italian and French comrades did not oppose the right of other Parties to criticize their mistakes. They have, on the contrary, borne the brunt of Bolshevik criticism and benefited from its conclusions. Moreover, the Yugoslav comrades took advantage of the opportunity to criticize the mistakes of the Italian and French comrades and did not consider that by so doing they were infringing on the equality of those Parties.

CPSU to CPY, 22 May 1948

Why are Yugoslav comrades making this radical change, and demanding the liquidation of already established precedents in the Informbureau? Because they believe that the Yugoslav Party and its leadership ought to be placed in a privileged position, and that the statute of the Informbureau does not apply to them; that, having the privilege of criticizing other Parties, they should not themselves submit to the criticism of other Parties. However, if we may say so, beliefs of that kind have nothing in common with equality. In fact this is nothing but a request from the Yugoslav leaders for a privileged position for the CPY (in the Cominform), a position which does not exist and cannot exist for any Party. We have taken and continue to take this stand, for without it the work of the Informbureau could not continue. Each Communist Party is obliged to submit reports to the Informbureau, each Communist Party has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. The refusal of the Yugoslavs to submit reports on their actions to the Cominform, and to hear criticisms from other Communist Parties, means a violation of the equality of Communist Parties.

2. In their letter of 17 May, Comrades Tito and Kardelj repeat the claim made in their previous letter, alleging that the CPSU criticism of Yugoslav Communist Party leadership is based on incorrect information.

But the Yugoslav comrades do not produce any evidence to prove this statement. The statement remains without substantiation and the CPSU's criticism remains unanswered, even though Comrades Tito and Kardelj state in their letter that they do not seek to avoid criticism on questions of principle. Maybe the Yugoslav leaders simply have nothing to say to justify themselves?

It is one of two things: either the Politbureau of the CPY, deep in its soul, is aware of the seriousness of the mistakes committed, but wishing to conceal this from the CPY and to deceive it, declares that the mistakes do not exist, in the meantime laying the blame on innocent men, who were supposed to have misinformed the CPSU; or it really does not understand that by its mistakes it is deviating from Marxism-Leninism. However, in that case it must be admitted that the Politbureau's ignorance of the principles of Marxism is extremely great.

3. Although they refuse to answer the direct questions of the CPSU and aggravate their mistakes by their stubborn unwillingness to admit and correct them, Comrades Tito and Kardelj assure

CPSU to CPY, 22 May 1948

us with words that they will show with deeds that they will remain true to the Soviet Union and the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. After what has happened we have no reason to believe in these verbal assurances. Comrades Tito and Kardelj have on many occasions given promises to the CPSU which have not been fulfilled. From their letters and especially from their last letter we are becoming ever more certain of this. The Politbureau of the CPY, and especially Comrade Tito, should understand that the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy which they have recently pursued in their everyday work has done all that was needed to undermine faith in them on the part of the CPSU and the Government of the USSR.

4. Comrades Tito and Kardelj complain that they have got into a difficult position and that the consequences of this are very serious for Yugoslavia. This of course is true, but the blame for this lies exclusively with Comrades Tito and Kardelj and with other members of the Politbureau of the CPY, who have put their own prestige and ambition above the interests of the Yugoslav people, and, instead of admitting and correcting their mistakes in the interests of the people, have stubbornly denied their mistakes, which are fatal for the Yugoslav people.

5. Comrades Tito and Kardelj claim that the CC of the CPY refuses to attend the meeting of the Informbureau to discuss the question of the Yugoslav Communist Party. If this is their final decision, then it means that they have nothing to tell the Informbureau in their defence, and that they are tacitly admitting their guilt and are afraid to appear before their fraternal Communist Parties. Moreover, refusal to report to the Informbureau means that the CPY has taken the path of cutting itself off from the united socialist people's front of people's democracies headed by the Soviet Union, and that it is now preparing the Yugoslav Party and people for a betrayal of the united front of people's democracies and the USSR. Since the Informbureau is a Party foundation of the united front, such a policy leads to the betrayal of the work done for international solidarity of the workers and to the adoption of an attitude of nationalism which is hostile to the cause of the working class.

Irrespective of whether the representatives of the CC of the CPY attend the meeting of the Informbureau, the CPSU insists upon the discussion of the situation in the CPY at the next meeting of the Informbureau.

CPSU to CPY, 22 May 1948

In view of the request of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian comrades that the meeting of the Informbureau take place in the second half of June, the CPSU expresses its agreement with this proposal.

CC of the CPSU

Moscow,
22 May 1948.

STATEMENT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO
COMINFORM CONFERENCE

20 June 1948

To the Informbureau:

Having received an invitation to send its representatives to the meeting of the Informbureau, which has already met for 'Discussion on the Situation in the CPY', the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia requests that the Informbureau session be informed of the following: -

The CC of the CPY is always ready to participate in the work of the Informbureau. But it cannot send its representatives to this meeting of the Bureau because it does not accept the agenda of the meeting, considering that the solution of the question of disagreement between the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CC of the CPY, which constitutes the agenda sent to us, has from the beginning up until this meeting of the Bureau been put on an incorrect basis, for the following reasons:

1. The first letter of the CC of the CPSU to our CC was not composed in a spirit of comradely criticism to which the CC of the CPY could answer in the same tone, but was rather in the form of a rude and unjust accusation which we, considering its falsity, could accept only to the detriment of our Party and State, or not accept at all.

2. The CC of the CPY considers it thoroughly incorrect to base accusations of a brotherly Communist Party on one-sided information of what some one said or on isolated quotations, and not on the basis of analysis of the entire activity of our Party, which passed through such great tests before, during, and after the war.

3. Some of the most serious accusations of the CC of the CPSU are obviously based on the information of anti-Party elements against which our Party waged a struggle before, during and after the war. The CC of the CPY considers it impermissible for such well-known remnants of former fractionalism in the CPY to receive the support of the CC of the CPSU.

4. The leaders of the member Parties of the Informbureau, uncritically accepting the accusations of the CC of the CPSU

CPY to Cominform, 20 June 1948

against our Party and without seeking any information from us, condemned our Party in written statements and refused to take into consideration the arguments in our answer to the first letter of the CC of the CPSU. Some of them, both within broad circles in their Parties and publicly, acted in a way harmful to our country.

5. The CC of the CPSU did not accept even one argument from our answer to its first letter but in response to that letter and later, too, brought out ever greater and totally unfounded accusations against the CPY. It is clear that such a stand makes it impossible for us to discuss matters on an equal footing.

All these facts are reasons why the CC of the CPY did not assent to the bringing out of the disagreements before the Informbureau, considering that this would only result in a deepening rather than in a solution of the disagreements.

The CC of the CPY points out that it proposed to the CC of the CPSU that it send its representatives to Yugoslavia for a joint investigation of disputed questions on the spot. The CC of the CPSU did not accept this procedure, which in our opinion represents the only correct one, but, even before receiving our answer, laid the disagreements before the other Parties of the Informbureau, that is, it sent them the text of the letter at the same time it was sent to us, at which the leaders of all the Parties, except the French and Italian, sent us written statements informing us of their judgment of our Party.

Such behaviour is not in the spirit of understanding or according to the principle of voluntariness upon which the Informbureau is based.

The CC of the CPY continues to adhere to its conviction that joint discussion of disputed questions by direct contact between the CC of the CPSU and the CC of the CPY in Yugoslavia itself is the correct way to solve the existing disagreements. The CC of the CPY expresses its deep sorrow at the fact that the disagreements have taken such a form on the part of the CC of the CPSU, and again appeals, both to the CC of the CPSU and to the Informbureau, that they agree with our opinion regarding the necessity for direct contact between the CC of the CPSU and the CC of the CPY for the solution of disagreements, and to this end to remove from the agenda the discussion of the situation in our Party, comprehending the incorrectness of such discussion without our consent.

CPY to Cominform, 20 June 1948

The CC of the CPY greets the brotherly Communist Parties and declares that no disagreements will prevent the CPY from remaining true to its policy of solidarity and of the closest co-operation with the CC of the CPSU and other Communist Parties.

20 June 1948

Politbureau, CC of the CPY

COMMUNIQUÉ¹

MEETING OF INFORMATION BUREAU OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

During the second half of June, a meeting of the Information Bureau was held in Rumania. The meeting was attended by the following representatives:

Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), Comrades T. Kostov, B. Chervenkov; Rumanian Workers' Party, Comrades G. Georgiu Dej, V. Luca, A. Pauker; Hungarian Workers' Party, Comrades M. Rakosi, M. Farcas, A. Gero; Polish Workers' Party, Comrades J. Berman, A. Zavadski; Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Comrades A. Zhdanov, G. Malenkov, M. Suslov; Communist Party of France, Comrades J. Duclos, E. Fajon; Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Comrades R. Slansky, V. Siroky, B. Geminder, G. Bares; Communist Party of Italy, Comrades P. Togliatti, P. Secchia.

The Information Bureau discussed the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and unanimously adopted a resolution on this question.

RESOLUTION

of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

The Information Bureau, composed of the representatives of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), Rumanian Workers' Party, Hungarian Workers' Party, Polish Workers' Party, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Italy, upon discussing the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and announcing that the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had refused to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, unanimously reached the following conclusions:

1. The Information Bureau notes that recently the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has pursued an incorrect

¹ Published 28 June 1948.

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line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism. In this connection the Information Bureau approves the action of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B), which took the initiative in exposing this incorrect policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, particularly the incorrect policy of Comrades Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovic.

2. The Information Bureau declares that the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU (B). An undignified policy of defaming Soviet military experts and discrediting the Soviet Union, has been carried out in Yugoslavia. A special régime was instituted for Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia, whereby they were under surveillance of Yugoslav state security organs and were continually followed. The representative of the CPSU (B) in the Information Bureau, Comrade Yudin, and a number of official representatives of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia, were followed and kept under observation by Yugoslav state security organs.

All these and similar facts show that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have taken a stand unworthy of Communists, and have begun to identify the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, behaving toward the Soviet Union in the same manner as they behave to the bourgeois states. Precisely because of this anti-Soviet stand, slanderous propaganda about the 'degeneration' of the CPSU (B), about the 'degeneration' of the USSR, and so on, borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, is current within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau denounces this anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as being incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and only appropriate to nationalists.

3. In home policy, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are departing from the positions of the working class and are breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. They deny that there is a growth of capitalist elements in their country, and consequently, a sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside. This denial is the direct result of the opportunist tenet that the class struggle does not become sharper during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, as Marxism-Leninism teaches, but dies down, as was affirmed by opportunists

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of the Bukharin type, who propagated the theory of the peaceful growing over of capitalism into socialism.

The Yugoslav leaders are pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside by ignoring the class differentiation in the countryside and by regarding the individual peasantry as a single entity, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle, contrary to the well-known Lenin thesis that small individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale. Moreover, the political situation in the Yugoslav countryside gives no grounds for smugness and complacency. In the conditions obtaining in Yugoslavia, where individual peasant farming predominates, where the land is not nationalized, where there is private property in land, and where land can be bought and sold, where much of the land is concentrated in the hands of kulaks, and where hired labour is employed—in such conditions there can be no question of educating the Party in the spirit of glossing over the class struggle and of reconciling class contradictions without by so doing disarming the Party itself in face of the difficulties connected with the construction of socialism.

Concerning the leading role of the working class, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, by affirming that the peasantry is the 'most stable foundation of the Yugoslav state' are departing from the Marxist-Leninist path and are taking the path of a populist, kulak party. Lenin taught that the proletariat as the 'only class in contemporary society which is revolutionary to the end. . . must be the leader in the struggle of the entire people for a thorough democratic transformation, in the struggle of all working people and the exploited against the oppressors and exploiters.'

The Yugoslav leaders are violating this thesis of Marxism-Leninism.

As far as the peasantry is concerned it may be that the majority, that is, the poor and medium peasants, are already in alliance with the working class, with the working class having the leading role in this alliance.

The attitude of the Yugoslav leaders disregards these theses of Marxism-Leninism.

As can be seen, this attitude also reflects views appropriate to petty-bourgeois nationalism, but not to Marxists-Leninists.

4. The Information Bureau considers that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is revising the Marxist-

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Leninist teachings about the Party. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Party is the main guiding and leading force in the country, which has its own, specific programme, and does not dissolve itself among the non-Party masses. The Party is the highest form of organization and the most important weapon of the working class.

In Yugoslavia, however, the People's Front, and not the Communist Party, is considered to be the main leading force in the country. The Yugoslav leaders belittle the role of the Communist Party and actually dissolve the Party in the non-party People's Front, which is composed of the most varied class elements (workers, peasants engaged in individual farming, kulaks, traders, small manufacturers, bourgeois intelligentsia, etc.) as well as mixed political groups which include certain bourgeois parties. The Yugoslav leaders stubbornly refuse to recognize the falseness of their tenet that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia allegedly cannot and should not have its own specific programme and that it should be satisfied with the programme of the People's Front.

The fact that in Yugoslavia it is only the People's Front which figures in the political arena, while the Party and its organizations do not appear openly before the people in its own name, not only belittles the role of the Party in the political life of the country, but also undermines the Party as an independent political force, which has the task of winning the growing confidence of the people and of influencing ever broader masses of the working people by open political activity and open propaganda of its views and programme. The leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party are repeating the mistakes of the Russian Mensheviks regarding the dissolution of the Marxist party into a non-party, mass organization. All this reveals the existence of liquidation tendencies in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau believes that this policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia threatens the very existence of the Communist Party, and ultimately carries with it the danger of the degeneration of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

5. The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic régime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections, and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party. Despite the unfounded assurances of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, the majority of the Central Committee of

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the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is composed of co-opted, and not of elected members. The Communist Party is actually in a position of semi-legality. Party meetings are either not held at all, or meet in secret—a fact which can only undermine the influence of the Party among the masses. This type of organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party cannot be described as anything but a sectarian-bureaucratic organization. It leads to the liquidation of the Party as an active, self-acting organism, it cultivates military methods of leadership in the Party similar to the methods advocated in his day by Trotsky.

It is a completely intolerable state of affairs when the most elementary rights of members in the Yugoslav Communist Party are suppressed, when the slightest criticism of incorrect measures in the Party is brutally repressed.

The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such actions as the expulsion from the Party and the arrest of the Central Committee members, Comrades Djuiovic and Hebrang, because they dared to criticize the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and called for friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

The Information Bureau considers that such a disgraceful, purely Turkish, terrorist régime cannot be tolerated in the Communist Party. The interests of the very existence and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party demand that an end be put to this régime.

6. The Information Bureau considers that the criticism made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and Central Committees of the other Communist Parties of the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and who in this way rendered fraternal assistance to the Yugoslav Communist Party, provides the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with all the conditions necessary to speedily correct the mistakes committed.

However, instead of honestly accepting this criticism and taking the Bolshevik path of correcting these mistakes, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, suffering from boundless ambition, arrogance and conceit, met this criticism with belligerence and hostility. They took the anti-Party path of indiscriminately denying all their mistakes, violated the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism regarding the attitude of a political party to its mistakes and thus aggravated their anti-Party mistakes.

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Unable to face the criticism of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) and the Central Committees of the other fraternal Parties, the Yugoslav leaders took the path of outrightly deceiving their Party and people by concealing from the Yugoslav Communist Party the criticism of the Central Committee's incorrect policy and also by concealing from the Party and the people the real reasons for the brutal measures against Comrades Djuiovic and Hebrang.

Recently, even after the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) and fraternal parties had criticized the mistakes of the Yugoslav leaders, the latter tried to bring in a number of new leftist laws. They hastily decreed the nationalization of medium industry and trade, though the basis for this is completely unprepared. In view of such haste the new decision only hampers the supply of goods to the population. In a similar hurried manner they brought in a new grain tax for which the way is also not prepared and which can, therefore, only dislocate grain supplies to the urban population. Finally, only recently the Yugoslav leaders in loud declarations declared their love for, and devotion to the Soviet Union, although it is known that in practice they are pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union.

Nor is this all. Of late the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have, with perfect aplomb, been declaiming a policy of liquidating the capitalist elements in Yugoslavia. In a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B), dated 13 April, Tito and Kardelj wrote that 'the plenum of the Central Committee approved the measures proposed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to liquidate the remnants of capitalism in the country'.

In accordance with this line Kardelj, speaking in the Skupschina on 25 April, declared: 'In our country the days of the last remnants of the exploitation of man by man are numbered.'

In the conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia this position of the leaders of the Communist Party in regard to the liquidation of the capitalist elements, and hence, the kulaks as a class, cannot be qualified as other than adventurous, and non-Marxist. For it is impossible to solve this task as long as individual peasant economy predominates in the country, which inevitably gives birth to capitalism; as long as conditions have not been created for the large-scale collectivization of agriculture; and as long as the majority of the working peasantry is not convinced of the advant-

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ages of collective methods of farming. The experience of the CPSU (B) shows that the elimination of the last and biggest exploiting class—the kulak class—is possible only on the basis of the mass collectivization of agriculture, that the elimination of the kulaks as a class, is an organic and integral part of the collectivization of agriculture.

In order to eliminate the kulaks as a class, and hence, to eliminate the capitalist elements in the countryside, it is necessary for the Party to engage in detailed preparatory work to restrict the capitalist elements in the countryside, to strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class, to make socialist industry capable of producing machinery for the collective administration of agriculture. Haste in this matter can only lead to irreparable harm.

Only on the basis of these measures, carefully prepared and consistently carried out, is it possible to go over from restriction of the capitalist elements in the countryside, to their liquidation.

All attempts by the Yugoslav leaders to solve this problem hastily and by means of decrees, signify either that the venture is foredoomed to failure or that it is a boastful and empty demagogic declaration.

The Information Bureau considers that by means of these false and demagogic tactics, the Yugoslav leaders are endeavouring to demonstrate that they are not only for class struggle, but that they go even further, beyond those demands which—taking into account the real possibilities—could be advanced by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the matter of restricting the capitalist elements.

The Information Bureau considers that since these leftist decrees and declarations of the Yugoslav leadership are demagogic and impracticable in the present conditions, they can but compromise the banner of socialist construction in Yugoslavia.

That is why the Information Bureau considers such adventurist tactics as an undignified manoeuvre and an impermissible political gamble.

As we see, these leftist demagogic measures and declarations on the part of the Yugoslav leaders are designed to cover up their refusal to recognize mistakes and honestly correct them.

7. Taking into account the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and seeking to show the leaders of the Party the way out of this situation, the Central Committee of the Communist

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Party of the Soviet Union (B) and the Central Committees of other fraternal parties, suggested that the matter of the Yugoslav Communist Party should be discussed at a meeting of the Information Bureau, on the same, normal party footing as that on which the activities of other Communist Parties were discussed at the first meeting of the Information Bureau.

However, the Yugoslav leaders rejected the repeated suggestions of the fraternal Communist Parties to discuss the situation in the Yugoslav Party at a meeting of the Information Bureau.

Attempting to avoid the just criticism of the fraternal parties in the Information Bureau, the Yugoslav leaders invented the fable of their allegedly 'unequal position'. There is not a grain of truth in this story. It is generally known that when the Information Bureau was set up, the Communist Parties based their work on the indisputable principle that any party could report to the Information Bureau in the same way that any party had the right to criticize other parties.

At the first meeting of the Nine Communist Parties, the Yugoslav Communist Party took full advantage of this right.

The refusal of the Yugoslav Party to report to the Information Bureau on its actions and to listen to criticism by other Communist Parties means, in practice, a violation of the equality of the Communist Parties and is, in fact, tantamount to a demand for a privileged position for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Information Bureau.

8. In view of this, the Information Bureau expresses complete agreement with the estimation of the situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party, with the criticism of the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Party, and with the political analysis of these mistakes contained in letters from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between March and May 1948.

The Information Bureau unanimously concludes that by their anti-Party and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the Information Bureau, have taken the path of seceding from the united socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of

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international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism.

The Information Bureau condemns this anti-Party policy and attitude of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau considers that, in view of all this, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau.

* * *

The Information Bureau considers that the basis of these mistakes made by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia lies in the undoubted fact that nationalist elements, which previously existed in a disguised form, managed in the course of the past five or six months to reach a dominant position in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and that consequently the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party has broken with the international traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and has taken the road of nationalism.

Considerably overestimating the internal, national forces of Yugoslavia and their influence, the Yugoslav leaders think that they can maintain Yugoslavia's independence and build socialism without the support of the Communist Parties of other countries, without the support of the people's democracies, without the support of the Soviet Union. They think that the new Yugoslavia can do without the help of these revolutionary forces.

Showing their poor understanding of the international situation and their intimidation by the blackmailing threats of the imperialists, the Yugoslav leaders think that by making concessions they can curry favour with the Imperialist states. They think they will be able to bargain with them for Yugoslavia's independence and, gradually, get the people of Yugoslavia orientated on these states, that is, on capitalism. In this they proceed tacitly from the well-known bourgeois-nationalist thesis that 'capitalist states are a lesser danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union'.

The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois

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republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the united socialist front.

Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism.

Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfil this honourable task.

STATEMENT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA ON THE
RESOLUTION OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU
OF COMMUNIST PARTIES ON THE SITUATION
IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

29 June 1948

The Resolution of the Information Bureau 'On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia' has a previous history, as is obvious from its contents.

Its basis lies in a number of letters dispatched by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The first of these letters, dated 27 March of this year, in which the CC of the CPSU sets forth its accusations against the CC of the CPY, was also simultaneously dispatched to all other members of the Information Bureau, a fact of which the CC of the CPY had not been informed. In addition, a letter from the CC of the CP of Hungary was received through the CC of the CPSU which supported the attitude of the CC of the CPSU in its entirety. The letter of the Hungarian Central Committee was sent to the other Parties also. Similar letters were received by the CC of the CPY from the other member Parties of the Information Bureau except from the French and Italian. The CC of the CPY points out that the Parties mentioned accepted as their base the standpoint of the CC of the CPSU without hearing the views or listening to the counter-arguments of the CC of the CPY. After this letter from the CC of the CPSU and the letters from the other Central Committees, as well as after the reply of the CC of the CPY dispatched to the CC of the CPSU dated 13 April, other letters from the CC of the CPSU were received on 4 and 22 May, which adhered more or less to the line of the first letter. The Resolution of the Information Bureau 'On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia' is essentially a repetition of these letters from the CC of the CPSU.

In these letters, the CC of the CPSU accuses the CC of the CPY and demands that it admit its mistakes, as: firstly, that the leading people of the CPY are paying lip service to the USSR

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while secretly slandering it and the CPSU; secondly, that leading personalities in Yugoslavia are slandering the Soviet army and that specialists from the Soviet Union are surrounded by enmity while Soviet citizens and Comrade Yudin are followed by state security agents; thirdly, that the Party cadres are under the surveillance of the Minister of Internal Affairs and that there is no democracy and criticism within the Party but that it is ruled by a system of military leadership; fourthly, that the Yugoslav Government wishes to get into the good graces of the imperialist countries through spies and to put itself under their control; fifth, that the Party submerges itself within the People's Front and cannot therefore be regarded as a Marxist-Leninist organization, that it is pervaded by Bernsteinist, Bukharinist and Vollmarist theories of the peaceful withering away of the capitalist elements in socialism; sixth, that the ambassador of a certain imperialist power behaves as master of the house in Yugoslavia and that friends and relatives of the hangman of the Yugoslav peoples, Nedic, have easily found themselves positions of comfort in the Yugoslav Government and Party apparatus; seventh, that the Yugoslav leaders identify the foreign policy of the USSR with the foreign policy of the imperialist governments; eighth, that the leading members of the CPY have deviated from the Marxist-Leninist course in the question of the leading role of the working class; ninth, that German parachutists destroyed the 'partisan' headquarters in Yugoslavia, that as a result of this a serious crisis ensued in the National Liberation Movement, and that thereafter the Soviet army came to assist, liberated Yugoslavia and created the conditions which enabled the Communist Party to come to power; tenth, that the CPY has boasted excessively of its successes during the war although its services do not exceed those of the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, etc., etc. To these accusations should be added those made in the Resolution of the Information Bureau but not specifically enumerated here.

From the statement submitted by the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY to the session of the Informbureau, which will be given as an appendix,¹ it is obvious that the CC of the CPY could not agree to a discussion based on the accusations of the CC of the CPSU founded on slanders, fabrications and ignorance of the situation in Yugoslavia, before the actual state of affairs had been

¹ This is the statement dated 20 June 1948.

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verified, and before the falsities had been separated from the actual grievances of principle, whether of the CC of the CPSU, or of any other Central Committee of the member Parties of the Information Bureau.

In connection with the publication of the Resolution of the Information Bureau, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia makes the following statement:

1. The criticism contained in the Resolution is based on inaccurate and unfounded assertions and represents an attempt to destroy the prestige of the CPY both abroad and in the country, to arouse confusion amongst the masses in the country and in the international workers' movement, to weaken the unity within the CPY and its leading role. It is therefore surprising that the CC of the CPSU refused to check its assertions on the spot as proposed in the letter of the CC of the CPY dated 13 April.

2. The Resolution maintains, without citing any proof, that the leadership of the CPY carried out a hostile policy towards the USSR. The statement that Soviet military specialists in Yugoslavia have been treated with scant respect, and that Soviet civilian citizens have been under the surveillance of state security agents does not in the least correspond to the truth. Up to their withdrawal not one of the representatives of the Soviet Union brought such matters to the attention of the Yugoslav representatives. That any of the Soviet citizens, and least of all Comrade Yudin, were under observation in Yugoslavia, is altogether false. This statement, and especially that in connection with Comrade Yudin, is designed solely to discredit the CPY and its leadership in the eyes of other Parties.

On the contrary, it is correct, as stated in the letter to the CC of the CPSU of 13 April, and based on numerous reports of members of the CPY to their Party organizations as well as on statements of other citizens of our country, that from the liberation up to date the Soviet intelligence service sought to enrol them. The CC of the CPY considered and considers that such an attitude towards a country where the communists are the ruling party and which is advancing toward socialism is impermissible—and that it leads towards the demoralization of the citizens of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia and towards the weakening and undermining of the governmental and Party leadership. The CC of the CPY considered and considers that the relationship of Yugoslavia toward the USSR must be based exclusively on confidence and

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sincerity and, in keeping with this principle, Yugoslav State organs never even dreamed of following or exercising any control over Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia.

3. The Resolution criticized the policy of the CPY in regard to the conduct of the class struggle and particularly the policy of the CPY in the village. In connection with this, well-known passages from Lenin are quoted. The CC of the CPY points out that in its policy of restricting the capitalist elements in the village, it is guided by the mentioned and similar passages from Lenin, which the authors of the Resolution—had they taken the trouble—might have read in the published Party documents and articles, and might have convinced themselves concerning the practical execution of this policy. For this reason, the charges made in the Resolution and by the CC of the CPSU in fact only knock on an open door; objectively, they inevitably tend to encourage and support reactionary and capitalist elements in town and village, and to provoke confusion among the population, as if the CC of the CPY and its policy were to blame for objective difficulties especially in regard to supply, in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The CC of the CPY considers that as a method it is impermissible to evaluate its activities on the basis of individual quotations taken from the most varied periods of the struggle, or on the basis of individual, isolated and distorted facts. The CC of the CPY considers that in assessing the policy of the CPY, as of other Parties, it is the practice of the Party that must be given primary consideration—whether the Party scores or does not score successes in the struggle for the socialist transformation of the country, whether as a whole the capitalist elements are growing weaker or stronger, whether the socialist sector of the national economy is growing weaker or stronger.

4. The CC of the CPY cannot but reject with deep indignation the assertions that the leading ranks in the CPY are deviating to the course of a kulak party, to the path of the liquidation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, that there is no democracy in the Party, that methods of military leadership are fostered within the Party, that the most basic rights of Party members are trampled upon in the Party and that the mildest criticism of irregularities in the Party is answered by sharp reprisals, etc. Could the members of the Party who dauntlessly faced death in thousands of battles, tolerate in the Party a state of affairs unworthy of both men and communists? The assertion that criticism is not allowed in the

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Party and similar statements are a terrible insult to every member of our Party, a degradation of the heroic and glorious past of the Party and its present heroic struggle for the reconstruction and development of the country. The CC of the CPY emphasizes that because certain Party organizations have not yet held elections it cannot be maintained that there is no democracy within the Party. These are the remnants of the war period and the tempestuous post-war development through which the CPY passed and in their time they were to be found in other Parties and in the CPSU as well.

As regards the assertion that the Party is losing itself in the Front, that the leading ranks are taking the path of a kulak party, it leads objectively to the shattering of the union of the working masses realized under the leadership of the working class in the united organization, the People's Front, to isolating the Party from the working masses. The root of this assertion, apart from what was said, is to be found in the misunderstanding of the relationship between the Party and Front in Yugoslavia, in the lack of understanding of the essence of the Front in Yugoslavia and the manner of the realization of the leading role of the working class in it. In this question also the point of departure is not facts but fabricated assertions followed by polemics using well-known passages from Lenin which no responsible person in the CPY has ever disputed. The facts, as well as numerous declarations made throughout the war and after it—not only by communists but by non-communists in the Front—show, first, that the CP is the leading force in the Front; second, that the CP does not lose itself in the Front but that on the contrary the Party ideologically and politically is raising the masses of Front members, educating them in the spirit of its policy of Marxism-Leninism; third, that the People's Front of Yugoslavia is in practice fighting for socialism, which surely could not be the case if motley political groups played any important role in it—the bourgeois parties, kulaks, merchants, small industrialists and the like, as is said in the Resolution, or if it were a coalition between the CP and other parties or a form of agreement of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie; fourth, that the Party does not take over the Front programme but that rather the Front gets its basic direction and its programme from the CP, which is natural in view of its leading role in the Front.

The CC of the CPY emphasizes in this connection that the further ideological and political closing of the ranks of the Front masses, the linking of the political activity of the Party with the

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activity of the Front and the all-round activity of the Front—is one of the most important tasks of the Party.

Finally, the CC of the CPY points out that the majority of its members are not co-opted but elected. In its calculation, the CC of the CPSU did not take into account members of the Political Bureau who were separately elected at the Fifth national Conference. For this reason, the seven members of the Political Bureau are to be added to the number of twenty-two members of the plenum of the CC of the CPY which is mentioned by the CC of the CPSU in one of its letters. It is odd to reproach the CC of the CPY, which lost ten of its members in the war, for having co-opted seven comrades in their place, chiefly from the ranks of candidates of the CC of the CPY.

The CC of the CPY rejects as ridiculous and untrue the assertion of the illegality of the CPY and considers that this also is a confirmation of the lack of understanding of the form of work of the CPY in the given conditions and at the given time. The forms of work of the CPY grew out of the concrete conditions of the long revolutionary practice of our Party; they were shown in practice to be correct and were an important factor in the Party's winning the confidence of the masses.

5. The CC of the CPY rejects as unworthy the accusation that a Turkish régime reigns in the CP and that the Yugoslav leaders concealed from the Party the 'criticism of the Central Committee's incorrect policy, concealed from the Party and the people the real reasons for the brutal measures against comrades Hebrang and Zhujovic'. The CC of the CPY could not publish the letters of the CC of the CPSU until this was done by the CC of the CPSU itself. The entire, broad, active body of the CPY, however, knows the contents of the letters of the CC of the CPSU and all party members are informed of the case of Hebrang and Zhujovic.

The CC of the CPY must express its amazement that representatives of the member Parties of the Information Bureau could take Hebrang and Zhujovic under their protection without asking for any details from the CC of the CPY. The CC of the CPY wonders why such men as Zhujovic are defended, for example, who in 1937 by decision of the Comintern, was expelled from the CC of the CPY together with Gorkic, or Hebrang who behaved treacherously before the Ustashi police,¹ on the subject of which he

¹ The Ustashi were a Croat terrorist organization, used by the German occupation forces as police during the war.

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deceived the Party; men who carried on fractionalist activity in the CPY and worked for its destruction and to sabotage the tempo of the development and industrialization of Yugoslavia. Is this not an encouragement to fractionalist activity, to traitors and to disruptive activity against the CPY? The CC in this connection publishes as a supplement its material concerning Hebrang and Zhujovic.

6. The CC of the CPY rejects as absurd the assertion that recently the Yugoslav leaders took measures for the nationalization of small-scale industry and small shops in a great hurry and for demagogical reasons. These measures as a matter of fact were prepared six months before the charges made by the CC of the CPSU against the CC of the CPY and are the result of the strengthening and development of the socialist sector.

The quotation torn from the speech of Comrade Kardelj has only a general significance, while the whole of his speech in point of fact sets forth the line of the Party towards the gradual squeezing out of capitalist elements in the present phase.

In connection with all this it is comprehensible why the organ of the Informbureau, the Soviet press, and the press of certain other Parties have not been publishing any news of late about the successes in the economic development of Yugoslavia, as, for instance, the measures for the further weakening of capitalist elements, the successes in the realization of the plan, the mass pre-congress competitions of the working class and working people rallied in the People's Front, etc. But facts remain facts. By keeping silent concerning them one cannot conceal the arbitrary and completely unfounded criticism of the economic policy of the Government of the FPRY and the line of the CC of the CPY in economic matters.

7. The CC of the CPY asserts that none of its leaders considers that Yugoslavia, in the struggle for the building of socialism and the preservation of independence, does not need the help of the countries of people's democracy and the USSR. Only people who have lost all contact with reality could assert anything of the kind. The CC of the CPY must emphasize in this connection that the extending of this aid and co-operation does not depend on it alone but also on the countries of people's democracy and the USSR. The CC of the CPY considers that this aid must be linked up with the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia and in no way with the fact that it could not accept the unfounded charges based on untruths.

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The assertion that the Yugoslav leaders are preparing to make concessions to imperialists and to bargain with them concerning the independence of Yugoslavia is completely invented and is among the most grievous slanders against the new Yugoslavia.

The CC of the CPY must, however, emphasize that in certain countries of people's democracy a whole series of unprovoked acts have been committed by Party and State organs which are insulting to the peoples of Yugoslavia, their State and State representatives and which lead toward the weakening of the mentioned co-operation, toward the deterioration of relations with Yugoslavia. The CC of the CPY does not consider itself bound to remain silent in the future concerning similar acts.

8. The CC of the CPY does not consider that by refusing to discuss the mistakes of which it is not guilty, it has in any way injured the unity of the communist front. The unity of this front is not based on the admission of invented or fabricated errors and slanders, but on the fact of whether or not the policy of a Party is actually internationalist. One cannot, however, ignore the fact that the Information Bureau has committed a breach of the principles on which it was based and which provide for the voluntary adoption of conclusions by every Party. The Informbureau, however, not only forces the leaders of the CPY to admit errors which they did not commit but also calls members of the CPY to rebellion within the Party, to shatter the unity of the Party. The CC of the CPY can never agree to a discussion about its policy on the basis of inventions and uncomradely behaviour without mutual confidence. Such a basis is not one of principle and in this and only in this sense the CC of the CPY considered that it was not on an equal footing in the discussion and that it could not accept discussion on that basis. Further, in connection with the above, the CC of the CPY resolutely rejects the accusation that the CPY has passed on to positions of nationalism. By its entire internal and foreign policy, and especially by its struggle during the national liberation war and the proper solution of the national question in Yugoslavia, the CPY has given proof of the exact opposite.

By the above-mentioned unjust charges, the greatest historical injustice has been done to our Party, our working class and working masses, the peoples in Yugoslavia in general and their unselfish and heroic struggle.

It is clear to the CC of the CPY that the charges of the CC of the CPSU against the CC of the CPY will be used by enemy propa-

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
ganda for the purpose of slandering the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other democratic countries. The CC of the CPY, however, declares that it bears no responsibility for all these phenomena as it did not provoke them by any act of its own.

The CC of the CPY calls upon the Party membership to close their ranks in the struggle for the realization of the Party line and for even greater strengthening of Party unity, while it calls upon the working class and other working masses, gathered in the People's Front, to continue to work even more persistently on the building of our socialist homeland. This is the only way, the only method to prove in full and by deeds the unjustness of the above-mentioned charges.


The Plenum of the CC of the CPY

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
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