






OUR ENEMY JAPAN



by
Wilfrid Fleisher



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OUR ENEMY JAPAN

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To
The Memory of
My Mother

Foreword

THIS IS THE story of the relations of the United States and Japan from the time Commodore Perry opened up the island empire to foreign intercourse down to the Japanese attack on Hawaii—the background of our war with Japan. In a short book of this character, intended to give the reader a quick and easy insight into a complex problem involving a military, political, and racial struggle, it has only been possible to cover the most important developments; events which, in themselves, might well be the subject of books—and some of them have been—obtain no more than a fleeting paragraph. But I have attempted to preserve a balance in the general picture of the underlying conditions that led up to this war.

It is also the story of our final diplomatic negotiations with Japan. After seventeen years in Japan, marked by recurrent crisis, I was privileged, as New York *Herald Tribune* correspondent at the State Department, to be in a position to observe closely developments in the critical

period that preceded this war and to be personally acquainted with all the participants in those negotiations.

The initial Japanese war effort has surprised us all. We can no longer think of recouping our position in Asia by reconquering the lost territories. We must now carry the war directly to Japan. For this we need more warships, more planes, more equipment—and we are daily acquiring them. Our enemy is extremely vulnerable, and when we shall have been given the tools, there can be no doubt of our ability to defeat Japan.

The Japanese plans have been carried out with clock-like precision. The Japanese are careful planners and organizers. They know perfectly how to meet a situation they have exactly foreseen, but let something unexpected occur, let something go wrong, and the Japanese machinery is thrown entirely out of gear, and panic replaces orderly precision. At the time of the great earthquake of 1923, which destroyed Tokyo and Yokohama, the Japanese fleet was maneuvering off Yokosuka, only a few miles out of Yokohama, but no one thought of summoning the fleet to the rescue because the earthquake had not been foreseen, and an American squadron arrived in Yokohama from Manila with relief ahead of the Japanese fleet. Some surprise move is needed to throw the Japanese war machine out of gear.

I have tried to show what sort of people we are fighting, what is the military mind that has conceived these dreams of conquest in Asia and planned them over many years, what is the strength of Japan's army and navy, and her economic position—the weakest link in her armor. I have not been concerned with the strategy of the war itself, nor

have I envisaged the kind of peace we want to follow, because our task is first to win the war.

My thanks are due to the New York *Herald Tribune* for granting me a leave of absence to write this book and for permission to reprint some excerpts of my dispatches from both Tokyo and Washington.

WILFRID FLEISHER

Washington

February 20, 1942

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CHAPTER 1

The Rise of Japan

JAPAN LAUNCHED her treacherous attack against Hawaii while her diplomats were still discussing terms of a Pacific settlement with our State Department, on December 7, 1941, exactly eighty-four years to the day since Townsend Harris, first American consul general to Japan, stood in the presence of Shogun Iyesada in the castle of Yedo—now Tokyo—and presented his letters of credence from President Franklin Pierce as the first envoy plenipotentiary from the United States to the empire of Japan.

Harris, who had taken up residence in Shimoda, one of only two ports open to American commerce, carried the American flag into Yedo and was received in audience by the Shogun on December 7, 1857, as the first diplomatic representative of a foreign government at the feudal court of Japan. It took Harris three days to cover the 180-mile distance from Shimoda to Yedo, traveling on horseback and by palanquin with a train of 350 men across a mountain range which renders Shimoda difficult of access to this day. In Yedo, he was quartered during his official stay in the "office for examination of barbarian books," near the feudal castle.

Of his audience with the Shogun, Harris has related in his journal of his mission to Japan that, while the three brothers of the Shogun, whom he calls the Tycoon, and members of the Grand Council were "prostrate on their faces," he advanced into the audience chamber, where he was announced as the "American ambassador" to within ten feet of where the Shogun sat. There he stopped, bowed, and addressed the Shogun briefly, saying he was presenting his "letters of credence" as envoy plenipotentiary of the United States.

"After a short silence the Tycoon began to jerk his head backward over his left shoulder," Harris reported, "at the

same time stamping with his right foot. This was repeated three or four times. After this he spoke audibly and in a pleasant and firm voice, what was interpreted as follows: 'Pleased with the letter sent with the ambassador from a far distant country, and likewise pleased with his discourse. Intercourse shall be continued forever.' "

Townsend Harris pushed open the doors of Japan upon which Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry had knocked loudly four years earlier when he sailed into Yedo Bay on July 8, 1853, with four ships of war—his famous black ships, as the Japanese dubbed them. He carried instructions which stipulated that his mission was to obtain protection for shipwrecked American seamen, permission for ships to coal, and the opening of several Japanese ports for commerce. The peaceful character of Perry's mission has been questioned by Japanese historians, but his instructions were that he was not to use force but was to accomplish his purpose by persuasion except in self-defense if his vessels were attacked.

On his first visit Perry remained in Japan for ten days. The American squadron, the largest naval force and comprising the first steam vessels ever seen by the Japanese, created great anxiety in a country which had been closed for centuries to foreign intercourse. Perry carried a letter from President Fillmore, which he left with high officials of the Shogun's court, promising to return later for an answer.

Perry returned, as he had promised, and entered Yedo Bay for the second time on February 13, 1854, with an enlarged squadron consisting of seven vessels, three of them steamboats, a force which caused the Japanese further apprehension. Perry landed three times, with due formality, to conduct negotiations with officials of the Shogunate. The discussions were carried on in a friendly manner, and gifts were exchanged. The American gifts included a miniature locomotive, tender, cars, and rails; books; various weapons; quantities of spirits; and other objects of great interest to the Japanese. The Japanese were eager to learn all they could from the Westerners, and visitors aboard vessels of the American squadron examined minutely the

armament, the ships' engines, and the maneuvers of the crew.

Japanese curiosity remains nowadays almost as great as it was in Perry's days, and when the American cruiser *Astoria* called at Yokohama in April 1939, bearing the ashes of the late ambassador to the United States, Hiroshi Saito, the American embassy was deluged with requests from Japanese who wanted to inspect it. On that occasion, however, no Japanese were allowed aboard, but hundreds of amateur photographers came to click their cameras on the dock in Yokohama where the American warship was anchored during a ten-day visit.

On March 31, 1854, Perry signed a treaty of peace and amity with the Tokugawa Shogunate, the first treaty Japan had ever entered into with an occidental Power. It provided for the opening of the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to American vessels and for supplying them with provisions; it assured relief for shipwrecked seamen, one of the most important points stressed by Perry in the negotiations; Americans were to be free to go about in Japan "within defined limits"; there was a most-favored-nation clause; and the United States was to be allowed to send consuls or agents to reside in Shimoda.

The signing of the treaty took place along the waterfront in Yokohama under an oak tree which, until recently, stood in the grounds of the British consulate general there.

For some years past, the signing of this first treaty has been celebrated as an annual event by the villagers of Shimoda, where Townsend Harris became the first consul general. The scale of the celebration has fluctuated with the vagaries of American-Japanese relations. There have been years when the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, or other members of the cabinet and the American ambassador have traveled to Shimoda to make a formal address, and there have been other years when the program has been carried out by only the local mayor with the children of the public school and the American school in Tokyo, which customarily sent a group to participate. There is no railway to Shimoda, and the trip had to be made either by boat from Tokyo, generally a rough over-

night journey, or by car over a winding mountain pass. For this reason it was considered off the tourist path, and few foreigners have been there. In recent years it has been included in the fortified zone, and foreigners were not welcome.

Perry, the sailor-diplomat, had paved the way, but it remained for Townsend Harris to place our relations with Japan on a sounder basis. The Japanese had reluctantly given in to Perry's demands, hoping to be able to evade their fulfillment once he had sailed away with his black ships. Harris labored with infinite patience to overcome Japan's centuries-old traditional hatred of foreigners without the advantage of the show of force which had so impressed the Japanese at the time of Perry's visits. After almost two years of persistent efforts he was finally able to agree with the Japanese on the terms of a treaty of commerce, signed on July 29, 1858, which remained in force for forty years and formed the basis of our relationship with the Asiatic island kingdom.

This second treaty opened up the port of Nagasaki to foreign intercourse; it permitted American citizens to reside at Shimoda and Hakodate; it established an exchange of coins, determined by weight; it allowed the consul to travel beyond the treaty limits in cases of special emergency, such as investigating shipwrecks; and it gave the consul the right to make direct purchases of goods for his own use without going through the intermediary of Japanese officials.

In the past ten years a number of plays have been written and staged in Japan surrounding the life of Townsend Harris and his alleged romance with Okichi, a geisha of Shimoda, who is reported to have been assigned as a maid in his house by the magistrate of Shimoda. Inasmuch as foreigners were regarded as "barbarians" and shunned, Okichi's role has been lauded by Japanese playwrights as one of patriotism and at the same time of faithful service to Harris. Okichi presumably reported all Harris' doings to the local authorities and thus inaugurated a system of spying which has continued in foreign households in Japan down to the present day.

In his own journal Harris made no reference to Okichi or to any maidservant in the employ of the American consulate at Shimoda, and it must be assumed that much of what has been written about the alleged romance belongs more to the realm of legend, which has naturally grown up about this historic episode, than to fact. One of the plays staged in Tokyo in recent years showed Okichi nursing Harris through a severe illness. Harris, according to his journal, was ill with "a very dangerous nervous fever" for several months in 1858, and it is recorded that Heusken, his "faithful secretary," who was later assassinated, "could spare no time from his devoted nursing."

In 1859 Harris was made Minister to Japan and the American legation was later established in Tsukiji, a part of Tokyo. After the great earthquake of 1923 the late Dr. Rudolph Bolling Teusler, head of St. Luke's International Hospital, was showing me over the ruins of the hospital, when we stumbled over several large stones and noticed that they bore the Great Seal of the United States, remnants of the first American legation.

The crisis precipitated by Perry's visit and the opening up of Japan to foreign intercourse began the process of disintegration of the Shogunate which led to its own downfall and to the "Restoration" of 1868, whereby the Emperor, long an exile in Kyoto, regained the powers of the throne usurped by the Tokugawas and exercised by them in his name for close to three centuries.

In a manifesto to the foreign Powers, Emperor Meiji announced that he would henceforth exercise "supreme authority" both with regard to internal and external affairs of the country and that the title of Emperor was to be substituted for that of Tycoon in the treaties.

The "Restoration" brought about a complete transformation in Japan. The feudal clans were abolished, and the country was divided instead into prefectures. A parliament was created, foreign envoys were received at court, embassies were dispatched abroad, railways were built, and the national life underwent a change in every phase, including education, religion, architecture, clothing, industry, public works, finance, business, etc. An army and

navy were created, and Japan's two-sworded warriors disappeared.

There has been much talk in Japan within recent years of a "Showa Restoration." The name of "Showa" is given to the reign of the present Emperor Hirohito, and the proponents of this movement have aimed to reverse the clock and set Japan back in the medieval framework from which Emperor Meiji lifted the nation. It has not been a question of "restoring" an emperor this time but of restoring some of the conditions which, in retrospect, have looked better to Japanese superpatriots than the foreign ways they have trod in modern history. If these same jingo leaders, who are largely responsible for plunging their country into the present suicidal war with the United States, were to have their way, they would make of all East Asia a Japanese protectorate based on a feudal system with provincial warlords owing allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, and in which intercourse with foreign nations would be rigidly controlled.

There has even been talk of a return to a Shogunate, and at the time of the military revolt in Tokyo in February 1936, it was said that the revolutionists were in favor of establishing Prince Chichibu, eldest brother of the Emperor, as Shogun. He was said to be popular among "younger officers" and to be considered by them as better fitted for the role of a feudal lord, with the Emperor relegated in the background, as in Tokugawa days. It is unlikely that Prince Chichibu himself favors such a scheme, but Premier Tojo may have ambitions to project himself in the role of Shogun.

After the "Restoration," Japan's attention quickly turned to the building up of an army and navy. Contrary to general belief, it was France, not Germany, that served as the first example in the creation of a Japanese army, and it was the French system of drill that was adopted for the training of the retainers of the old feudal clans. Conscription was enacted in 1872 but met at first with a great deal of opposition among a people to whom warring was the business of the feudal lords and their retainers.

The creation of a navy received its impetus from the

time of Perry's visit, which awakened among the Japanese a keen sense of their danger from overseas, a danger which they were in no way prepared to meet, since ship-building had been forbidden under the Shogunate.

In a period of a quarter of a century Japan built up a sufficient armed strength to engage in a successful war against China. The Sino-Japanese conflict of 1894 arose over differences concerning the administration of Korea, which was then supposedly independent but actually under the tutelage of China. As in every other war Japan has engaged in, she attacked first and did not declare war until later.

The Japanese army occupied Seoul, capital of Korea, without resistance, while a Japanese force defeated a Chinese army at Pingyang (now Heijo) in northern Korea and the Japanese fleet destroyed a Chinese fleet off the coast of Korea. By the treaty of Shimonoseki, which brought the two-year war to a close, China recognized the "independence and autonomy" of Korea, later annexed by Japan; ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula, the island of Formosa, and the Pescadores group of islands; and agreed to open new areas of China to Japanese trade.

Under the joint pressure of Russia, Germany, and France, however, Japan was compelled to renounce her claim to the Liaotung Peninsula, a sore that has rankled ever since among the Japanese and which was one of the contributory causes of the subsequent Russo-Japanese War. Japan gave up her claim in return for a war indemnity of 30,000,000 Chinese taels.

It was the same theater that led Japan into her second war—her first encounter with an occidental Power—in 1904 when Russia extended her influence over Manchuria with apparent designs on Korea. After six months of negotiations, diplomatic relations were broken off on February 5, 1904, when the Japanese gave notice that they reserved the right "to take such independent actions as they may deem necessary."

On the following day, the Japanese fleet sailed secretly from the port Sasebo and suddenly attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur at midnight on February 8.

Japan's formal declaration of war against Russia did not come until two days later and was timed to be announced on the anniversary of the Empire, which is celebrated annually on February 11. The recent Japanese attack on Hawaii followed the same pattern adopted by Japan in both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, when Japan attacked suddenly before any declaration of war, but on no previous occasion was the Japanese action as treacherous as in the present war, when the Washington "peace" negotiations were being deliberately dragged out by her envoys with the now-evident purpose of cloaking her military plans, which must have been under way fully ten days before the Japanese struck at Hawaii.

Three Japanese squadrons comprising ten destroyers took part in the night raid on Port Arthur when they torpedoed two Russian battleships and a cruiser, the most powerful units of the Russian fleet. On the next day another detachment of the Japanese fleet seriously damaged two Russian cruisers, and the Japanese landed troops in Korea and entered Seoul.

A Japanese army gained a victory over the Russians at the Yalu River, while a second army landed on the Liaotung Peninsula and captured Dalny (now Dairen), and a third army, under General Nogi, was sent to attack Port Arthur. Ultimately these three armies joined under the command of Field Marshal Oyama and decisively defeated the Russians at the battle of Liaoyang. Port Arthur fell to General Nogi, after a siege of seven months, on January 1, 1905. The crucial point of the battle centered about the capture of the so-called "203 meter hill" which gave to the Japanese command of the inner harbor of Port Arthur, in which operation they suffered upwards of 10,000 casualties. Although Nogi is regarded in Japan as one of the great heroes of the Russo-Japanese War, he is also known as the "butcher" because of the reckless manner in which he sacrificed thousands of his soldiers in the attacks on the forts of Port Arthur. This system of direct assault with wanton waste of life is one of the characteristics of Japanese attack which has continued to the present day.

Meanwhile the Russian flagship *Petropavlovsk* struck

a mine at the entrance of Port Arthur and sank with the Russian Admiral Makarov and his staff. Russian hopes then turned to the Baltic fleet of Admiral Rozhdestvenski who had left Libau with some forty ships and was making his way around the world to the Pacific shores.

The classic engagement of the Russo-Japanese War, which immediately ranked Japan as one of the foremost naval Powers, was the Battle of the Japan Sea—commonly known in Japan as the Battle of Tsushima Straits—in which Admiral Togo succeeded in annihilating the Baltic fleet of Admiral Rozhdestvenski. Togo had patiently waited for the Russian fleet in the waters between Japan and Korea, and when it sailed into Tsushima Straits on May 27, he attacked it and sank twenty vessels and captured six, while only two of the Russian warships escaped. The Japanese losses were only three torpedo boats.

In the treaty of Portsmouth, which terminated the war, Russia recognized Japan's "preponderant influence" in Korea, surrendered all rights under the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula (long a matter of dispute), surrendered the Manchurian railway from Port Arthur to Changchun (which henceforth became an instrument of Japanese exploitation of Manchuria in much the same way that it had served Russia), and gave to Japan the southern half of the island of Sakhalin.

I am perhaps the only foreign newspaperman who has ever interviewed Admiral Togo, the victor of that battle and Japan's greatest national hero. It happened in 1924, when there was considerable agitation in Japan to preserve the battleship *Mikasa*, Admiral Togo's flagship at the battle of the Japan Sea, which was destined to be scrapped in accordance with the terms of the Washington naval-disarmament treaty. I wanted to ask Admiral Togo what he himself thought about it, and so I drove out one afternoon to his home, near the Kudan shrine in Tokyo, unaccompanied by even an interpreter, believing that my chances of seeing him would be greater if I went alone.

By what appeared to the Japanese to be a miracle, Togo's house was the only dwelling in that neighborhood remaining standing and intact after the great earthquake of Sep-

tember 1, 1923. Fire raged all around it, but it escaped unharmed. Presumably the Japanese made every effort to keep the fire away from it, but inasmuch as the memories of that day are somewhat confused, Japanese have since looked upon the fact that Togo's house stood unscathed as a phenomenon.

It was indeed strange, when I visited Togo the following March, to see his house standing amid what was still a wilderness of destruction. The old admiral, then seventy-seven years of age, lived in an unpretentious foreign-style frame house. I rang the doorbell, and the admiral himself opened it, and I wedged my way in. I was an American newspaperman, I explained, who wanted to know from him whether he thought the *Mikasa*, his old flagship, should be preserved as a historical monument or should be sent to the scrap heap as stipulated by the Washington Treaty.

The admiral ushered me into what appeared to be the dining room. There was a long table with a dozen chairs around it, and he beckoned me to take a seat. He sat alongside of me. On the walls hung all sorts of trophies: animal heads, skins, and old muskets. He himself was dressed in the conventional kimono and appeared worn and bent, his thin fingers tapping on the table as he spoke.

Fortunately Togo spoke a little English, at least enough so that I could understand him. He said he would like to see his flagship preserved, but Japan would have to abide by the treaty. The first stage of the scrapping had been carried out in accordance with the terms of the Washington Treaty, and the *Mikasa* had been stripped of all her armament. The vessel had furthermore been damaged in the earthquake, he pointed out, and was then in dry-dock at Yokosuka, Japan's principal naval port.

The *Mikasa* was eventually saved from destruction and has been preserved as a museum in Yokosuka harbor. Togo was represented in Japan as having been in favor of both the Washington and London naval disarmament treaties but as having resented the manner in which the Japanese navy was overridden by the civilian government of Premier Hamaguchi in subscribing to the London Treaty. Al-

though Togo lived a hermit's life after his retirement from active service, he was said to be well abreast of world developments but extremely jealous of Japanese naval prerogatives.

Togo's death on May 30, 1934, occurred, according to Japanese calculations, exactly twenty-nine years "to the minute" after his fleet docked at Sasebo following his victory in the Battle of the Japan Sea. In his coffin were deposited a lock of his wife's hair, fingernail parings of other members of the family, and articles habitually used by him, including a writing brush, an inkstone, a tobacco pouch, a mirror, a Japanese-Chinese dictionary, his walking stick, a felt hat, and his favorite pruning shears.

All of Tokyo turned out for Togo's funeral procession. The coffin was placed on a gun carriage and escorted by bluejackets. The pallbearers who walked alongside the casket included Admiral Eisuke Yamamoto, the former commander-in-chief of the Japanese fleet, an intimate friend of Togo's. I was among two score of foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents who attended the funeral ceremony in Hibiya Park, where several hundreds of the nation's notables were gathered for their last homage to Japan's naval hero. We sat under a canopy in front of a specially erected shrine, where Togo's casket was placed, while Shinto priests, in their light blue robes, chanted to the strains of weird flute music and offered fruits and rice cakes to the spirit of the deceased.

Togo was buried in the Tama Cemetery on the outskirts of Tokyo, and a group of veteran sailors who fought under him aboard the *Mikasa* in the Battle of the Japan Sea stood guard over his grave for a week.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded at the turn of the century, and scrapped at the Washington Conference in 1922, must be accounted the main factor for Japan's participation in the first World War on the side of Great Britain and as a partner of the Allies. The Japanese themselves were not particularly interested in the European war, and Japan's choice was not dictated by sentiment, which was by no means hostile to Germany, but by practical considerations as to the effect of the outcome of the

war on Japan's future. In other words, Japanese leaders gambled on an Allied victory and won.

Dr. Hidemichi Akagi, a Japanese historian, has ascribed Japan's entry into the last European war to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as well as "to the memory of the German hand which robbed Japan of the Liaotung peninsula in 1895." Japan welcomed the opportunity to avenge the German pressure at the time of the Shimonoseki peace with China, when the tripartite intervention of Russia, Germany, and France forced Japan to abandon her claim. The Russo-Japanese War had already squared the account with Russia.

Accordingly Japan's ultimatum to Germany was framed as an "advice," in the language of the three Powers' note to Japan in 1895. The ultimatum demanded the withdrawal of German vessels from Japanese and Chinese waters and surrender of the leased territory of Kiaochow "with a view of eventual restoration of the same to China." A week's time limit was fixed, and when Germany failed to reply, Japan declared war on August 23, 1914.

The declaration of war created scant attention in Japan, where it was felt that the war was of little direct concern. I was a young boy then, and I remember accompanying my father to the German embassy to interview the counselor immediately after the declaration of war had been made. We found the big iron gates of the embassy locked, and my father handed his visiting card through the bars to a janitor. A couple of Japanese photographers rushed up to take a picture of the two foreigners calling at that historic moment.

After we had waited a few minutes in the street the janitor swung the gates open and we were conducted to the counselor's home in the compound. The Germans seemed to have anticipated the event, and packing cases were strewn about the lawn and were being rapidly nailed up. The counselor himself was unperturbed though disappointed at the turn events had taken.

Japanese forces immediately attacked Tsingtao, which was captured from the Germans—mostly volunteer fighters—after a siege of two months. At the same time Jap-

Japanese naval units took possession of the German islands of the Caroline, Marshall, and Marianas groups in the southern Pacific north of the equator, which were later formally placed under Japanese administration by a mandate of the League of Nations. Despite the League's strict prohibition, the Japanese fortified some of them and are now using them as submarine and aviation bases for Japanese operations in the present war.

In the autumn of 1918 Japan joined with the Allies in dispatching an expeditionary force to Siberia, but the Japanese contingent was so disproportionately large and Japan's reluctance to withdraw so evident that considerable anxiety was felt by the other Powers regarding Japan's intentions. The Japanese troops remained behind after the others had withdrawn, and their evacuation was not completed until after the Washington Conference.

The Japanese engaged in all kinds of machinations in Siberia by bribing Cossack bandits and stirring up trouble which caused friction with the other Allied units. I was in Siberia as a newspaper correspondent with the American Expeditionary Force throughout the winter of 1918-19, and I know from personal contact of the constant irritation which such Japanese provocation produced among the Allied commanders.

When Japan emerged from the first World War on the side of the victors she associated herself fully with all their activities. Japan was ranked as one of the Big Five at the Versailles Peace Conference; she acquired a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations and was represented on all sorts of committees, many of which had to do with such purely European affairs as the disposition of Upper Silesia, in which she had no interest but in which her vote was a trading point. She adhered to the Kellogg anti-war pact.

At the Washington Conference in 1922 Japan joined with the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy in a sweeping reduction in capital ships and airplane carriers, establishing a ratio of 5-5-3 for the United States, Britain, and Japan respectively. This was carried one step further at the London Conference in 1930, when the three

Powers agreed to an extension of the limitation to cover cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. A third naval conference, in London in 1934, ended in failure when the Japanese insisted upon naval parity, which would give them undisputed supremacy in the Orient. Following the breakdown of the conference Japan denounced the Washington naval treaty and embarked on a secret naval building program.

The Washington Conference scrapped the Ishii-Lansing agreement by which the United States in 1917 had recognized Japan's "special" position in China due to geographical propinquity; it set aside the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; and Japan joined in a Nine Power Pact pledging to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China, a pact which Japan has flouted and repeatedly violated since 1931 while her armies have trampled over the map of Asia. Japan also subscribed to a Four Power Pact, guaranteeing the status quo of insular possessions in the Pacific area.

While Japan was thus associating herself with the policies of the Allied nations she was striving to adopt their democratic ways at home. Constitutional government, which had come into being at the time of the "Restoration," existed little more than in name, and it was the aim of the liberal statesmen who then wielded power to put it into practice by gradual steps. Universal suffrage was adopted, and the franchise was increased.

Prince Saionji, the elder statesman upon whom devolved the task of advising the Emperor on the choice of a new Premier at a time of Cabinet crises, was represented as feeling that the selection should gradually become a perfunctory duty in accordance with the political trend. While he did not adhere strictly to the parliamentary procedure, as practiced in Western democracies, of recommending as Premier the head of the party enjoying the greatest numerical strength in the parliament, he followed the system of recommending the appointment of the leader of the major opposition party to the outgoing administration. By this method minority parties were not infrequently brought to power, and in cases when general elec-

tions followed a dissolution of the Diet, the minority party was invariably returned with a majority and remained in power.

But the assassination of Premier Inukai, in May 1932, put an abrupt end to all semblance of party government, and Premiers since then have been chosen solely by expediency. The Diet, which had gradually become a forum for political views, was rapidly transformed into the mere rubber stamp for governmental policies it now is.

Japan's experiment in liberalism, modeled on the Western concept, was but a brief interval in a history which the Japanese claim dates back 2,600 years, given over almost entirely to the warring of feudal clans. Sir George Sansom, the eminent British scholar and historian of Japan, wrote recently:

"Since the Restoration of 1868 there have been short phases of liberalism in internal politics in Japan, but it was liberalism of a type long obsolete in occidental countries, and events have shown that it had in it no power of growth because it was a borrowed thing, out of harmony with Japan's traditional ways of thinking."



CHAPTER 2

Back to Militarism

JAPAN STARTED on her conquest of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, which must be reckoned the most important date in Japan's modern history, not because of the Manchurian invasion itself, but because it marked the beginning of a decade during which Japan has retraced her way to a military barbarism rooted in feudal days while at the same time divorcing herself from her associations with the Western democracies which had contributed so much to her progress and advancement in the preceding sixty years.

A warrior nation has turned back to its warring ways, but the military leaders of modern Japan are playing with far greater stakes than the warlords who carried on their clan strifes in seclusion behind Japan's locked gates, and they aim to carry their conquests over a portion of the globe containing half of the world's population.

The record of the past ten years speaks for itself. The Manchurian conquest has been followed by a war with China, now in its seventh year; by the invasion of Indo-China; by Japanese threats to the Dutch East Indies and to Siberia; and by an all-out attack in a zone of operations stretching all the way from Hawaii to the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, the East Indies, and Thailand. Quite clearly Japan's aim is to dispossess the white man of his long-acquired rights in Asia and to make of it a Japanese domain.

In the same period Japan scrapped every important international commitment to which she had become a party. She quit the League of Nations, denounced the Washington naval treaty, and violated the Kellogg Pact, the Nine Power Pact, the Four Power Pact of the Pacific, and the Portsmouth treaty with Russia, which had limited the number of railway guards which Japan was to main-

tain in Manchuria. In their place she substituted the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy, forerunner of the Axis pact she later entered, which led her into the present war with the United States and the Allied democracies.

On the night of September 18, 1931, a section of the track of the South Manchuria Railway line, north of Mukden, was mysteriously blown up, an incident which led to the rapid Japanese military occupation of the whole of Manchuria. The most conflicting reports have been made of that incident, the Japanese claiming that Chinese soldiers sabotaged the railway and attacked the Japanese railway guards as a prelude to a "general assault" against Japanese forces in Manchuria, whereas the Chinese contended the Japanese had set off the explosion to gain a pretext for a conquest of Manchuria. The most reliable version is undoubtedly that of the Lytton Commission, appointed by the League of Nations, which investigated the circumstances on the ground in Manchuria. General Frank R. McCoy, who was in 1942 an investigator into the events at Pearl Harbor, was the American member of the League's commission. The Lytton report said:

Tense feeling undoubtedly existed between the Japanese and Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18-19 this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces, and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 o'clock and 10:30 o'clock on the night of September 18, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the southbound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defense.

... All the [Japanese] forces in Manchuria, and some of them in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of September 18 over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur.

I have in my possession a piece of evidence that shows clearly the Japanese move was premediated and indicat-

ing that a secret Japanese mobilization had been carried out in advance. It is nothing more than the issue of the *China Press* of September 17, 1931, published at Shanghai, which reported from Nanking—almost two days in advance of the railway explosion—that “the Japanese authorities are secretly mobilizing preparatory to moving against Manchuria in connection with the Nakamura incident.”

The Nakamura incident refers to the killing of Captain Shintaro Nakamura, a Japanese officer who was on a secret mission in northern Manchuria for the Japanese army and was traveling in the guise of an agricultural expert. The Chinese contended they shot him as a spy. There was great indignation among Japanese army officers, and the Manchurian outbreak has been ascribed, in part at least, to this affair.

From what I was able to learn in Japan, the Japanese plan for conquest of Manchuria had been carefully prepared and was put into effect by a group of so-called “junior officers” without the knowledge of the commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, Lieutenant General Shigeru Honjo, who was compelled to act. This group comprised Major General Miyake, a little-known officer then or since; Colonel Doihara, frequently referred to as Japan’s “Lawrence,” actually one of her most astute plotters and long since a lieutenant general; Colonel Itagaki, who later became a lieutenant general and Minister of War; and Colonel Ishihara. Their coup amounted virtually to an army revolt and marked the seizure of power in the army by the so-called younger-officer element.

Colonel Ishihara, then a staff officer in Manchuria, who testified before the Lytton Commission, told of receiving the report of the railway explosion on the night of September 18 and then going into conference with other Japanese officers. “By that time,” he related, “Lieutenant General Honjo, our commander, had arrived, and we expressed the opinion that all troops should be concentrated in Mukden. Quite difficult discussions continued among the officers, but a final decision was reached at 1:20 A.M.” The “quite difficult discussions” no doubt refer to the successful efforts of the younger-officer group to force General

Honjo to carry out their ideas for the big conquest.

On the morning of September 19, when vendors were rushing about the streets of Tokyo with full-page extras telling of the outbreak in Manchuria and the Japanese attack on Mukden, I hurried around to Toshio Shiratori, the Foreign Office spokesman, and was told by him that had Baron Shidehara, then Foreign Minister, known of the initial clash, he never would have permitted it to assume the proportions it did. The cabinet meeting held that day decided to localize the conflict in Manchuria as much as possible, but the cabinet's instructions, telegraphed to Japanese Consul General Hayashi in Mukden, to be passed on to General Honjo, could not be delivered because Hayashi could not get in to see Honjo.

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria was completed by the end of the year, and Henry Pu-yi, the former boy emperor of China, who was led by Colonel Doihara from his refuge in the Japanese concession in Tientsin to Changchun—renamed Hsinking by the Japanese—was established as emperor of the puppet State. All this went on in complete defiance of repeated resolutions of the League of Nations and a series of protests from Henry L. Stimson, then American Secretary of State, culminating in a note on January 7, 1932, enunciating the doctrine of non-recognition as applicable to the Japanese-created state of Manchukuo.

Japan flatly rejected the recommendations of the Lytton Commission, which envisaged an autonomous Manchuria under nominal Chinese sovereignty, and the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria as "too refined and intricate, and not adapted to the realities of the Far East" and withdrew in protest from the League of Nations.

The effect of Japanese defiance of the League and the world Powers cannot be overestimated and must be looked upon as constituting the first blow which finally wrecked the peace structure erected after the first World War. Japan's action demonstrated the League's inability to compel a major Power to accept its verdict and set an example, which Italy was quick to emulate at the time of her Ethiopian campaign and which was the forerunner of now well-

known Axis technique which was used again and again.

The Sino-Japanese hostilities in Manchuria were extended to Shanghai in January 1932, when a force of 2,500 Japanese marines launched a surprise attack on Chapoo, a populous Chinese-administered district north of the International Settlement, after the mayor of Shanghai had accepted a set of Japanese demands, contained in an ultimatum, for suppression of all anti-Japanese activities growing out of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. The Japanese dispatched a large expeditionary force to Shanghai and met with severe resistance on the part of the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army. Hostilities continued for three months, and an armistice was not actually reached until May.

Perhaps few persons in this country realize how strained American-Japanese relations became during the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The climax was reached when Stimson's non-recognition note was received in Tokyo. It was reported that the American ambassador, Cameron Forbes, then sent word to Secretary Stimson saying: "If you want to send any more notes, you had better send battleships to deliver them." I have never been able to confirm whether such a message was actually sent by Ambassador Forbes, but the story aptly illustrates the state of mind then prevailing in Japan.

With Manchuria in their possession, the Japanese quickly turned their eyes to other conquests, and the five provinces of North China—across the Great Wall from Manchuria—were the most tempting and appeared easiest at hand. But the Japanese, who prided themselves on their understanding of the Chinese mind, blundered from the very day of the initial clash at Lukoukiao on July 7, 1937, and involved themselves inextricably to an extent they had never dreamt of. They misfigured when they thought they could conquer North China without involving themselves with the Central Government; they miscalculated again when they thought Chiang Kai-shek was bluffing and would not risk a war with them; and they believed that the conflict, when it came, would be a matter of only a few months.

Japan's war with China was not solely the outcome of a prolonged controversy with the Chinese in which Japan sought to reduce North China to a puppet status similar to that of Manchukuo, but it was also the result of internal conditions in Japan. A Japanese military revolt in February 1936 brought out sharply the fact that Japan was rent with dissension and threatened with a major revolution. Prolonged and acute suffering among the oppressed farmers, from whom the bulk of the Japanese army is recruited, and the inequality of the distribution of wealth, largely concentrated in the hands of a dozen big capitalistic families, were at the root of the trouble. It was necessary for Japanese leaders to deflect public attention from conditions at home, and one of the most obvious and effective ways was to plunge the nation into war, an effort requiring a unity which seemed otherwise unachievable.

But Japanese authorities never envisaged the scale of the war into which they were leading the nation. It was to be a mopping up operation in North China, by which Japan aimed to obtain control of the five northern provinces and to establish a puppet regime and link it up with Manchukuo. There were persistent rumors that Emperor Pu-yi would be moved back to Peking to head a combined North China-Manchukuo regime.

The easy manner in which the Japanese forces disposed of Sung Che-yuan's Twenty-ninth Army within the space of a few days and took possession of Peking and Tientsin immensely increased the confidence of Japanese military authorities and led them to suppose that a conflict with the Nanking forces might not prove such a hazardous task. It emboldened them, in the three weeks' negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek that followed, to risk a conflict, although they never really believed Chiang Kai-shek would take such a risk.

Having watched closely the day-to-day developments through the month of July 1937 which led up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, I believe the Japanese did not want to become involved again at Shanghai. The Japanese naval force there was outnumbered by the Chinese in a ratio of ten to one. The Japanese navy had

again to call upon the army, and that was a terrible blow to the navy's prestige, which had not recovered from the fact that the army had to be called to save the navy at Shanghai in 1932.

But the Japanese need not have gone in at Shanghai had they accepted the British offer to create a neutral zone around the International Settlement from which both Chinese and Japanese troops would have been withdrawn, and which would have been protected by forces of Britain, France, and the United States. Before even submitting the plan to the American government, the British put it up to the Japanese, who turned it down flat.

Involved at Shanghai again, the Japanese lost their heads and their military temper. From Shanghai the cry was on to Nanking, then on to Hankow and Hsuechow, and from there the cry was even raised for a drive on to Chungking. The sterility of the Japanese victories riled the conquerors. Each time the story was the same: the Japanese became more and more deeply involved, with more territory to guard, longer lines of communications to hold, and the need for pouring more troops into China.

From the very outset there was never any enthusiasm among the Japanese people for the war in China, and as it has dragged out from a matter of months to years it has become increasingly unpopular. The Japanese have never understood why they have been fighting a war in China. They had no feeling of bitterness against the Chinese. Japanese soldiers have gone to war unquestioningly, however, to serve the Emperor, and officials have narrowed down the objective in the minds of the people to the duty of serving the nation in a time of emergency.

The following postcard from a Japanese soldier, a former servant in our household, to one of our children reveals much of the mentality of the average Japanese soldier in China. It was written in the summer of 1938, and the man subsequently died in a Hankow hospital, presumably of cholera, in November of that year. It was passed by the Japanese military censor and is translated as follows:

DEAR MASTER ERIC:

China is very dirty with many mosquitoes and flies and I cannot

ake meals comfortably. It is very hot here. On the road, in the mountains, in the fields and everywhere, there are many corpses of Chinese and the stench is very bad. Among them, many skeletons are found with iron helmets. In the rain, in the hot sunshine, we always take our meals with our uniform on, wet or dry, without time to sit down. On the front, cholera, typhoid fever and many other bad diseases prevail.

The Chinese airplanes have dropped bombs but they never scored a hit. They fly too high and look like kites. That is why their bombs did not hit.

Sincerely yours,

J. JOMA
Oyama Company
Matsuura Unit
Central China

Some months later Joma's ashes were brought back to Japan and delivered to his widow, who was employed as a maid at the German embassy.

The Japanese government has repeatedly tried to make peace with Chiang Kai-shek, more or less openly. On three occasions Japanese peace terms have been offered to Chiang Kai-shek and rejected by him, while clandestine approaches through intermediaries have been made time and time again. Ever since the Japanese succeeded in persuading Wang Ching-wei to head their puppet regime in Nanking, government leaders in Tokyo have hoped that he might prove a channel of contact with Chiang Kai-shek and might eventually entice him into the orbit of the Nanking regime and a peace with Japan.

Japanese losses in the China war have been enormous. There are no accurate figures available, the official figures from both Japanese and Chinese sources being unreliable, but according to neutral estimates Japanese casualties have exceeded a million, with at least a quarter of a million killed.

The Japanese conquest of Manchuria and conflict in China were accompanied by a complete disregard of the rights and interests and the lives and property of American and other foreign nationals. The Japanese official excuse, constantly repeated, was that the hostilities had created a state of confusion which it was impossible to control but that in due time the situation would be "normalized."

Such statements, however, were frequently qualified by assertions that the rights and interests of only parties "cooperating" with Japan's New Order would be respected.

The sinking of the American gunboat *Panay* in the Yangtze River at the time of the Japanese capture of Nanking on December 12, 1937, brought American-Japanese relations to a more acute crisis than at any time up to the outbreak of the present war. The Japanese were not then ready for war with the United States, and Japanese officials were extremely apprehensive of the outcome and were therefore quick to apologize. The *Panay* sinking was minimized in Japan, where it was represented as a "mistake" on the part of Japanese navy fliers who were out to bomb "Chinese junks and other vessels carrying fleeing Chinese soldiers [from Nanking] upstream."

President Roosevelt's message to the Emperor of Japan expressing shock and concern over the sinking of the *Panay*, was never published in any Japanese newspaper. I received it by telephone from the New York *Herald Tribune* in New York and the *Japan Advertiser*, the American newspaper of which I was managing editor, was the only one to print it.

The incident was finally settled by a formal note of apology from the Japanese government, which never dared reveal at home the extent of the apology. Two separate texts were made available, one for American newspaper correspondents to cable home and one for Japanese newspapers, from which certain passages had been erased. A comparison of both texts revealed that the passages removed concerned the recall of the commander of the flying force from China and the fact that those responsible had been "duly dealt with according to law." Omission was also made in the text published in Japan of the fact that instructions had been issued by the Japanese navy "to exercise the greatest caution in the future even at the sacrifice of a strategic advantage in attacking Chinese troops."

American protests to Japan through the years, dealing with separate incidents in which American nationals and interests were victimized, totaled over 300 by the end of 1939, when the Japanese government indicated it was pre-

ured to examine the claims. All that was ever done in this respect was for the Foreign Office to dispatch a third secretary to Shanghai allegedly to check up on certain specific instances.

From the time of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, the American government repeatedly called Japan's attention to her violations of the Nine Power Pact, which had pledged the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. The Japanese answer, invariably the same, was that conditions had changed and that the United States would have to recognize the new situation which had come about in Asia.

In a note on October 6, 1938, the American government protested Japan's violation of the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China, one of a series of protests at intervals through the years, which brought the rejoinder from the Japanese government in a note on November 18, 1938, that:

. It is the firm conviction of the Japanese government that in the face of the new situation, fast developing in East Asia, any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past neither would contribute toward the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issues.

On December 31, 1938, the American government addressed another formal note to Japan reviewing at great length the American position in support of the treaty structure but leaving the door open for treaty revision by multilateral action among all the Powers concerned, to which the Japanese government never replied. In this note the American government declared:

Fundamental principles such as the principle of equality of opportunity, which have long been regarded as inherently wise and just, which have been widely adopted and adhered to and which are general in their application are not subject to nullification by unilateral affirmation.

With regard to the implication in the Japanese Government's note that the "conditions of today and tomorrow" in the Far East call for revision of the ideas and principles of the past, this Government desires to recall to the Japanese Government its position on the subject of revision of agreements.

... This Government is well aware the situation has changed. This

Government is also well aware that many of the changes have been brought about by the action of Japan. This Government does not admit, however, that there is need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a "new order" in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority in regard thereto.

The American note wound up by indicating the willingness of the United States to "give due and ample consideration to any proposals based on justice and reasonableness which envisage the resolving of problems in a manner duly considerate of the rights and obligations of all parties concerned by processes of free negotiation and new commitment by and among all of the parties so concerned."

It was in October 1939, when Ambassador Grew returned from a leave of absence in the United States, that he delivered a speech before the America-Japan Society in Tokyo that made a profound impression upon Japanese officials. Grew said he was speaking "straight from the horse's mouth," which left no doubt that he was speaking with the blessings of the Administration. The important part of his speech, criticizing Japan's military activities in China, had been framed during his visit in Washington but he had been left to fill in whatever else he wanted to say at the time to fit in with conditions as he might find them in Japan.

Grew publicly upbraided the activities of the Japanese army in China and Japan's "New Order in Asia," which he said was just as clearly and precisely understood by the American government and people as it was in Japan and which "appeared to include, among other things, depriving Americans of their long-established rights in China."

Indicating clearly that the Japanese people were not aware of the full extent of the damage done to American interests by the Japanese forces in China, which was hidden from them by censorship, Grew said:

It is probable that many of you are not aware of the increasing extent to which the people of the United States resent the methods which the Japanese armed forces are employing in China today at what appear to be their objectives. . . . The American people have been profoundly shocked over the widespread use of bombing in China, not only on grounds of humanity but also on grounds of direct

menace to American lives and property accompanied by the loss of American life and the crippling of American citizens; they regard with growing seriousness the violation of and interference with American rights by the Japanese armed forces in China in disregard of treaties and agreements entered into by the United States and Japan and treaties and agreements entered into by several nations, including Japan.

... Not only are the American people perturbed over their being arbitrarily deprived of long-established rights, including those of equal opportunity and fair treatment, but they feel that the present end in the Far East, if continued, will be destructive of the hopes which they sincerely cherish of the development of an orderly world. American rights and interests in China are being impaired or destroyed; American nationals are being endangered and subjected to indignities.

Three months earlier, during Grew's absence in the United States, the State Department had given Japan six months' advance notice of the American intention to denounce the treaty of commerce between the United States and Japan which was to lapse on January 26, 1940. As that dread day for Japan approached, Japanese leaders became extremely nervous as to the consequences, believing that it would lead to immediate embargoes on American products essential to Japan's prosecution of her war in China and to her own existence at home. It was as an attempt to pave off this prospect that Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, then Foreign Minister (later ambassador to Washington), initiated negotiations with Ambassador Grew in an attempt to find some basis for settlement of American-Japanese differences.

Four meetings were held between Nomura and Grew, in which the American ambassador left the Japanese Foreign Minister in no uncertain mind regarding the American position in the Far East. The Japanese went no farther, however, than to make a gesture to reopen the Yangtze River to navigation below Nanking under conditions which were never specified, and the conversations ended with the presentation of an American memorandum which stressed the principle of equality of commercial rights and opportunities on a reciprocal basis as a prerequisite to any new trade agreement.

Eight months later Japan threw in her lot definitely with

the Axis, after considerable hesitation and under pressure from Germany. Since Japan's entry into the Axis pact on September 27, 1940, I have never been in any doubt that she meant to play the Axis game to the end. Japan's participation in the Axis alliance has been frequently misrepresented as the decision of Foreign Minister Yosuk Matsuoka, whereas the issue was debated at over a hundred cabinet meetings and was a collective decision of the Japanese government, reinforced by the Emperor's endorsement in a special Imperial Rescript, making it virtually impossible for Japan to back water.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka explained to me, in an interview just before I left Tokyo, that Japan had no choice but to enter the Axis pact because an agreement with the United States was impossible. "You Americans," he said "want us to withdraw our troops from China. You must know that it is impossible and that Japanese public opinion would never stand for it." Japan's refusal to withdraw her forces from China remained one of the main obstacles in the Washington discussions that preceded the present war.

Three days after her entry into the Axis pact Japan began her invasion of Indo-China, confirming the belief widely prevalent in foreign diplomatic circles in Tokyo that there was more in the pact than appeared on the surface and that Germany had given her tacit assent to the new Japanese move and was probably exerting pressure on the Vichy government to yield to a Japanese ultimatum.

This ultimatum was delivered to the French authorities in Hanoi by Major General Issaku Nishihara, head of a Japanese military mission dispatched to Indo-China for the ostensible purpose of seeing to it that no arms were sent to China over the border from the French colony, but actually to lay the groundwork for the Japanese occupation. It was timed to expire on Sunday, September 22, and the French, having no choice, since they possessed insufficient forces to resist a Japanese invasion, signed an agreement which gave Japan the right to send in 6,000 Japanese troops through the port of Haiphong to occupy certain strategic points.

General Nishihara, knowing that Lieutenant General Rikichi Ando was poised on the northern border of Indo-China with a force of 20,000 men, took the precaution to send a special messenger to him to inform him that the agreement had been signed and he was not to attack. Ando, however, took matters into his own hands and began moving in that night.

When General Nishihara heard that Ando's troops were marching in, he hurriedly dispatched a member of his staff by airplane to Langson, a border town, in an attempt to stop the advance. This officer rode out in a car with a white flag in front of the advancing Japanese forces. The soldiers, recognizing a Japanese officer, gathered around him, and he repeated General Nishihara's instructions to the local commander. The latter, however, said he was taking orders from General Ando and not from General Nishihara, and the Japanese advance continued.

The French authorities then hurriedly telegraphed to Charles Arsene-Henry, French ambassador in Tokyo, who made representations to the Foreign Office, and an imperial order was sent directly to General Ando, instructing him to halt his advance, return the seized arms to the French, and bury the French dead. This he did, and the bulk of his troops were marched across Indo-China and withdrawn through Haiphong. Some of them were sent to Hainan island, while others were withdrawn to Formosa. General Ando was brought back to Tokyo, deprived of his command, and placed on the General Staff, which was tantamount to being shelved.

This is not to indicate that Japan's advance into Indo-China was not planned, but it was planned differently, and it must be supposed that German pressure was responsible for the manner in which the Tokyo government dealt with General Ando.

Japanese troops then poured in through Haiphong and rapidly exceeded the 6,000 laid down in the agreement with Vichy. Early in 1941 Japan made a new agreement with Vichy, the terms of which have never been fully disclosed, which gave the Japanese new bases in southern Indo-China and which permitted them to increase their troops,

presumably to about 50,000 in that area. At the end of November 1941 when Secretary of State Cordell Hull was insisting upon Japan withdrawing her troops from Indo-China as a prerequisite to any Pacific settlement, the American government had information that Japan had concentrated a force of 66,000 men in northern Indo-China and 128,000 in southern Indo-China for what appeared likely to be an attack on Thailand.

Richest of all prizes in the southern Pacific and most tempting to the Japanese were the Dutch East Indies, with their immense natural resources, including oil, rubber, tin, tobacco, quinine, gold, silver, nickel, manganese, bauxite, lead, sulphur, copper, sugar, tea, and coffee. The Japanese have long had their eyes focused on the wealth of these islands and they have only been divided as to the means of gaining access to it, whether by economic penetration or by armed force.

The Dutch, however, proved stubborn in their resistance to all Japanese attempts to acquire more than a fair share of trade by whatever means they tried, and they tried them all. Successive Japanese negotiators found it impossible to break down the sturdy Dutch refusal to surrender to Japanese demands, even when backed by threats and ultimatums. Negotiations were finally abandoned in the summer of 1941 when the last Japanese envoy, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, now Japanese ambassador to Indo-China, withdrew in anger.

Japanese plans now were focused on the Dutch East Indies, from which they hope to obtain the raw materials which they lack for the prosecution of a long war.

Japan's plans of conquest in Asia in the past decade have given us good reason to wonder whether the so-called Tanaka memorial, said to have been presented to Emperor Hirohito by the late Premier Baron Tanaka on July 25, 1927, is not being followed out. This memorial, which has been called a forgery by the Japanese, envisaged the seizure of Manchuria, to be followed by the conquest of China, which would lead to the automatic surrender of the remainder of the Asiatic countries to Japan out of fear. To complete it Japan would have to "crush the United

States." The events of the past ten years in the Far East would seem to indicate that if General Tanaka himself did not write such a memorial, someone else had a remarkably prophetic vision.

CHAPTER 3

Ties with Germany

JAPAN'S TIES with Germany have been forged ever closer in the past several years since Japan suddenly entered into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, thereby turning her back on her old associations with the Western democracies which had led her to a recognized position as a world Power. The Japanese had no particular liking for the Germans, but Japanese military leaders were impressed by Germany's growing military might, which opened up to them visions of conquest on an unprecedented scale.

The Anti-Comintern Pact came like a thunderbolt to the Japanese people as to the other Powers. On the morning of November 11, 1936, I came across a small item in the newspaper *Asahi*, Japan's leading daily, which said merely that the Japanese government had decided "to submit to the Privy Council an important diplomatic matter which will probably be revealed within this year." The Privy Council in Japan is the highest advisory body to the Emperor, but in diplomatic matters it is concerned mainly with the ratification of treaties with foreign Powers.

That item at once set me speculating, as on so many other occasions in Japan where the public has been kept in the dark, as to what it meant. It seemed to indicate that Japan was about to enter into treaty with a foreign Power, but nothing was known to that effect. Before evening, however, I had found out that the projected pact was with Germany, that Colonel Eugen Ott, then German military attaché (now General Ott, ambassador to Japan), had brought it back from Berlin two weeks earlier, and that German Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen, who had returned from attending the Nuremberg Nazi party congress only a few days earlier, was scheduled to meet Premier Koki Hirota the next morning to discuss "the whole scope of German-Japanese relations." I also learned that the

pact being discussed was directed against the Soviet Union.

That evening I wrote out two dispatches telling of the newly projected alliance between Japan and Germany. I drove to the central telegraph office and filed them myself at eleven o'clock that night, but I figured that since the Japanese newspapers were apparently aware of the pact but under a ban not to reveal it, there was a likelihood that cables destined abroad would also be banned and would not pass the censorship, and so I stopped by a branch telegraph office on the way home and sent a private cable to Grafton Wilcox, then managing editor of the New York *Herald Tribune*, addressing it to 230 West 41 Street, the address of the newspaper, but without mentioning it by name, asking him if he had received two messages, and I paid for the cable.

At seven o'clock the next morning, November 12, I received a brief cable from Wilcox saying: "Nothing received." I had expected it, and I then immediately put in a telephone call for Wilcox in New York, giving the *Herald Tribune's* telephone number but again without mentioning the name of the newspaper so as not to arouse the suspicion of the Japanese authorities. The New York-Tokyo telephone circuit, then newly in operation, was open from six o'clock in the morning to three o'clock in the afternoon Tokyo time.

I waited for hours and received repeated reports from the international operator that the weather conditions were not satisfactory and it was impossible to make the connection. I cursed myself over and over again for having tried to cable the story the night before, thereby letting the Japanese authorities know that I knew about the pact, and I felt sure I never would get the call through. Then at one-twenty o'clock Tokyo time (eleven-twenty o'clock New York time on the preceding night of November 11) I suddenly got the connection and read the story to Wilcox.

At the time I did not know that Wilcox had gone home to bed and that he was speaking to me from his bedside. I later learned that when the call was put through to him he had no paper at hand but grabbed a pencil and the New York telephone directory and scribbled the story

BIBLIOTEKA

Wydział Szkoły Politycznej - Wych.

down on the pages of the telephone book. The story was related in the December issue of *Copy*, issued monthly by the New York *Herald Tribune* to members of its staff. The account follows:

On the night of Armistice Day, Wilfrid Fleisher, *Herald Tribune* staff man in Tokyo, picked up his telephone and called Grafton Wilcox—managing editor of this newspaper.

It was 11 o'clock in New York.

Wilcox, having tucked his first edition to bed, went home to tuck himself to bed. The San Francisco operator who received Fleisher's transpacific call hung on until she found her man.

Wilcox, picking up the call at his bedside, grabbed for a pad and got—the telephone book. The phone book did very nicely until paper reinforcements arrived.

The news from Tokyo, a clean world beat, made the City [second] edition.

Other messages in other times have been recorded on fly leaves. Possibly no message of greater international import has reached the world via the telephone book. News of the Berlin-Tokyo alliance, a *Herald Tribune* exclusive, preceded the actual treaty-signing by eleven days.

When he heard of it, Wilbur Forrest, executive assistant to the paper's president, cracked: "Why didn't you turn back the bedclothes and write on the sheets?"

Soon the foreign reactions to the story began coming in from the various world capitals—from Berlin, Moscow, London, and Washington. The newspaper *Yomiuri*, which received the International News Service, resold it to the *Japan Advertiser* and supplied us with the original cables after Japanese translations had been made. The editor of the *Yomiuri* sent us over a batch of these cables with a sketch of a skull and crossbones and the penciled warning: "Don't get suppressed." Neither the *Yomiuri* nor we were able to print these dispatches at the time.

Negotiations leading up to the Anti-Comintern Pact originated in Tokyo in the spring of 1936 among a group of officers of the Japanese General Staff of the rank of colonel and German and Polish diplomats in Tokyo. I have been reliably informed by a diplomat who was a participant in these early talks that the idea of such an alliance was first conceived by Colonel Masaka Yamawaki of the Japanese General Staff, who was later promoted to major general and became Vice-Minister of War in 1939.

This fact is not generally known in Japan, and General Yamawaiki has never figured prominently in national or international affairs, but his influence has been exerted from behind the scenes, as is so frequently the case with the more powerful elements in Japan.

The Poles never favored the idea much, feeling that their security lay in maintaining a balance between Germany and the Soviet Union without committing themselves to side with either, and they gradually dropped out of the talks. When the idea met with favor in Berlin the negotiations were transferred there, and Colonel Ott was recalled to the German capital in the summer of 1936 to take part in them. The negotiators were Von Ribbentrop, who later returned to Berlin from his post as ambassador to London to sign the pact, and Ott on the German side, and Lieutenant General Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, and Toshio Shiratori, then Japanese minister to Sweden, who made frequent trips to Berlin to join in the discussions.

Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji, Japanese ambassador to Germany, is understood to have had no part in the negotiations and to have played no other role than to affix his signature when the pact was formally concluded and had been approved by the Japanese government. There is reason to believe too that the Japanese government had little knowledge of what was going on and that the Japanese army first placed it before Premier Hirota after Colonel Ott had brought the text from Berlin.

The essence of the Anti-Comintern Pact, as published, was contained in the first paragraph by which the two signatories undertook "to keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Communist International, and to confer upon the necessary measure of defense" and carry out these measures in close co-operation. To repeated inquiries as to how the two countries, at opposite ends of the globe, could co-operate to eradicate Communism in their respective countries, Japanese officials were never able to offer any explanation.

While both the Germans and the Japanese repeatedly denied there were any secret clauses to the pact, there was

a widespread belief in Japan that there was a secret understanding for exchange of military information and for talks on military matters of concern to both countries. In the case of Japan that meant principally that the Japanese would consult the Germans regarding their war in Asia, and from the German side that the Germans would examine what use Japan might have for them in the event of another World War.

That the Japanese public generally interpreted the Anti-Comintern Pact as a military alliance directed against Russia was evident from the very day the pact was announced, when Japanese newspapers published extras with full-page photographs showing Germany's military might, although the newspapers were prohibited from making any allusion to alleged secret military clauses.

The pact was so unpopular when Toshio Shiratori, one of its co-authors, returned to Japan from his post as minister to Sweden at the close of 1936 that relatives and friends of his sent word to Kobe, where he landed, advising him to refrain from giving any interviews or making any statements about the pact which they felt would prove harmful to his career.

Shiratori told me himself, after his return from Sweden, that the pact had purposely been worded vaguely so that it might serve as a frame for any kind of picture which might later be drawn in. He said that this was the strength of the pact, as it afforded a very loose and wide opportunity for its implementation. When I asked Shiratori what his role had been in the negotiations, he likened it to a legend, often told in Japan, that Chinese soldiers in the second line of battle are used to fire on the front line when they are tempted to retreat. Shiratori said his part had been that of "a second-line Chinese soldier."

Japan's entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact provided the Germans with a wedge to exert their influence on the Japanese press with a view to molding Japanese public opinion. In 1938 the Germans sent a press attaché, Frederick de la Trobe, to Tokyo, and one of his principal duties was to go over the local newspapers and to bring to the attention of the Foreign Office items which the Germans

considered "incompatible with the spirit of the anti-Comintern alliance." I have seen a score of notes written to the Foreign Office by Press Attaché de la Trobe complaining about the policy and news items appearing in the *Japan Advertiser*. At first officials at the Foreign Office used to call me there and show me the notes, but they gave this practice up when they found that we paid no attention. Instead they sent me batches of clippings underscored in red pencil by the German embassy, but with no more effect than before, and as a last resort the Foreign Office would tell the embassy to contact us directly if they had any complaints to make, which the Germans never did, probably fearing to involve the American embassy.

At the end of 1938 the German embassy published a small newspaper of its own with radio dispatches from Berlin. It was called the *Deutsche Nachrichten* and was a four-page bulletin of tabloid size. The name of the editor was given as W. Zederbohm, but it was well known that it was assembled under the direction of Press Attaché de la Trobe, who had been Hitler's chief of propagandea in Vienna before the German annexation of Austria.

At first it was distributed free to all Nazi Germans, members of German associations, which were numerous, and foreign diplomatic missions believed to be in sympathy with the Nazis. It attacked the United States daily, and such headlines as these appeared: "Roosevelt Peace Enemy Number One"; "America under Bolshevik Influence"; "Swiss Press Condemns Roosevelt"; "Americans Protest against Roosevelt Policy"; and, in its issue of February 6, 1939, the headline, "Roosevelt Lies," referring to the President's denial that America's frontier was in France. The newspaper was made up largely of press comment from German and Italian newspapers.

Short-wave radio sets were prohibited to the public in Japan, but foreign embassies and legations were allowed to have them on condition that the news picked up was not distributed or sold. What other diplomats wanted to know was by what privilege the German embassy was able to pick up Berlin radio news, which was said to be recorded automatically on a ticker tape in the German embassy,

and publish it. We at the *Advertiser* also wanted to know, and I called at the Foreign Office to inquire how this was possible. I was told by an official of the Information Bureau that they had no knowledge of the matter but would investigate it, and to my astonishment a week later the paper announced its suspension because of "lack of funds," expressing the hope it might be able to resume at some later time.

The Anti-Comintern Pact seemed likely to become a dead letter when the outbreak of war with China in the summer of 1937 changed the whole complex of the Far Eastern situation. Japan, finding herself condemned by the big democratic powers as an aggressor and treaty-breaker, turned to her partners of the Axis. Italy had joined the combination on the first anniversary of the pact. The Japanese people were told that the Comintern was behind the enemy Chiang Kai-shek and was indirectly fighting Japan. Germany and Italy were represented as Japan's friends, and in the same breath Great Britain and the United States were depicted as obstacles to Japan's ambitions and destiny in Asia.

But if it suited the Japanese to lean on the pact in the early days of the China war, it became a more valuable instrument for the Axis powers as the situation in Europe worsened and war became more imminent. The situation was then reversed, and the Japanese were being urged by both Germany and Italy to enter into a military alliance throughout the winter and spring of 1939. Over a hundred meetings of the cabinet of Premier Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma debated the question as to whether or not Japan should commit herself to a military alliance, with the decision being finally reached that Japan would stay out "for the time being." Lieutenant General Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese ambassador to Berlin, and Toshio Shiratori, ambassador to Rome, had been so insistently urging the alliance on their government that it became necessary for the Hiranuma cabinet to dispatch a secret mission to the Axis capitals, comprising Dr. Nobufumi Ito, ambassador at large, Rear Admiral Abe, of the Navy General Staff, and Colonel Tatsumi, of the Army General Staff, to hold

down the enthusiasm and strong insistence of the envoys.

When Germany and Italy cemented their relationship by a military alliance, signed in Berlin in May 1939, the Japanese, who had been pressed to join in the alliance at the same time, remained aloof. Oshima and Shiratori are understood to have been so reluctant to communicate the decision to Hitler and Mussolini that they simply stayed away. Hitler was reported to have been so angered that he threatened to denounce the Anti-Comintern Pact. It seems certain that Hitler told the Japanese at the time that if they did not play ball they would be left in the lurch.

The Japanese, however, did not expect Hitler to make such a *volte-face* and to embrace the Russians in a non-aggression pact. The shock was so great that the Hiranuma cabinet was immediately overthrown and both Oshima and Shiratori were recalled. Swastika flags quickly disappeared from the streets and shop windows of Tokyo, and the Anti-Comintern alliance seemed about to pass into the discard.

Oshima, recalled from Berlin, was a passenger on the steamer *Tatsuta Maru* from San Francisco, late in October 1939, on which I happened to be returning to Japan from a short leave of absence. We had long talks, and Oshima thought that Germany would have to win by a "lightning stroke" against England or the war would be a long-drawn-out one over years, with a compromise peace in the end. Faced with the failure of his efforts in Germany, he had his eyes turned on the possibility of a *rapprochement* with the United States, but his brief stay in America had given him no encouragement in this respect, and our talks seemed only to emphasize the wide gap between our viewpoints.

Thus German-Japanese relations drifted apart until the Nazi conquest of Norway and the invasion of the Low Countries and the collapse of France fired the imagination of Japanese militarists. Shiratori and Oshima, who had predicted great things for the Axis powers, were vindicated, and there developed an increasing movement in Japan for reviving the ties with Germany and giving greater substance to the Anti-Comintern Pact by supple-

menting it with the long-contemplated military alliance. Oshima was later sent back to Berlin as ambassador.

The movement gained rapidly with new German military successes and the growing belief in Japan in the summer of 1940 that Germany was going to win the war and that England was doomed. The agitation virtually attained the proportions of a revolution, and the downfall of the Yonai cabinet in July and its replacement by the Konoye cabinet was in effect the culmination of this upheaval. The pro-Axis group came to power.

Premier Konoye's picture had long figured on postcards along with those of Hitler and Mussolini, and he had been looked to as the coming leader of a fascist Japan, but he himself did not want to commit the nation outright to an Axis alliance. The pressure of the military, however, brought to bear through General Tojo, then War Minister, was overwhelming, and Konoye was carried along with the stream. He gave way gradually in his characteristic manner of fitting himself to the trend of events and the will of the personalities who surround him.

Japan's final decision to enter the tripartite Axis Pact with Germany and Italy was reached at an Imperial Conference held in Tokyo on September 19, 1940. Imperial Conferences had been generally called merely to confirm decisions previously reached and to give them the appearance of national unanimity, but the prolonged session on that occasion indicated that no prior agreement had been reached. It was said that the Emperor was personally bitterly opposed to the pact, as were also some of the navy men, but that the army's pressure was so great that it proved irresistible. The Emperor was even prevailed upon to issue an Imperial Rescript expressing his satisfaction over the conclusion of the pact.

A Japanese official who was attending a wedding at the British embassy on September 20, the day following the Imperial Conference, whose decision was kept a strict secret until Japan actually entered the Axis Pact on September 27, was dumfounded when Lady Craigie, wife of the British ambassador, approached him and asked "Why did you do it?"

"Do what?" answered the nonplused official.

"Join the Axis," she said.

That the wife of the British ambassador should be acquainted with Japan's greatest state secret twenty-four hours after the event completely baffled him.

Foreign correspondents had known for some days previously that Japan was about to join the Axis, but it was not until the morning of September 27 that I heard that the pact would be signed within the day. Correspondents were summoned to an emergency press conference at ten o'clock that night.

Arriving at the Japanese Foreign Office, I found the compound jammed with cars and motorcycles. Japanese newspapermen were rushing about, and the glare of flash-lights exploded at every turn. American and British newspapermen were rushed into a waiting room by themselves, while Yakichiro Suma, the Foreign Office spokesman, first held a press conference with Japanese newspapermen, and German and Italian correspondents were celebrating the event in the offices of Japanese officials to the loud clank of beer bottles and hoarse shouts and toasts to the Axis. The Japanese radio was already blaring out its announcement to the unsuspecting Japanese public, which had had no inkling of the momentous decision to which they were being committed.

At ten-thirty o'clock Suma sent for us. As had been customary ever since the outbreak of the European war, the half-dozen American and British correspondents took their seats at a long table to the right of the spokesman, while the German and Italian newspapermen, some thirty in number, crowded in on the left. German newspapermen had come to Japan in increasing numbers along with German traders and tourists.

Four heaps of documents were piled high on Suma's desk, and he began distributing them. They included a "summary of the Three-Power Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy," an Imperial Rescript, and statements respectively of Premier Fumimaro Konoye and Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. I glanced through the pact rapidly and came to the immediate realization that here

was a document of far-reaching importance. I had expected a tripartite military alliance, but I did not anticipate, nor did any of the other American and British newspapermen present, that it would be aimed so plainly against America and that it might have such a vital bearing on the future in the Far East. It seemed to me the biggest news story I had ever covered in twenty-four years of newspaper experience in many different parts of the world.

Correspondents noted immediately that not only was the text of the pact handed to them labeled a "summary," but it also bore the legend in the upper left-hand corner "tentative translation." One of the correspondents asked Suma if that was all of it, and he replied that all the essential points had been covered. An American correspondent wanted to know whether it was aimed against the United States, and Suma said: "We are not changing our policy toward the United States. We have not abandoned hope for adjusting our relations." That was the first of many interpretative statements made by Japanese statesmen.

Questioned as to whether the pact meant abandonment of Japan's so-called "non-involvement" policy adopted at the time of the outbreak of the European war, Suma maintained that Japan still adhered to that policy. "We are not going to participate in war at this moment," he said.

When Heinrich Stahmer, Hitler's special envoy, came to Japan to negotiate the Axis alliance, this ban was issued by the Japanese Foreign Office. It was dated September 3, 1940:

Nothing is to be mentioned of the coming to Japan, presence here or movements of Heinrich Stahmer, a German Minister, who will be here at the German Embassy on a certain mission.

Stahmer's presence was kept a secret until after the signing of the pact, when he was introduced to a gathering of officials, celebrating the conclusion of the pact, by German Ambassador Eugen Ott, who said. "Let me introduce to you Dr. Stahmer, who has come here as Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop's proxy and who has contributed so much through the past years toward the three-powers' present accomplishment."

Stahmer had brought assurances with him from the

Kremlin that the Russians would remain neutral in the event of Japan becoming involved in a major war in the Pacific, meaning a war with the United States. Stahmer had made an earlier visit to Japan in April 1940 as a member of the suite of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who brought congratulations to the Emperor on the occasion of the 2,600th anniversary of the Japanese Empire. He is now Hitler's ambassador to the Japanese puppet government at Nanking and must be accounted one of Germany's key men in driving Japan to war with the United States.

The most important point of the Axis pact was contained in Article 3, by which Germany, Italy, and Japan undertook "to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present [September 27, 1940] not involved in the European war or the Sino-Japanese conflict."

It was widely supposed at the time that the pact would work rather as an instrument to bring Japan into war with Germany and Italy than the other way around, as it finally turned out, for it was evident that neither Germany nor Italy was in a position to give Japan any effective assistance, and their declarations of war against the United States must be looked upon as intended largely to bolster Japanese morale and as a reward for Japan's role in Asia in doing her share to divert attention from the European center of war.

It was evident from the time the Axis pact was concluded that the signatories intended it to be applicable against the United States and that they never seriously envisaged its application in Europe. It might as well have stated that the signatories would assist one another if the United States attacked any one of them, had it not been that the American government might then have considered it a declaration of war; so the United States was described as "a power at present not involved in the European war or the Sino-Japanese conflict," and Russia was specifically exempted from the application of the pact under Article 5, by which the signatories affirmed that the terms "do not

in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia."

In declaring war against the United States, Germany disclosed that the three Axis Powers had entered into a new pact on December 11, 1941, not to make a separate peace "except in complete mutual agreement." They pledged themselves also to establish "after victory" a new world order, the character of which has been amply demonstrated in the countries of Europe conquered by Germany and in Japan's attempts at domination in Asia.

In March 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka made a trip to Berlin by way of Moscow to gauge to what extent Japan might further commit herself to Hitler's schemes. Wherever he went he seemed to bring ill omen to his Axis allies. His visit to Berlin coincided with a revolution in Yugoslavia which repudiated the Axis tie-up with Germany, while his stay in Rome came at a time when the Fascist armies were forced back by the Greeks into Albania.

Matsuoka, who had been an ardent admirer of the totalitarian examples of Germany and Italy from afar, cannot have failed to be impressed by the adverse circumstances of the moment, which must account, in part at least, for his refusal to yield to Hitler's insistence that Japan immediately take an active part in the war. Colonel Yatsuji Nagai, a member of Matsuoka's party, is reported to have said that Hitler was so angered that "he did not seem to know who he was talking to."

Germany had assured Japan when she entered the Axis pact that Russia would remain neutral in the event of a Pacific war, and Matsuoka wanted this pledge implemented directly by the Russians. When Matsuoka stopped off in Moscow on his way back from Berlin, it seems likely that Stalin had an uncannily shrewd idea of events to come which made a Neutrality Pact with Japan much more valuable to Russia than was generally realized at the time. When the Russo-German war broke out in June, the Japanese were taken entirely by surprise, and it was not long before Matsuoka was forced out of office. It was Japan's second letdown by Hitler, who had allied himself

with Stalin when Germany and Japan were partners in a pact aimed against Russia, and who now went to war against the Soviet Union when Japan was newly bound to maintain neutrality in such a war.

The Anti-Comintern Pact pushed ajar the doors of Japan to the German "fifth-column" invasion, while the Axis pact flung them wide open. It is now estimated that there are upwards of 3,000 German agents in Japan in the guise of businessmen, technicians, advisers, teachers, and tourists, instructing the Japanese in the Nazi ways both economically and politically at home, and advising them militarily in their war plans.

After the signing of the Axis pact, foreign diplomats of the democratic Powers in Tokyo jested that soon they would be going to the German embassy to transact their official business rather than to the Japanese Foreign Office, so great was the influence which the German Ambassador General Eugen Ott and his staff had come to exercise in high Japanese quarters. German embassy cars, with the swastika flag on the hood of the motor, were always parked in the Foreign Office compound, indicating the presence of German embassy officials, while it was generally known that there were Germans employed in the important Home Ministry, which has jurisdiction over the police and censorship, and in the Metropolitan Police Board.

But of greatest importance has been the increasing number of German military advisers who have gone to Japan to instruct the Japanese in the latest Nazi methods of warfare. They are said to be working in both the War and Navy Departments in Tokyo and to have found their way into munitions factories, while German fliers have been teaching Japanese aviators dive bombing and parachuting, and German gunnery crews are reported to be serving aboard some of the Japanese warships.

The technique of dive bombing is certainly entirely new to the Japanese. Three years ago the Japanese Navy Department invited the American naval attaché in Tokyo and his aide, a flying officer, to witness a so-called "dive-bombing" exhibition at an air base near Nagasaki. Japanese planes circled the field a number of times and dipped

slightly at a certain point in an incline of about 25 degrees. When the American naval attaché commented that the flying was very fine and asked when the dive bombing was to begin, the Japanese answered that he had already seen it. It is not possible, of course, to say to what extent the Japanese intended to deceive the American officials, but the Japanese had done nothing during the whole course of the Chinese war to lead any observer to believe that they knew anything about either dive bombing or parachuting or that their bombing aim was anything but negligible.

Residents who left Japan only a few weeks before the present war report that the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo was filled with German travelers and had assumed the appearance of a "fifth-column" headquarters. In addition to the large number of Germans resident in Japan, over 2,000 "businessmen and tourists" are reported to have gone in and out of the country in the three months preceding the war.

Ambassador Ott, who directs the German "fifth column," first came to Japan eight years ago as military attaché with the rank of colonel, after the Hitler purge in which Captain Ernst Roehm, one of Hitler's inner circle, and General Kurt von Schleicher were shot. Ott had been an aide to Von Schleicher, and it was said among other diplomats in Tokyo that his attachment to the Nazi cause was more a matter of expediency than of personal choice. But if his allegiance to Hitler's doctrines was in doubt in those days, he made up for it amply by his extremely active role in the direction of all Nazi activities in Japan in recent years.

Ott is the typical German officer type—tall, stiff, unbending, with steel blue eyes and thinning blond hair. He is equally formal in uniform or in the striped trousers and cutaway of the diplomat. He took an unusually keen interest in the Japanese military revolt of February 1936, which he watched with spy glasses from the compound of the German embassy in Tokyo, which was in the midst of the fray.

I remember last seeing Ott in the summer of 1940, in

the main street of Karuizawa, a mountain resort, striding through the village lifting his right arm in repeated Nazi salutes as he met with scores of other Germans gathered there for a Far Eastern meeting of leaders of Nazi activities. His wife, an unusually tall woman, towered beside him and dragged a couple of police dogs on a leash. At times the Otts would race through the village streets in their car without any regard for speed limits or the safety of pedestrians, seemingly relying on the Nazi flag for immunity.

Those of us who have watched at first hand the slow-motion tactics of the Japanese in their military conquests in Asia over the past ten years cannot but believe that the all-out attack against the United States by Japan on December 7, 1941, was a plan worked out in close cooperation with the Germans, if not actually framed by them. It was the "blitzkrieg" technique, made familiar by the all-out German attack against the Low Countries and France in the spring of 1940, and which so aroused the admiration of Japanese military leaders. It had all the earmarks of a grand strategy worked out on a world-wide pattern of Axis collaboration.

CHAPTER 4

Japanese Leaders

THE EMPEROR of Japan is a tool of the military clique which today rules and controls the nation. By a gradual process, over the past ten years, Japanese military leaders have succeeded in surrounding the Emperor with their satellites and compelling him to do their bidding, supposedly against his will, insofar as anything is actually known of his own ideas on the outside. The Emperor, a figurehead, has been powerless to resist the pressure brought to bear upon him and the changed circumstances revolving about him.

To put it bluntly, the Emperor has been "kidnaped" by Japan's militarists, who have gradually blocked every avenue by which he could himself make his will prevail. One of the first and most important steps taken by the Japanese army and navy after the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was to appoint imperial princes to the posts of Chief of the Army General Staff and Chief of the Navy General Staff, respectively, so that they might have readier access to the Emperor. The constitution has been interpreted by Japanese military and naval leaders as giving them direct access to the throne in matters coming under their jurisdiction, but this has been a moot point, and it was felt that there could be no question if imperial princes held the key posts, since they would automatically be entitled to approach the Emperor directly at any time.

Prince Kanin, who was then made Chief of the Army General Staff, and Prince Fushimi, Chief of the Navy General Staff, were themselves mere instruments in the hands of the army and navy and convenient pawns to do the bidding of the military leaders. There were numerous occasions during the beginning of the Manchurian invasion when Prince Kanin rushed to the palace to obtain the Emperor's consent for the dispatch of reinforcements

from Japan—a move requiring imperial consent—while civilian leaders and the cabinet were still discussing the issue. Thus the army and navy were able to override the government by going to the Emperor directly over the heads of the cabinet.

Military control came to be so firmly established, however, by the close of 1940 that the army and navy were able to do away with their puppet princes and to appoint regular officers in their places. Thus General Gen Sugiyama, a former commander-in-chief of Japan's forces in China and a former War Minister, was elevated to the post of Chief of the Army General Staff, which he now holds, and Admiral Osami Nagano to that of Chief of the Navy General Staff.

In the meantime the armed services had succeeded over the past ten years in surrounding the Emperor with their own appointees in key posts. Thus, the liberal Count Shinken Makino, former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was displaced some years ago by Kurahei Yuasa, somewhat less of a liberal, who later yielded the post to Marquis Koichi Kido, the present incumbent. Kido's only qualification for the key post, which consists in presenting to the Emperor all state documents requiring the imperial seal of approval, was his friendship with former Premier Konoye and his close affiliation with army leaders and evident disposition to lend himself to their ways. The only remaining liberal in the court entourage is Tsuneo Matsudaira, a former ambassador to Washington and London, who functions as Imperial Household Minister and who could not be displaced because he is the father of Princess Chichibu, wife of the eldest brother of the Emperor. Matsudaira has clung on tenaciously, but his influence in recent years has been more paternal and personal than political.

According to mythology, the Emperor of Japan is "heaven-descended," and the imperial lineage is traced back to "ages immemorial." Actually, Japanese history goes back to 660 B.C., when the first Emperor, Jimmu Tenno (*tenno* means Emperor), ascended the throne. The imperial lineage is said never to have been broken, but it

has not always come down directly, as in the case of European dynasties, but has been perpetuated at times by adoption from related branches of the imperial family, and there have been frequent instances when Emperors have been sons of concubines. No secret was made of this in former times, and it is a known fact that the last Emperor, Taisho, was the son of Emperor Meiji and Countess Yanagiwara.

The Emperor is the spiritual head of the nation. He is the apex of the pyramid in the cult of ancestor worship as descended from the Sun Goddess. This ancestor worship is the backbone of the Shinto religion, the national creed, on which the family system is based, a remnant of the clan system of feudal days. The Emperor is the head of the national family, with each family a unit in the system. It is this feature of Japanese life that welds the unity of the nation in wartime and that is largely accountable for the fanaticism of many Japanese soldiers.

Emperor Hirohito is forty-three years old and the one hundred and twenty-fourth Emperor of Japan in "direct descent." He is of medium height for a Japanese but would be reckoned of short stature according to western standards. As a young man he was slim, but of recent years he has grown heavier, as most middle-aged men are apt to. His straight black hair is cut short and is thinning in parts, and he is said to use a popular inky-black hair restorer sold widely throughout Japan. He wears spectacles and has a short wiry mustache which he has cultivated since his late teens.

For upwards of four years, since Japan's invasion of China, the Emperor has worn military uniform both in his office in the palace and whenever he has attended functions, in keeping with the warlike atmosphere of the nation. When I have seen him at close range at semiannual intervals at the imperial garden parties in the spring and autumn, he has walked with a stoop, his sword dangling at his side. His is not a military bearing, and he walks along much as any civilian would, without any of the precision of movement expected of army officers.

I have never seen the Emperor smile. His expression is

generally grave, if not one of boredom. He performs his duties conscientiously and without ostentation. He does what is expected of him and receives the obeisance of his people without visible reaction. He has been brought up in the role of Emperor, and he seems to take it as it comes.

He is the only Emperor of Japan who has ever been abroad. As Crown Prince in 1921, when he was only twenty years of age, he made a trip to Europe, visiting London, Paris, Brussels, the Hague, and Rome. That was in the days after the last World War, when Japan had set out with some earnestness to follow the democratic ways of the victorious Powers with whom she was associated in the League of Nations. Japan's highest advisers thought the court of Japan might loosen its ancient tradition to the extent of absorbing something of the democracy of the English court. The Prince of Wales seemed to the Japanese an ideal example which the Emperor might beneficially emulate to a certain extent. So he was permitted, or even encouraged, to play golf with the Prince of Wales, fish with the Duke of Atholl in Scotland, go shopping in London and Paris, incognito, with only one or two attendants, and in the course of his trip he granted two interviews, one on landing in Southampton to Carl Ackerman, then head of the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* European service, and the other to me as United Press correspondent in Paris.

My interview with him showed clearly how he has been led all his life by his entourage. A statement was carefully prepared in advance by Setsuzo Sawada, a member of the Crown Prince's suite, and was handed to me by the Crown Prince when I called on him at the Japanese embassy. It was a friendly message in which he praised the "fine spirit of patriotism and the noble ideals" of the American people and expressed the hope that he might be able some day to visit the United States.

In much the same manner, no doubt, Emperor Hirohito, in a special Imperial Rescript, welcomed the conclusion of the Axis pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, when he declared: "We commanded our government to deliberate on the matter of mutual assist-

ance and co-operation with the governments of Germany and Italy which share in the views and aspirations of Our Empire. We are deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded among these three Powers."

In the political sense, Emperor Hirohito, whose only contact with foreign countries during his trip aboard as Crown Prince was with the European democracies, is represented as liberal and as being opposed to the militaristic exploits which Japan has launched upon in the last ten years and which have brought her finally into conflict with those nations with whom she was associated in the days of her rise. The story is told that at the time of the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo, which the Japanese contended was in accordance with the free will of the thirty million inhabitants of Manchuria, the Emperor asked one of his advisers, who was expounding this theory to him, what would happen if the people of Korea should get the same idea of self-determination. Korea was annexed by Japan in 1895 and is part of the Japanese Empire.

The Emperor was said to have been strongly opposed to Japan's abrogation of the Washington naval treaty where Japan gave formal notice at the end of 1934 of her denunciation of the pact. Some foreign diplomats in Tokyo even speculated as to whether it would be possible for the Emperor to refuse to put his seal to the recommendation of the Privy Council. There was, of course, no way out for the Emperor, and his function, as on so many other occasions, was nothing more than perfunctory.

Japan's entry into the Axis pact was said in Tokyo to have been reached in defiance of the Emperor's wishes. The pressure of army and some navy leaders was reported to have been so great that Emperor Hirohito's throne was at stake and that his refusal to sanction the Axis pact might have led to a revolt and his banishment to Kyoto and the substitution of Prince Chichibu in the role of Shogun. The Imperial Rescript endorsing the pact spelled the Emperor's complete submission to the military war lords.

Joseph Newman, who succeeded me as New York *Herald Tribune* correspondent when I left Japan, re-

ported he had been informed by a member of the Imperial court that Emperor Hirohito called Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura to the palace the day before he left for Washington and ordered him "to make peace with the United States at any cost."

Presidents of the United States have addressed Japanese Emperors directly three times in the course of the eighty years of American-Japanese relations. The first such message was the letter of President Millard Fillmore, countersigned by Edward Everett, Secretary of State, dated November 13, 1852, which Commodore Perry carried to Japan and left with officials of the Shogunate on his first visit. It became the basis for negotiations which led to the Treaty of Kanagawa of 1854, the first treaty between the United States and Japan.

When Japanese naval airmen bombed the American gunboat *Panay* in the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937, President Roosevelt personally wrote out a memorandum which was transmitted to the late Japanese Ambassador Hiroshi Saito by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, expressing deep shock and concern over the sinking of the American vessel and requesting that "the Emperor be so advised." On that occasion no direct answer was sent, but Ambassador Saito was instructed to inform Secretary Hull that the President's memorandum had been brought to the Emperor's attention.

Again on December 6, 1941, when reports were being received in Washington that the Japanese were hourly increasing their forces in the southern Pacific region, threatening to precipitate war, President Roosevelt sent an eleventh-hour message to the Emperor of Japan, somewhat similar to the messages he had addressed to Hitler and Mussolini before the outbreak of the present European war, in which he demanded the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Indo-China as a requisite to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

The Emperor replied to this last message of the President through Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, who summoned American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the Tokyo Foreign Office, three hours and forty minutes after

the Japanese attack on Hawaii, and stressed the Emperor's efforts in the cause of peace. The message was unprecedented, for never before has the Emperor, who is considered in Japan to be "above politics," answered a message of a political nature.

In the concluding paragraph of his reply the Emperor declared:

Establishment of peace in the Pacific and consequently of the world has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact.

Was Emperor Hirohito trying to tell President Roosevelt that he had done all he could to keep peace?

While the Emperor is nominally the head of the state, the power is in the hands of a small military group, of which Premier Hideki Tojo is the leader and spokesman. Japanese military extremists are of two kinds: the bombastic, swaggering, defiant type, of which there are many examples among the soldiers of Japan's conquering armies, and the humble, simple, but fanatic type, with no personal desire for gains and riches, but with a yearning for fame and a place in history comparable to Napoleon's. Tojo belongs to the latter group of fanatic visionary who would sacrifice everything for the attainment of his ambitions to become a great empire-builder.

In this respect Tojo resembles General Sadao Araki whose nebulous theories of grandeur nearly made a dictator of him in 1931, when he emerged as the leader of the younger-officer group in the Japanese army. Tojo is the leader of that same group, but he has undertaken to translate Araki's dreams of world conquest into reality at the risk of national suicide.

Tojo is the first military officer on the active list to become Premier in the last quarter of a century. During that period three generals became Premiers, but all of them were retired military men. There was General Baron Giichi Tanaka, who was Premier in 1927 and whose alleged plan of conquest was embodied in the so-called Tanaka memorandum; General Senjuro Hayashi, who held the post for a

brief period of four months in 1937 and who tried vainly to cling to it after his unpopular government had been defeated in a general election; and General Nobuyuki Abe, who headed a stopgap government in 1939 after the Hiranuma cabinet had been overthrown by Hitler's non-aggression pact with Stalin. But Tojo is the only active military officer to become Premier since the days of Field Marshal Terauchi in 1916, and as if to emphasize the significance of that event, he was raised from lieutenant general to the rank of a full general when he assumed the Premiership last October.

Combining the portfolios of War Minister and Home Minister with that of Premier, General Tojo has unified army control in the cabinet and has taken over the police and judiciary, which provide him with a powerful weapon against any opposition. There is no other strong man in the present Japanese cabinet, unless it be Naoki Hoshino, chief Secretary of the cabinet, an ultranationalist who shared Tojo's experience of running things over in Manchuria. Tojo was at one time Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army—Japan's army of occupation in Manchukuo—and Hoshino was chief of the General Affairs Board, which was tantamount to being general civilian director in the government.

Tojo's first name is Hideki or Eiki—he himself uses Hideki—the name being made up of two characters, the first of which may be read either way and whatever the reading may be translated: "brilliant opportunity." His father was a general and no doubt had visions of greatness for his son when he named him.

When Tojo became War Minister in the second Konoye cabinet, in the summer of 1940, Japanese commentators described him as "a man of unshakeable determination." He has little patience for arguments or other people's views. In a characteristic speech of instruction to the staff of the War Office, he declared:

"There is no use arguing. Put your decisions into effect at once. If employees of any bureau cannot reach a decision, let the bureau chief decide. If he cannot make up his mind, then there is no reason why I should not be asked,

and you may be sure I will lose no time in rendering a decision." Tojo added that a day's idleness in wartime was as criminal as a hundred years of idleness in peacetime and that a hundred thousand arguments were worthless in comparison to a single deed.

When he had finished speaking he called over the army press officer and instructed him: "What I have just said concerns not only the army but the entire civilian population. Have the newspapers publish my address at once."

Japan's warlord Premier is now sixty years old and is unimpressive in appearance. He is of average Japanese height, about five feet and a half, his hair is closely cropped, and there are bald patches which give his head a mangy appearance. His face is an inscrutable mask which seems to register no change. He wears spectacles and has a short mustache, not unlike that of the Emperor. He is a hard worker, slave-drives his subordinates, and lives on the border of poverty, as is the case with many Japanese officers who have large families to raise on scant pay. He never partakes of more than a bowl and a half of rice at a meal, whereas the average Japanese portion is three bowls.

Tojo is the father of seven children, and his wife is a strong advocate of the government's campaign to increase the birth rate. In an interview, when her husband became War Minister two years ago, Mrs. Tojo said: "When our last child was born at the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, we wondered how we could support such a large family on the meager salary of an army officer, but we considered that, if the people of the middle class put a limit to the number of children they were to raise, it would mean the eventual disappearance of Japan's middle class and would be a great loss to the nation." Mrs. Tojo said her husband believed the children needed "no special education other than to learn how to stand on their own feet."

The story is told that when Tojo was a captain he used to attend almost nightly parties with other young officers which extended into the early hours of the morning. These were expensive affairs for a younger officer, and Mrs. Tojo had to ask for help from her family to meet her budget. It

is said that she received 30 yen (then about \$15) a month from her parents and a roll of kimono material.

Biding her time to find her husband in a good mood, Mrs. Tojo tried to put him to shame and said meekly late one night: "It wouldn't be necessary for my family to send me a roll of kimono material every month if you could just save the taxi fare home from your parties." That put an end to his night revelry, and it is said that he has not returned home later than midnight for the past twenty years and always takes the streetcar.

Tojo's rise through the military ranks was not spectacular. After graduating from the military academy he served for a term in the War Office and was sent to Germany in 1919 at the close of the last World War as a resident officer. He returned to Japan three years later and was given a series of routine commands, eventually rising to the rank of a lieutenant general in 1937, when he was made commander of the Kwantung gendarmerie—the dreaded military police. Only the most hard-boiled officers attain high posts in Japan's Gestapo. When Japan went to war with China in the summer of that year, he was sent into the field and led a division across the Gobi Desert from Chengtu, in Jehol Province, to Talun, a march of 375 miles which has since been cited by Japanese army officers as a military epic. He later became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and was made Vice-Minister of War toward the end of the first Konoye cabinet's tenure of office. He was inspector general of military aviation before becoming War Minister in the second Konoye cabinet.

Tojo is known to be antiforeign, with a particular dislike for the Russians. He was credited as being responsible for the antiforeign agitation in Japan in the summer of 1940, when sixteen Britishers were arrested and imprisoned, including James M. Cox, the former Reuters correspondent, who was killed in a leap from a window at the headquarters of the Tokyo gendarmerie. These arrests were carried out by the military police without the knowledge of either Premier Konoye or Foreign Minister Matsuo, who read of them in the Japanese newspapers only after Cox's death could not be concealed.

While serving as Vice-Minister of War in 1938, Tojo made a speech, warning that America should be carefully watched. "The United States," he said, "is insisting upon the observance of various treaties of the past in disregard of the developments of the new situation in East Asia and is showing no signs of recognizing any change in the East Asiatic scene. We must keep careful watch on America's moves apart from the motives that may actuate them."

In the same speech he clearly showed his hatred of Russia when he said Japan should be prepared for a war on two fronts—a Russian front as well as a Chinese one. Those who know Tojo's mind would not be surprised to see him involve Japan in a war with the Soviet Union at any moment that might seem appropriate to the Japanese High Command. Japan has half a million men under arms along the Manchukuo-Soviet border in readiness for such an eventuality.

When Japan entered the Axis pact on September 27, 1940, Tojo declared he was "overwhelmed with a mingled feel of austerity and joy," and he urged the nation to go forward with Germany and Italy "with renewed strength toward Japan's fixed goal in world affairs." He said the road Japan would follow had been "definitely decided" and there was no turning back. When the signing of the pact was celebrated, he was in the forefront with German Ambassador Ott in lifting his glass to the prosperity of the Axis.

For months before Japan went to war with the United States, Tojo stirred up public feeling in Japan by calling upon the people to "break the encirclement by the foreign Powers" by which he meant the defensive co-operation which was being worked out by the A.B.C.D. nations to meet the possibility of a Japanese attack in the Pacific. Two days after he became Premier he made a brief statement, on October 20, 1941, which must now be looked upon with far greater significance than at the time it was made. He said: "Our policies have been decided. We have only to follow them. I dislike talking and I will make our policies clear by enforcing them." There is good reason to believe that Japan's decision to make war on the

United States was reached at the time of the cabinet change, when Premier Konoye relinquished the reins to Tojo.

Besides Premier Tojo, four men played important roles in the direction of the Japanese war machine. They are: General Gen Sugiyama, Chief of the Army General Staff; General Shunroku Hata, commander of the Japanese armies in China; Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Navy General Staff; and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Japanese combined fleets.

It was in October 1940 that Prince Kanin relinquished the highest military office of Chief of the Army General Staff to General Sugiyama, who has had the distinction of having held successively the three highest posts in the Japanese army, those of Inspector General of Military Education, War Minister, and Chief of the General Staff. They make up the "Big Three," who reach all the important decisions of a military character and who recommend a War Minister when a new cabinet takes office.

Sugiyama is short, rotund of face and figure, and his cropped hair is graying at the temples. Despite his sixty-four years of age, he is excessively energetic and appears always to be in a hurry. He rushes in and out of the War Office and of cabinet meetings, and his subordinates are said to have a hard time keeping up with him. As War Minister in the first Konoye cabinet at the time of the outbreak of the China war, his aggressive manner contrasted strikingly with the phlegmatic disposition of the oft-indisposed Premier, who took to his bed whenever the political situation became too acute.

Gen Sugiyama was the son of a rural school teacher who reared his family on strict principles of discipline. Young Sugiyama was made to rise early, go through a curriculum of gymnastics, and help in cleaning the house, being assigned the most unpleasant part of the business. His military career of twenty-nine years has been almost a perfect one from the viewpoint of a Japanese officer, having progressed from one important post to another to the top of the ladder. He was chief of the important Military Affairs Bureau of the War Office, recognized as a steppingstone

to high military rank, director of Army Aviation, War Minister, Inspector General of Military Education, commander of the Japanese armies in North China in 1938, and a member of the Supreme War Council before being appointed to his present post.

He has been identified with aviation on and off throughout his career, a factor which was largely responsible for his appointment to command the Japanese forces in North China, where great stress was laid on the role of the air force. The fact that both Tojo and Sugiyama have had their training in aviation is no doubt largely accountable for the development of the Japanese air force and the wide use of Japanese aircraft in the present war.

General Shunroku Hata, commander of the Japanese armies in China, is an opportunist who has long been urging that Japan should take advantage of world conditions to carve herself out a big empire in Asia. As War Minister, in the early summer of 1940, he told officers of the War Department: "World events are moving in a direction favorable for the execution of the policies of this country. We must not let this opportunity slip."

Hata, who is sixty-five years old, graduated from the military academy in 1901 at the top of his class and ahead of his classmate, Sugiyama, the present Chief of the Army General Staff. He was commissioned a lieutenant in the artillery and took part in the attack on Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War. He then served a term in Germany and returned to become an instructor in the War College in Tokyo. He was chief of aviation headquarters in 1935, and in the following year was appointed commander of the Japanese garrison in Formosa, Japan's outpost in the Pacific and an important base in her present southward drive. In 1938 he became commander of the Japanese forces in central China in succession to General Iwane Matsui, whose troops had run amuck at Shanghai and were responsible for the rape of Nanking. Hata was to restore discipline.

He was War Minister in the relatively mild Yonai cabinet early in 1940, but it was he who forced that cabinet out when he presented Premier Yonai with a memoran-

dum which called for internal reform by the establishment of a totalitarian system and the "reorienting" of Japan's foreign policy to make the most of what army extremists considered to be a golden opportunity of joining Germany in a campaign of world conquest. When Yonai rejected the army's ultimatum and resigned, it was generally supposed that Hata would be the next Premier, but the council of elder statesmen passed him over in favor of Prince Konoye.

Hata, himself, contended he did not want the Premiership, which at that time would have compelled him to give up his active military status. He was then quoted as saying:

"If I should take off my uniform I would become a mere child. If I am well thought of now, it is because I have a sword at my side. The army is supposed to be the propelling force behind the government but not the government itself. I am willing to push, but I cannot push and be pushed at the same time."

This statement was amazingly frank. Hata's role as War Minister had indeed been to push the Government from behind, and he evidently felt that it would be uncomfortable for him to be Premier and be pushed about by another War Minister. Tojo has eliminated that danger by combining the posts of Premier and War Minister, but the time was not yet ripe in Hata's day for such a move.

Both of Japan's leading navy men—Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Navy General Staff, and the late Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the combined fleets—had a direct hand in Japan's scrapping of the naval limitation treaties. Yamamoto went ahead to the second London naval conference as Japanese spokesman to pave the way, and Admiral Nagano was chief delegate when Japan withdrew from that conference in December 1934 and shortly after denounced the Washington naval treaty.

Admiral Nagano had demanded the termination of the "inferior" status assigned to Japan in the Washington and first London naval treaties, offering to abolish capital ships and aircraft carriers if the principle of naval parity were recognized. Japan preferred the smaller ships, and

Japanese navy men figured that parity coupled with the abolition of the larger ships with long cruising range would make Japan supreme in the Far East. It would have placed her beyond range of American capital ships but would have given her naval supremacy in the southern Pacific, where Japan had numerous bases where smaller vessels could refuel. To the other Powers this program was naturally unacceptable, being in effect tantamount to a recognition of the position of Japan as a dominant one in Asia in line with her so-called Monroe Doctrine. The "New Order" slogan of Japan had not yet been coined then.

Notwithstanding Nagano's veiled claim to naval supremacy for Japan in Asia, he himself was regarded as a middle-of-the-course navy man, being rated neither an extremist nor a liberal. Nagano is known as Japan's leading naval strategist, and it may be assumed that the naval war plans now being unfolded are largely of his creation although their execution was in Yamamoto's hands.

Nagano was the son of a feudal lord and graduated from the naval academy at the turn of the century. Thirty-one years later he was to become head of the academy. He served in the United States at two different periods in his career, first as a language student and later as naval attaché in Washington from 1920 to 1923. He was the commander of a Japanese training squadron which visited Annapolis in October 1928 and was entertained by President Hoover at lunch at the White House. He was a member of the Japanese delegation to the abortive Geneva naval disarmament conference in 1935 and was appointed Navy Minister the following year. He was named to his present post last year.

Admiral Yamamoto, who directed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, was one of the Japanese navy's warmongers, who had long been hoping for just such an opportunity as he had to take a crack at the fleets of the Western Powers. He had long nursed a grievance against the Powers for the "inferior" 5-5-3 ratio which Japan was allotted at the Washington conference. When he went to the London disarmament conference as naval spokesman

in 1934, he said he felt he was leaving for "actual warfare."

Yamamoto was heavy-set, clean-shaven, and had cropped hair, like most Japanese army and navy officers. He lost a couple of fingers serving as an ensign aboard the late Fleet Admiral Togo's flagship, the *Mikasa*, in the battle of the Japan Sea in the Russo-Japanese War. He was a lifelong friend and admirer of Togo's and a pallbearer at his funeral.

He was naval attaché in Washington in 1925 and was a member of the Japanese delegation at the first London naval conference in 1929, which extended the Washington naval limitation agreement to cover cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. He was resentful of that agreement and in recent years had been rated a big-navy man.

After his return from London he was appointed Vice-Minister of the Navy and later became chief of the naval air force. In Tokyo he mingled freely with officials of the American embassy, with whom he played bridge regularly. The games would take place in the afternoons, when he had a few hours' spare time, and he always left by six o'clock in the evening no matter how the game fared. He was a regular loser, his losses averaging about 10 yen a time (now \$2.50) but being about equivalent to a day's pay for a Japanese admiral. He was a conservative player, unwilling to take great risks. Those who knew Yamamoto well, reckoned him to be solid and dependable but neither brilliant nor quick.

The official Tokyo radio reported that Admiral Yamamoto had sent a letter to a friend before the outbreak of war, expressing the humiliation he had felt since the last London disarmament conference, when Japan's claim for naval parity was rejected by the Powers. He was further quoted as having written: "Any time war breaks out between Japan and the United States, I shall not be content merely to capture Guam and the Philippines and occupy Hawaii and San Francisco. I am looking forward to dictating peace to the United States in the White House at Washington."

The Tokyo radio announced in 1943 that Yamamoto had been killed on active service.

CHAPTER 5

The Japanese Army

THE JAPANESE ARMY is much more than an instrument of policy. It is the directive force in Japan, the arbiter of the nation's destiny, the mainspring in domestic as well as foreign affairs, the institution to which all administrative functions are subservient. Two years ago General Shunrouka Hata, then War Minister, called it the "propelling force between the government," but now it has become the propelling force of the government.

It has seized its power by breaking down or circumventing all the barriers which a semblance of constitutional government had erected. It has reached into the inner circle of the Court, passed over the heads of the civil government, usurped the power of the police, and made a rubber stamp of the Diet, the parliament.

As far back as eleven years the police virtually yielded up its prerogatives insofar as the army was concerned. The test came when Private Nakamura, a soldier of the eighth regiment stationed in Osaka, crossed the street on a stop signal and was pushed back by Policeman Nakanishi. This small incident became a national issue between the army and the police and was only finally settled when the local chief of police and the chief of the prefectural police board called on the commander of Nakamura's regiment and the divisional chief of staff to apologize. Since then no policeman has ever dared interfere with the behavior of troops in any part of Japan. Soldiers bivouacked in the streets, blocked traffic wherever they chose, ignored the regular traffic rules, drove their cars at any speed, and comported themselves as they pleased.

It was one of Emperor Meiji's first tasks at the time of the Restoration to make an army out of the warrior feudal clans. He first set about organizing an imperial guard, with headquarters in Tokyo, consisting of selected clansmen

and step by step garrisons were established at other points. In 1869 the Emperor sent Aritomo Yamagata—a former retainer of the powerful Choshu clan, who later became Marshal Prince Yamagata—to Europe and America to study military organizations abroad, and after a year's trip he returned to report his findings.

"I have observed during my travels in occidental countries," he reported, "that all these nations have spent millions on national defense in past centuries. Look at our own country and you will see that she has enjoyed centuries of peaceful sleep because of her seclusion policy. It is high time for this nation to stand up and do something for the purpose of maintaining her independence among these powerful nations. The increase of the national defense will require enormous expenditure, but it is the nation's most urgent business. For what should have been done during the past century, we are now obliged to do in the next decade."

In my boyhood days we lived next door to Prince Yamagata in Tokyo. Our gardens adjoined, but his was fenced about with a high wall. His house was an ugly foreign-style Mid-Victorian one with a tile roof on which was mounted a small gun to ward off evil spirits. Yamagata was well protected, and I recall that on one occasion, when a fire broke out in the neighborhood several blocks away, firemen rushed to his house and turned their hose on it. They paid no attention to ours. Although I passed Yamagata's house four or five times daily for three years, I never did see the great man who had been described to me as "the uncrowned Emperor of Japan." Yamagata was a Genro (elder statesman) and the most powerful adviser to the Emperor. Both houses were later destroyed in the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923.

In 1871 a War Office was created, and a staff of French officers headed by Lieutenant Colonel Marquirie was brought to Japan to act as instructors. The following year, conscription was put into effect, enrolling men from the age of twenty up to forty and providing for three years' active military service followed by a four-year period in the reserve.

When the conscription law was first enacted, conscripting former feudal lords and their retainers, who had been professional warriors, along with the remainder of the male population, there was considerable agitation from all sides. The feudal lords were offended at the invasion of their profession by commoners, while the latter were fearful of the new system. The situation was such that it was impossible for the government to obtain a sufficient number of men for an army of about 200,000 men.

After France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 the Japanese replaced their French instructors with Germans. Lieutenant Katsura—later General Prince Katsura—was sent to Germany to study military organization, and he hired the first German instructors. Thus, the Japanese army was modeled on the German army right up to the first World War, when Japan aligned herself with the Allies, although sympathy in the Japanese army remained strong for Germany.

After the first World War, and in keeping with the trend toward disarmament, Japan made two cuts in the strength of her army. The first, in 1922, retained the number of twenty-one divisions but reduced their total strength by 1,800 officers and 56,000 men, while in 1925 the number of divisions was cut to seventeen, at which level the standing Japanese army has since been maintained, with a peacetime strength of 230,000 men. After the Japanese navy had subscribed to further limitations in the London Naval Treaty of 1930, there was considerable pressure in Japan to further reduce the size of the army, and another cut in personnel of about 30,000 men was recommended by the Hamaguchi government but never carried out.

The sudden rise of the military power in Japan at the time of the Manchurian invasion in 1931 came completely by surprise to Japanese in other walks of life. While the signs are now easy to see in retrospect, those of us who watched the agitation which developed in the Japanese army over the resistance of Chang Hsueh-liang, the Manchurian warlord, to Japan's undermining schemes never believed it had reached the point of explosion. Japan's Manchurian invasion, in fact, marked an internal revolu-

tion in Japan which brought the so-called younger-officer element to power.

The Manchurian invasion fired the imagination and martial spirit of Japanese youth, and the reactionary groups, until then obscure, gained in both membership and influence and became the nucleus of the fascist movement outside the army, acting in conjunction with the army. National socialism had a certain appeal, too, to young Japanese who harbored communist leanings and who had been severely repressed while the authorities encouraged the fascist trend. As a result, the communists turned fascists, which was safer and to a large extent served the same purpose, since they were primarily anti-capitalist.

Late in 1931 an article in the *Imperial University Weekly*, journal of Japan's leading educational institution, where radicalism and socialism were strongly entrenched among a large section of the students, ascribed seven reasons for the growth of fascism in Japan as follows:

(1) the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, opposed by the big-navy group in Japan, which was overruled; (2) the alleged failure of the policy of Baron Kijuro Shidehara, then Foreign Minister, to protect Japan's rights in China and Manchuria, described as one of the main reasons leading up to Japan's Manchurian conquest; (3) disappointment with parliamentary procedure as practiced in Japan, based on the widespread suspicion that financial interests were influencing the legislature and were pulling political wires behind scenes; (4) repression of communists, which compelled radical youths to seek some other outlet; (5) an economic depression then prevalent, accompanied by unemployment; (6) discontent among the rural populations, who were barely able to eke out an existence; (7) the Manchurian campaign, which aroused the nationalistic spirit of Japan.

The army became the champion of the long-impoorished farmers. Their distress was very real, and the bulk of the Japanese army was drawn from among the sons of farmers who felt that, as defenders of the Empire, they were in a position to rectify some of these conditions. This revolutionary tendency was heightened by the new

nationalism that developed in the wake of the Manchurian invasion.

The farmers were burdened with debts which they could never hope to pay off, and they were scarcely able to make a living, so that any calamity such as a severe storm, a flood, or a drought was liable to lead them to the brink of famine. Each winter, farmers of certain districts were so impoverished that they sold their daughters into slavery. The income of the average farmer with a family of five, for instance, was placed at 1,500 yen a year, from which his outlay for grain, fertilizer, and other necessities consumed close to two thirds. His interest on loans averaged 300 yen, leaving him a net profit of approximately 200 yen to support the family. The result was that the farmers did not pay their debts, and the 500-yen margin provided a bare subsistence.

The first fascist uprising occurred in October 1931, when younger military officers attempted a *coup d'état* which proved abortive, but with the advent of the Inukai cabinet in January 1932 the younger officers found a leader in General Sadao Araki, who became Minister of War—and for a while came close to becoming dictator. Araki's power, however, did not long outlast the assassination of Premier Inukai in an uprising on May 15, 1932. The fact that the attack was carried out by younger army and navy officers and that General Araki, as War Minister, did not assume responsibility by resigning his post—in earlier days he would have had to commit hara-kiri—discredited him.

Plots and assassinations were frequent during this period. Jinnosuke Inouye, Finance Minister in the Inukai cabinet, was shot at a political meeting, and Baron Takuma Dan, head of the powerful Mitsui business interests, was the victim of an assassin's bullet as he stepped from his car in front of his office. The fascist agitation reached its peak with the military revolt of February 26, 1936, when two divisions of troops revolted, and soldiers attempted to assassinate Premier Keisuke Okada. They killed his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzo Matsuo, who resembled him, by mistake; General Jiro Watanabe, inspector general of the army; Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi;

and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Viscount Makoto Saito; and they seriously wounded Admiral Kentaro Suzuki, Grand Chamberlain to the Emperor, among others.

Although the revolt was put down and eighteen officers were court-martialed and shot, it resulted actually in a further gain for army extremists, whose aims were taken into account in the postrevolutionary setup. Two years later Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, the rebels' candidate for the Premiership, became head of the government. By then, however, Hiranuma's views had mellowed, and this was the reason for his attempted assassination in the summer of 1941.

For a while the Japanese army's prestige suffered severely from this revolt. The people were disgusted at seeing the army divided against itself. Other factors, such as the rebel officers' failure to surrender when commanded by the Emperor during the revolt; their unauthorized use of government troops who were not rebels; and, in particular, their failure to commit *hara-kiri* when the rebel troops surrendered, discredited them. But the China war soon recouped the army's position and established it in the saddle.

With the advent of General Tojo's cabinet in October, the army openly took over the government and immediately began to prepare for war on a major scale. It is now evident that the Japanese attack against Hawaii was long planned and that the actual military and naval operations must have got under way in the early part of November, only two weeks after the Tojo government was installed in office.

The organization of the Japanese army in wartime, as at present, is a complicated one. Under Article XI of the Constitution, the Emperor "has the supreme command of the Army and Navy," but this command is exercised through a number of agencies which, in practice, conduct military operations with the Emperor's perfunctory acquiescence. The highest advisory body in military affairs is the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals, but actually it is non-existent, as there is only one marshal in Japan—Field Marshal Prince Kanin, the former puppet chief of staff, who was shelved years ago—and the only fleet ad-

miral was the late Togo, whose place has remained unfilled. Next is the Supreme Military Council, made up of senior army and navy officers, who are occasionally consulted when it is desired to give a decision an appearance of unanimity but which consists mainly of distinguished retired men who are sometimes removed from the shelf and given important active commands. Several of the present military and naval leaders of Japan have at one time adorned the shelf of the Supreme Military Council.

But more important than these boards is the Imperial Headquarters, established in the autumn of 1937 to direct and co-ordinate the prosecution of the war in China and on the Asiatic mainland. Similar headquarters were established under the direct command of the Emperor in both the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War, when Emperor Meiji took a much more active part in the conduct of war operations than the present Emperor Hirohito. Of equal importance is the new defense headquarters established in 1941, which was deliberately misrepresented as a move to placate extremist military elements but which was actually a step in preparation for the present war. This organization is charged with the defense of Japan proper as distinct from the military operations outside of Japan.

There is the War Office, under the Minister of War and the office of Chief of the Army General Staff. In wartime, the War Minister's duties are principally concerned with the raising of troops and supplies at home, whereas the direction of military operations is largely in the hands of the Chief of the General Staff. Both have direct access to the Emperor, as have also commanding generals of divisions in Japan and the commanders of the Korean, Kwantung, and Formosan garrisons.

The China war gave us a sample of Japan's military system at work. Mobilization was what military experts call "vertical," as against the "horizontal" system in most European countries. Reservists were selected from all ranks and of all ages, without apparent reason, in a vertical sweep instead of men being drafted according to age classification. Any Japanese reservist was liable to be called, r

matter what his occupation or his age. Men of sixty and boys of eighteen were summoned to the colors in the same mobilization order.

A man called to service in the Japanese army would receive a pink postcard from the War Office, giving him two or three days to make his preparations, which meant winding up his business and private affairs and taking leave of his family. A large part of this time was spent in calls on relatives and in receiving farewell gifts. These consisted mainly of flags, banners, and monetary contributions which might be put aside for the support of the family during the soldier's absence or with which small necessities might be purchased, such as a razor, cigarettes, or dried fish or other small parcels of food. It was the custom for a departing soldier to receive flags with the signatures of friends or business associates to carry into battle as an encouragement.

At the time designated on the conscript's postcard fifty reservists in military uniform would call for him at his home to conduct him to the barracks. In the early days of the China war the reservists would call with a truck, hoist the draftee onto the truck, and climb on themselves, holding aloft his flags and banners. Thus they would ride through the streets, lined with crowds waving paper flags, amid cheers from the reservist escort as well as from the crowds. I have seen thousands of these open trucks go by, loaded with shouting reservists. Many of the conscripts went with an air of deep gloom and seemed utterly bewildered by the circumstances which made of them the heroes of an hour or two, while a few joined in the shouting themselves, sometimes fortified by the hang-over of a farewell party the night before. While trucks were most popular, streetcars, busses, and taxis were also requisitioned for this purpose.

I remember one Sunday when hundreds of truckloads paraded through the streets of Tokyo day and night. I followed some of the trucks in a car to see what was the routine. First the conscripts were taken to the military barracks, where they were checked off and provided with a railway ticket to a point of concentration. Then they

were escorted to a shrine of their choice, and then driven on to a railway station for a final send-off.

The sight of endless truckloads of soldiers driving through the streets eventually caused a near panic among the population, for it seemed from the numbers as if the whole nation were being mobilized. This was due to the fact that, for every man called, another fifty accompanied him on his round. The authorities then prohibited driving about in trucks, on the ground that many accidents resulted—which they undoubtedly did, too—and soldiers left more inconspicuously for the front.

At the railway stations thousand of reservists left in a continuous stream. There were gatherings of relatives and friends and the never-failing reservists and representative of patriotic groups on hand. The departing soldier would stand in the center of a ring, often immobile, looking down at his feet, while the crowd about him would sing the usual war songs and wave flags until he stepped onto the train and was lost to sight in the shuffle. The *banzais* would echo on every side as the train pulled out. I have seen this ceremony repeated hundreds of times.

From the very outset there was never any enthusiasm among the Japanese people for the war in China, and as it dragged on from a matter of months to years it became increasingly unpopular. The Japanese never understood why they were fighting a war in China. They had no feeling of bitterness against the Chinese, and Chinese in Japan remained there unmolested and continued their businesses without interference. Many, however, were prevailed upon, by pressure from the Japanese police, to declare their allegiance to the puppet regimes established by the Japanese in China, but they did this as a mere matter of expediency in the same manner as Chinese residing in the Japanese-occupied zones of China.

Every Japanese knew that Japan's objective in China was conquest. Few Japanese concurred in the long advanced official Japanese thesis that the war was being fought to make friends of the Chinese and to bring about Sino-Japanese co-operation to their mutual benefit in Asia. Ridiculous as this theme may appear here, in Japan it was

put forward in all earnestness by Japanese leaders in the early days of the war but was little heard of later, in view of its failure to impress even the Japanese people.

Although the Japanese have relatively little regard for life, and sacrifice their existence much more readily than occidentals, they have the greatest respect for the dead. This is the basis of ancestor worship and the family system upon which the nation is reared. No matter where or how a Japanese soldier is killed or dies in warfare, some human ashes are returned to the family as those of the deceased, and they are so accepted without question and honored accordingly. No Japanese soldier is ever reported "missing."

For upwards of six years past, ever since the China war, trainloads of white wooden boxes, containing human ashes, have been arriving back in Japan. Each box has a strap which enables a soldier to carry it in front of him, slung over his shoulders. The ashes are thus borne to the home of the deceased soldier's family, who have been notified in advance by the War Department and have prepared a special altar to receive the remains. A priest is asked in to sing a few sutras, and relatives, friends, neighbors, and members of patriotic societies gather to burn a stick of incense before the altar.

But that is not all of the ritual connected with the return of a soldier's ashes. Eventually his spirit is enshrined and deified. Twice a year the grand Yasakuni Shrine in Tokyo holds a week's festival to mark the ceremony for the enshrinement of the war dead. The number enshrined on each occasion is much smaller than the losses suffered in battle, as the government is reluctant to have the figures known, and the enshrinement may be delayed for years. Although the ceremony is an impressive one, conducted at night amid the flare of torches and to the weird sound of flute music, the accompanying daytime festival is a gaudy fair at which there is a great deal of merrymaking as Tokyo citizens take a holiday to visit circus attractions and to patronize street stalls and cheap eating places. The irreverence of the daytime crowds on these solemn occasions was a shock to Westerners.

A Japanese civilian, put into military uniform, is a transformed being. I have seen scores of instances of pleasant enough Japanese youths, called to the colors, who have overnight become arrogant, self-inflated, officious soldiers of the type familiar throughout China and other conquered territories in Asia. The explanation seems to be that the military uniform cloaks a Japanese with the authority of the Emperor into whose direct service he has been called. He seems to figure himself a representative of the almighty descendant of the son of heaven. It is this mentality which makes of inconspicuous, downtrodden office clerks and sons of farmers an army of brazen, cruel conquerors who take pleasure in mass killings, torture of innocent victims, and rape such as descended upon Nanking. The inferiority complex of the poor worker, product of generations of virtual serfdom, suddenly becomes a superiority complex which transcends all limits.

It is difficult to reconcile the average Japanese in his ordinary civilian pursuit with the swaggering type encountered on the continent of Asia. Yet he is the same individual, imbued with the conqueror spirit which the mere setting on of a uniform imparts to him. Experience has shown that Japanese conscripted into the army directly from the civilian reserves are worse-behaved than the regular army, which, by training, is more disciplined. It was Japan's army of laundrymen, taxi drivers, office clerks, farmers, and the like which fell upon Shanghai and Nanking in a disorderly mob at the outset of the China war and which was beyond the control of its commanders. When the army was completely out of hand, after the rape of Nanking, and high army leaders in Tokyo felt something had to be done about it, the remedy suggested was the gradual replacement of the reservist soldiers with regular troops.

The average Japanese soldier is physically tough, his endurance extraordinary, his wants scant, and his training spartan-like. I have seen soldiers running through the streets of Tokyo, on their return from maneuvers, headed for their barracks with heavy loads, pressing on to the point of exhaustion. I saw one of them fall flat with his

rifle in the street—in a state of collapse—while a crowd gathered around, but no other soldier would dare stop a minute to see what had happened or to lend a helping hand.

In appearance, the average soldier is sloppy but sturdy and relentless. His uniform may be ill-fitting—it is generally soiled—his cap pushed back on his head, his puttees carelessly rolled; he generally does not keep step, and his ranks may be out of alignment; but he is solid and determined. The Japanese army on the march, even only through the streets of Tokyo, looks grim. It is obviously a war machine for use and not for parade. A common sight is a regiment of soldiers, camouflaged with straw or ivy, which conveys the impression of a moving landscape at a distance.

The problem of feeding the Japanese army is a comparatively simple one for, contrary to Western tradition, it does not seem to move on its stomach. A Japanese soldier is content with what is called a "rising sun" meal, consisting of a square box of rice with a red pickled plum in the center, resembling a Japanese flag, hence its name. With it goes a cup of green tea. Occasionally it is supplemented with what is known as "nori," a kind of seaweed containing a large quantity of iodine. On rare festive occasions there may be a piece of beef.

The Japanese soldier is not so fanatical or so careless of his life as he used to be, or is supposed to be. The inroads of modernism in Japan have placed life at a higher value than in the period of Japan's emergence from feudalism, and *hara-kiri* is much less frequently resorted to than it used to be when General Nogi, hero of the Russo-Japanese War, gave it added luster by committing suicide at the time of the death of the Emperor Meiji. To be sure, there are Japanese soldiers—as there are soldiers in any army—who volunteer for dangerous jobs, and it would not be difficult to recruit "suicide" squads for certain purposes, but, by and large, the Japanese soldier does not like to throw his life away needlessly, although his commanders take far greater chances than the average occidental officer. This accounts for the mass assaults on fortified positions

which have often been carried out at great sacrifice of life.

In the last ten years of war on the Asiatic mainland there have been few examples of "suicide" action on the part of Japanese. One example has become a classic in Japan. It is the case of three soldiers who volunteered to carry the lighted fuse of a bomb into the Chinese lines at Shanghai in the fighting there in 1932 and who were blown to pieces. A statue to the "three human bombs" has been erected in Tokyo and shows them carrying the stick of dynamite to their death.

There was also the case of Major Noboru Kuga, wounded in the fighting at Shanghai in 1932 and taken prisoner by the Chinese, who, after he was liberated, returned to the scene of battle and shot himself because of the disgrace at having been a prisoner of war. This was in accordance with the strict feudal warrior code, which prescribed death in preference to capture by the enemy.

The feeling of the modern Japanese soldier is well described in *Barley and Soldiers*, a Japanese wartime best seller by Ashihei Hino, actually Sergeant Katsunori Tamai, a former superintendent of longshoremen, in telling of a battle with the Chinese in which the Japanese were suffering reverses. He wrote:

"I did think for a moment it would be better to die by my own hand, and actually put my revolver to my head. I thought that I would cry out: 'May Great Imperial Japan live forever!' in so loud a voice that the enemy would hear me, and then press the trigger. But the feel of the cold steel made me shudder, and I hastily replaced the weapon in my holster. I wanted to live on as long as I could. Thoughts of home brought tears to my eyes, and I shut them and prayed while the shells continued to explode around us mingled with the groans of the wounded."

Japan's performance in the initial stage of the present war has caused many Americans to reconsider their estimate of Japanese military strength. Military experts have formulated their judgment largely on the basis of Japanese operations in China during the past four years, which, it has now become evident, was not an accurate gauge. Japanese bombing in China had been destructive enough

but the aim of Japanese fliers had been negligible; the Japanese army, highly mechanized in comparison to the Chinese masses fighting for the most part with primitive equipment, had been successful to the point only of capturing the coastal area, with tremendous losses; the Japanese navy had not had a chance to show what it could do.

It had long been known that Japan was keeping her best reserves in man power and had sent an inferior army to China, drawn largely from second and third reserves, and it was assumed that these men were being held back for a major war, but it was not generally known that Japan was holding her best material in reserve too. The fact is that Japanese military preparations have been carried out with the utmost secrecy for years past. No nation has perhaps so thoroughly dissimulated its military preparations and its industrial mobilization both from its own people and from the world at large.

A strict censorship covered every conceivable subject even remotely connected with the national defense. This included all military and naval matters—Japan's army expansion and her naval building plans—which have been kept strictly secret since she quit the last London naval conference in 1934, as well as all figures relating to wartime industries and items of trade connected with the national-defense program. Foreigners have long been prohibited from approaching Japanese fortified zones and have been kept at considerable distance from all army stations and naval bases. The approach to Yokosuka, Japan's largest naval base, in proximity to Yokohama, has been fenced off so that it is invisible to travelers arriving by railway or vessels at sea, which are furthermore prohibited from navigating within miles off the base.

A strict military-secrets law, passed in 1937, after the outbreak of the war with China, imposes the death penalty or heavy prison sentences for divulging military information. The law is so strict that it punishes even those who have accidentally come into possession of so-called military secrets. Article 5 of the law stipulates that "those who have accidentally acquired or come into possession of military secrets and given information to others shall be

sentenced to prison for not less than six months and not more than ten years with hard labor." A military secret may be almost anything.

The greatest precautions are taken to keep military information from the Japanese people themselves. A young Japanese boy who worked in a war plant and who used to play with our children was often seen toying with strange kinds of metal cups and containers which he carried home from the factory. They were turned out in the plant in which he worked, but neither he nor the other workers employed there had any knowledge of what they were making or its eventual use. These parts were assembled at another factory and, from the shape of them, appeared to be sections of barrels of small-caliber guns or larger cartridges. The same was true all over Japan, and only workers in the final assembly plant knew what they were turning out, and they were hand-picked men closely watched by the Japanese military police.

Since 1937 Japanese newspapers have been prohibited from publishing any items which might give out information regarding the national defense. No Japanese newspapers have ever published production figures such as are seen daily in American newspapers, nor is anything known among the public as to the strength of the Japanese army under arms. Newspaper readers have become used to seeing strings of naughts substituted for figures. The Japanese read them *maru—maru*, meaning "naught—naught." Editors sometimes daringly hinted at the figures by the number of naughts aligned.

Budgets presented to the Diet for army and navy expenditures have long been unintelligible even to members of parliament who are called upon to pass on them. They have given their rubber-stamp approval without questioning the items. Only lump sums have been listed for the various branches of the defense, and figures have not added up to the totals. All that could be deduced by foreign military observers is what Japan might possibly be building within the totals. It was all a matter of guesswork.

The Japanese army is like a huge octopus which

cking the lifeblood of the nation and whose tentacles
tend into every ramification of the national existence.
now stretches out to embrace the whole of Asia within
grasp.

CHAPTER 6

The Japanese Navy

JAPAN DEVELOPED her navy over the past seventy years with the aid of those nations she is now fighting, principally the Dutch, the British, and ourselves. It was with a navy built entirely in foreign shipyards that Japan fought the Russo-Japanese war and achieved a victory which classed her immediately as one of the outstanding naval Powers. It is a case of the school children turning against their teachers with the very weapons the teacher had placed in their hands—dangerous weapons indeed.

For six hundred years, until Commodore Perry sailed into Yedo Bay, Japan was shut off from the world. Her feudal rulers, believing in the safety of their insular position, prohibited the building of any seagoing vessels which might expose the nation to dangerous intercourse with the outside world. Ships of Western nations were forbidden from coming to Japan, and foreign sailors who were shipwrecked there were massacred. An exception was made in the early part of the nineteenth century in so far as Dutch traders were concerned, and a limited number were allowed to come to Nagasaki under severe restrictions.

The Japanese obtained their first sight of a foreign warship when a British man-of-war entered the port of Nagasaki in 1808. It is described as having been 186 feet long and is said to have stood 10 feet above the water. On both sides of the ship were twenty-three guns, in two rows, besides two in the stern and bow of the vessel respectively, a total of fifty guns. It caused such a sensation that the local governor of Nagasaki committed hari-ki-ri—suicide by disemboweling—out of disgrace.

But it was Commodore Perry's visit with his four warships in 1853, compelling Japan to open her doors to foreign intercourse, that led to the abolition of the cen-

tures-old prohibition against the building of sea-going vessels and that gave to the Japanese the impetus to build a navy to defend themselves against the danger of foreign invasion, which was forcefully brought home to them.

The first attempt to build warships in Japan, along the lines of the foreign war vessels the Japanese had seen, failed. There were no shipbuilders in Japan, and the first boats built were top-heavy and keeled over. The Dutch were the closest at hand, since Dutch traders had been coming to Japan for some years, and it was to them that the Japanese turned and ordered two warships. In 1854 the Dutch government presented one of its own warships to Japan. The *Soembing*, as it was named, was a paddle-wheel steamer, mounted with five guns, and the Japanese renamed it the *Kanko*. It was Japan's first warship.

Several wooden warships were bought from Holland within the next few years, and just before the Restoration, in 1868, the Japanese Shogunate ordered an "armored man-of-war" from the United States. By the time the vessel was ready for delivery the Shogunate had been overthrown and Emperor Meiji had come to the throne. The American government therefore delivered the vessel to the Japanese Imperial Government and it was used in a naval battle to subdue the remaining rebel feudal clans. The Navy Minister of the Shogunate had fled with the fleet to Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan, refusing to yield to the Emperor's authority. Emperor Meiji recruited a naval force of wooden boats from among loyal clansmen, to which was added the "powerful" American man-of-war, which proved decisive in the battle. The ironclad *Azuma*, as it was known, was the Japanese counterpart of the American *Monitor*.

Eight years after Commodore Perry had sailed into Yedo Bay with his famous "black ships," the Japanese government dispatched the warship *Kanrin*, one of the first war boats purchased from Holland, to the United States on a mission to exchange the text of the first treaty of commerce with America, negotiated by Townsend Harris. The vessel was considerably damaged by storms in the eventful thirty-seven-day voyage across the Pacific

to San Francisco and was repaired at the Mare Island naval station at the expense of the American government, as a gesture of good will.

Not only were the Dutch the first to supply Japan with war boats, but they were the first to undertake to train Japanese seamen to operate the newly acquired ships, and a training school was established at Nagasaki in 1863 with Dutch instructors. Toward the end of the Shogunate, French instructors replaced the Dutch, and at the time of the Restoration, Britishers supplanted the French. From then on, up to the Russo-Japanese war, Britain played the leading part in building up the Japanese navy.

When Japan went to war against Russia in 1904, the entire Japanese fleet was composed of warships purchased from foreign nations, including six battleships, five cruisers, sixteen destroyers, and fifteen torpedo boats brought from England, including the *Mikasa*, Admiral Togo's flagship in the Battle of the Japan Sea; two cruisers from the United States; one cruiser and sixteen torpedo boats from France; one cruiser and thirteen torpedo boats from Germany; and two cruisers from Argentina which had been built in Italy.

It was during the Russo-Japanese war, when Japan found herself unable to purchase more warships from abroad because of the policy of neutrality of the foreign Powers, that she determined to try to build her own ships. The last warships purchased from abroad were two battleships ordered from England before the Russo-Japanese war but delivered afterwards. Since then, the Japanese navy has been built entirely in Japanese shipyards, which are now building some of the largest capital ships in the world.

When the Japanese started building their own boats for both war and commercial purposes, they encountered many difficulties, and many of their ships, even of recent construction, have proved top-heavy. A story widely told is that when Japan first began building passenger ships, she ordered two from England and, after receiving the blueprints, canceled the order and decided to build them herself from those plans. The British had anticipated this

possibility and had purposely drawn the plans in such a way that if they were followed out the boats would be out of balance. They are said to have capsized when they were launched. There is probably more fiction than truth to this story and I was never able to confirm it in Japan.

Several years ago a Japanese gunboat turned over on maneuvers in a rough sea and the crew perished. Several other gunboats engaged in the same maneuvers had narrow escapes. This accident was due to the warships mounting too-heavy equipment.

Thirty years ago the *Shinyo Maru*, a passenger liner of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, almost capsized in a storm on a transpacific crossing. It was top-heavy, and the upper deck had to be removed. In the autumn of 1940, passengers making the maiden voyage on the *Ywata Maru*, latest of the same line's passenger fleet, reported that the ship rolled unduly in smooth weather and that one evening, at dinner time, it almost keeled over suddenly, and all the chairs and dishes went rolling across the dining saloon for no apparent reason.

The four large passenger vessels of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, formerly used on the run to the West Coast of the United States—the *Tatuta Maru*, *Kamakura Maru*, *Nitta Maru*, and *Ywatta Maru*—were all built so they could be converted into aircraft carriers and are now probably serving with the Japanese fleet. When we crossed on the *Tatuta Maru* in the autumn of 1939, Japanese officers of the ship showed our children how the funnels could be pushed to the side and other changes made to clear the sun deck to be used as an aircraft carrier. We never found any of the Japanese ships steady or easy-going.

The Japanese have shown an extraordinary aptitude for adapting foreign inventions, choosing the best wherever they have found it. Their modern warships have combined features from all of the other navies, but they had not, until the present war, developed any innovation of their own. The "two-man" submarines, used in their attack on Hawaii on December 7, are the only invention in shipbuilding which the Japanese have developed on their own initiative. How useful they may be in warfare

remains a matter of speculation. One of two such vessels, known to have been used in the attack at Pearl Harbor, foundered on a reef. It is supposed these vessels are lowered from a "mother ship," possibly from a large submarine.

After World War I, a naval race developed which had its repercussions on both sides of the Pacific. Japan had an ambitious naval program—the so-called eight-eight plan—which provided for the building of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers. It was to allay the increasing tension between the United States and Japan that President Harding summoned the Washington Naval Conference in 1921, which established the famous 5—5—3 ratio for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, respectively, in so far as the larger capital ships were concerned, a rating to which Japan has found increasing objection through the years and which has rankled as much as the tripartite intervention of Russia, Germany, and France at the close of the Sino-Japanese war of 1895. It has, in fact, played a much more important role in Japanese policy in recent years than is generally supposed abroad and was a contributory factor in Japan's reversion to an ultra-nationalist, militaristic policy.

Japanese opposition to the naval ratio did not crystallize immediately. The Japanese were well-enough content with their newly acquired prestige in the post-war world which their participation in the peace structure had bestowed on them. The showdown did not come until after the London Naval Conference of 1930, which extended the 5—5—3 ratio to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

Admiral Takarabe, Japan's Navy Minister, was a delegate to the London Conference, and it was due to the circumstance of his absence that the Hamaguchi government was able to override naval opposition at home. It was Vice-Admiral Yamanashi, as Vice-Minister of the Navy, who sat in the fateful cabinet council in Tokyo which decided on Japan's acceptance of the London formula. Yamanashi, not being a cabinet member, had no voice, and it was Premier Hamaguchi who cast the navy's vote as

Acting Minister of the Navy. Hamaguchi later paid for this act with his life when he was assassinated by a fanatical youth who said he opposed the London naval pact.

Admiral Kanji Kato, Chief of the Navy General Staff, then carried the navy's opposition directly to the Emperor, using his prerogative of direct access to the Throne in matters under his jurisdiction. He contended that the government had no authority to accept the treaty without consulting the Navy General Staff. His appeal to the Emperor was ignored and he was compelled to resign, but he became the champion of a cause which, though at first supported by only navy extremists, finally enlisted the whole of the Japanese navy.

At the time of the dispute over the London treaty I went one afternoon to interview Admiral Kato at his home in the outskirts of Tokyo. I drove for an hour along Japanese streets, one like another—the usual two-story buildings huddled close together mile after mile—until the car stopped before a Japanese house that looked like any other. I pushed the wooden sliding door and a bell tinkled. A student in uniform came running. I gave him my card, in English and Japanese.

He pushed open a door on the left and I could see Admiral Kato, in kimono, squatting on a cushion on the matted floor. He looked straight at me and said gruffly to the student, in Japanese: "Tell him I am out." Kato had no liking for foreigners, particularly Americans.

In recent years, advocates of the London treaty have been weeded out from the naval ranks one by one and placed on the retired list. By the end of 1934, when the second London Naval Conference took place, Japan was claiming naval parity, which would, in effect, have given her naval supremacy in the Pacific, where she has many bases close at hand. When this was refused her, she quit the conference and denounced the Washington treaty.

No sooner was the ink dry on the first London naval treaty than the Japanese navy began to devise ways to strengthen Japan's sea forces by all the available means left open. Before the end of 1930 Japan had drawn up the first of a series of four so-called "replenishment" pro-

grams. The first two three-year programs were published, but by the time Japan came to planning a third program in 1937, a policy of strict secrecy had been inaugurated and the other Powers have been left to guess what Japan was building from the round-figure budgets presented to the Diet, which have given few clues.

The naval strength of Japan in ships built and building has been compiled by reliable American sources as of October 10, 1941, as follows:

	BUILT	BUILDING
Battleships	10	8
Aircraft carriers	8	2
Cruisers	46	10
Destroyers	125	11
Submarines	71	7

Japan is believed to have since completed one new battleship and two aircraft carriers, bringing the total number of battleships to eleven and aircraft carriers to ten.

The same list for the United States, for comparative purposes, is given as follows:

	BUILT	BUILDING
Battleships	17	15
Aircraft carriers	6	12
Cruisers	37	54
Destroyers	171	193
Submarines	113	73

Neither of these lists takes into account the gains and losses in the present war.

While the greatest secrecy has been maintained regarding the details of Japan's last two building programs, it has been supposed for the past five or six years that Japan was building at least four giant capital ships of about 42,000 tons each. A study of Japanese naval budgets disclosed that it would be possible for Japan to build two of these ships—estimated to cost 120,000,000 yen each (\$30,000,000)—with the auxiliary vessels needed to round out the Japanese fleet within the cost of the four-year naval program initiated in 1937-38 and due to be completed in

1941-42. In addition, special funds appropriated for the Japanese navy in connection with the China war, far in excess of actual needs, would have enabled Japan to build another two of the larger capital ships. Japan has four or five naval shipyards where it is believed she could build such large ships, including the Kawasaki dockyard in Kobe and the naval bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, and Maizuru.

Japan's naval plans have been kept so secret since Japan quit the second London Naval Conference in 1934 that they are said to be known to only a dozen of the nation's highest naval officers and a score of technicians employed in the drafting of the plans. The story is told in Tokyo of a Brazilian mission of naval cadets who were being escorted around the Yokosuka naval base when one of them commented to the Japanese officer who was showing them the sights that there seemed to be nothing going on, to which their Japanese guide is said to have replied: "There's a forty-thousand tonner building over there." This was taken to be a revealing slip of the tongue.

There have been reports, too, that, in addition to the four large capital ships said to be on the ways, Japan is also building a new type of pocket battleship or super-cruiser of about 15,000 tons and that she may have as many as four of these under construction. This would bring the total number of battleships, building, up to eight, as listed in the American estimate.

There is good reason to believe that the larger capital ships Japan is building are to be mounted with 16-inch guns. Japan flatly refused a limitation on gun caliber at fourteen inches, proposed by Britain in 1937, and Japanese experiments with 18-inch guns, reported to have been carried out at the Yokosuka naval base several years ago, were said to have been a failure.

Perhaps the most significant development, in so far as the Japanese navy is concerned, is the fact that Japanese naval building had been falling behind schedule increasingly and cumulatively in 1941. This is attributed to the shortage of steel consequent upon the decline in Japan's imports of iron ore and scrap iron due to embar-

goes by the United States and other nations which made Japan reliant upon the limited product of Manchukuo while Japan has encountered great obstacles in exploiting North China because of Chinese resistance and guerrilla tactics. The delay in the Japanese building program has affected all classes of vessels, but particularly the larger ones. It reveals clearly that Japan's war effort is limited by her industrial resources, and this situation will become the more critical for Japan as the need for replacement of her war losses grows and as the United States gets into her full industrial stride.

CHAPTER 7

Japan's Economic Position

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC position is the weakest point in her armor. Those of us who saw, at first hand, evidence of her economic deterioration on all sides cannot but remain amazed at her audacity in launching upon a major war against a combination of Powers whose potential economic strength and resources are so vastly superior to hers that she can never, under the most favorable circumstances, hope to remotely equal them.

At the time of Japan's entry into war against the United States her economic situation was worse than that of Germany at the outset of the European war, though it resembled it in many respects. Long before the outbreak of the European war in the summer of 1939, the German people had been on a virtual war footing, with a strict system of rationing in effect which afforded them a bare living. Now, with a large part of the continent of Europe under Nazi armed occupation, the German position has been improved at the cost of the conquered peoples, who are on the verge of starvation. Germany, as was widely recognized at the outset of the war, had to make quick conquests in Europe to keep going.

The same is true of Japan. She must continue to grab quickly in Asia and to exploit her gains as rapidly as she acquires them in order to replenish her stocks and replace her losses in arms and equipment, or otherwise she will find herself without the wherewithal to carry on. It is a desperate undertaking Japan has launched upon, in which time is an all-important factor. Unlike Germany, Japan has shown herself incapable, in the last ten years of conquest on the continent of Asia, of successfully exploiting the resources of the conquered territories; nor has she been able, as have the Germans, to put the conquered peoples to work for her. Japan has failed to make the

Chinese in Manchukuo or in North China work for her but rather they have undermined Japanese efforts. The Japanese are not good colonizers and they stand isolated even in the communities over which they have acquired military control.

It must be borne in mind that Japan unloosed the present war after four years of fighting in China which had already severely drained her resources and had made a deep imprint on the national existence. Japan's trade with Europe had dwindled to a mere fraction of what it used to be because of the European war, and her trade with the United States had been virtually at a standstill since the end of July owing to American embargoes. Her trade in the Orient, too, had been hard hit by British and Dutch restrictions, and her only unrestricted area of trading was with the so-called yen bloc, comprising Manchukuo and northern China. Japan's trade with the democracies alone represented 70 per cent of her total trade. Now she is virtually isolated with few raw materials available and her reserves dwindling rapidly through her lavish use of war materials over a widely scattered fighting area.

If Japan succeeds in holding the Dutch East Indies with their great wealth of raw materials; if Japan is able to maintain her communications, uninterrupted, with these far-flung areas of the southern Pacific; and if she is able to turn the raw materials in her factories into finished products and send them back to those areas where her troops are fighting—then she can last a long time; not indefinitely, because even these conquests will not provide her with all of the raw materials she requires for replenishing her war needs.

The Dutch East Indies are now within Japan's grasp which opens up vast new supplies to Japan and shuts them off from other Powers, but it will take time for the Japanese to repair the oil wells and to restore the properties destroyed by the Dutch in pursuance of their "scorched earth" policy before they can tap these great resources. Japan may be able, with the naval supremacy she now enjoys in Asia, to keep open her communications so that the raw materials may be conveyed to her factories and

sent back to her fighting forces as finished products, but Japan's naval superiority is a temporary factor. Before very long she will be outbuilt by the United States. The present lack of steel in Japan has made it impossible for Japan to carry out her present building program on schedule. Great battleships are said to rest on their ways, uncompleted in Japanese dockyards. But more important is the fact that Japanese industries are vulnerable to attack from the air, and this is the most vital point in Japan's armor and one that cannot be overlooked. The sooner American bombers are able to unload their missiles over Japan's industrial centers, the sooner will Japan be brought to her knees, for once the wheels of industry cease to turn, the days of Japan's resistance will be numbered by her shrinking stocks.

Honshu, the main island of Japan, is slightly smaller than the state of California, and only 16 per cent of that area is arable; the remainder—rocky volcanic soil—is waste. It is this small portion, approximately one fifth of the size of the state of California, that Japan's cities and industrial centers are concentrated in a narrow strip of territory stretching from Osaka, Japan's Pittsburgh, along the coast line to Kyushu, the southernmost tip of the island, a distance of only 400 miles—scarcely more than an hour's flying distance.

Japanese military leaders have long been aware of this danger to the nation's industry, and some effort was made to establish new factories in the northern island of Hokkaido or in Manchukuo, but it was largely a matter of expanding existing industries to meet the needs, wherever they happened to be located. Japan's wartime industries have grown up mushroomlike, and many of the newly constructed buildings that cluster about the original factories are of only the flimsiest material. It is easy, therefore, to imagine the immense damage that air raids over this area could do to Japanese industry and to the lasting power of Japan in war. While Japan undoubtedly has sufficient stocks of primary war materials safely stowed away to last possibly a year or more, it would mean putting a definite time limit to Japan's endurance.

Bombing of Japanese industries would create irreparable damage in most cases, for unlike many of the European countries which have suffered from air raids, there is virtually no possibility of replacing the machinery in Japan, the bulk of which has been imported, while there is a lack of iron and other metals as well as of building materials. Whereas the British, for example, were able to rehabilitate their damaged factories and industrial centers after the German *Blitz* in the autumn of 1940 and the spring of 1941, the Japanese, unless they can establish a direct link with Germany, would be in no position to do so.

Air raids over Japan would also severely shake Japanese morale and would sow widespread panic among a people who have never tasted war or invasion at home and whose paper and matchwood cities would be a devastating prey to incendiarism. I well remember the popular uneasiness in Japan in the summer of 1938, when Japanese and Russian forces clashed at Changkufeng on the Russo-Manchukuo frontier and when it was feared Russian planes might be over us any night, a two-hours flying distance from Vladivostok. Japanese radio stations stopped broadcasting weather reports and Japanese planes flew over Tokyo day and night on the watch-out for possible raiders.

Any casual visitor to Japan knows how flimsy are the Japanese houses. Tokyo, the capital, with a population of 6,778,804, according to the 1940 census, covers an area of approximately 214 square miles of which the Marunouchi district—Tokyo's business area—consists of only about four square miles. With the exception of this small district in the center of the capital—where are located the railway station, the banks, and the principal business concerns, in modern concrete, stone, or brick buildings—the remainder of the city is made up of the average two-story Japanese house built only of wood, frequently covered with a thin layer of stucco, with paper sliding doors.

The same is true to an even greater extent of the other large Japanese cities—such as Osaka, the great industrial center; Kobe, the port of Osaka; Yokohama, the port to Tokyo—where there are comparatively few modern build-

ings. The greatest danger to these cities is, of course, from fire, and they are constantly the prey of large conflagrations. A large part of Tokyo was destroyed by fire in the great earthquake of 1923, while Yokohama has thrice burned to the ground. Fires which wipe out entire cities are common enough in Japan. Some of the lesser towns, such as Hakodate, Numazu, Shizuoka, the tea-growing center, and other cities have burned to the ground at various times.

How closely Japanese industry is crowded into the Osaka-Kobe area is told by Burton Crane, former financial editor of the *Japan Advertiser*, who wrote recently: "Flying almost in a straight line from Sakai, on the eastern borders of Osaka, to the western edge of Kobe, bombers would pass over such vital objectives as the Japan Dye-stuff Manufacturing Company plant, now making explosives; the Kawasaki Dockyard, biggest maker of rolled steel products; the Japan Steel Tube Company, biggest maker of pipes; the Kobe Steel Works; the Osaka Iron Works; the metal refineries and engineering works of the Mitsubishi and Sumitomo companies; several shipyards; several steam standby plants and substations; and the facilities of Kobe harbor, main shipping point of supplies to the forces abroad."

The fire hazard has been increased in recent years by the heavy drain on the water supply due to the great activity in wartime industries, which have been working under great pressure in preparation for the present war. In Tokyo, during the summer of 1940, the water shortage was so acute—officially attributed to a supposed drought—that it had to be rationed to one hour's supply in the morning and one in the evening. The contents of the reservoir had sunk in May and June from the normal twenty million tons of water to only one million tons. At that point an epidemic was feared, and we were prepared to leave the city if need be.

We used to turn on our spigots in the bathtubs and leave them on for whenever the water would come. The ration hours were from five to six o'clock in the morning and four to five o'clock in the evening. Owing to the distance

of our house from the reservoir, however, and the fact that everyone was drawing water at the same time along the way, our supply did not last over fifteen minutes of each period. For three days in June we were without a single drop of water for any purpose. We had to send out buckets and bottles to draw water elsewhere. Complaints to the Foreign Office by the American Embassy next door eventually assured us our daily limited ration by special arrangement with the Tokyo water works.

On the night of June 20, 1940, when we had had no water for three days, there was a thunderstorm, and lightning struck a number of government buildings, which burned down. Owing to the shortage of water, the fire spread rapidly and seemed for a while to threaten the whole residential part of Tokyo. Firemen, however, were able to pump sufficient water out of the Imperial Palace moat, close at hand, to extinguish the fire.

The Japanese do all their washing in low wooden tubs on the floor, and in order to bring the water down to that level from the spigots, they attach rubber hoses. When the water was turned off, the suction was so great that the dirty washing water was drawn into the pipes and the water was thus contaminated, giving rise to a serious threat of epidemic.

Japan is a poor country in resources, lacking almost all of the raw materials necessary for her war industries. Some of the more important commodities in which Japan is lacking are: oil, scrap iron, pig iron, iron ore, copper, lead, aluminum, nickel, rubber, wool, cotton, pulp for rayon and for paper, chemicals, and hides and leathers. For all of these she has been dependent in the past on imports, principally from the United States. Some of them will become available to her if she captures the Dutch East Indies—such as oil, rubber, tin, iron, lead, and copper—but they will not supply the entire demands of war time industries and will leave her short of one of her greatest needs—steel to replace lost warships.

Japan's vast cotton-textile industry, which outstripped Manchester and has provided the principal item in Japan's export trade, surpassing even silk, has been shattered by

Japan's virtual inability to import raw cotton, the bulk of which came from the United States; her rayon plants, hitherto a rapidly developing industry, are in the same position because of her lack of imported wood pulp, while her woolen mills have been almost at a standstill. On the other hand, raw silk, Japan's second most important item of export, has become a drug on the Japanese market with nowhere to send it. Large farming areas, formerly given over to the cultivation of mulberry leaves to feed the silkworms, are being converted to grow wheat, barley, and other products.

In the copy of the German methods, Japan has established a system of controlled economy which has been gradually tightened on the totalitarian pattern. Industries have been amalgamated to work for the state, and profits pared down. The National Mobilization Law of 1938 provided the backbone for the series of government ordinances and decrees which have placed business and industry under increasingly strict control. The government was empowered to conscript labor; regulate working conditions; control production, consumption, and exchange of goods; confiscate property; compel the formation of business associations; regulate the use of funds; and limit prices and profits.

There has been a shortage of skilled labor in Japan and of electrical power, which has greatly handicapped Japanese industry. The labor shortage has been due in part to the fact that close to three million men are serving in the armed forces, while the new demands of industries could not be met by a population which has been engaged largely in agricultural pursuits. The shortage of electric power is the result of the sudden industrial expansion. A maximum twelve-hour working day has been decreed in the machinery, shipbuilding, rolling stock, and metallurgical industries, and a minimum two days' holiday a month was made compulsory.

At the outset of the China war in 1937 there were 7,344,950 laborers engaged in Japanese industry, according to official figures, and as no statistics have been published since, there is no way of knowing how many millions more

are now enrolled in the war industries, but a new class of *nouveau riche* laborer has grown up in Japan and has made a marked change in the country's social structure. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese workers in munition plants are now earning ten times what they made previously and have paper yen to spend in abundance. Their problem is to find anything to buy with their newly acquired wealth. As the stores are virtually empty, they spend their money traveling about the country on trains which are packed beyond capacity; patronizing bars, cafés, and tea houses where geisha girls, who came near to facing extinction several years ago with the trend toward modernism, have made a comeback; and at movies and theaters.

Not only are workers profiting by the munitions boom, but other laborers, who plodded away in the past for a mere pittance, are becoming money-conscious. On the last day I worked as editor of the *Japan Advertiser* before it was turned over to Japanese ownership, Yamada-san, an old typesetter who had worked long on the paper, came up to my office to get my editorial, as he had done every evening for upwards of ten years, and I gave him my silver cigarette case as a personal memento. Yamada-san took it with his inky hands and bowed himself out of the office. He was an unassuming man in his late fifties who held aloof from the other workers, with apparently no interest in political affairs, the world situation, or the politics of the office, which, among Japanese in the composing room, were almost as complex as those of their government. He brought his dinner with him in a small metal container and would sneak off into a corner with a pair of chopsticks and eat his rice and pickled plum by himself.

A few days later, when we were packing up, Yamada-san, neatly dressed in a foreign suit, called at my home with his wife. They brought a roll of expensive kimono material as a farewell present to my wife. I felt greatly embarrassed, knowing that he had earned a salary of only 150 yen (\$37.50) a month on the paper. He said he had quit the *Advertiser* and would not work for the new management. He was going to retire. I offered to try to find him another job, but he declined, saying he was going to

look after his business interests in and around the big city.

When I inquired what his business interests were, he admitted he owned forty small houses on the outskirts of Tokyo which brought him in a rental of 50 yen each a month, a total income of 2,000 yen a month. He said he had used his salary at the *Japan Advertiser* to indulge in his hobby of collecting dwarf trees. He had just built himself a new home with hothouses, and he invited me to come and see it, which, unfortunately in the last rush before leaving, I did not have time to do. To my growing astonishment, Yamada-san said that he had been in the United States years ago, doing odd jobs—serving as a waiter in restaurants and as a stevedore—and had made a collection of paintings which he had just sold, at the peak of the boom in Japan, for 60,000 yen (\$15,000). He also had a collection of Chinese curios and was well acquainted with all the periods. My own gift seemed so inadequate that I hastened to add another Chinese curio to his collection.

Shortages of food and daily necessities began to manifest themselves in Japan in the summer of 1939, and they have multiplied and grown apace since then. Rice and fish are staple foods necessary to every Japanese family, and while Japan's principal agricultural product is rice, and fish abound in the seas about the Japanese isles, there is a shortage of both of these.

For the years 1940 and 1941 the rice crops were poor, while Japan has had to export four times as much rice as previously to feed her armies scattered over the continent of Asia and some of the populations in areas under Japanese domination in China, because of the necessity of keeping on close terms with the puppet regimes set up in those areas. Since the end of 1939 the Japanese people at home have been eating "brown rice," which is partially polished and is considered more nutritive, but for which they have no taste. White rice has been a luxury difficult to obtain.

For a long time the Japanese hesitated to ration rice, fearing it would create popular uneasiness, and a system was adopted whereby storekeepers served only regular clients with whatever proportion they could spare. New-

comers were not served. Just before the present war, however, rice was officially rationed to an amount approximating a handful a day per person, whereas the average consumption is about three bowls a day, and some Japanese eat as many as five bowlfuls.

The shortage of fish is attributed to two causes: the lack of fishermen because Japan maintains an army of between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 under arms, which has drained her man power at home, and the lack of gasoline for fishing boats. General Tojo, as War Minister in the preceding Konoye cabinet, determined to investigate for himself the cause of the fish shortage and made a surprise visit to the Tokyo fish market last summer. When he was told by fishermen that their main trouble was the lack of gasoline for their fishing vessels, he advised them to "rise earlier and work longer hours."

Next in importance in the everyday life of the Japanese is charcoal, which serves for cooking and heating by means of charcoal braziers. Charcoal was strictly rationed in the winter of 1940-41 to one bale per family for the four coldest winter months extending from December to March inclusive. Meat, butter, eggs, milk, and potatoes had been virtually unobtainable for over a year, while sugar, salt, flour, and a whole list of other commodities were on the ticket-ration list.

While the Japanese have gradually schooled themselves to these hardships, they have not accepted them without a great deal of grumbling and dissatisfaction, which they have ill concealed under a system of internal terrorism which bans all freedom of expression. We, who had heard so much of Japanese patriotism, were continually shocked at the ingenious manner in which the people sought continually to circumvent the series of decrees and regulations which were imposed upon them. This attempted evasion was accompanied by widespread graft which seemed to permeate almost every walk of life. I do not mean to imply that Japanese popular dissatisfaction will cause an internal upheaval, for now that Japan is engaged in a struggle of the present magnitude, with the national existence at stake, there will probably be far less disposition to escape

the restrictions, but what I do mean to stress is that Japan entered the present war at a low ebb in so far as the existence of the people is concerned and that the specter of a long war cannot but make them fearful.

With a population of 105,226,101 in the Japanese Empire, Japan's man power in war is virtually inexhaustible in relation to any other nation, excepting possibly China. Her navy, little used in the course of the China war but held on a war footing in constant readiness, is at its peak, and her armed forces are backed by reserve supplies accumulated over a period of years. These are advantages that cannot be maintained with a seriously impaired economy which may be partially redeemed by exploitation of new conquests, but which, in the long run, is bound to take its toll.

CHAPTER 8

The Washington Negotiations

THE FIRST emperor of Japan, Jimmu Tenno, who ascended the throne in 660 B.C., is credited with having issued an Imperial Rescript, more legendary than historical, which is literally rather clumsily translated to read in part: "We shall found the Empire and cover the whole of that which is under the heavens." This rescript has been repeatedly cited by Japanese leaders, particularly within recent years, as pointing the way to Japan's path of world conquest.

I have watched Japan's plan of conquest develop during the past twelve years with sheer amazement, partly at the mentality which conceives such schemes, evidence of an extraordinary egotism, and gain at the ingenuity which attempts to translate them into reality. No dream seems too wild for the fancy of Japanese military leaders, and the wildest ideas take roots with time and assume tangible form.

Japan's program of conquest today embodies all the dreams of Japanese military leaders rolled into one. If Japanese leaders had their way, they would create an empire extending all the way from Lake Baikal, in eastern Siberia, to Australia and India, embracing a territory containing half of the world's population. There are not limits to Japan's appetite and no confines to her schemes of conquest other than sheer physical barriers.

It was only three years ago that former Premier Konoye first spoke of establishing a "New Order in East Asia," which was to consist merely of an economic bloc between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. Three years ago, former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka said Japan's New Order went far beyond that and extended to Thailand and Burma but did not include Australia and New Zealand. Now Japan's armies are scattered over the map of Asia all

the way from the northern frontier of Manchukuo, through China, Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Thailand, and Burma and were within threatening range of Australia and India. There is no doubt too that if an appropriate moment occurs, Japan will attack eastern Siberia in an attempt to annex the maritime province with the important port of Vladivostok, the eastern gateway to Europe.

Twelve years ago an active American military attaché had in his office in Tokyo a map on which he had traced Japan's future scheme of Empire in Asia. It extended from Lake Baikal to the Yangtze River and was considered fantastic by his colleagues. Today such a scheme falls far short of Japan's ambitions and her actual military aims.

There is a racial element, too, in Japan's bid for conquest in Asia which has been expressed by Rear Admiral Goompey Sekine of the Japanese navy, a former spokesman of the Tokyo Navy Department, now retired, who has written of Japan's New Order:

"Once Orientals were powerful, as shown by Genghis Khan who overran great portions even of Europe. But with the change of the world current of power from East to West, Orientals have been forced to lead lives of forbearance and suffering for over three hundred years under the iron yoke of Westerners and especially of the English and Russians. Establishment of a 'New Order in East Asia' has been undertaken to create a co-operate body for the emancipation of the Oriental races akin to our own people. This idea is by no means new. It is to be traced back 2,600 years to the founding of the Japanese Empire." This is no doubt a reference to the first Imperial Rescript of Emperor Jimmu.

Perhaps the clearest statement of Japanese aims under the so-called New Order was that of Hachiro Arita, Foreign Minister in the cabinet of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, in the summer of 1940, who declared:

"It seems to be a most natural step that peoples who are closely related geographically, racially, culturally, and economically should first form a sphere of their own for coexistence and co-prosperity and establish peace and order

within that sphere, and at the same time secure a relationship of common existence and prosperity with other spheres.

"... The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically, racially, and economically very closely related to one another. They are destined to co-operate and minister to one another's needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote the peace and progress of their regions. The uniting of all these regions under a single sphere on the basis of common existence and the insuring thereby of the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion. . . . This system presupposes the existence of a stabilizing force in each region with which as a center the peoples of that region are to secure their coexistence and coprosperity as well as the stability of their sphere. . . .

"Japan, while she is carrying on vigorously her task of constructing a 'New Order in East Asia,' is paying serious attention to developments in the European war and to its repercussions in the various quarters of East Asia, including the South Seas region. I desire to declare that the destiny of these regions—any development therein and any disposal thereof—is a matter for grave concern to Japan in view of her mission and responsibility as the stabilizing force in East Asia."

Although Japan's ideas of conquest have grown considerably since Arita made his statement, it gives a general idea of the plan for the enslavement of the peoples of Asia under Japanese domination.

There is every reason to believe that Japan's decision to go to war with the United States was reached when the Konoye government yielded to the military cabinet of Premier Hideki Tojo on October 17, 1941. It was no mere change of cabinet in the ordinary sense, but the culmination of a long struggle behind scenes in which the issue of war or peace in the Pacific hung in the balance and which was settled in favor of war when the Japanese army, which was urging it, openly took over the reins of government.

Former Premier Konoye tried to avert war with the

United States and to placate the army. It was in line with that policy that the Konoye government initiated negotiations with the American government in March 1941, shortly after the arrival of Ambassador Nomura in Washington, but Konoye never had enough leeway to make an agreement with the United States possible. The Konoye government sought to obtain by peaceful means what the Tojo government has set out to gain by war—recognition of Japan's hegemony over the whole of Asia. It is now evident that Tojo never had any faith in the negotiations and that he only made use of them as a blind for the military preparations which his government immediately set into motion and which culminated in the attack on Hawaii.

When Ambassador Nomura came to Washington in January 1941, he had no illusions regarding the task ahead of him. He had refused the offer of the post twice before. He was finally talked into it, and it was understood that he yielded to former Foreign Minister Matsuoka's entreaties only on the understanding that he would not be sidetracked in the same way that three other Japanese ambassadors had been before him: Katsuji Debuchi, the late Hiroshi Saito, and Kensuke Horinouchi, and that his advice would be heeded. As things turned out, Nomura was left out more on a limb than any of his predecessors, and his position was rendered the more precarious when Saburo Kurusu was sent over as special envoy.

Nomura faced a tense situation from the moment he stepped from the train at Union Station in Washington to be greeted by German and Italian diplomats, representatives of Japan's Axis partners, a most unusual procedure, as it is customary to leave the reception of a foreign envoy to the government to which he is accredited. On the same day, President Roosevelt told his press conference that if the United States should get into a war in the Far East it would not affect deliveries of American war materials to Great Britain. President Roosevelt has an acute sense of timing, and the fact that he made the remark, coincident with the new Japanese envoy's arrival, seemed to convey a warning to Japan that America was prepared to face trou-

ble in two oceans simultaneously if this was necessary.

Nomura's call on Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the following day, remains the shortest diplomatic visit ever made by an ambassador to the State Department. Nomura remained only four minutes in Mr. Hull's office, and the briefness of his visit contrasted vividly at the time with the arrival of Viscount Halifax, the British ambassador, who had been met at Annapolis by President Roosevelt and who remained with Mr. Hull for over an hour at their first meeting.

Very little was seen of Nomura during the ensuing months, and it was supposed he was keeping entirely to himself, until British Prime Minister Winston Churchill disclosed in a speech in the House of Commons on August 24, after his return from his Atlantic meeting with President Roosevelt, that talks were taking place between the United States and Japan and warned Japan that if the negotiations failed, Britain would not hesitate to range herself at America's side. It then became known that Ambassador Nomura had been meeting Secretary Hull secretly in his apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel since the first days of March in an attempt to find a basis for a Pacific settlement.

These talks were initiated by the Japanese. Mr. Hull called them "exploratory" and they were never formalized until Kurusu's arrival as special envoy in November. As Nomura's English was barely understandable, the talks were conducted through the medium of interpreters. Nomura was accompanied by Torikichi Obata, a secretary of the Japanese embassy, who returned to Tokyo in October to report to his government, and later by another secretary, while Hull generally had Joseph W. Ballantine, chief of the Japanese Section in the State Department, a Japanese linguist, on hand.

The conversations, which were at first desultory, were abandoned altogether when Japan made an agreement with Vichy for further penetration into Indo-China in April. The situation was further aggravated and reached one of the recurrent crises when Japanese troops moved into southern Indo-China, and President Roosevelt struck

back late in July with an order freezing all Japanese assets and an oil embargo. From then on, Japan received no supplies of any kind from this country, as no funds were permitted to be unfrozen.

It was in the face of this complete embargo that the Japanese government made a bid for a reopening of the talks early in August, and Ambassador Nomura followed this up, on August 28, when he called at the White House with a personal message from Premier Konoye addressed to President Roosevelt, accepting a set of four principles previously put forward by Mr. Hull as a basis of negotiations, and suggesting a meeting between himself and President Roosevelt for a personal discussion of Pacific problems. I reported this, in an exclusive dispatch to the *New York Herald Tribune* on September 3, which then brought a denial from the White House that President Roosevelt had received such an "invitation."

Mr. Hull's principles, to which Premier Konoye subscribed, have since been disclosed as follows:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

In replying to this note on September 3, President Roosevelt insisted that there should be a further clarification of these principles in their application to the problems of the Pacific as a prerequisite to his meeting Premier Konoye. In his message to Congress, reviewing the course of American-Japanese relations, on December 15, President Roosevelt declared:

"I should have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan. . . . But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic principles. This government tried hard—but without success—to obtain such assurance from the Japanese government."

On the afternoon of August 28, after Ambassador Nomura had called with Konoye's message at the White House, I felt I should try to find out from the Japanese embassy, if possible, what was in Konoye's note, so I went around to the embassy and asked to see the ambassador. The reply came that the ambassador was too busy, but I should see Mr. Terasaki, the first secretary, instead.

Mr. Terasaki greeted me cordially and said he remembered his wife had met my wife in Tokyo some ten years ago. I replied politely that I was sure Mrs. Fleisher would be very glad to see Mrs. Terasaki again.

He went on to explain that the ambassador was too busy to see me and had asked him to tell me a little story.

"There was a father and a son," he said, "who had been quarreling for ten years. At the end of that time, the son went to the father and said: 'Father, I am sorry I was wrong.' Then the father went to the son and said: 'Son, I am sorry, I was wrong too.' After that they got on perfectly well together. Today," Mr. Terasaki added, "Japan came to America, now it is up to America to come to Japan."

I felt the story was too insignificant to report, but in my dispatch to the New York *Herald Tribune* that evening I included a paragraph saying a spokesman of the Japanese embassy had indicated that, in any negotiations, concessions would have to come from both sides.

The following morning, my telephone rang, and Mr. Terasaki was on the other end of the wire. Very formally, he said:

"With reference to my conversation of yesterday, I wish to make two corrections: first, my wife never met your wife, and, second, I never said that Japan would make any concessions—good-bye," and Mr. Terasaki hung up the receiver.

On September 6, Premier Konoye personally told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that he "subscribed fully" to the Hull principles, but on the same day Ambassador Nomura delivered a note to Secretary Hull which immediately narrowed down the application of those principles. The Japanese government sought to limit the principle of com-

mercial equality to the southwest Pacific—namely, the Dutch East Indies, where Japan wanted a greater share of trade—instead of being applicable to the whole Pacific area, and insisted upon certain reservations with regard to China because of “geographical propinquity.” In other words, Japan lent lip service to the principles but at the same time gave evidence that she did not intend to see them applied.

In a long note addressed to Japan on October 2, the American government expressed “disappointment” that the Japanese government had sought to “narrow down and restrict” the principles agreed to and to circumscribe “its assurances of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases,” and questioned whether a meeting between the heads of state under such circumstances would be of any avail. It demanded a “clear-cut manifestation of Japan’s intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China.”

In informal talks that followed between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese envoy pointed to the difficulty of Japan withdrawing her troops from China, which, he argued, would bring into the open a conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China and would result in chaos. He pointed to cases in which the United States had maintained troops in certain Latin-American countries in the past, to which Mr. Hull replied that such a policy was no longer being followed and that it had been found that it perpetuated a situation of instability. To this, Nomura agreed.

By the end of October the talks were deadlocked with the same wide breach dividing the two countries. The main questions at issue were: Japan’s attitude toward the Axis, from which Secretary Hull sought to wean her; Japan’s refusal to withdraw her troops from China and Indo-China; and her reservations with regard to the application of the principle of non-discrimination of trade in the Pacific area. In fact, the only point upon which any progress had been made in the entire Hull-Nomura talks was that looking toward eventual restoration of trade in

the event an agreement was satisfactorily concluded.

During the whole of the American-Japanese negotiations there were two distinct viewpoints prevailing within the State Department and in other Administration quarters regarding the policy which the American government ought to follow in its dealings with Japan. There were those who would appease Japan, at least as a temporary expedient. Their argument, well enough known, was that the United States should not become involved in a war in two oceans simultaneously, and since the Nazi menace was the greater, it should be dealt with first, and a truce should be made with Japan, even at the expense of China. They contended that if Germany were defeated, Japan would *ipso facto* yield to pressure later without even a fight. The other group considered that Japan was in league with Germany and Italy—the Japanese were allies of the European Axis nations—and that Japan's game was part and parcel of a world movement by nations committed to a doctrine of force and conquest. They believed that an agreement with the present-day military Japan was beyond reach. This group was bitterly opposed to any accord which would mean "selling China down the river." These groups had their say and their ups and downs during the negotiations, which proved beyond a doubt that the appeasers were in the wrong.

There were some in the "appeaser" group who went so far as to believe, when General Tojo became Premier of Japan in October, that it was a victory for the cause of moderation because he, as a strong man, would be able to hold the Japanese army in leash. The same element interpreted the establishment of the new defense headquarters in Tokyo as a step to place the extremists under control, whereas it is now crystal clear, as it should have been then to anyone acquainted with the situation existing in Japan within recent years, that the advent of Tojo as Premier meant the advent of the Japanese military to full power in Japan and that the establishment of the defense headquarters was a move preparatory to a major war.

By the end of October, Japan's attitude became menacing. The American government was given to understand

that there was a time limit to the negotiations and that an agreement, if any was to come out of the talks, would have to be reached before November 15, when Premier Tojo had convened a special session of the Diet. A few days before the scheduled Diet meeting the Japanese government suddenly announced its intention to dispatch Saburo Kurusu as a special envoy to this country, ostensibly in an eleventh-hour effort to avert a break. Actually, as is now known, Kurusu's departure from Japan about coincided with the dispatch of the three aircraft carriers which took Japanese planes to within striking distance of Hawaii, and Kurusu's mission appears to have been only to stall for time until Japan's military plans were completed.

Kurusu's arrival in Washington coincided with a loud beating of war drums in the Japanese Diet. When the special envoy made his first call with Ambassador Nomura at the State Department on the morning of November 17, Secretary of State Hull had before him on his desk newspapers containing the text of belligerent speeches delivered to the Japanese parliament by both Premier Tojo and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, breathing animosity against the United States. Tojo placed the onus for a Pacific settlement at America's door and called upon the United States to end the so-called "economic blockade" of Japan, halt the "military encirclement" which he alleged the A.B.C.D. nations had thrown about Japan, and observe a hands-off policy with regard to China.

These speeches in themselves seemed plainly to belie any intention on the part of Japan to arrive at a peaceful settlement with the United States, the professed objective of Kurusu's mission, and they were followed up the next day by more saber-rattling when the Japanese War and Navy Ministers reported to the Diet that the two services had "completed all necessary preparations."

Secretary Hull had never shown any enthusiasm for Kurusu's mission. He had merely indicated he would be treated as an assistant to Ambassador Nomura. The Administration saw no particular reason for superseding Nomura, and the latter was given precedence on all occa-

sions. As things turned out, Kurusu did not bring any new instructions, and as the ground had been thoroughly canvassed and all possibilities explored before his arrival, there was little more to be done.

On the occasion of Kurusu's first call, Mr. Hull reiterated to the two Japanese envoys his fundamental principles, which Konoye had accepted as a basis for discussion, and he listened with patience, if also irritation, to the well-worn Japanese arguments about establishing a "New Order in East Asia" and a "co-prosperity sphere" among all the nations of the Pacific. He tried to picture for the Japanese his conception of a world in which government was carried on by law and orderly processes based on justice, morals, and principles for preserving the freedom of individual nations as against the doctrine of force, conquest, and subjugation of conquered peoples espoused by the Axis nations.

Kurusu said the Tojo government was pressed for time and wanted a quick decision. The reason for the Tokyo government's haste was evident. Japan was feeling increasingly the severe pinch of the embargoes imposed by the United States and the other democratic nations and had to choose between renouncing her policy of conquest under the economic pressure brought to bear on her or striking for a quick cleanup. Each day, Japan was using up her reserves without being able to replenish them.

Mr. Hull's terms—endorsed by President Roosevelt in a personal meeting with the Japanese envoys at the White House—met with rejection, and the Japanese, upon receiving new instructions from Tokyo, put forward a scheme which was so absurd that it merited no consideration, but it did reveal clearly that there was no chance of an agreement with Japan. The Japanese plan, outlined in a memorandum presented to Secretary Hull by the Japanese envoys on November 20, consisted of five points, as follows:

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the southeastern Asia and southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.
2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops

now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement, which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Governments of Japan and the United States shall co-operate with a view of securing the acquisition of those goods and necessities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

What this proposal amounted to was that the United States was to supply Japan with all the oil she needed, suspend the embaroges and freezing measures, and cease aid to China, in return for which Japan would agree to launch no new conquests. All that Japan was willing to do was remove its troops from southern Indo-China, where they had been recently sent, into the northern part.

From the time the Japanese presented that memorandum, Mr. Hull realized clearly that there was nothing left to be done in the diplomatic field and that it was only a matter of time until a complete breakdown developed, and possibly war. At the end of that critical week of discussions, the Japanese envoys threatened to break off the talks and go home, indicating at the same time that Japan would then follow an "independent" policy of her own making. The implication was clearly that she would go on the warpath in Asia again.

We now come to that delicate stage in the negotiations about which nothing has been made public so far. It consisted of a last-minute attempt to devise a formula which would prevent, or at least stave off, the growing threat of war in the Pacific. It was the more urgent because reports from the Far East showed that Japan was carrying out

military preparations in the southern Pacific region, particularly in Indo-China, which indicated that some new Japanese aggression might be expected at any moment.

It was at this point—on Saturday, November 22—that Mr. Hull called to the State Department the diplomatic representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China and acquainted them in detail with the course of the negotiations. At the end of that three-hour talk the envoys indicated they had been in entire accord. The Australian Minister Richard C. Casey said there had been "entire harmony in the diplomatic lute." They seem to have been agreed that if Japan undertook any new aggression in the southern Pacific—as appeared imminent—they would present a united front and would range themselves instantly at the side of the United States if America went to war. British Prime Minister Churchill had already made such a pledge, but the Australians, the Dutch, and the Chinese had never actually committed themselves.

Exactly how the so-called "truce" formula was evolved, which became the subject of active diplomatic negotiations in the ensuing days, has not been disclosed. The official attitude is that this final stage of the negotiations is of little importance, as the formula proved abortive, but it played an important role. Mr. Hull met the Japanese envoys in his apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel on the same Saturday night and presumably discussed it with them. On Tuesday, November 25, he called the A.B.C.D. envoys to the State Department again and held another long talk with them, after which it was apparent that there was not the same unanimity of views among them as at their previous meeting. The British favored the formula; the Australians were with the British; the Dutch, who had never placed much faith in an agreement with Japan, acquiesced only reluctantly; but the Chinese balked. They would have none of it.

Although the formula has been kept secret, its general outline has been hinted at. O. H. Thompson, United Press correspondent at the State Department, reported that it contemplated a three months' "truce" during which efforts would be continued to arrive at a general Pacific settle-

ment. From what could be learned at the time, the Japanese were to renounce further aggression during the "truce" and to withdraw their troops from Indo-China, or at least the southern part of it, where they were then concentrating reinforcements, so as to remove the threat to Thailand, Burma, and Singapore. In return, there was to be a partial relaxation of trade restrictions against Japan by the democratic nations.

The next twenty-four hours were marked by feverish diplomatic activity. Mr. Hull called the Chinese ambassador to his apartment, on the night of November 25, for a talk which failed, however, to shake the Chinese envoy's opposition, and the following day the Chinese representatives, Dr. T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, administrator of lend-lease aid to China, and Dr. Huh Shih, the Chinese ambassador, carried their objections directly to President Roosevelt. The Chinese stood by the Nine-Power Pact, which guaranteed China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and they contended that any accord, no matter how temporary, that ignored China's position and left Japanese troops in occupation of Chinese territory was totally unacceptable.

After this meeting at the White House on the afternoon of November 26, President Roosevelt called in Mr. Hull for a talk. When he returned to his office at the State Department, Mr. Hull then summoned the Japanese envoys and handed to them a 2,000-word memorandum in which he outlined a plan for a general Pacific settlement which embodied the principles of American policy and the points he had put forward in the whole course of the protracted negotiations. It was a recapitulation of American policy on which Mr. Hull had been working for some days. The "truce" plan had been abandoned. It was, in fact, dropped so suddenly that the diplomatic envoys of the other Pacific nations were not advised of this development until after Mr. Hull had handed his memorandum to the Japanese.

While Chinese objections played a large part in abandonment of the "truce" plan, there were other factors too. Japan had just adhered to a new Anti-Comintern alliance

with the European Axis nations and their satellites, and thus stressed again her ties with the Axis, while Japanese troop movements, coinciding with the negotiations, had caused considerable misgivings regarding Japan's intentions.

It was not expected at that late hour that the Japanese would accept the American proposals. They could have done so if their professions for peace had been genuine, but at that time—as is now known—their aircraft carriers were well on their way to Hawaii and their troop movements were being carried out in preparation for the all-out attack of December 7.

The Hull plan was divided into two parts. In the first part there was a reaffirmation of the principles which the American government deemed essential to peace in the Pacific, while the second part contained the draft of a multilateral seven-Power non-aggression pact between the United States, Britain, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and Thailand, and an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China in which the Soviet Union, however, was not to be included. While not specifically stated, it was Mr. Hull's idea that Indo-China should not revert to the Vichy administration after the withdrawal of Japanese troops, but that the French colony should be placed under a system of international control of the six Pacific nations. That this was so understood by the Japanese is shown in the Japanese reply, of December 7, which declared the proposal "would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries." It is interesting to note that since the Nine-Power Pact was concluded in 1922 there has been a change in the list of the so-called Pacific Powers and that the new list of seven nations to take part in the non-aggression pact excluded France, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal and added the Soviet Union and Thailand.

Furthermore, Mr. Hull insisted that Japan withdraw her troops entirely from both China and Indo-China. America and Japan were to abolish extraterritoriality in China and to persuade the other Powers to follow suit, and

they were to conclude a new commercial treaty to replace the one the United States denounced in January 1940, to normalize their trade relations.

During the last days of November, reports reaching the State Department disclosed that Japan was continuing to pour troops and material into Indo-China. Thousands of Japanese troops had been newly landed at Saigon and others had been moved from northern Indo-China to the southern part of the country. Other Japanese contingents were expected in Haiphong momentarily, and large quantities of material were being moved out of Saigon towards the south. Artillery had been newly landed as well as anti-tank guns, and ships had been purchased all up and down the coast. The reports indicated that an attack on Thailand was imminent.

Consequently, on December 2, President Roosevelt directed Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to inquire of the Japanese envoys what were the reasons for this increase of forces in Indo-China in excess of the Japanese agreement with Vichy, threatening the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya, and Thailand. On December 5 the Japanese negotiators brought an answer to the effect that the reports were exaggerated and that they were precautionary measures following Chinese troop concentrations on the northern border of Indo-China. Mr. Roosevelt, in his message to Congress on December 15, called it an "evasive and specious reply."

When the Japanese envoys were leaving Mr. Welles' office that morning, after delivering their reply, Ambassador Nomura spotted me among the newspapermen and came up to me, laid his hands on my shoulders, and said: "I see you have joined the war party." He had reference to a speech I had delivered a few days earlier in New York, in which I had said that we stood closer to war with Japan than at any other time in our history. Nomura looked extremely dejected as he left that meeting.

As war clouds were gathering ominously over the Pacific, President Roosevelt played a last card. He sent a direct message to the Emperor of Japan, on the night of December 6, in which he declared that continuance of the exist-

ing strained situation was unthinkable and that the peoples of the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, and Thailand cannot sit "either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite." The President urged the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China as a condition for the maintenance of peace in the South Pacific area.

Emperor Hirohito's answer was delivered to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo three hours and forty minutes after the Japanese attack on Hawaii.

CHAPTER 9

Thirteen Minutes—December 7, 1941

ON SUNDAY morning, December 7, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull came to his office in the State Department, as he had been doing for several Sundays past during the emergency situation, at ten-fifteen o'clock. He looked tired and worn from the twenty days of incessant meetings, since Ambassador Kurusu's arrival in Washington, not only with the Japanese envoys, but with the diplomatic representatives of the other nations concerned in Pacific affairs and with high American naval and military officials.

The Secretary of State's office is on the second floor in the rear of the State Department, overlooking the park with the Washington Monument in the center. It is a spacious office, comfortably furnished with a dozen easy chairs and armchairs upholstered in leather, and Mr. Hull sits at a swivel chair behind a mahogany desk with his back to the windows and facing the door. Directly behind him are the American flag and the standard of the Secretary of State. On his desk is usually a heap of papers and documents waiting his perusal or signature. Often, when the day is over and he has not had time to go over them, he stuffs them into a brief case and carries them home with him. There are two telephones on his desk: a direct line to the President, across the street at the White House, and an outside line.

For several months past, a large map of the world, pinned to a board, has stood on an easel at the right of the Secretary's desk, and on this he follows the war news. Informal callers enter Mr. Hull's office from the left by a roundabout way through a secretarial office and the office of a private secretary, while official diplomatic visitors are usually ushered directly through the door ahead of him. Beyond the outer secretarial office is a large reception room, on the walls of which hang paintings of former

Secretaries of State down to Henry L. Stimson, Mr. Hull's predecessor in office. This is the conference room where Mr. Hull holds his daily press conferences.

The American-Japanese negotiations had been at a virtual standstill since November 26, when Mr. Hull had handed his memorandum to the Japanese envoys, restating the basic American principles of policy. In the intervening period, continued disquieting reports had been coming into the State Department from American diplomatic and consular establishments in the Far East—supplemented by American naval and military intelligence reports—indicating that Japan was continuing her concentration of troops in southern Indo-China and was taking other military steps in the southern Pacific foreshadowing some new Japanese aggression.

At one o'clock in the afternoon the Japanese embassy telephoned for an appointment for the Japanese envoys to meet Secretary Hull at once. This appointment was fixed for one forty-five o'clock. The Japanese arrived late at the State Department, at five minutes past two, and were conducted to the diplomatic waiting room. As their visit was unexpected, and it was Sunday, there were no newspapermen on hand to question them, and they sat alone in the waiting room.

While the Japanese negotiators were waiting, Mr. Hull, who was seated at his desk in his office across the hall, received a telephone call from what he has described as an "official" source to the effect that "there is a report that Pearl Harbor was attacked this morning," and he was told that his informant was trying to "run it down." Mr. Hull believes that this information was based on a press report which the official source was trying to confirm.

At two-twenty o'clock, five or ten minutes after Mr. Hull had hung up the telephone receiver on his desk and while he was still awaiting confirmation of the reported attack on Hawaii, the two Japanese envoys were ushered into his office through the room on the left, by way of the secretarial office instead of the door ahead, which was locked on Sundays. As usual, they wore their formal diplomatic attire—dark coats and striped trousers—and Mr. Hull motioned

to them to sit down. Admiral Nomura occupied a leather armchair to the left of Secretary Hull, and Ambassador Kurusu sat some distance farther away, by the window in the left corner of the office.

Mr. Hull looked grave, as did also the Japanese envoys, who presumably were unaware at that moment of the Japanese attack on Hawaii but who had brought Japan's defiant note rejecting the American proposals for a Pacific settlement and breaking off negotiations. Ambassador Nomura said they had intended to deliver the note, which he then handed to Secretary Hull, at one o'clock, but there had been some delay in decoding it. One o'clock Eastern standard time corresponds to seven-thirty o'clock in the morning, Honolulu time, twenty-five minutes before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was actually launched.

Mr. Hull said: "Why one o'clock?"

Ambassador Nomura mumbled something evasively, explaining that he did not know but that his instructions had been to deliver the note at one o'clock.

It would appear that the Japanese Government had carefully timed the delivery of its note to coincide with the Japanese attack on Hawaii, which was evidently scheduled to take place at seven-thirty o'clock that morning, Honolulu time. The Japanese note was actually delivered just after two-twenty o'clock, Washington time, fifty-five minutes after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Hull has said that if he had known that the report of the Japanese attack was correct he would not have received the Japanese envoys, but he had had no confirmation of it then, and he felt that he could not act on the basis of an unconfirmed report. There had been many rumors within recent weeks, including one of a Japanese attack on Thailand which had proved erroneous, and the Secretary of State could not be guided in his diplomatic action by rumors unless they were substantiated.

Secretary Hull read the long 2,500-word note presented to him by Ambassador Nomura "carefully and deliberately" in the most tense silence, and as he read it his anger mounted, but he contained himself until he had finished the last insulting paragraph, which read:

"Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust American-Japanese relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American Government has been finally lost. . . ."

Turning in his swivel chair toward Ambassador Nomura at his left, with the note still in hand, Mr. Hull declared with the greatest indignation and in a voice quavering with emotion:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered a word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

Those of us who are familiar with Mr. Hull's carefully chosen, though at times emphatic, language, realize how very strongly he must have felt when he uttered those words to Ambassador Nomura, with whom he had so patiently negotiated for nine months, exploring every possibility, and with whom he had held forty private meetings in his apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel, to say nothing of the score of official meetings at the State Department.

The "infamous falsehoods and distortions" to which Mr. Hull referred stood out from every paragraph of the Japanese note. As Mr. Hull's eyes traveled over that document he came across such passages: "The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States to secure the peace of the Pacific area. . . . It is the

immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and promote world peace. . . . The Japanese Government has striven for restoration of peace [in China] and has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of warlike disturbances. . . . When Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both the American and British Governments willfully misrepresented it as a threat to their own possessions. . . . These countries perfected an encirclement of Japan. . . . From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation . . . and showed a most conciliatory attitude [with regard to China]. . . . The American Government caused undue delay in the negotiations. . . . The American Government may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. . . ."

Ambassador Nomura, who had sat by in silence until then, fumbled to try and find some words to reply to the Secretary of State's scathing remarks, but Mr. Hull gave the envoys no chance to formulate an answer and curtly bowed them out of his office without a handshake. They filed out solemnly through the door at the left, Nomura first and Kurusu following. Kurusu, Japan's special envoy, had not opened his mouth during the entire proceedings.

The historic meeting had lasted exactly thirteen minutes, consumed for the most part by Mr. Hull's reading of the Japanese note. The Japanese envoys went through the motions of carrying out their instructions, and Mr. Hull was in no mood to listen to any more evasive explanations of the type he had been receiving for the nine months past. No mention whatever was made during the meeting of the report of the Japanese attack on Hawaii.

Quite possibly Ambassador Nomura had no knowledge of his country's warlike intentions during the period of the negotiations or even up to the time of the delivery of the last Japanese note. He had accepted the post of ambassador to Washington at the close of 1940 very much against his own will and only under repeated pressure from former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. Nomura knew

from his own experience as Foreign Minister in the Abe cabinet in the autumn of 1939, when he negotiated with American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, that it was next to impossible to bridge the gap between the American and Japanese positions.

When he arrived in Washington at the end of January 1941 he declared, in his first interview, that he had found the atmosphere more strained than he had been led to believe before he came to this country. During the negotiations he had told Mr. Hull that 99 per cent of the Japanese people did not want war with the United States but that they were a disciplined people and would fight if commanded to do so. He had said there were agitators in Japan backed by other countries—presumably Japan's Axis partners—who aimed to create trouble between the United States and Japan, and he had repeatedly expressed the hope that war could be avoided. Nomura seems to have been a pawn who was used to further Japan's schemes without a knowledge of those schemes.

But if Nomura was not informed of his country's war-like intentions, the same cannot be said of Kurusu, who must have been informed before he left Tokyo that the alternative to an agreement with the United States on Japan's terms would be an attack against America. Kurusu brought no message from his Government, no plan for a settlement, no new instructions, and the only purpose of his mission seems quite clearly to have been to play for time until Japan's military preparations were completed. He may have believed there was one chance in a million that the United States would give in to the Japanese viewpoint because of what he may have supposed to be American reluctance to become involved in a war in two oceans simultaneously. That is the most charitable interpretation that can be placed on his mission. The odds are that he knew what was in the offing although he probably did not know that Japan planned to launch the war with an attack on Hawaii, because Japanese military leaders would not have trusted him with such a military secret when he was coming to the United States.

Later that Sunday afternoon, when Mr. Hull had con-

firmed the report of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he issued a formal statement, expressing anew his indignation at Japan's treachery in making use of the diplomatic talks as a shield for her military preparations. "At the very moment," he said, "when representatives of the Japanese Government were discussing with representatives of this Government, at the request of the former, principles and courses of peace, the armed forces of Japan were preparing and assembling at various strategic points to launch new attacks and new aggressions upon nations and peoples with which Japan was professedly at peace, including the United States. . . . It is now apparent to the whole world that Japan in its recent professions of a desire for peace has been infamously false and fraudulent."

Mr. Hull's position was a difficult one, and during the whole period of the negotiations, extending over nine months, he had been under constant pressure from various quarters to pursue opposing policies. The State Department was receiving numerous letters, some of them couched in strong language, urging the Administration to adopt a firmer attitude toward Japan and to "freeze" the Japanese by a complete set of embargoes on all commodities. Mr. Hull was fully conscious that pressure of this kind on Japan was likely to precipitate war prematurely before either the United States or the nations associated with her in the Pacific were militarily prepared. Mr. Hull felt that the Japanese Government was sitting "with its finger on the trigger of the Japanese Navy" and was ready to press the trigger at any moment.

At the same time, Mr. Hull was being insistently urged by the British and Australians as well as by American Army and Navy leaders to avoid precipitating a conflict up to the very last minute before the Japanese attack so as to allow more time for military preparations which were then being feverishly rushed and which subsequent events have shown were far from completed when the war came.


Mr. Hull was harassed by charges from critics of the State Department's policy that he was appeasing the Japanese at the expense of China, whereas he had been one of the first to try to arouse public opinion in the United

States in support of a policy of aid to China when Americans were apathetic toward the conflict in the Far East.

In his dealings with Japan, Mr. Hull had to consider the international situation affecting all the nations of the Pacific area, not least of which was Russia, whose attitude in the event of a Far Eastern conflict was of the utmost importance. The Russian position had undergone great changes since the negotiations with Japan were started. In March 1941, when Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka visited Berlin and Moscow, there was the possibility of a German-Russian-Japanese coalition, but when Germany attacked Russia suddenly in June, the situation was completely altered. Even now the Russian attitude is of tremendous importance in the whole picture of the Far Eastern war. Mr. Hull had, furthermore, to reckon with China, which had already withstood four years of fighting Japan alone, and to take into account the military position of all the A.B.C.D. nations and the fact that the British and Australians were not ready to enter a war in the Pacific and wanted to avoid one altogether if possible. Mr. Hull has told me that he hopes never to live through such a period again.

Thus, on December 7, 1941, eighty-four years to the day since Townsend Harris, first American envoy to Japan, opened up diplomatic intercourse with the Government of the Japanese Shogunate, Japan shattered that intercourse, and the United States and Japan were at war.

APPENDIX



Appendix

SECRETARY HULL'S NOTE TO JAPAN

Following is the text of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese ambassador on November 26, 1941, consisting of two parts, an oral statement and an outline of a proposed basis of agreement between the United States and Japan, as made public by the State Department on December 7, 1941:

ORAL STATEMENT

“November 26, 1941

“The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

“It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehen-

sive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuing peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

"With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach

to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worth-while international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited."

"November 26, 1911

"OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND JAPAN

"Section I

"Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- "(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- "(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
- "(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in

their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- "(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- "(2) The principle of international economic co operation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- "(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- "(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
- "(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

"Section II

"Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary

and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement."

BIBLIOTEKA

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JAPAN'S FINAL ANSWER

The text of the reply handed by the Japanese ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:15 p.m. on December 7, 1941, is as follows:

"1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

"The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

"2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

"Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

"However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East

Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

"Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions. "3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its

previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

"(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

"(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

"(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

"(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

"(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

"As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parts have commenced direct negotiations.

"The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called "introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose

upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government. "4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

"It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

"On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

"1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof.

The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

"Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual condition it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

"Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

"2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states—'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

"The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through

peaceful means.

"3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

"4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

"The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

"5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacua-

tion of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any régime other than the régime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking régime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

"5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifice in the four years of the China Affairs, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

"6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking régime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Gov-

ernment to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE TO EMPEROR

Following is the text of President Roosevelt's message to the Emperor of Japan sent from Washington at 9 P.M. on December 6 and released by the White House on December 7, 1941:

"Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers, have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

"Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

"The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

"I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan

and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

"More than a year ago Your Majesty's government concluded an agreement with the Vichy government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China farther north. And this spring and summer the Vichy government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, or that any has been contemplated.

"During the last few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is defensive in its character.

"Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

"I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

"It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

"None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

"There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

"I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the governments of the East Indies, the governments of Malaya and the government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

"I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries, but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world."

PRESIDENT'S WAR MESSAGE

Following is the text of President Roosevelt's war message delivered to a joint session of both Houses of Congress on December 8, 1941:

Mr. Vice-President, Mr. Speaker, members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives:

Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the American island of Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that many American lives have been lost. In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.

And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation.

As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

Always will our whole nation remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.

I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, Dec. 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

TEXT OF DECLARATION OF WAR

Here is the text of the United States resolution formally declaring a state of war with Japan adopted by Congress on December 8, 1941:

JOINT RESOLUTION

Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial Government of Japan and the Government and the people of the United States, and making provisions to prosecute this same.

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan, and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

PRESIDENT'S RADIO ADDRESS

Following is the text of President Roosevelt's radio address to the nation on December 9, 1941:

My Fellow Americans:

The sudden criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the Pacific provide the climax of a decade of international immorality.

Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race. Their challenge has now been flung at the United States of America. The Japanese have treacherously violated the long-standing peace between us. Many American soldiers and sailors have been killed by enemy action. American ships have been sunk, American airplanes have been destroyed.

The Congress and the people of the United States have accepted that challenge.

Together with other free peoples, we are now fighting to maintain our right to live among our world neighbors in freedom, in common decency, without fear of assault.

I have prepared the full record of our past relations with Japan, and it will be submitted to the Congress. It begins with the visit of Commodore Perry to Japan eighty-eight years ago. It ends with the visit of two Japanese emissaries to the Secretary of State last Sunday, an hour after Japanese forces had loosed their bombs and machine guns against our flag, our forces and our citizens.

I can say with utmost confidence that no Americans today or a thousand years hence need feel anything but pride in our patience and in our efforts through all the years toward achieving a peace in the Pacific which would be fair and honorable to every nation, large or small. And no honest person, today or a thousand years hence, will be able to suppress a sense of indignation and horror at the treachery committed by the military dictators of Japan, under the very shadow of the flag of peace borne by their

special envoys in our midst.

The course that Japan has followed for the past ten years in Asia has paralleled the course of Hitler and Mussolini in Europe and in Africa. Today it has become far more than a parallel. It is collaboration—actual collaboration—so well calculated that all the continents of the world, and all the oceans, are now considered by the Axis strategists as one gigantic battlefield.

In 1931, ten years ago, Japan invaded Manchukuo—without warning.

In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia—without warning.

In 1938, Hitler occupied Austria—without warning.

In 1939, Hitler invaded Czecho-Slovakia—without warning.

Later in 1939, Hitler invaded Poland—without warning.

In 1940, Hitler invaded Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg—without warning.

In 1940, Italy attacked France and later Greece—without warning.

And this year, in 1941, the Axis powers attacked Yugoslavia and Greece and they dominated the Balkans—without warning.

In 1941 also, Hitler invaded Russia—without warning.

And now Japan has attacked Malaya and Thailand—and the United States—without warning.

It is all of one pattern.

We are now in this war. We are all in it—all the way. Every single man, woman and child is a partner in the most tremendous undertaking of our American history. We must share together the bad news and the good news, the defeats and the victories—the changing fortunes of war.

So far the news has been all bad. We have suffered a serious setback in Hawaii. Our forces in the Philippines, which include the brave people of that commonwealth, are taking punishment, but are defending themselves vigorously. The reports from Guam and Wake and Midway Islands are still confused, but we must be prepared for the announcement that all these three outposts have been

seized.

The casualty lists of these first few days will undoubtedly be large. I deeply feel the anxiety of all of the families of the men in our armed forces and the relatives of people in cities which have been bombed. I can only give them by my solemn promise that they will get news just as quickly as possible.

This government will put its trust in the stamina of the American people, and will give the facts to the public as soon as two conditions have been fulfilled: first, that the information has been definitely and officially confirmed; and, second, that the release of the information at the time it is received will not prove valuable to the enemy directly or indirectly.

Most earnestly I urge my countrymen to reject all rumors. These ugly little hints of complete disaster fly thick and fast in war time. They have to be examined and appraised.

As an example, I can tell you frankly that until further surveys are made, I have not sufficient information to state the exact damage which has been done to our naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. Admittedly the damage is serious. But no one can say how serious, until we know how much of this damage can be repaired and how quickly the necessary repairs can be made.

I cite as another example a statement made on Sunday night that a Japanese carrier had been located and sunk off the Canal Zone. And when you hear statements that are attributed to what they call "an authoritative source," you can be reasonably sure from now on that under these war circumstances the "authoritative source" is not any person in authority.

Many rumors and reports which we now hear originate with enemy sources. For instance, today the Japanese are claiming that as a result of their one action against Hawaii they have gained naval supremacy in the Pacific. This is an old trick of propaganda which has been used innumerable times by the Nazis. The purposes of such fantastic claims are, of course, to spread fear and confusion among us, and to goad us into revealing military information

which **our** enemies are desperately anxious to obtain.

Our government will not be caught in this obvious trap—and neither will the people of the United States.

It must be remembered by each and every one of us that our free and rapid communication these days must be greatly restricted in war time. It is not possible to receive full, and speedy, and accurate reports from distant areas of combat. This is particularly true where naval operations are concerned. For in these days of the marvels of the radio it is often impossible for the commanders of various units to report their activities by radio at all for the very simple reason that this information would become available to the enemy, and would disclose their position and their plan of defense or attack.

Of necessity there will be delays in officially confirming or denying reports of operations but we will not hide facts from the country if we know the facts and if the enemy will not be aided by their disclosure.

To all newspapers and radio stations—all those who reach the eyes and ears of the American people—I say this: You have a most grave responsibility to the nation now and for the duration of this war.

If you feel that your government is not disclosing enough of the truth you have every right to say so. But—in the absence of all the facts, as revealed by official sources—you have no right in the ethics of patriotism to deal out unconfirmed reports in such a way as to make people believe they are gospel truth.

Every citizen, in every walk of life, shares this same responsibility. The lives of our soldiers and sailors—the whole future of this nation—depend upon the manner in which each and every one of us fulfills his obligation to our country.

Now, a word about the recent past—and the future. A year and a half has elapsed since the fall of France, when the whole world first realized the mechanized might which the Axis nations had been building for so many years. America has used that year and a half to great advantage. Knowing that the attack might reach us in all too short a time, we immediately began greatly to increase our in-

dustrial strength and our capacity to meet the demands of modern warfare.

Precious months were gained by sending vast quantities of our war material to the nations of the world still able to resist Axis aggression. Our policy rested on the fundamental truth that the defense of any country resisting Hitler or Japan was in the long run the defense of our own country. That policy has been justified. It has given us time, invaluable time, to build our American assembly lines of production.

Assembly lines are now in operation. Others are being rushed to completion. A steady stream of tanks and planes, of guns and ships, and shells and equipment—that is what these eighteen months have given us.

But it is all only a beginning of what has to be done. We must be set to face a long war against crafty and powerful bandits. The attack at Pearl Harbor can be repeated at any one of many points, points in both oceans and along both our coast lines and against all the rest of the hemisphere.

It will not only be a long war, it will be a hard war. That is the basis on which we now lay all our plans. That is the yardstick by which we measure what we shall need and demand: money, materials, doubled and quadrupled production—ever increasing. The production must be not only for our own Army and Navy and air forces. It must reinforce the other armies and navies and air forces fighting the Nazis and war lords of Japan throughout the Americas and throughout the world.

I have been working today on the subject of production. Your government has decided on two broad policies.

The first is to speed up all existing production by working on a seven-day-week basis in every war industry, including the production of essential raw materials.

The second policy, now being put into form, is to rush additions to the capacity of production by building more new plants, by adding to old plants, and by using the many smaller plants for war needs.

Over the hard road of the past months, we have at times met obstacles and difficulties, divisions and disputes, indif-

terence and callousness. That is now all past—and, I am sure, forgotten.

The fact is that the country now has an organization in Washington built around men and women who are recognized experts in their own fields. I think the country knows that the people who are actually responsible in each and every one of these many fields are pulling together with a teamwork that has never before been excelled.

On the road ahead there lies hard work—gruelling work—day and night, every hour and every minute.

I was about to add that ahead there lies sacrifice for all of us.

But it is not correct to use that word. The United States does not consider it a sacrifice to do all one can, to give one's best to our nation, when the nation is fighting for its existence and its future life.

It is not a sacrifice for any man, old or young, to be in the Army or the Navy of the United States. Rather is it a privilege.

It is not a sacrifice for the industrialist or the wage earner, the farmer or the shopkeeper, the trainman or the doctor to pay more taxes, to buy more bonds, to forego extra profits, to work longer or harder at the task for which he is best fitted—rather is it a privilege.

It is not a sacrifice to do without many things to which we are accustomed if the national defense calls for doing without it.

A review this morning leads me to the conclusion that at present we shall not have to curtail the normal use articles of food. There is enough food today for all of us and enough left over to send to those who are fighting on the same side with us.

But there will be a clear and definite shortage of metals for many kinds of civilian use, for the very good reason that in our increased program we shall need for war purposes more than half of that portion of the principal metals which during the past year have gone into articles for civilian use. Yes, we shall have to give up many things entirely.

And I am sure that the people in every part of the

nation are prepared in their individual living to win this war. I am sure that they will cheerfully help to pay a large part of its financial cost while it goes on. I am sure they will cheerfully give up those material things that they are asked to give up.

And I am sure that they will retain all those great spiritual things without which we can not win through.

I repeat that the United States can accept no result save victory, final, complete. Not only must the shame of Japanese treachery be wiped out, but the sources of international brutality, wherever they exist, must be absolutely and finally broken.

In my message to the Congress yesterday I said that we "will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again." In order to achieve that certainty, we must begin the great task that is before us by abandoning once and for all the illusion that we can ever again isolate ourselves from the rest of humanity.

In these past few years—and, most violently, in the past few days—we have learned a terrible lesson.

It is our obligation to our dead—it is our sacred obligation to their children and to our children—that we must never forget what we have learned.

And what we all have learned is this:

There is no such thing as security for any nation—or any individual—in a world ruled by the principles of gangsterism.

There is no such thing as impregnable defense against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike without warning.

We have learned that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not immune from severe attack—that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map any more.

We may acknowledge that our enemies have performed a brilliant feat of deception, perfectly timed and executed with great skill. It was a thoroughly dishonorable deed, but we must face the fact that modern warfare as conducted in the Nazi manner is a dirty business. We don't like it—we didn't want to get in it—but we are in it and we're going to fight it with everything we've got.

I do not think any American has any doubt of our ability to administer proper punishment to the perpetrators of these crimes.

Your government knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in dividing the spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would receive the complete and perpetual control of the whole of the Pacific area—and that means not only the Far East but also all of the islands in the Pacific, and also a strangle-hold on the west coast of North, Central and South America.

We know also that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan. That plan considers all peoples and nations which are not helping the Axis powers as common enemies of each and every one of the Axis powers.

That is their simple and obvious grand strategy. And that is why the American people must realize that it can be matched only with similar grand strategy. We must realize for example that Japanese successes against the United States in the Pacific are helpful to German operations in Libya; that any German success against the Caucasus is inevitably an assistance to Japan in her operations against the Dutch East Indies; that a German attack against Algiers or Morocco opens the way to a German attack against South America and the canal.

On the other side of the picture, we must learn also to know that guerrilla warfare against the Germans in, let us say, Serbia or Norway, helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the Germans helps us, and that British successes on land or sea in any part of the world strengthens our hands.

Remember always that Germany and Italy, regardless of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain or Russia. And Germany puts all the other republics of the Americas into the same category of enemies. The people of our sister republics of this hemisphere can be honored by that fact.

The true goal we seek is far above and beyond the ugly field of battle. When we resort to force, as now we must, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good as well as against immediate evils. We Americans are not destroyers—we are builders.

We are now in the midst of a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in which this nation, and all that this nation represents, will be safe for our children. We expect to eliminate the danger from Japan, but it would serve us ill if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini.

So, we are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows.

And in the difficult hours of this day—through dark days that may be yet to come—we will know that the vast majority of the members of the human race are on our side. Many of them are fighting with us. All of them are praying for us. For, in representing our cause, we represent theirs as well—our hope and their hope for liberty under God.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON EVENTS LEADING UP TO WAR WITH JAPAN

The text of President Roosevelt's message, communicated to Congress on December 15, 1941, follows:

On December 8, 1941, I presented to the Congress a message in person asking for a declaration of war as an answer to the treacherous attack made by Japan the previous day upon the United States. For the information of the Congress, and as a public record of the facts, I am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate events leading up to this Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached hereto are the various documents and correspondence implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1833, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate, and in 1844 there was concluded our first treaty with China.

In 1853 Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those early years the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to world peace of fair and equal treatment among nations. Accordingly, whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other

nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the 19th century the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions." There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900 the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China * * * protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

Ever since that day we have consistently and unflinchingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1908 the Government of the United States and the government of Japan concluded an agreement by an exchange of notes. In that agreement the two governments jointly declared that they were determined to support "by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that empire"; that it was "the wish of the two governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean"; and that "the policy of both governments" was "directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has consistently practiced the principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the first World War,

nine powers having interests in the Western Pacific met in conference in Washington. China, Japan and the United States were there. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the nine-power treaty. It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.

Another was a treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan providing for limitation of naval armament.

The course of events which have led directly to the present crisis began 10 years ago. For it was then—in 1931—that Japan undertook, on a large scale, its present policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter, tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. For example, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, specially stated in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese governments that it would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement brought about by violation of treaties.

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once rearmed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe. Italy—then still under the domination of Mussolini—also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the years which followed, Germany, Italy and Japan reached an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage—and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note to the United States stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two governments that was "fundamentally incapable of amicable solution." He added that Japan had "no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other power." Our Secretary of State Cordell Hull, replied in kind.

But in spite of this exchange of friendly sentiments, and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese government began to belie these assurances—at least so far as the rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.

Our Government thereupon expressed to Japan the view of the American people, and of the American Government, that no nation has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

The structure of peace which had been founded upon the Washington Conference treaties began to be discarded by Japan. Indeed, in December of 1934, the Japanese government gave notice of its intention to terminate the naval treaty of February 6, 1922, which had limited competition in naval armament. She thereafter intensified and multiplied her rearmament program.

In 1936 the government of Japan openly associated itself with Germany by entering the anti-Comintern pact.

This pact, as we all know, was nominally directed against the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of fascism against the free world, particularly against Great Britain, France and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy and Japan, the stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In July, 1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed forces of Japan opened new large-scale military operations against China. Presently, her leaders, dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to seize and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of Eastern Asia, the Western Pacific and the Southern Pacific.

They thus accept the German thesis that 70,000,000 or 80,000,000 Germans were, by race, training, ability and

might, superior in every way to any other race in Europe—superior to about 400,000,000 other human beings in that area. And Japan, following suit, announced that the 70,000,000 or 80,000,000 Japanese people were also superior to the 700,000,000 or 800,000,000 other inhabitants of the Orient—nearly all of whom were infinitely older and more developed in culture and civilization than themselves. Their conceit would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans. They wounded or abused American men, women and children. They sank American vessels—including a naval vessel, the *Panay*. They bombed American hospitals, churches, schools and missions. They destroyed American property. They obstructed, and, in some cases, drove out American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage upon China and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese people. They were inflicting wholesale injuries upon other nations—flouting all the principles of peace and good will among men.

There are attached hereto lists of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to indignities; of interferences with American nationals' rights and interests. These lists are not complete. However, they are ample evidence of the flagrant Japanese disregard of American rights and civilized standards.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of unlimited conquest. Since 1935, without provocation or ex-

cuse, they have attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some 16 independent nations. This machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also huge organizations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimidation, propaganda and sabotage. This machine—unprecedented in size—has world-wide ramifications; and into them the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.

As the forces of Germany, Italy and Japan increasingly combined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere—if it were successful in the other continents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of nations in the New World, would be a standing challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their scheme of destruction.

This they did last year, in 1940, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan deliberately aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Though infiltration, encirclement, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan had first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she had invaded China; and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her.

Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indo-China. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest throughout Thailand—and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma. The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java come next on the Japanese timetable; and it is prob-

able that further down the Japanese page are the names of Australia, New Zealand and all the other islands of the Pacific—including Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Carolina, Marshall and Marianas Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia," and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia." What they really intended was the enslavement of every nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment—not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan—but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese state. Here, too, they were following the Nazi pattern.

By this course of aggression, Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler's Japanese ally forced the peace-loving nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.

IV

Throughout this course and program of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese government and to the Chinese government that whenever both those governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part

remained unchanged.

In October, 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian government made itself the host, 19 countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937, the conference adopted a declaration, urging that "hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes."

Japan scorned the conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this source of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.

Therefore, in this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

Throughout all of these conversations, this Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were:

The principles of inviolability of territorial integrity

and sovereignty of all nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality— including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies.

The Japanese government, it is true, repeatedly offered qualified statements of peaceful intention. But it became clear, as each proposal was explored, that Japan did not intend to modify in any way her greedy designs upon the whole Pacific world. Although she continually maintained that she was promoting only the peace and greater prosperity of East Asia, she continued her brutal assault upon the Chinese people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce her unholy alliance with Hitlerism.

In July of this year the Japanese government connived with Hitler to force the Vichy government of France permission to place Japanese armed forces in Southern Indo-China, and began sending her troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this government and the Japanese government were thereupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent request of the Japanese government, which again made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations were resumed.

At that time the Japanese government made the suggestion that the responsible heads of the Japanese government and the Government of the United States meet personally to discuss an adjustment of relations between the two countries. I should have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic principles. This Government tried hard— but without success—to obtain such assurance from the Japanese government.

The various proposals of the Japanese government and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941.

Thereafter, several formulas were offered and discussed. But the Japanese government continued upon its course of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese government presented a new and narrow proposal, which called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained however no provision for abandonment by Japan of her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal obviously offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. The American Government, in order to clarify the issues, presented to the Japanese government, on November 26, a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement.

The outline of the proposed plan for agreement between the United States and Japan was divided into two parts:

In section one there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in the area and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other foreign armed forces in French Indo-China or in China. Mutual commitments were suggested along lines as fol-

lows: (a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein; (c) not to support any government in China other than the national government of the republic of China, with capital temporarily at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extra-territorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate; (h) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, and (i) to use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

In the midst of these conversations, we learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and new masses of equipment were moving into Indo-China. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear, under cover of negotiations, attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked the Japanese government for a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indo-China. I was given an evasive and specious reply. Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that they had ordered and were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined, however, to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December 6 last, I addressed a personal message to the

Emperor of Japan.

To this Government's proposal of November 26th the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7th. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the special representative whom the Japanese Government had sent to the United States to assist in peaceful negotiations delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a vicious attack upon American territory and American citizens in the Pacific.

That document was a few minutes after its receipt aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

I concur emphatically in every word of that statement.

For the record of history, it is essential in reading this part of my message always to bear in mind that the actual air and submarine attack in the Hawaiian Islands commenced on Sunday, December 7, at 1:20 p.m., Washington time—7:50 a.m., Honolulu time of the same day—Monday, December 8, 3:20 a.m., Tokio time.

To my message of December 6 (9 p.m., Washington time—December 7, 11 a.m., Tokio time) to the Emperor of Japan, invoking his co-operation with me in further effort to preserve peace, there has finally come to me on December 10) 6:23 a.m., Washington time—December 10, 8:23, Tokio time) a reply, conveyed in a telegraphic report by the American Ambassador at Tokio dated December 8, 1 p.m. (December 7, 11 a.m., Washington time).

The Ambassador reported that at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 8th (December 7, 5 p.m., Washington time) the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked him

to call at his official residence; that the foreign minister handed the Ambassador a memorandum dated December 8 (December 7, Washington time) the text of which had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the American Government (this was the memorandum which was delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m., on Sunday, December 7 (Monday, December 8, 4:20 a.m., Tokio time); that the foreign minister had been in touch with the Emperor; and that the Emperor desired that the memorandum be regarded as the Emperor's reply to my message.

Further, the Ambassador reports, the foreign minister made an oral statement. Textually, the oral statement began, "His majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President." The message further continued to the effect that, in regard to our inquiries on the subject of increase of Japanese forces in French Indo-China, his majesty had commanded his government to state its views to the American Government. The message concluded, textually, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of his majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his government to continue its earnest endeavors. His majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact."

Japan's real reply, however, made by Japan's war lords and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of the attack which had already been made without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

There is the record, for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and in disgust!

We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defense. We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice, against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon

humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, too—a host of them—have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her by Japan. After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with renewed confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

All members of the Great British Commonwealth, themselves fighting heroically on many fronts against Germany and her allies, have joined with us in the Battle of the Pacific as we have joined with them in the Battle of the Atlantic.

All but three of the Governments of nations overrun by German armies have declared war on Japan. The other three are severing relations.

In our own hemisphere many of our sister republics have declared war on Japan and the others have given firm expression of their solidarity with the United States.

The following are the countries which have to date declared war against Japan.

Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Panama, El Salvador, South Africa, United Kingdom and Poland.

These and other peace-loving countries will be fighting as we, first, to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and manpower to bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and force which has long menaced the world and which now has struck deliberately and directly at the safety of the United States.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

The White House,
December 15, 1941.

ADDITIONS TO MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

The following are the texts of Items 10, 11 and 13 of the annexes attached to the President's message to Congress on December 15, 1941. Item 10 is a document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941; Item 11 is a document handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941; and Item 13 is a memorandum addressed by the President to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State, copy of which, under authorization of the President, was read and handed by the Under Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on December 2, 1941.

Item 10.

"Reference is made to the proposals of the Japanese Government communicated on September 6, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, and to statements relating thereto subsequently communicated to this Government by the Japanese Government.

"Thoughtful study has been given to the communications to which reference is made, and in connection with that study careful review has been made of other communications previously received from the Japanese Government on the same subject. On the basis of this study observations are offered as follows:

"The Government of the United States welcomed, as affording a possible opportunity for furthering the broad-gauge objectives and principles of a program of peace, the Japanese Government's suggestions made through its Ambassador here in the early part of August that there be held a meeting of the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan and that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two countries to ascertain whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

"Accordingly, in the reply made by the President on August 17, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador the view was expressed that such informal conversations would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful means; that such a program would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities, and there were described the advantages which would flow to all countries, including Japan, from the adoption of such a program. In conclusion, it was stated that if the Japanese Government were in position to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, this Government would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

"In the light of the broad purposes and fundamental principles which this Government holds, it was gratifying to the President and the Government of the United States to receive the message of the Prime Minister and the statement of the Government of Japan on August 28, 1941, containing statements expressing Japan's desire and intent to pursue courses of peace in harmony with the fundamental principles to which the people and Government of the United States are committed. In its statement the Japanese Government gave, with some qualifications, broad assurances of its peaceful intent, including a comprehensive assurance that the Japanese Government has no intention of using without provocation military force against any neighboring nation. The Japanese Government declared that it supported the program and principles which had been briefly outlined by the President not only as applicable to the Pacific area but also as a program for the entire world.

"The Government of the United States, while desiring to proceed as rapidly as possible with consideration of arrangements for a meeting between the heads of state, felt

it desirable, in order to assure that that meeting would accomplish the objectives in view, to clarify the interpretation of certain principles and the practical application thereof to concrete problems in the Pacific area. It has not been the purpose of this Government to enter into a discussion of details; this Government has felt, however, that the clarification sought would afford a means of expediting our effort to arrive at a meeting of minds.

"On September 3, 1941, the President in giving reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the earnest desire of the Government of the United States to collaborate in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese government made reference. The President reiterated the four principles regarded by this Government as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest. Those principles are:

- "1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
- "2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- "3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
- "4. Non-disturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.

"The President pointed out that in order to bring about any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions it was highly important to reach a community of view and a clear agreement upon certain points with respect to which fundamental differences of opinion between our two Governments had developed in the informal conversations; and the President requested an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to those fundamental questions.

"On September 6, the Prime Minister of Japan in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo stated that he subscribed fully to the four principles above mentioned.

"The foregoing developments and assurances, together

with other statements made by the Japanese Government, seemed to justify this Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area. It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area.

"As has already been said, the various broad assurances given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government are highly gratifying. In putting forward its attitude of peaceful intent toward other nations, the Japanese Government qualified its assurances with certain phrases the need for which is not easily understood. It is difficult to conceive of there developing under present circumstances in any of the territories neighboring French Indochina, in Thailand or in the Soviet Union any aggressive threat or provocation to Japan. The inalienable right of self-defense is of course well recognized by all nations and there could arise in some minds a question as to just what the Japanese Government has in view in circumscribing its assurances of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases.

"In the informal conversations there was tentatively arrived at a formula in regard to economic policy (Section V of the draft understanding), which provided that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be

carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In the Japanese Government's proposals of September 6 and in subsequent communications from the Japanese Government the commitments contained in that formula were restricted to the countries of the *Southwest Pacific area* (not the Pacific area as a whole). In reference to China, the Japanese Government states that it will respect the principle of non-discrimination, but the explanation given in regard to this point would seem to be open to the implication that the Japanese Government has in mind some limitation upon the application of this principle occasioned by reasons of Japan's geographical propinquity to China.

"Obviously, it would not be likely to serve the purposes affirmed by the Japanese Government or by this Government if either the United States or Japan were to pursue one course or policy in certain areas while at the same time pursuing an opposite course or policy in other areas.

"This Government has noted the views of the Japanese Government in support of its desire to station troops for an indeterminate period in certain areas of China. Entirely apart from the question of the reasons for such a proposal, the inclusion of such a provision in the proposed terms of a peaceful settlement between Japan and China at a time when Japan is in military occupation of large areas in China is open to certain objections. For example, when a country in military occupation of territory of another country proposes to the second country the continued stationing of troops of the first country in certain areas as a condition for a peaceful settlement and thus for the withdrawal of the occupationary forces from other areas, such procedure would seem to be out of keeping with the progressive and enlightened courses and principles which were discussed in the informal conversations and thus would not, in the opinion of this Government, make for peace or offer prospects of stability.

"It is believed that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina would be most helpful

in making known—in particular to those who might be inclined to be critical—Japan's peaceful intentions and Japan's desire to follow courses calculated to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area.

“With reference to the attitude of each country toward the European war, this Government has noted with appreciation the further step taken by the Japanese Government to meet the difficulties inherent in this aspect of the relations between the two countries. It is believed that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could give further study to the question of possible additional clarification of its position.

“In the exchanges of views which have taken place between the two Governments in an effort to reach an agreement in principle upon fundamental questions in order to prepare the ground for the proposed meeting of the responsible chiefs of government, this Government has endeavored to make clear that what it envisages is a comprehensive program calling for the application uniformly to the entire Pacific area of liberal and progressive principles. From what the Japanese Government has so far indicated in regard to its purposes this Government derives the impression that the Japanese Government has in mind a program which would be circumscribed by the imposition of qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those principles.

“If this impression is correct, can the Japanese Government feel that a meeting between the responsible heads of government under such circumstances would be likely to contribute to the advancement of the high purposes which we have mutually had in mind?

“As already stated, this Government welcomed the assurances contained in the statement of the Japanese Government which accompanied the Japanese Prime Minister's message to the President of the United States that the Japanese Government subscribed to the principles which have long been advocated by this Government as the only sound basis for stable international relations. This Government believes that renewed consideration of these fun-

damental principles may be helpful in our effort to seek a meeting of minds in regard to the essential questions on which we seek agreement and thus lay a firm foundation for a meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments. The subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought have engaged, and continue to engage, the close and active interest of the President of the United States, and it is the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions may be so developed that such a meeting can be held. It is also the President's hope that the Japanese Government shares the conviction of this Government that, if the Governments of Japan and of the United States are resolved to give those principles practical and comprehensive application, the two Governments can work out a fundamental rehabilitation of the relations between the United States and Japan and contribute to the bringing about of a lasting peace with justice, equity and order in the whole Pacific area.

Item 11.

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Governments of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries

need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

Item 13.

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.

"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement—and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement—between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already there.

"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government.

"Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for

the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government."

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