




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BY

WŁADYSŁAW KONOPCZYŃSKI

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
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CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	5
Chapter 1. Geographical and Structural Elements in Historical Development	7
Geography, p. 7; Social Organization, p. 9; State Organization, p. 11; Dynastic Rule, p. 14.	
Chapter 2. Piast and Jagellon Times	16
The Polish-Lithuanian Union, p. 18; Closer relations in the 15th century p. 19; Sweden against the Teu- tonic Order, p. 20; Sigismund I and the Swedish Throne, p. 21; Concord with Gustavus Vasa, p. 24; National Affinities, p. 26.	
Chapter 3. War separates the Two Peoples.	28
Beginnings of discord, p. 28; Dynastic and Personal union, p. 30; The war for Livonia, p. 32; Loss and recovery of the Prussian ports, p. 34; Charles Gu- stavus invades Poland, p. 36.	
Chapter 4. Russia menaces Poland and Sweden	39
France as the peacemaker, p. 39; The Northern War, p. 41; Russia menaces Poland and Sweden, p. 43; Sweden saved — first partition of Poland, p. 46; Last attempts to form an alliance p. 48	
Chapter 5. Fall of the Polish Commonwealth	50
Ties broken, p. 50; Swedish sympathy towards the insurrection of 1830, p. 52; The Polish cause in Swe- den 1863-64, p. 54; Oblivion, p. 57.	
Chapter 6. The Polish Cause in Sweden during the Great War.	59



INTRODUCTION

The vicissitudes of a thousand years of good and ill fortune, of concord and discord, have marked the co-existence of the Poles and the Swedes. For whole centuries religion was a bond of union, and then for centuries it became a source of cleavage. The trade routes brought the two peoples together, rivalries set up barriers between them, and common dangers united them for mutual defence. In the onward movement of progress, the relative importance of each nation has always been changing. Poland was first to accept Christianity and to set up a powerful body politic, but she later suffered more from regional separatism; she earlier attained a high level of intellectual and material culture, only to fall later into the slough of a greater stagnation; she preceded Sweden in assuring the liberty of the subject, but she finally thereby undermined her own power as a state. One of the most powerful countries in Europe, she was later erased from the map for the term of four generations, to reappear after the Great War as an independent state and as one of the recognized powers of Europe.

In point of area and population, independent Poland has always surpassed Sweden. Under the Piast dynasty (962-1370) the population of Poland was many times greater than that of Sweden, and under the Jagellons (1386-1572) her population was still six times larger than that of her oversea neighbour to the north. Even during the period of her decline and actual downfall, she could always boast of a larger population than Sweden.

Today, in the 20th century, with the whole world forming a single economic and cultural complex, at a time when the excessive power of high finance is so evident at every step, when the imperialistic tendencies of the great powers and the universal trends of spiritual and social forces are pressing down upon all, the problems of rivalry play only a petty rôle in Polish-Swedish relations. They are now overshadowed by questions of economic, cultural and, at times, political collaboration. It is to the interests of both these Baltic peoples to extend and strengthen this co-operation, to attain a fuller comprehension of its fundamental bases, especially taking into consideration the influence and working of historical processes, and to avoid falling into the pitfalls of misleading and biased outside suggestion.

CHAPTER 1

GEOGRAPHICAL
AND STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS
IN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

GEOGRAPHY

For many centuries there was no contact between the Polish and Swedish peoples. Enclosed between the mountain chains of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea, at the dawn of history deprived of Skåne, the most fertile and warmest province of Sweden, and so cut off by Danes from the Sund, later expelled by the economic pressure of the Germans from their islands, the Swedes found themselves stifling upon their ethnical territory. They were obliged to relieve themselves of their surplus population and bursting energy by invading the Russian and Ruthenian lands (founding of the Russo-Kieff principality by the Varegians), Finland, Estonia and Livonia. From the middle of the 13th century Sweden occupied Finland, and from the times of Magnus VI. (1319-1362) she had a foothold in Estonia. Her pressure towards the east, however, was held up by the powerful republics of Novgorod and Pskov.

Poland, cut off from the sea since 1309, likewise pushed forward towards the east, and, as did Sweden, expanded more to the south-east, in the direction of Red Ruthenia. For this reason the Middle Ages went by without any conflicts between the two countries. It was only in later times, when contact was established upon the waters of the Baltic, that the Swedes as a nation showed much more activity than the Poles and more frequently took the initiative in regulating the mutual relations of the two countries. This cannot evoke surprise: the chief natural resources of Sweden were metals (with rich forests a close second) and these being iron and copper could be used for the manufacture of weapons. Poland's chief natural wealth (likewise apart from forests) was her corn, a shortage of which was sorely felt by the Swedes. The two nations, so diversely endowed by nature, could not live in separation for long, and either war or a system of peaceful commercial exchange had to ensue.

Numerous ports (Ålborg, Kalmar, Stockholm, Nyköping, and, later, Ystad, Karlskrona, Karlshamn and Hålsingborg) facilitated peaceful or warlike activities on the part of the Swedes as regards the Poles, who from 1309 till 1466 had no ports of their own. After that year they had sea-ports but often failed to utilize them properly. There were many factors which favoured Polish-Swedish friendship: upon the Baltic there was a natural solidarity between the north and

the south and the east and the west. Denmark, the age-long rival of Sweden, barred that country off from the Atlantic, and at the same time inhibited Polish maritime expansion in order the better to exploit Poland's export trade passing through Danish territorial waters. Moscovy held up the growth of Swedish colonization east of the Baltic upon Finnish and Estonian lands, and herself seized Ruthenian lands by main force. Poland had received Ruthenian territories at the time of her pacific Union with Lithuania. Thus it was only in the latter half of the 16th century that conflicts arose between Poland and Sweden over expansion in eastern Europe. The ensuing strife exhausted both countries and finally proved beneficial only to the Germans and Russians.

The reasons for the superior organization and better fighting qualities of the Swedes are to be found in the social and political structure of their country, also, to some extent, in the geographical situation of the rival states.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

When Polish-Swedish competition began, the social and political structures of the two countries were in some measure similar. On both sides much freedom was enjoyed by the individual. In both cases also there was considerable regional separatism. It seems that in pagan times Sweden was marked by such

fierce inter-regional strife and by such separatism amongst the various sections of the land as was never known in Poland. Poland's history can offer no parallel to the prolonged and bloody internecine strife of Götaland with Svealand. At no time in Poland did regional separatism reach such dimensions as in Sweden in the pre-Christian era, when every district lived under its own laws and held its own assemblies, and the *Konungs* differed from the *Yarls* only by the larger household forces under their command. But once this stage had been passed, the Swedes never reverted to the system of regional separatism, although the custom of granting whole provinces to the brothers of the crown-prince lasted until the end of the 16th century. This system was not, however, dangerous, as the whole nation had already been firmly cemented together during the struggles for independence which took place towards the end of the Middle Ages.

Fortunately for them, the Swedes had succeeded in maintaining equilibrium amongst the four Estates of the country: differentiation among the general mass of freeholders between privileged, independent freemen and dependent peasants, never went so far as to cause the latter to become the serfs of the former. From the first half of the 15th century the gentry, burghers, clergy and free peasants sent their representatives to the Riksdag. In this connexion it should be borne in mind that the mass of the freemen had on

more than one occasion contributed to save the cause of Swedish liberty and independence. whilst it was the burghers together with the gentry who furnished the motive force behind the ambitions of the kings of Sweden. In Poland, on the other hand, the masses of the gentry grew to such dimensions, and so consolidated their rights and privileges, that the townfolk and peasants suffered thereby. Moreover the clergy, largely recruited from the ranks of the nobility and gentry, could not but become imbued with ideas and principles in accordance with the interests of the predominant classes.

A common feature marking both the culture and national character of the Poles and the Swedes was the spirit of chivalry, which, together with a certain aristocratic frame of mind, passing from the upper orders, strongly influenced the lower and middle ones. The only difference was that the rôle of the aristocracy and gentry in Poland steadily grew from the 16th to the 18th century, whilst in Sweden it constantly declined.

STATE ORGANIZATION

Up to the 15th century, the Kingdom of Poland had an executive organization which was more concentrated in the hands of the central authorities than was the case with Sweden. In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania such a state of affairs lasted even longer.

Since the times of the Swedish struggles for independence (the Dalekarl uprising under Engelbrekt in 1434-36, Sture's victory at Brunkeberg in 1473 and the second Dalekarl rising under Gustavus Vasa), the Swedes had attained a greater concentration of national forces, while, with the confiscation of ecclesiastical property during the Reformation, royal power in Sweden achieved that independence of the concurrence of the Estates that the Polish kings had lost after the extinction of the Piast dynasty.

This does not mean that the Swedes were disinclined to extend their political liberties. They have always been proud of their ancient freedom and their whole internal history consists of periods when the royal power was successively being weakened or strengthened. The 15th century was marked by a number of uprisings against the ruling dynasty, the 16th by rebellions: the Catholic uprising in Westergötland (1529), the revolt of the 'Counts' (*Grevefejden*, 1533) and the *Dackefejden* or peasant riots of 1542. During the course of the 16th century, monarchs of Sweden were dethroned on three occasions (Christian II, 1520-23; Eric XIV, 1568 and Sigismund 1599). At the time when the Polish gentry were just securing their first charter of liberties (the Koszyce Charter, 1374), their Swedish colleagues were also forcing Albrecht of Mecklenburg to grant them their first confirmation of rights (*Könungafoersaekran*), whereby they hoped to transfer the

royal authority and prerogatives to the aristocratic senate. The Protestant covenants of the lower classes against Sigismund towards the end of the 16th century are not dissimilar to the confederations set up in Poland against royal authority.

The aristocracy occasionally raised its head during the 17th century, but by the 18th century the government of the land was already for the most part in the hands of the Estates sitting in the Riksdag. The important thing to bear in mind is that these Estates were four in number and not a single one, the gentry, as in Poland. In Poland liberty was assured by the equal rights of the several hundred thousand members of the gentry; in Sweden political rights and freedom were enjoyed also by the burghers, the clergy and the peasants. Although class differentiation was maintained, and the hierarchy of the social system in many respects kept intact, the nobility never became omnipotent and therefore never fell into stagnation, while the royal authority could always find support against the nobility at critical times by appealing to the other Estates. Religious unity too, had been more fully attained in Sweden than in Poland and Lithuania: there were no confessional minorities there such as the Ruthenians in Poland since the times of Casimir the Great. Protestantism in later times did not tolerate the co-existence of other faiths in Sweden, while the Poles, in spite of all, tolerated Protestants, as well as the Greek-Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Ruthenians.

DYNASTIC RULE

In reviewing those forces which led to the rise of the states here examined, it is essential to devote a few remarks to the rôle played by the various dynasties ruling the countries in question. Both Sweden and Poland were ruled successively by several dynasties, and in both countries the interdynastic crises which arose were utilized to enhance the liberty of the subject. In the case of Poland the duration of the rule of the various dynasties steadily became shorter and shorter: the Piasts reigned until 1370 with nearly a score of generations of kings and princes; the Jagellons contributed seven kings in four generations during the period 1386-1572; the Vasas accounted for three kings during two generations (1587-1668); the Wettins or Saxon kings were two in number in two generations (1696-1763). Sweden had more dynasties during her history: there was the semi-legendary Ynglinga with whom Swedish history opens; then the throne was in succession seized by the regional dynasties of Eric, Stenkil and Sverker, and finally by that of the Folkungs in 1250-1389. Then followed a hundred and fifty years of unrest during which various pretenders to the throne fought against the reigning Danish monarchs of the country until liberty had been regained and secured by the nation under the Vasas, who, together with the Wittelsbachs (related

to the Vasas on the distaff side), gave Sweden her greatest warrior-kings and organizers. The later dynasty of the Gottorps (1751-1818) and of the House of Ponte Corvo did something in their turn to consolidate the nation, and to maintain that continuity of policies which Poland had lost upon the introduction of the system of electing her kings.



CHAPTER 2

PIAST AND JAGELLON TIMES

Contacts between Poland and Sweden were set up at the time that the two nations established the beginnings of their bodies politic. Travellers, itinerant merchants and missionaries kept each nation informed, as far as possible, regarding the other. The first wars for the retention of Pomerania were conducted by Mieszko and Boleslas against the Danes and not against the Swedes, and it was with the former people that the earlier political agreements and treaties were concluded. There can be no doubt that the pressure of the two northern neighbours upon Poland would have been greater, were it not for the fact that they were continually at war with each other, as they had been since times immemorial.

Perhaps it was just for this reason that Mieszko, wishing to rid himself of Scandinavian invaders of Pomerania, married his daughter Sigrid to Eric the Victorious, King of Sweden, then a relatively weak state. It was this queen who married King Sven of Denmark upon her husband's death, and became the mother of Canute the Great, King of

England, Denmark and Norway. As a Christian she undoubtedly assisted the missionaries who were sent from Poland by St. Bruno for the difficult task of converting the Swedes. Her son, Olaf, who succeeded Eric, remained in friendly relations with the Poles, and continued the work of spreading Christianity in his realm. In later times the family contact thus established became weaker, but we know that Ryxa, a daughter of Boleslas Wrymouth, King of Poland, married two Scandinavian princes in succession — Magnus of Denmark and Sverker of Sweden, — and that Przemyslas II., Prince of Great Poland and the restorer of the Kingdom of Poland, married a Swedish princess after the death of the unfortunate Ludgarda.

But these were times when Denmark dominated and as it were overshadowed the relations of Poland with the whole Scandinavian world. It was she who forced the Pomeranian princes to swear fealty to her. It was she who, after the subjection of East (Danzig) Pomerania by the Knights of the Teutonic Order, concluded an alliance with Ladislas the Short of Poland (1315), and extended the network of her influences across the Baltic to Livonia, while the Swedes following the example of Rurik, subdued and occupied the territory of Finland, and penetrated thence into Estonia and the interior of Russia. Mutual relations and intercourse with Sweden, however, were not broken off, and communications must have been re-

tained, as is evidenced by echoes of the martyrdom of St. Stanislas having reached Sweden, the event being commemorated by the carvings upon the great baptismal font at Tryde (Gotland), executed by Pomeranian stonemasons. Moreover the cult of St. Bridget of Sweden reached Poland in the 14th century and soon became popular among the faithful.

THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN UNION

In the meantime the Germans became predominant upon the shores of the Baltic. The Teutonic Order built up its strongholds at Danzig and Malborg, whilst the Hanseatic League dominated the trade of the whole sea. Soon the trading agencies of the latter began to exploit the economic life of both the Poles and the Swedes, and threatened by this dual pressure — commercial on the part of the League and military on the part of the Order — the various peoples concerned began to devise measures of self-defence in the shape of large unions of states. Casimir the Great prepared, and Queen Jadwiga accomplished the union of Poland with Lithuania in 1385. Similarly, Waldemar IV of Denmark, who had sought for help so far afield as Cracow when the pressure of the Hanseatic League became too threatening, prepared the ground for the union of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, realized by his daughter Margaret in the Union of Kalmar (1397).

CLOSER RELATIONS IN THE 15TH CENTURY

In actual practice, the working of the Union of Kalmar failed to satisfy the expectations it had aroused amongst the Swedes. They found themselves relegated to a subordinate rôle, and in effect forced to adapt themselves to the exigencies of co-operation with alien peoples. But having monarchs in common with Denmark and Norway proved beneficial in the long run, for Sweden emerged from her isolation, established closer relations with the more distant countries and was enabled to cope successfully with the competition of the Hanseatic League. From the year 1400 efforts were made to attain an understanding between Eric of Pomerania, monarch of the united Scandinavian crowns, Jagiello, King of Poland, and Witold, Grand-Duke of Lithuania. The princes of Stettin and Stolpe, most threatened by the rapacity of the Teutonic Order, acted as the chief agents in negotiating this understanding. The Emperor Sigismund of Luxembourg, the tried ally of the Teutonic Order, did everything possible to defeat these plans by attracting Eric to his side. Fortunately for Poland however, the Swedes had been obstructed by the Order when they had attempted to occupy Reval, and for this reason it proved easier than had been expected for the proposed alliance of Eric with Jagiello and Witold to be effected in 1419. The alliance was really chiefly a Polish-Danish one,

but it incidentally caused the Swedes to gain a better knowledge of Polish-Lithuanian affairs, which was not without its uses. The alliance was to be still further strengthened by the marriage of Jagiello's daughter to the heir-apparent of the Scandinavian thrones. Perhaps Eric would have exercised his good offices, as he had been invited to do, for the appeasement of Jagiello's conflict with Witold, but by that time the Union of Kalmar had begun to betray signs of collapse, and his whole attention was diverted towards strengthening the threatened structure of the United Scandinavian Kingdom. Since 1434 the Swedes had been rising against the Union and their Danish kings. They proclaimed and crowned their own king, Charles Knudson, at Stockholm in 1448, and in an effort to consolidate Swedish independence he took up arms against Christian, King of Denmark, the founder of the House of Oldenburg.

SWEDEN AGAINST THE TEUTONIC ORDER

It was at this juncture that the natural co-operation of Poland and Sweden yielded its first example of political collaboration arising out of geographical conditions. The burghers of the towns and cities of Prussia had risen against the tyranny of the Teutonic Order and had claimed the protection of King Casimir IV of Poland. In the warfare which followed, Christian supported the Order, and Charles naturally

sided against him, supporting the free cities and Poland. The outcome of the conflict was unfortunate for the Swedish king; defeated by the Danes, he was forced to flee from Stockholm and take refuge at Danzig, where the King of Poland received him *non ut exulem sed ut sibi parem*. Polish and Danzig representations and intervention in Sweden in favour of the banished king were fruitless; Christian occupied Stockholm and reasserted his rights as monarch of the United Kingdoms of Scandinavia. Not content with this success he continued to oppose Poland, and, assuming the rôle of protector of the Sword-bearers of Livonia, a branch of the Teutonic Order, he declared war upon Casimir in the name of Sweden. The hostilities were short-lived, a truce soon putting an end to this impolitic war, while a formal peace was concluded by Sweden in 1462. Later, when the cause of Swedish secession had been revived by Sten Sture, the great national leader and hero, and Christian was heavily defeated by the Swedish forces, the Danish king planned to arrange a marriage between his niece and the eldest son of the Polish king (1472). The project however was never realized.

SIGISMUND I AND THE SWEDISH THRONE

The attainment of a Polish-Swedish understanding in the face of the German danger was not realized, but the menace of Moscovy both to Poland

and Sweden was great enough to accelerate common action. With the seizure of Novgorod by the Tsar Ivan III, the Swedes felt that, pressed between the Danes and the Moscovites, they would be too feeble without outside help. It was now the turn of the Empire to encourage the Poles, the Swedes and the Hansa in their joint opposition to Moscow's ambitions. But Denmark did not feel herself menaced by Moscow, and even entered for the first time into friendly relations with Ivan (1493). As a natural consequence the cross-currents of Baltic alliances began to assume more and more concrete shape. In 1497 the idea arose of inviting Sigismund, the future king of Poland, to assume the Swedish crown. Strange to state, the plan was proposed by von Tieffen, Grand-Master of the Teutonic Order, who believed that his friendly move would induce Poland to restore Prussia to the Order, so that the two states would be enabled to form a barrier against the barbarians of the east. But Sten Sture preferred, it would seem, Alexander, Grand-Duke of Lithuania, and entered into negotiations with him. Unfortunately these dragged out so interminably, that before a definite understanding was attained both sides suffered heavy defeats (at the hands of the Danes and the Moscovites respectively) which caused the project to be abandoned. The idea of effecting a dynastic union, however, was not finally given up. The wise and prudent bishop of Warmia (Ermeland),

Luke Watzelrode, returned time after time to the attack, persuading Alexander to renew his efforts for the Swedish throne and stressing the importance of Swedish metal-ores in the economy of the day. And in very fact it would seem that the chief natural riches of the two countries — the fertile wheat-lands of Poland and the rich iron mines of Sweden — were eminently suitable for mutual exchange, and excellently supplemented each other.

At the beginning of the reign of Sigismund I everything appeared to indicate that these natural forces of attraction would prove decisive. Common action against Moscovy was planned. The large-scale and ambitious Moscovite-German project for an attack upon the Polish Commonwealth (1512-13) was to cover the inclusion of the King of Denmark as commander-in-chief of the forces of invasion, but Sweden proper, that is to say as a nation, was excluded as a factor against Poland. If Christian II. at a later epoch counted upon Polish help in subjecting the Swedes (with Poland hand in hand with the Teutonic Order and with the Hanseatic League!), this would appear to be due to his faulty interpretation of the renewed alliance of 1419, which was directed against the Germans and not against his Swedish subjects. Polish arms could have been used with purpose then on the Dnieper, on the Lower Vistula, on the Dniester and on the Danube, but never on the

shores of Lake Mälär. Thus, when the uprising against the tyranny of Christian had grown to such dimensions that the whole Swedish nation was involved, the first thought of the champions of liberty was to apply to Poland for help, whilst there were many who again invited Sigismund to ascend the Swedish throne. But the King of Poland was not so blinded by ambition as to promise the Swedes more than he could fulfil, and Gustavus Vasa was proclaimed king of Sweden in 1523. It was this monarch who supplanted the Catholic Church in his kingdom by the Lutheran, in order thereby still further to consolidate the liberty and independence of his country (1527).

CONCORD WITH GUSTAVUS VASA

In later years Sigismund I continued his cautious policies as regards Sweden, Denmark and the Hansa. He maintained a friendly correspondence with Gustavus I, the possibilities of dynastic marriages between the Jagellons and the Vasas were discussed, he dissuaded the Swedish king from breaking off relations with the Catholic Church, and rejected, for fundamental reasons, the advice offered by his nephew, Duke Albrecht of Prussia, that he enter into closer relations with the Scandinavian protestants. Sigismund Augustus of Poland however, did not harbour such scruples, and needed, moreover, not only

Tartar but also Swedish help in preserving Lithuania against the aggression of Ivan the Terrible. But matters turned out in such a way that when the King of Poland recommended his Swedish colleague to undertake swift, common action against the Tsar, the King of Sweden proved dilatory, and explained his lack of initiative by indicating the need of considering other foes (the Hanseatic League). When, however, Gustavus was at length ready to act, it proved too late, as Sigismund had in the meantime concluded an armistice with Moscow (1556). The need for common action arose again at a later date, when Livonia submitted to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Tsar laid that province waste with most ruthless barbarity. Sigismund Augustus, upon the outbreak of the Livonian War, wedded his sister Catherine to Prince Johan of Finland, a son of King Gustavus and brother of Eric XIV., then King of Sweden. It was only when the Swedish monarch met his offer of an alliance by the most exorbitant demands and by secretly dealing with Ivan, that Sigismund was obliged to conclude a less natural alliance, with Denmark. Eric expressed his dissatisfaction at this step in very characteristic fashion: he incarcerated his brother, Prince Johan, and his Polish wife in the castle of Gripsholm. The Danish alliance proved advantageous for Poland insofar as it helped to transfer the theatre of war to Scandinavia and to detract the Swe-

dish naval forces to western waters where they were unable to help the Moscovites in tearing Livonia away from the Polish Commonwealth. Luckily revolution broke out in Sweden and the cruel and half-insane Eric was deposed (1568). His successor, Johan III, as a brother-in-law of the reigning Polish king, very willingly broke off all relations with Ivan the Terrible, the more readily as Eric had planned to deliver Catherine into the hands of the sadistic Tsar of Moscovy. Sigismund undertook to act as a peacemaker in the Danish-Swedish conflict, in the hope that in reward he would have his rights to Livonia recognized by the two sides; his plans, however, were doomed to failure, as the Congress of Stettin (1570) yielded him nothing in this respect.

NATIONAL AFFINITIES

The course of the 16th century, at a time when the two peoples were rapidly approaching a fuller comprehension of their individualities, was marked by more numerous features of affinity and similarity than difference. It is true that the Swedes had been much more successful in maintaining a sound equilibrium between the Estates than had the Poles. None the less, the nobility and gentry played a decisive and leading part in the politics of both countries. Both nations were deeply and stubbornly attached to their ancient liberties, and gave ex-

pression to these sentiments at their periodical diets. The Swedes, as the Poles, were acquainted with the institution of free elections; they recognized the mutual compact between the king and his people, and did not hesitate to refuse obedience to bad kings. In such an event the opponents of the king united their forces in confederations, just as was done in Poland. Local governmental autonomy was not unknown and was rather similar to like institutions in Poland. The Swedish Senate surpassed the Polish equivalent in efficiency, but its fundamental structure in some respects resembled the organization of the Royal Privy Council in Poland.

There were no differences between Poland and Sweden which can be compared to those separating the Polish Commonwealth, with its heritage of Latin civilization and constitutional rule, from the Byzantine-Tartar despotic absolutism of Moscovy. Territorial disputes between Poland and Sweden were not marked by such fierce strife as that evoked by German attacks upon Slavonic soil. Taking into consideration those geographical and commercial factors already mentioned, it will be easily understood that during the reigns of the last Jagellons and the first Vasas there was every reason for harmony between the two countries rather than dispute.

CHAPTER 3

WAR SEPARATES THE TWO PEOPLES

BEGINNINGS OF DISCORD

Excellent relations were still the rule between Poland and Sweden during the reign of King Stefan Batory. The allied forces defeated the Russians at Wenden in 1578, and, thanks to Stefan's victorious offensive, Johan was enabled to occupy Estonia and to gain control of Narva, the key to the commerce of the North Baltic. But it was just this collaboration that was to sow the seeds of a rivalry, which, harmful first to Poland and later to Sweden, was ultimately to prove of advantage only to Moscovy and Denmark. The Poles demanded the whole country, including not only Livonia and Courland but also Estonia, while the Swedes had since the times of Eric XIV been planning to extend their rule to cover the eastern and southern shores of the Baltic. Poland was in no vital need of Estonia and could have been content with possession of Riga with the hinterland and control of both banks of the Dwina river, thus assuring Lithuania adequate river transport to the sea. Sweden, on the other hand, sorely felt the lack of her most fertile province, then

still firmly in the grasp of Denmark, and felt that if she was to feed her population she must build up an extensive and profitable overseas trade. As a result of these considerations, Sweden was in a way impelled to follow the dictates of what may be termed a fiscal imperialism in annexing Lettish and other ports on the Baltic.

For that matter, other factors were at work evoking disputes and conflicts between the two countries. Intoxicated by their prosperity, their numerical strength and the extensive political liberties they enjoyed, the Polish gentry, all-powerful in their own country, tended rather to despise Sweden as a poor, sparsely populated land, still governed only on semi-constitutional lines, while its monarch was commented on with compassion and advised to limit himself to 'ruling his peasants'. Johan and Catherine were even refused what was due to them by the laws of inheritance and on the strength of agreements. In time the state of affairs was further aggravated by the Reformation and the partisanship which it evoked. This feature, however, need not be regarded as a serious difference and can in fact be relegated to an insignificant last place. After all, the ultra-Catholic France of the 17th century established a very successful *modus vivendi* in her relations with Sweden even after completely crushing the Protestant movement upon her own soil. In the case of Poland, however,

confessional differences played an incomparably greater rôle, in view of the irrational dynastic, and, at times, personal union between Warsaw and Stockholm.

DYNASTIC AND PERSONAL UNION

All would appear to have been in favour of an alliance being set up between the two countries — nothing would seem to support the idea of a personal union. A single monarch could neither properly guard the material interests of the two nations, nor secure their religious needs once one side had remained faithful to the Roman Catholic faith and the other had embraced the tenets of the Reformed Church of Augsburg. It was believed in Poland, however, that by electing Sigismund Vasa to the Polish throne the conflict with Sweden as regards Estonia would be settled, and that the son of a Polish princess occupying both thrones would consolidate the brotherhood of arms existing between the two nations, also, at the same time, assuring Poland supremacy over Sweden, and even bringing about the attainment of the idea of a *Dominium maris Baltici* upheld by the united forces of the two states. Such, too, was the inducement held out by the Princess Anna Jagellon after the death of King Stefan Batory, whose efforts the Swedish aristocracy whole-heartedly supported, though for very different reasons. They considered that the more time a com-

mon king would spend overseas, the more power would have to be given to the Swedish Senate during his absence. Anna's policy was furthered by Zamoyski, the great Chancellor of Poland, who, having little interest in Baltic affairs, was chiefly concerned with preventing a Habsburg from ascending the Polish throne. When the Poles elected the Swedish Crown-Prince as their king, they exacted a promise from him that he would yield up Estonia to the Polish Commonwealth. The Swedes, on the other hand, before permitting him to leave for Poland, obliged him to acknowledge that debatable territory as part of his hereditary state.

It cannot be surprising therefore, that soon after the election both sides began to have doubts as to the wisdom of the choice, and when Sigismund inherited Sweden upon the death of his father (1592), the clash in opinions and policies broke out in open and keen form. Sigismund could not secure even a modicum of tolerance for the Roman Catholic faith in Sweden although, fully under the influence of his Jesuit advisers, he made considerable efforts. Charles of Suderman, his ambitious and scheming uncle, on his part did all possible to undermine Sigismund's authority and to oppress the King's adherents. So vigorously and efficiently was this done that finally civil war broke out in Sweden (1598). Poland discreetly avoided taking part in the conflict, while the

King's own forces proved too weak to turn the scales in his favour. Sigismund was defeated and forced to flee to Poland. When his Swedish subjects deposed him from the throne and began to eject his garrisons from Finland and Estonia, he recognized the state of war existing — and ceded to Poland the already lost province of Estonia.

THE WAR FOR LIVONIA

In the struggle which ensued from 1600 Poland would have been at first decidedly at an advantage, if she could have concentrated her forces on this northern front. True it is that the superlative fighting qualities of the Poles were once again demonstrated at the battle of Kirchholm (1605), where the Swedish forces were signally defeated. Denmark was quite prepared to exert pressure on Charles of Suderman from the west. Moscovy, held by False Demetrius with the help of his Polish mercenaries, likewise could have had good reason for attacking the Swedes. But Sigismund III, in spite of all, was a loyal king of the Swedes, Goths and Wends. He was opposed to the tearing up of his inheritance, and firmly believed that with the help of the Poles he would be able to recover all that he had lost. His efforts were, however, hindered and indeed paralysed by internal dissensions and strife (Zebrzydowski's Rebellion), and still more by

the fact that Poland became embroiled in the interminable complications of Russian affairs.

Both the Polish Commonwealth and Sweden intervened by force of arms on more than one occasion, more or less sincerely playing the rôle of protectors of orphaned Moscovy, but always with the ulterior motive of recovering lost territory. For that matter both these states did in effect secure territorial gains. Poland seized Smoleńsk and the Sieversk country, whilst Sweden occupied such a strongly fortified belt of land east of Estonia that Moscovy was for a number of generations effectively cut off from the Baltic. Unfortunately too, at that time Poland likewise became embroiled in Moldavian affairs, and this threatened her with the enmity of the Turks. Sigismund III had rendered considerable services to the Habsburgs during the Thirty Years War (by permitting the guerilla companies of Lissowski's Horse to enlist on the side of the Emperor), but he was doomed to disappointment as regards his reward, as not a single foot of Silesia was ceded to him as had been expected. His opponent, however, the heroic Gustavus Adolphus, was more adroit and knew his own mind better. Before marching to aid his fellow Lutherans in Germany he seized Riga, at a time when almost all the forces of the Commonwealth were engaged in mortal combat on the southern frontier against the forces of the Crescent (Battle of Chocim,

1621). A few years later the whole of Livonia fell into the hands of the Swedes, and the fighting moved on to a fresh scene of operations — Prussia.

LOSS AND RECOVERY OF THE PRUSSIAN PORTS

Enfeebled by the prolonged struggle, Sigismund and the Poles grew weaker and weaker, while their opponents grew steadily in force and demanded greater and greater concessions. Though at the outbreak of hostilities Gustavus had been quite willing to conclude peace if only Sigismund would have recognized his sole rights to the Swedish Crown, later, when he had driven a wedge through Prussia as far as Toruń, the idea of retaining the additional Baltic ports he had occupied gained in force and attraction. The Duke of Prussia had in the meantime betrayed Poland, while Lithuania had refused her co-operation in maintaining the blockade of Sweden, and thought of nothing but of being allowed to continue her maritime trade through the Port of Riga. In spite of the help afforded by the Austrians, Poland was obliged to conclude a six-year truce at Altmark, whereby she left all the Baltic ports in Swedish hands with the exception of Danzig and Puck on the Gulf of Danzig. Even the Duke of Prussia had to receive his share of the loot, and a number of fortresses were perforce handed over to him as security. Gustavus introduced heavy customs duties

at all the Prussian ports held by him and forced Danzig to conclude with him a very onerous customs agreement (1630). Now, at length, the Poles understood how much they had lost by neglecting the defence of the sea-coast, and by differentiating so sharply between the interests of their state and those of their king. In spite of the truce Gustavus remained the bitter foe of the Poles, and during the interregnum in Poland he tried to incite all the Commonwealth's enemies, Moscovites, Hungarians, Tartars and Turks, to attack her frontiers from the east. It was only his death at the Battle of Lützen which freed Poland from her inveterate and terrible enemy.

During the reign of King Ladislas IV, the successor of Sigismund, Poland's situation became somewhat better. This able monarch took advantage of the defeats suffered by Swedish arms in Germany, and in 1635 concentrated his forces in Prussia in order to secure recognition of his hereditary rights to the crown of his forefathers, and also to regain Livonia for Poland. Backed up by an army of veteran soldiers hardened and trained in the wars with Moscow, and imbued with a feeling of prestige gained by their victories, Ladislas was a rival to be reckoned with. Foreign mediators at the Congress of Stumsdorf for the most part supported the pretensions of the Polish Commonwealth, on condition, however, that the King abandon his dynastic claim.

But the country as a whole failed to follow up this advantage. The Diet delegation refused to agree on war and contented itself with securing the liberation of the Prussian ports. Poland remained a spectator viewing the further successes of Swedish arms in Germany, having no foreboding that the utter defeat of Denmark in 1644-45 would be followed by disaster to herself.

CHARLES GUSTAVUS INVADES POLAND

In 1655, Poland found herself exhausted by the wars with Moscovy and with the Cossaks. Charles X Gustavus seized this opportunity to strike at Poland upon the pretext that the Polish King, John Casimir, was dangerous to his rule over Sweden. He quite evidently had determined to finish with Poland once for all — to destroy the Commonwealth so that it could never again prove a stumbling block to the plans he harboured. The fact that the twenty-six-year truce had not expired was no obstacle to the King of Sweden. In order to make his success the more certain and the work of destruction more complete he was careful before starting hostilities to offer parts of Poland to Moscovy, to Brandenburg and even to Austria; all that he wished to secure was the coastal belt from Courland and Samogitia, through Ducal Prussia up to Puck on the west shore of the Gulf of Danzig.

But the ease with which Charles occupied Great Poland, Warsaw, Cracow and Lithuania so intoxicated him, that he believed it possible to subject the whole Commonwealth under the guise of extending his protection over it. After the Swedish check at Czystochowa, he turned his attention to Prussia and induced the Duke Friedrich Wilhelm to join forces with him as an ally in his plans for partitioning Poland with the aid of various other states. Moscovy, however, was to be excluded since Charles had in the meantime renewed his conflict with that land in order to maintain his control of the Baltic. Charles' deep-laid plans, however, were doomed to failure. A great revival of national patriotism in Poland aroused the whole country against the invaders, while the adroit diplomacy of John Casimir gained Poland new allies and weakened Charles' position in other countries. The Poles drove the invaders out of the Commonwealth and ended the war, firmly supported by a powerful alliance with Austria, Brandenburg and Denmark. But the country was so enfeebled by the prolonged wars it had passed through, and was so menaced by Moscovy on the east, that it failed to recover Livonia by the Peace of Oliva. John Casimir renounced all claim to the inheritance of the Vasas; the middle Dwina was fixed as the Polish-Swedish frontier and in such wise Riga and its immediate district was left to Sweden.

whilst Letgalia, beyond the Dwina, remained with Poland. Free trade was guaranteed between the two countries. Religious tolerance was to be assured in full to the Protestants of Prussia, and in part to the Catholics of Livonia, the latter only being granted toleration of their public masses.

In such manner ended this sixty-year period of warring. The destruction wrought and the completeness with which the country had been laid waste were indeed terrible. Antiquities, art treasures, whole libraries and archives, even ornamentations and sculptures had been seized by the Swedish forces and sent out to their northern homeland. What could not be plundered was ruthlessly destroyed; the fires of conflagrations swept away untold riches of cultural and artistic wealth. And all in vain — in an illusionary cause — for the greatest gains were secured by the envious rivals of both Poland and Sweden. The Duke of Prussia took advantage of Swedish protection to break his bonds of allegiance to the Polish crown (Treaties of Wehlon and Bydgoszcz (Bromberg), 1657), and Moscovy acquired enough strength to break through the barrier which Gustavus Adolphus had set up to cut her from the sea.

CHAPTER 4

RUSSIA MENACES POLAND AND SWEDEN

FRANCE AS THE PEACEMAKER

France had foreseen the turn events would take and immediately after the Peace of Oliva had endeavoured to restore complete friendship between the lately warring countries. The good offices of the French were well received at the court of John Casimir and Marie Louise. The King of Poland even considered utilizing the allied Swedish forces to overcome the unruly elements in Poland and so introducing reforms by curtailing the excessive democracy of the Commonwealth, strengthening thereby the central authority of the country. It was for this very reason that the all-powerful gentry continued to regard the Swedes with suspicion and to oppose all efforts aimed at strengthening the power of the King.

John Sobieski, King of Poland (1674-96), was one of the most ardent supporters of amical relations with Sweden. With that genius which marked him as a general he fully realized the advantages which collaboration with Sweden would offer to Poland:

potent aid and support against Brandenburg and Moscovy would, he clearly saw, be gained. When therefore the Regency which arose after the death of Charles Gustavus became embroiled in an unfortunate war with Prussia and Denmark, King John Sobieski concluded a secret treaty with France (1675) and with Sweden (1677) binding Poland to aid the latter either by attacking Prussia itself or by permitting Sweden to recruit soldiers in Poland. Although this arrangement was from more than one angle advantageous to Poland and presented hopes of driving the Hohenzollerns from Prussia (present-day East-Prussia), the King's plans were not received with favour in Poland. A part of the aristocracy, headed by the powerful Pac family of Lithuania, not only refused its support but even assisted the Duke of Prussia in repulsing the Swedish attack.

From that time onwards, for a period of two decades, Polish-Swedish relations became much looser. The wounds of war and invasion were healed, the libraries and manuscripts pillaged in Poland returned from Sweden, the hero of the Relief of Vienna enjoyed a deserved popularity on the northern shores of the Baltic, but the policies of the two countries were still far from including concerted counter-action against the looming menace of Russia in the east.

THE NORTHERN WAR

Having encountered insuperable obstacles in the way of Russia's access to the warmer seas of the south owing to Turkey's still unbroken power, the Tsar Peter I. decided to break his way through to the Baltic by annexing Swedish Ingria and Estonia. Influenced by his German culture and upbringing, Peter readily found means of coming to an understanding with two other monarchs who were native Germans: these were the Saxon Augustus the Strong, who had been elected King of Poland, and the King of Denmark, of the House of Gottorp. All three were interested in weakening Sweden and in depriving her of the oversea possessions. A third German, Frederic I, King of Prussia, was only waiting an opportunity to seize Polish and Swedish Pomerania. Augustus II intended Livonia to be a hereditary possession of his dynasty in the event of Poland failing to secure this province for herself. All seemed to point to an easy success. Sweden's position was by no means brilliant, and the young king, Charles XII, although still an unknown quantity, was quite evidently lacking in experience and in the decisive strength which comes with years. Amongst the Poles, embroilment in this war aroused no enthusiasm. Some feared the despotic tendencies of the Saxon King, others saw their chief enemy in the person of the Tsar, the King's principal ally.

Provoked by an attack of the Saxon forces upon Riga, the Swedes not only defeated them but, following up their advantage, even pursued the army of Augustus into Lithuania and marched on upon Warsaw. The Polish Commonwealth could not but oppose the invasion although as a state it had nothing to do with the conflict, and when Charles high-handedly demanded that the Poles depose Augustus and elect another monarch in his place, the bulk of the nation remained loyal to its rightful ruler. The Diet of 1703 voted for war with Sweden, and its representative, Działyński, concluded an alliance with Peter the Great at Narva (1704). The supporters of the Swedes then proclaimed an interregnum, and followed up this measure by electing Stanislas Leszczyński to the throne of Poland (1704) at the express demand of Charles XII. In the name of the newly-elected monarch they concluded a treaty with Sweden (1705) which was as humiliating to the Commonwealth as it was dangerous to Polish trade. Fortunately, however, its provisions were never carried out in actual practice, as all the victories of Charles XII were powerless to consolidate his authority over the Poles. Stanislas was, as an imposed monarch, naturally viewed with the greatest suspicion by his subjects, and although the noble and exalted character of Charles little resembled that of his grasping and ruthless grandfather, Charles Gustavus, it was

assumed, not without justification, that Stanislas would have to pay for the protection he enjoyed by ceding Courland and Letgalia to Sweden. It was for these reasons that even after Augustus had been forced to abdicate there was not a single part of Poland where Stanislas' royal authority did not require the support of Swedish arms to be made effective.

RUSSIA MENACES POLAND AND SWEDEN

It was only the catastrophic outcome of the Battle of Poltava which brought the Poles and King Augustus a keen understanding of the real significance of a victory on the part of the Tsar Peter. Once Riga had fallen into the Tsar's grasp in 1710, it was lost for ever to Poland. Even Poland's continued possession of the mouth of the Vistula depended upon the good or ill will of the Tsar in permitting Prussia to seize Polish soil. Matters assumed such a tragic turn that Charles XII, forced to flee after his defeat to Turkey, was constrained to sue for the help of such countries as Turkey and Prussia, which sought their chief reward from the dismemberment of Poland. With the most unusual loyalty, and with a firmness of character which distinguished the whole man, Charles XII supported the principle of maintaining Poland's integrity, and extended his care and protection over the now banished Stanislas. Before his death, however, he appeared to be inclined to effect a compromise with

the Tsar, and for this reason his demise was greeted in Poland with a certain degree of relief.

As long as conditions in Europe were favourable, efforts were made to find support in Austria and in England against the growing encroachments of Russia in Poland, and at the same time to preserve Sweden from final ruin. But Peter the Great accomplished his plans unhindered: by the Peace of Nystadt (1721) he gained possession of Livonia, Estonia, Ingria and Carelia.

In the period which followed when the Senate and Diet in Sweden governed the country on parliamentary lines, Polish-Swedish solidarity appeared with much greater force. Both sides had now given up the idea of overseas conquest, while the Tsar was as menacing and dangerous to one side as to the other — in fact at that time Russia was already a danger to the whole of European equilibrium and stability. Both Sweden and Poland, loving and prizing liberty above all, had fallen upon evil days. The republican views harboured by the masses in Sweden caused that country to lose all significance in international politics. Corruption and bribery were rife to an even greater extent than in Poland and the other countries of Europe. For this was the epoch when, as Walpole said, every man had his price: voters, members of parliament, senators, generals, ministers and even kings only differed in regard to the amount they

demande. In Sweden, the members of the Riksdag were in the pay of France, Russia, England, Denmark, and others, and the authority and dignity of the Crown fell to an exceedingly low level.

It was with such a Sweden that Poland resumed her friendly relations in 1732 with a view to withstanding by joint action the pressure of Russian hegemony. But the Poles waited in vain for help from their northern friends during the interregnum which followed. The Swedes were delighted to hear that Stanislas Leszczyński had again been elected King of Poland, but all the practical aid they extended to the Polish Commonwealth consisted in the participation of a handful of volunteers at the defence of Danzig. Similarly during the Eastern (Russo-Turkish) War of 1735-39, when the forces of the Tsar were heavily engaged in Moldavia and in the Crimea, the Swedes hesitated too long before deciding to make common cause against Russia in alliance or in co-operation with the Turks. The later understanding attained between the opponents of Russia in Sweden and Poland yielded no positive results. The enfeeblement of Sweden was brought out into high relief by the outcome of the wars with Russia in 1741-43 and Prussia 1757-62. The situation of Poland was even more deplorable than that of Sweden at the time: the menace of partition was looming heavily over the whole country, the final tragedy was already imminent.

SWEDEN SAVED — FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND

When the ambitious and capable Catherine II of Russia ascended the throne, both Poland and Sweden were drawn into the so-called Northern System, in which Russia, ably seconded by Prussia and Denmark played a leading rôle. Under the influence of Russia, Sweden took an active part in obliging Poland to make concessions to the dissenters within the Commonwealth (1766-68), although the Catholics were still persecuted upon the northern shores of the Baltic.

Although in his youth King Gustavus III of Sweden (1771-92) regarded that enthusiast and reformer, King Stanislas Augustus, last king of Poland, with admiration and respect, nevertheless the rôles of the respective monarchs were soon to be changed. The Polish King's submissive attitude towards Russia during the Radom and Bar protests against the aggression of that country could not but be regarded by the Swedish monarch as an example to be avoided. For five long years the Poles did everything possible under their special circumstances to save their country; but in vain — the first partition took place in 1772 and Poland fell a victim to the rapacity of the three huge military powers surrounding her. Russia, Prussia and Austria effected their first dismemberment of the old Polish Commonwealth.

In Sweden, however, events assumed an unexpected turn. The young King of Sweden, financially aided by France, executed a *coup d'état* on August 19, 1772 upon the depraved and corrupt Riksdag and Senate of his realm. There are few instances of a revolution as well conceived and conducted from above as that engineered by Gustavus III. It was honestly put through, bloodless, unblemished by reprisals or petty revenge, and, most important, entirely successful in its aims, for it saved the country from the greed of its neighbours. Counter to all the plans of Russia, Prussia and Denmark, which only awaited an opportunity for annexing Sweden's outlying provinces, the power of the king was reconstructed and a wise and strong central government constituted. The plans laid for undermining and partitioning Sweden and Poland were successful only with the latter country, failing in the case of Sweden for a number of reasons. It was not solely that the heroic spirit of Gustavus so markedly outstripped Stanislas Augustus' submissive and timid nature, or that Sweden had better government than Poland. The Swedes remained neutral during the whole eastern crisis (1758-74), and it was thus that Poland and the Ottoman Empire bore the brunt of Russian and Prussian greed for territorial aggrandizement. In order to facilitate their plans Poland's eastern and western neighbours determined to exclude all chances of reform and of strengthening of

central authority in Poland by forcing upon her a system modelled after the one that Gustavus had abolished in his own country. That which Poland was obliged to follow was, however, even worse, for it was not even accompanied by any measure of parliamentary reform.

LAST ATTEMPTS TO FORM AN ALLIANCE

The last opportunity which arose for establishing political collaboration between Stockholm and Warsaw took place during the times of the Great Sejm (1788-1792). Gustavus III. had maintained contacts with the freemasons of Poland and Courland, and foreseeing that a Russo-Prussian conflict would break out upon the death of Frederic the Great, he sent Laurence Engeström in 1787 upon a secret mission to Poland. This sincere friend of the Polish nation did much to inspire the Four-Year or Great Sejm in Poland. He was not successful, however, in pressing the Poles to declare war on Russia (which was at war with Gustavus in 1788-99); but he helped in throwing off the enforced protectorate extended by Russia over Poland, encouraged the country to effect bold reforms, arranged for the last Polish diplomatic envoy to come to Stockholm and greeted the famous constitution of May 3, 1791 with the greatest enthusiasm. But Gustavus' attitude towards Poland did not coincide with that of his envoy. He harboured a grudge against

Poland, as a Saxon king had been invited to ascend the throne of that country and his own candidature had been disregarded. When therefore a fresh catastrophe overcame the Polish Commonwealth, he determined to extract advantage from the situation by acquiring more territory on the Baltic. He desired to prove himself worthy of such gain by leading a royalistic crusade against revolutionary France. His plans were, however, nipped in the bud by his premature and violent death.

CHAPTER 5

FALL OF THE POLISH COMMONWEALTH

TIES BROKEN

In the face of the dramatic events unfolding themselves in Poland — the rise of the Pro-Russian Confederation, the second Partition and the Kościuszko uprising — Sweden remained an inactive but not a disinterested onlooker. While the Regency government of Sweden adapted itself to please Russia and reaction in Europe or made overtures to Paris, a considerable portion of the nation followed the tragic course of Poland's fall with the deepest sympathy and sorrow. Kościuszko, the hero of his own country and of the United States, must have received many proofs of this, for when, freed from his St. Petersburg prison upon the death of the Tsarina Catherine, he was passing through Göteborg on his way to America, he wrote in the visitors' book of the city: *'Dieu assiste cette bonne et brave nation dans toutes ses entreprises.'*

During the whole of the 19th century the fates of Poland and Sweden found no points of contact. The age was not an easy one for the latter country:

she had to avoid entering into alliance with France in view of the near-by and potent strength of the Russian colossus; yet, in spite of this caution or perhaps because of it, she was deprived of Finland by Russia (1809). Amidst the stirring events of those troublous times a dynastic change evoked an entirely different situation. A former Napoleonic marshal of France, Jean Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, ascended the throne as Johan Charles XIV. He had been adopted by the last of the House of Holstein-Gottorp, Charles XIII, and had been recognized by the Diet as heir-apparent. He led Sweden into the anti-French coalition, allied himself with Russia in 1812 and, by gaining Norway for his country, moved the centre of gravity of Swedish international politics towards the west. Public opinion in Sweden likewise turned its face from Polish affairs, raising the catchphrase of the poet Bellman to the dignity of a political tenet: '*Hvad lan angå oss polska affaerer?*' (How the devil do Polish affairs concern us?). As regards Russia a policy of the most complete opportunism was practised, and Chancellor Engeström's injunctions in the face of these trends were but those of a voice in the wilderness. At the Congress of Vienna whatever scraps of bearable existence were secured to Poland were due only to the Russian orientation of certain of her statesmen, led by Adam Czartoryski.

SWEDISH SYMPATHY TOWARDS THE INSURRECTION OF 1830

The outbreak of a Polish Insurrectionary War against Russia in 1830 was, however, greeted with enthusiasm and understanding. Some saw in it the promise of a removal of the wrongs done to Poland by the partitions, and the checking of the menacing pressure of Russia, whilst others, influenced by Lafayette and the wide-spread lodges of the freemasons, were enthusiastic for the cause of liberty as an end in itself. But these supporters of Poland were counterbalanced by another group which condemned the uprising for fundamental, purely conservative reasons. The latter group found support for its attitude in the court of Charles XIV. and in the emissaries of the Russian legation at Stockholm, whilst it found a ready welcome in the columns of such pillars of the Press as the *Post och Inrikes Tidningen*, the *Faerneslanaet*, the *Stokholm Tidningen* and the *Svenska Minerva*. On the other hand, the newly established *Aftonbladet* and a few of the other democratically inclined journals developed an active campaign in favour of Poland. The government of Sweden closed its frontiers to Polish political *émigrés*, expelled Zaluski, the chief emissary of the Polish National Government, and forbade its citizens to arrange mass-meetings of sympathy for Poland. In spite of all these measures, many demonstrations took place in the

towns expressing sympathy for Poland's gallant fight for liberty — the great banquet given by the Liberal leader, Danielsson, at Göteborg is especially memorable. The students of Upsala and of Lund gave proof of the heartiest sympathy for Polish aims, and much was written and said in Sweden on the mutuality of interests of the two peoples, the harmony of which had in the past been unnecessarily disturbed by royal and dynastic rivalries.

This general enthusiasm found its expression in the poetry of Esaias Tegner and the works of such minor writers as Wallmark, Ridderstad, Sturzen-Becker and others, but its effect upon the official policies of the Hartmansdorf cabinet was as small as that of the mild persuasions of the Swedish prime minister upon St. Petersburg — that is to say upon the revengeful will of the Tsar Nicholas I. Although Sweden did not experience the influence of the 'Spring-time of the Nations' in 1848 so strongly and violently as the central European states, none the less it was but natural that in the epoch of Young Europe and the brotherhood of man the cause of Poland should have been popular in that country. Strong anti-Russian and pro-Polish tendencies must have reigned in Sweden at that time, since it was from Stockholm that Lord Dudley Stuart, a tried friend of the Polish cause, intended to develop his active propaganda campaign during the Crimean War. His mission was

undoubtedly connected with the action instituted by the Emperor Napoleon III and by Lord Palmerston for drawing Sweden into the war against Russia. There was no lack of reasons for an armed conflict between the two countries: Russia had been exhibiting a most disquietening appetite for the northern part of Norway in the vicinity of Varangerfjörd, and Stockholm itself was threatened from the Aland islands. But as Finland evinced no marked desire to return under the rule of Sweden, the government of King Oscar I (1844-59) saw no object or possibility of gain by warring with the oppressor of Poland. It is true that a defensive alliance was concluded with Great Britain and France in 1855, but before it could yield any positive results the Tsar Alexander accepted the peace terms of his opponents.

THE POLISH CAUSE IN SWEDEN 1863—64

The defeat of the Russian colossus for the first time in two centuries aroused hopes of retrieving what Sweden had lost, while the principles of national integrity proclaimed by Napoleon III found a ready echo in that country. In the name of 'Scandinavianism' common cause was made with the Danes against the Germans; in the name of freedom and civilization it was desired to recover Finland from Russia and to assist in building up Poland anew — in short to undo the evil consequences of Poltava. Such were

the dreams of Charles XV (1859-72), the royal idealist, who was all his life a firm friend of Poland and who knew how to imbue his brother, Oscar II, the historian and poet, with the same ideals and with the same friendly sentiments toward the Poles that he himself harboured.

The heroic struggle of the champions of Polish freedom during the Insurrection of 1863-64 and the tragedy of their failure were fully and sympathetically appraised by such leading lights of the intellectual world of Sweden as the authors August Blanche, Harald Wieselgren, Johan Gabriel Carlén, Karl Wetterloff, K. D. af Wirsén and, especially, Karl Snoilsky. The students of Upsala once again demonstrated in favour of the oppressed Poles, fiery speeches were delivered and appropriate resolutions carried in the legislative chambers, public subscriptions were organized to help the Polish cause and a number of Swedes even participated in the Polish guerilla war. For it must be stated that the Hotel Lambert had well prepared the ground in Scandinavia by moulding public feeling in support of the Polish cause. Prince Constantine Czartoryski had free access to the King at Stockholm, and the French and English governments showed energy in encouraging Stockholm to adhere to their joint representations in favour of Poland at the court of St. Petersburg.

Among the representatives of Poland at that time were, not to speak of Czartoryski and his colleague Valerian Kalinka, Ladislas Mickiewicz and the agents of the democratic party. These were headed by Łapiński and Demontowicz, both of whom had their headquarters at Malmö. These last had bought and manned an English ship containing a fully armed expedition of some few hundred volunteers to harry the Russians. The members of the crew had at their disposal five cannon, a thousand muskets and considerable stocks of ammunition, all bought in Great Britain with the funds of the insurrectionary organizations. This remarkable venture, however, was doomed to failure from the very first: the Russian authorities were warned of the expedition before it left the shores of England, while the fiery champions of Polish liberty wasted so much time in political discussions and in general procrastination that Russia was enabled to take effective counter-measures. Such strong representations were made to the Swedish government by the Russians that the cautious minister Manderström, seeing that England and France were by no means ready to resort to concrete action, considered it wiser to intern the vessel with its cargo of munitions. In spite of the great pro-Polish feeling current in the country and expressed in the writings of such as Harald Wieselgren, Adolf Hedin, A. Nyström, Sohlman and others, the ship was kept in custody and

not returned to the Poles until the struggle for freedom in Poland had collapsed, swamped in blood.

Again, as in 1831, a part of the press (*Aftonbladet* and the *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*) called for bold action, while another part damped the ardour of its readers. In 1863, however, the situation was different inasmuch as the King was this time anxious for action, and was only with difficulty restrained by the cautious persuasions of his prime minister. No exception can justly be taken to the prudent policies of Sweden. As the great powers, particularly France and Great Britain, which had encouraged the Poles to arise in arms, failed to take any concrete action to help the cause of Polish liberty, Sweden could not adopt a more forceful attitude as regards Russia in a matter which did not directly affect her interests.

OBLIVION

The cooling off in enthusiasm for idealistic principles which ensued in Europe after the Franco-Prussian War did not spare Scandinavia. Excessive trust in the brotherhood of man began to be deplored. Governments and parties concentrated their attention upon economic matters, and in Sweden profitable commercial relations with Russia and Germany played no small rôle in shaping public sentiment and opinion. The remaining Polish exiles left upon the shores of Lake Mälär after Demontowicz's death in

1876 grew fewer and fewer in number. Such patriots as the antiquary, Henry Bukowski, Pomian Haydukiewicz and others fostered in their immediate environment the last remnants of Swedish feeling and sympathy for Poland until death released them from their self-imposed task.

A certain growth in the interest felt in Poland made itself evident from the times when Finland and the Baltic provinces, so close to Sweden in tradition and culture, began in turn to experience the dire results and oppression of the Tsar's unificatory policies. The slogan of national defence, defence against the encroachment and imperialism of the East, had already many years before the Great War begun to influence opinion. Professor Harald Hjärne of Uppsala, the eminent scholar and student of East Europe, played no mean rôle in arousing Swedish national consciousness to the lessons of history and to the Russian danger. Alfred Jensen proved an able and prolific translator of Polish and South Slavonic poetry besides showing much zeal in furthering the cause of Ukraina. The historian-king, Oscar II, (1872-1907), taught much to his subjects of the joint tragedy of Charles XII and the old Polish Commonwealth.

CHAPTER 6

THE POLISH CAUSE IN SWEDEN DURING THE GREAT WAR

For all these reasons, when the Great War broke out and the masses of Poles, subjects of Russia, escaped from Germany to return to their homeland through Sweden, the people of that country were already quite well acquainted with that aspect of the Polish problem which consisted in throwing off the yoke of Russian subjection. During the course of the War Poles from various parts of their country — from the part occupied by the Russians and from those parts in the hands of the Germans and Austrians — would meet in Sweden and discuss plans of action for liberating their land from the triple oppression weighing it down. Most frequent visitors to Sweden in those days were the Polish activists whose lines of policy were primarily directed against the Tsarist regime. In this connexion, the propaganda work of Stanislas Wędkiewicz, representing the Cracow Supreme National Committee of the Poles, was very fruitful in its results, and was supported by such writers,

publicists and historians as Rudolf Kjellen, Alfred Jensen, Harald Hjärne and others.

The Swedish activists (*foesvarsaenner*) who were the adherents to the ideal of national defence, hoped that the Polish cause would be furthered by the victories of Hindenburg; the liberals and socialists, supporters of the Allies, were more apt to be objective in their judgments in this matter, but were in any case luke-warm in their sentiments. With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution the need and basis for both Polish and Swedish activism disappeared. In the face of efforts made by the Second International at Stockholm to bring about peace, the Swedish socialists adopted the attitude dictated to them by their German colleagues, namely that Poland should be restored but bereft of the Polish provinces held by Germany and Austria. The socialists of the Entente and allied countries on the other hand recognized Poland's right to complete liberty and the unification of all Polish territories in accordance with President Wilson's peace platform. For that matter, however, Scandinavia had no direct influence upon the proceedings and decisions of the Congress of Versailles.

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